(English abstract further below.) -/- Wer denkt, Polyamorie erfordere ein geringeres Maß an Verpflichtung als Zweierbeziehungen, der liegt gründlich daneben. Wie aber gestaltet sich polyamoröse wechselseitige Verpflichtung idealerweise? In diesem Beitrag untersuche ich, ob sich ein bestimmtes, auf Iris Murdochs Konzeption von Liebe als gerechter Aufmerksamkeit beruhendes Ideal wechselseitiger Verpflichtung in romantischen Partnerschaften fruchtbar auf polyamoröse Beziehungsgeflechte anwenden lässt. Ich beginne damit, Murdochs im deutschsprachigen Raum kaum rezipierte Liebeskonzeption ausführlich darzustellen und diese dabei von Simone Weils Position abzugrenzen, der Murdoch (...) wesentliche Elemente entnimmt. In einem zweiten Schritt skizziere ich das von Murdochs Position inspirierte Ideal wechselseitiger Verpflichtung. In Auseinandersetzung mit Überlegungen, die John Enman-Beech und Julienne Obadia mit Blick auf die in polyamorösen Beziehungsgeflechten verbreitete Praxis angestellt haben, Beziehungsvereinbarungen einzugehen, werbe ich drittens für die skizzierte Idealkonzeption, indem ich zeige, dass sich mit ihr den von Enman-Beech und Obadia aufgeworfenen Herausforderungen, die sich im Zuge intrapolykularer Beziehungsvereinbarungen stellen, in zwei Hinsichten mit Erfolg begegnen lässt. Erstens hebe ich hervor, dass eine am skizzierten Ideal orientierte Praxis bereits die Art von prozeduralen Normen implementiert, auf deren Bedeutung Enman-Beech zu Recht hinweist. Zweitens argumentiere ich dafür, dass das skizzierte Ideal nicht den Schwierigkeiten ausgesetzt ist, die sich nach Obadia mit denjenigen Elementen intrapolykularer Beziehungsvereinbarungen verbinden, die sie als Vertragskomplex bezeichnet, und ein weniger pessimistisches Bild davon nahelegt, wie vermittelst solcher Beziehungsvereinbarungen konstituierte Individuen aufzufassen sind. -/- ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this paper, I focus on a certain ideal conception of how lovers may commit to each other in polyamorous relationships. Drawing on an analysis of Iris Murdoch’s adaptation of Simone Weil’s ideas, I sketch what I have elsewhere called the ideal lovers’ pledge—a conception of a commitment between lovers that is spelled out in terms of Weil’s and Murdoch’s shared notion of love as just attention. I then argue that this conception is well-suited to meet certain challenges that arise in the context of thinking about relationship agreements in polyamorous relationships, challenges that have been brought out in recent work by John Enman-Beech and Julienne Obadia. First, I show that practices of forging relationship agreements in polyamorous relationships that are oriented toward the ideal I propose will naturally implement the kind of procedural norms that Enman-Beech rightly highlights. Second, I argue that the ideal I propose does not generate the kinds of problems that according to Obadia arise due to a constellation of assumptions that she thinks underlie the practice of forging relationship agreements in polyamorous relationships – a constellation she dubs the contract complex. The proposed ideal thus suggests an alternative under-standing of such agreements and implies a less pessimistic account of what kind of individuals are constituted by way of forging such agreements. (shrink)

In some cultures, people tend to believe that it is very important to be sexually exclusive in romantic relationships and idealise monogamous romantic relationships; but there is a tension in this ideal. Sex is generally considered to have value, and usually when we love someone we want to increase the amount of value in their lives, not restrict it without good reason. There is thus a call, not yet adequately responded to by philosophers, for greater clarity in the reasons §why (...) it might be reasonable for a couple to adopt a policy of sexual exclusivity. This article argues that we cannot justify the demand for sexual exclusivity by a need to protect the relationship from the risk of one partner ‘trading-up’, or by appealing to jealousy. However, sexual exclusivity can be intelligible if it supports the romantic relationship and helps to distinguish it from other relationships. Nonetheless, sexual exclusivity ought not to be the hegemonic social norm that it currently is in some societies because this diminishes the potential value it might have and gives the idea of faithfulness the wrong focus. (shrink)

hese are replies to my critics at at Society for German Idealism and Romanticism (SGIR) Author-Meets-Critics session, Pacific APA 2021. -/- Published version of the full symposium is available on SGIR Review's homepage.

Christopher Bennett has argued that state support of conjugal relationships can be founded on the unique contribution such relationships make to the autonomy of their participants by providing them with various forms of recognition and support unavailable elsewhere. I argue that, in part because a long history of interaction between two people who need each other’s validation tends to produce less meaningful responses over time, long-term conjugal relationships are unlikely to provide autonomy-enhancing support to their participants. To the extent that (...) intimate relationships can provide a unique form of reciprocal support, Bennett fails to show that couples have an advantage over multiple-partner arrangements in doing so. (shrink)