This article begins the task of assessing polygamy as a moral ideal. The structure of traditional polygamy, in which only one central spouse may marry multiple partners, necessarily yields two inequalities. The central spouse has greater rights and expectations within each marriage and greater control over the wider family. However, two alternative structures for polygamy can remove these inequalities. In polyfidelity, each spouse marries every other spouse in the family. In “molecular” polygamy, any spouses may marry (...) a new spouse outside the family. These new models of polygamy face additional difficulties, but they can be egalitarian in principle. (shrink)

In “Confucianism and Same-Sex Marriage,” published recently in Politics and Religion, Professor Tongdong Bai argues for a “moderate Confucian position on same-sex marriage,” one that supports its legalization and yet endeavors “to use public opinion and social and political policies to encourage heterosexual marriages, and to prevent same-sex marriages from becoming the majority form of marriages” (Bai 2021:146). Against the backdrop of downright homophobia prevalent among vocal Confucians in mainland China today, Bai claims that his pro-legalization rendition “show[s] a different (...) version of Confucianism that challenges the received perception of Confucianism that it is deeply conservative, a perception that often lies at the core of the rejection of its contemporary relevance, especially by the so-called ‘liberals’ in China and elsewhere” (Bai 2021:133). Furthermore, Bai claims that his moderate Confucianism is normatively preferrable to “the typical liberal or individualist position” of a marriage equality supporter, because the specter of polygamy – the conservative trope of invoking polygamy as a reductio ad absurdum against same-sex marriage – imposes “a serious challenge” to liberals but not to moderate Confucians (Bai 2021:146, 153). -/- Both of Bai’s claims falter upon scrutiny, however. Granted, it is applaudable that Bai tries to dissuade his more conservative Confucian colleagues from opposing the legalization of same-sex marriage. But as Section 1 of this Response will show, the alternative rendition of Confucianism he presents, along with the way he presents it, is premised on a highly contested conception of what shared Confucian values are; does injustice to Confucians who embrace marriage equality more unreservedly (i.e., without caveats à la Bai); fails to produce new arguments that “enrich the theoretical basis for same-sex marriage” (Bai 2021:133); and, ironically, reinforces – rather than “challenges” – the “received perception” of Confucianism as deeply conservative. Meanwhile, Section 2 will show that Bai’s comparison between liberalism and moderate Confucianism relies both upon an apparent unfamiliarity with the extensive and nuanced liberal discussions on polygamy, and upon fallacious methods of assessing comparative normative valence. -/- Finally, Section 3 will offer some concluding thoughts from the perspective of decolonial theory, examining the dynamic of spectacularized postcoloniality that propels the production and consumption of dubious theoretical projects like Bai’s. As it turns out, this case serves not only as a cautionary tale of how not to conduct comparative normative theorizing, but also as a cautionary tale of how not to let the spectacle of postcoloniality derail the pursuit of academic decolonization. (shrink)

The Progressive favors extending the legal institution of marriage so as to include same-sex unions along with heterosexual ones. The Traditionalist opposes such an extension, preferring to retain the legal institution of marriage in its present form. I argue that the Progressive ought to broaden her position, endorsing instead the Liberal case for extending the current institution so as to include polygamous unions as well—for any consideration favoring Progressivism over Traditionalism likewise favors Liberalism over Progressivism. Progressives inclined to resist Liberalism (...) are invited to consider an alternative position: the Libertarian stance that favors instead the ‘disestablishment’ of marriage. (shrink)

The notion of equality attracts both proponents and critics of nonmonogamy. Inequality is a widely discussed objection to nonmonogamy. Simultaneously, equality is highlighted as a core value in ethical nonmonogamy. The notions of equality and inequality in these debates have not been clearly conceptualized. In order to propose a conception of egalitarian nonmonogamy, it is important to first understand possible inequalities within it. This paper establishes a clearer and in-depth understanding of inequalities in nonmonogamy by categorizing inequalities in traditional (...) class='Hi'>polygamy into different kinds. I argue that these inequalities are generally unjust. Although these inequalities are common in traditional polygamy, the objection that polygamy—as a type of marriage—is inherently unequal and unjust is not a convincing argument. By contrast, not all kinds of equality—such as equal love or equal number of partners—are morally significant. I conclude this paper by providing some groundwork for future research on egalitarian nonmonogamy. (shrink)

Opponents of same-sex marriage suggest that legalizing same-sex marriage will start a slide down the "slippery-slope" leading to the legalization of all kinds of salacious family arrangements including polygamy. In this paper, I argue that because previous attempts by liberal political theorists to combat such slippery-slope arguments have been unsuccessful, there are two options left open to political liberals. Either one could embrace polygamy as a logically consistent implication of extending civil liberties to same-sex couples or one could (...) find a new strategy for blocking the slide down the slope. I take the second option arguing that we ought to devise a harm principle for domestic partnerships. Once this principle has been established, it becomes clear that the risk of exploitation for those potentially occupying the multiple side of the marriage is sufficient reason to reject polygamous marriage arrangements. I conclude that, contrary to appearances, holding both (a) same-sex marriage is permissible and (b) polygamous marriage is impermissible is at the same time consistent and consistently liberal. (shrink)

This second part of a two-part series exploring implications of the natural differences between the sexes for the cultural evolution of marriage considers how the institution of marriage might evolve, if Kant’s reasons for defending monogamy are extended and applied to a future culture. After summarizing the philosophical framework for making cross-cultural ethical assessments that was introduced in Part I and then explaining Kant’s portrayal of marriage as an antidote to the objectifying tendencies of sex, I summarize Kant’s reasons for (...) rejecting polygamy and for viewing monogamy as the only ethically acceptable form of marriage. Finally, I argue that if we apply Kantian principles to the real situation of marriage in many modern cultures, and if we wish to maintain a legitimate place for marriage in the future evolution of human culture, then the future evolution of marriage laws must recognize polyfidelity (i.e., plural marriages for both men and women) as being just as legitimate as monogamy. (shrink)

Citizenship and marriage are legal statuses that generate numerous privileges and responsibilities. Legal doctrine and argument have analogized these statuses in passing: consider, for example, Ted Olson’s statement in the Hollingsworth v. Perry oral argument that denying the label “marriage” to gay unions “is like you were to say you can vote, you can travel, but you may not be a citizen.” However, the parallel between citizenship and marriage has rarely been investigated in depth. This paper investigates the marriage-citizenship parallel (...) with a particular focus on three questions prompted by recent developments in law and policy: -/- 1) Should we provide second-best statuses? Some couples — in particular gay and lesbian couples — have been offered permanent statuses, like civil unions, that bear legal privileges but fall short of full marriage equality. In contrast, similar differentiations within citizenship are generally resisted. The history of citizenship may presage the increasing unacceptability of differentiations within status in the gay marriage context. Meanwhile, the history of marriage equality efforts may help present-day citizenship advocates choose legal strategies. -/- 2) Should statuses be a gateway to rights? Some early gay rights advocates unsuccessfully argued that advocates should challenge the primacy of marriage, rather than seek access to the institution. Advocates attempting to expand the rights of current noncitizens face similar choices: should they seek to give current noncitizens greater access to citizenship, or challenge the reservation of important rights to citizens? -/- 3) Can status relationships be plural? Many critics of dual and multiple citizenship argued that allegiance to multiple states was immoral, unadministrable, or both. More recently, polygamous marriage has become a topic of legal and political discourse, first as a foil in anti-gay marriage arguments and later as a political possibility in its own right. I consider whether polygamous marriage advocates can profitably draw on arguments for multiple citizenship, and how multiple-citizenship advocates should responsibly respond to the analogy with polygamy. (shrink)

The question of studying the metamorphosis of Europeans’ perception of the Islam is a topical issue now, because it helps to better understand the religious processes in modern Europe. Reconstructing the image of Islam in the ideas of the Christian peoples of the medieval Europe is the purpose of the study. To achieve this aim, I have used such methods as historical method, logical method, analysis, and hermeneutics. The research discusses the ideas of such authors as W.M. Watt, A.K.S Lambton, (...) W. B. Hallaq, I. P. Dobaev, P. Veimar and others. I have identified four components of the medieval image of Islam in Europe. Firstly, it is the idea of alienation of Islam and Muslims for European countries. I have showed that this idea was a result of two facts: (1) Muslim-Christian wars of this period; (2) absence of assimilation processes of Muslim population in European countries. The second component is the thought that Europeans can learn Muslim ideas and technologies. During the middle ages Europeans borrowed from Muslims a lot of important knowledge, ideas and techniques, as well as Muslims from Europeans. I argue that the idea, that Muslim religion is something incompatible with Christianity, is the third component of the image of Islam by Christian Europeans of the Middle Ages. In particular, Thomas Aquinas rejects the idea that Muslims, Jews and Christians have a common Scripture. According to him, Muhammad’s religion did not have worthy confirmation of the truth of the teachings. Thomas Aquinas interpreted the fact that great masses of people believed in Islam by suggestion that Islam appeals to the carnal desires of people, offering polygamy and the idea of physical pleasures in the paradise. Also, Thomas points out that Islam is a religion of sword and violence. Also, I have argued that a fear of large masses of Muslim population and their military successes was the fourth component in the image of Muslims by Europeans in the Middle Ages. (shrink)

In order for the process of hominization to continue, with its prolonged and extreme period of juvenile defencelessness, it was necessary, or at least convenient, for males to more actively participate in the care of females and offspring. This necessity, together with the abrupt loss of hominid sexual dimorphism starting with Homo ergaster (more than 1.5 million years ago) suggests to the authors that our ancestor’s sexuality might have evolved around the same time from an earlier state of polygamy (...) to monogamy. Taking into consideration our meagre dimorphism, small relative testicular size, and interest for living in partnerships, monogamy may still persist in modern Homo sapiens. This theory would allow for new perspectives regarding the complex suite of enigmatic emotions have plagued modern humans since our beginnings. (shrink)

Controversially, psychologist and public intellectual Jordan Peterson advises “enforced monogamy” for societies with high percentages of “incels.” As Peterson’s proposal resonates in manosphere circles, this chapter reconstructs and briefly evaluates the argument for it. Premised on the moral importance of civilizational sustainability, advocates argue that both polygamous and socially monogamous but sexually liberal mating patterns result in unsustainable proportions of unattached young men. Given the premises, monogamous societies are probably justified in maintaining their anti-polygamist social and legal norms. The case (...) for imposing stricter sexual norms on socially monogamous but sexually liberal societies is weaker, however, as male involuntary celibacy in those places isn’t as directly caused by male intrasexual competition, and since less intrusive social interventions are more likely to ameliorate “the incel problem.”. (shrink)