There is a widespread, popular view—and one I basically endorse—that Nietzsche is, in one sense of the word, a nihilist. As Arthur Danto put it some time ago, according to Nietzsche, “there is nothing in [the world] which might sensibly be supposed to have value.” As interpreters of Nietzsche, though, we cannot simply stop here. Nietzsche's higher men, Übermenschen, “genuine philosophers”, free spirits—the types Nietzsche wants to bring forth from the human, all-too-human herds he sees around him with the fish (...) hooks, as he says, of his books—seem to engage in what looks like valuing. These free spirits are supposed to revalue the old values—revaluing, as is clear from the texts, is not simply to remove the old values from circulation (Nietzsche uses “umwerten” and not “entwerten”)—and they are supposed to create new values. And, of course, Nietzsche himself, free spirit that he is, takes on the task of revaluing all values and seems to assert many a strident evaluation. So we need to say more here. What are Nietzsche and his free spirits up to when they engage in what looks, for all the world, like a practice of valuing? What is the practice of valuing Nietzsche is recommending for his free spirits? I argue for two claims: (i) First, we end up facing an interpretive puzzle when we attempt to explain how Nietzsche's free spirits are supposed to engage in a practice of valuing. (ii) Second, we can solve the interpretive puzzle by taking Nietzsche's free spirits to be engaged in a fictionalist simulacrum of valuing. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s favourable comments about science and the senses have recently been taken as evidence of naturalism. Others focus on his falsification thesis: our beliefs are falsifying interpretations of reality. Clark argues that Nietzsche eventually rejects this thesis. This article utilizes the multiple ways of being science friendly in Nietzsche’s context by focussing on Mach’s neutral monism. Mach’s positivism is a natural development of neo-Kantian positions Nietzsche was reacting to. Section 15 of Beyond Good and Evil is crucial to Clark’s interpretation. (...) The presented interpretation makes better sense of this passage and shows that Nietzsche can accept both falsification and empiricism. (shrink)

Requirements of rationality, like the following, have recently been the focus of much discussion: (1) Rationality requires of S that, if S intends that e and believes that e will not be so unless S intends that m, then S intends that m. (2) Rationality requires of S that S not both believe p and believe not-p.1 How many requirements there are and how precisely to state them is a matter of controversy, but I will focus on a different kind (...) of controversy, namely, how to conceive of such requirements in general.2 I will start by sketching a picture of their general nature and role that I find compelling and attractive. My picture is not, however, consistent with many of the recent approaches to rational requirements in the literature. 3 As I will try to show, the arguments that are often made about rational requirements assume, mostly implicitly, that my picture is flawed. These arguments do not, however, or so I will claim, actually give us reason to reject my picture of rational requirements. Indeed, many of the puzzles about rational requirements taken up by others turn out not to really be puzzles once we realize that this alternative picture.. (shrink)

Fictionalism has recently returned as a standard response to ontologically problematic domains. This article assesses moral fictionalism. It argues (i) that a correct understanding of the dialectical situation in contemporary metaethics shows that fictionalism is only an interesting new alternative if it can provide a new account of normative content: what is it that I am thinking or saying when I think or say that I ought to do something; and (ii) that fictionalism, qua fictionalism, does not provide us with (...) any new resources for providing such an account. (shrink)

This article discusses how a wide range of apparently conflicting metaethical theories have been ascribed to Nietzsche. It reviews the major kinds of contemporary metaethical theories and the initial textual evidence for ascribing some version of each kind to Nietzsche. It then considers the objections to such ascriptions as well as arguments in favor of claims of the relative plausibility of ascribing one metaethical interpretation to Nietzsche over another. The article concludes with a serious consideration of the view that perhaps (...) Nietzsche simply does not have a considered metaethical stance. (shrink)

We can distinguish between ambitious metanormative constructivism and a variety of other constructivist projects in ethics and metaethics. Ambitious metanormative constructivism is the project of either developing a type of new metanormative theory, worthy of the label “constructivism”, that is distinct from the existing types of metaethical, or metanormative, theories already on the table—various realisms, non-cognitivisms, error-theories and so on—or showing that the questions that lead to these existing types of theories are somehow fundamentally confused. Natural ways of pursuing the (...) project of ambitious metanormative constructivism lead to certain obvious, and related, worries about whether the ambitions are really being achieved—that is whether we really are being given a distinctive theory. I will argue that responding to these initial worries pushes ambitious metanormative constructivism towards adopting a kind of position that I will call “constructivism all the way down”. Such a position does see off most of the above initial worries. Drawing on the work of Ralph Walker and Crispin Wright, I argue, however, that it faces a distinct objection that is a descendent of Bertrand Russell’s Bishop Stubbs objection against coherentist theories of truth. I grant that the constructivist need not be a coherentist about truth. I argue, however, that despite this the constructivist cannot escape my version of the objection. I also distinguish between this objection and various traditional charges of circularity, regress, relativism, or psychologistic reductionism. (shrink)

Though Nietzsche traditionally often used to be interpreted as a nihilist, a range of possible metaethical interpretations, including varieties of realism, subjectivism and fictionalism, have emerged in the secondary literature. Recently the possibility that Nietzsche is a non-cognitivist has been broached. If one sees Hume as a central non-cognitivist figure, as recent non-cognitivists such as Simon Blackburn have, then the similarities between Nietzsche and Hume can make this reading seem plausible. This paper assesses the general plausibility of interpreting Nietzsche as (...) a non-cognitivist. Non-cognitivism can mean various things and so some attempt is made to lay out the various kinds of non-cognitivism one might ascribe to Nietzsche. As part of the overall assessment of the plausibility of a non-cognitivist Nietzsche, the paper considers in detail the arguments of Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick on behalf of a non-cognitivist reading. It argues, however, that there is insufficient evidence to justify the interpretation and that the analogy to Hume is unhelpful. (shrink)

In THE GENEALOGY OF MORALITY Nietzsche assess the value of the value judgments of morality from the perspective of human flourishing. His positive descriptions of the “higher men” he hopes for and the negative descriptions of the decadent humans he thinks morality unfortunately supports both point to a particular substantive conception of what such flourishing comes to. The Genealogy, however, presents us with a puzzle: why does Nietzsche’s own evaluative standard not receive a genealogical critique? The answer to this puzzle, (...) I argue, lies in recognizing the centrality of the notion of “life”, and its connection to power, in Nietzsche’s overall account. Leiter has argued that his “Millian Model” provides the most charitable reconstruction of appeals to a privileged evaluative standard of power; this model ascribes an inference from a strong doctrine of the will to power according to which only power can be desired. I propose a “Benthamite Model” that ascribes an inference from the inescapability of a tendency towards power, a tendency that is essential to life. I argue that this model avoids the objections Leiter directs at the Millian Model. (shrink)

The maturing of metaethics has been accompanied by widespread, but relatively unarticulated, discontent that mainstream metaethics is fundamentally on the wrong track. The malcontents we have in mind do not simply champion a competitor to the likes of noncognitivism or realism; they disapprove of the supposed presuppositions of the existing debate. Their aim is not to generate a new theory within metaethics, but to go beyond metaethics and to transcend the distinctions it draws between metaethics and normative ethics and between (...) cognitivism and non-cognitivism. In our experience, the differences with traditional metaethics go deep enough that it can feel as if two different paradigms are talking past each other. We attempt to bring clarity and focus to this rather inchoate debate by simultaneously articulating the general issues involved and engaging in a detailed case study of one of the prominent representatives of this discontent, Christine Korsgaard. We argue that Korsgaard fails to go beyond metaethics–indeed, fails even to provide a theory within metaethics. Our strategy for showing this is to argue that her claims are compatible with both cognitivism and non-cognitivism. We have argued elsewhere that her distinctive claims are compatible with realism. Here we focus on the crucial role that claims about agency and the will seem to play her in work and, according to our interpretation, in her attempts to go beyond mainstream metaethics. We show in detail that these claims are actually compatible with non-cognitivism. Though our discussion often focuses on her work in particular, it has clear implications for other attempts to obviate the debates of traditional metaethics. (shrink)

Bernard Reginster, in his book The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism, takes up the challenge of figuring out what Nietzsche might mean by nihilism and the revaluation of values. He argues that there is an alternative, normative subjectivist interpretation of Nietzsche's views on nihilism and revaluation that makes as much sense as—indeed, he often clearly leans toward thinking that it makes more sense than—a fictionalist reading of Nietzsche. I argue that his arguments do not succeed. Once we have (...) looked carefully at the details of the positions and the arguments ascribed to Nietzsche, the fictionalist option is the more charitable interpretation of the texts. I focus on the metaethical issues that play a central role for Reginster in his articulation of Nietzsche's nihilism and Nietzsche's strategy for overcoming nihilism. (shrink)

(Version 2.4) I have argued elsewhere for ascribing an error theory about all normative and evaluative judgements to Nietzsche. Such a nihilism brings with it a puzzle: how could we—or at least the select few of us being addressed by Nietzsche—continue in the face of this nihilism? This is a philosophical puzzle and so, defeasibly, an interpretive puzzle. If there is no theory it would make sense for Nietzsche to have about how the select few could go on, then this (...) is some evidence against the proposed interpretation of him as a nihilist. I defended the interpretation by arguing that Nietzsche’s declarations about creating values point to a practice of generating honest evaluative illusions. Such honest evaluative illusions are tricky things, though, and, precisely because they are honest, one might worry that they lack the motivational power of genuine evaluative belief. Can they truly play the role that evaluative beliefs play in our psychological economies? I suspect that Nietzsche does not want the honest illusions to play exactly the role that evaluative beliefs played. The cheerfulness, the playfulness, the lightness that Nietzsche hopes for are, I have suggested, a function of the shift from belief to pretence, from illusion to honest illusion. The question, nonetheless, is whether the resulting picture is too light. Can I go through life merely acting, as a critic might put it? My suggestion in this essay will be that the thought of eternal recurrence is meant to add weight to the lightness of acting—“acting”, obviously, in both the here relevant senses of the word. (shrink)

Given the ascribed antinaturalist theory of judgment, Green’s Nietzsche cannot stop with the error theory. “Kant and Spir argue that the only way an objectively valid judgment about an object is possible is if the qualities attributed to the object are unconditionally united in the mind, that is, united in an atemporal and necessary manner”. Thoughts, and the subjects that have them, must be timeless. There must also be a “necessary connection between thought and its object”. Reality, on the other (...) hand, isn’t timeless: there is change, or becoming—this is Nietzsche’s naturalism. Thus, the connection between thoughts and reality fails, there is no timeless subject to have thoughts, and so: “We do not think”. It follows that there are no thoughts to be false—no error theory—and naturalism itself “cannot be thought”. Green calls this Nietzsche’s “noncognitivism” and concludes that the contradictions between Nietzsche’s naturalism, error theory, and noncognitivism mean that he “did not have one considered epistemological position” —a rather mild way of putting it. (shrink)

Contribution to a book symposium on David Velleman's THE POSSIBILITY OF PRACTICAL REASON. In this book, Velleman argues that agency is compatible with a causal conception of the world, since the role of the agent can be played in this conception by an aim of self-knowledge instantiated in the mechanisms governing mental states. This article argues (i) that he must show what at the causal level plays the role of the agent's awareness of the normative guise of reasons and (ii) (...) that any attempt to provide the needed metaethical account of the normative property of being a reason will either be implausible or require serious changes in his "story of motivation". (shrink)

Contemporary Kantianism is often regarded as both a position within normative ethics and as an alternative to metaethical moral realism. We argue that it is not clear how contemporary Kantianism can distinguish itself from moral realism. There are many Kantian positions. For reasons of space we focus on the position of one of the most prominent, contemporary Kantians, Christine Korsgaard. Our claim is that she fails to show either that Kantianism is different or that it is better than realism. Our (...) strategy is to argue that what are supposed to be claims that conflict with realism in fact do not. (shrink)

This paper surveys contemporary accounts of error theory and fictionalism. It introduces these categories to those new to metaethics by beginning with moral nihilism, the view that nothing really is right or wrong. One main motivation is that the scientific worldview seems to have no place for rightness or wrongness. Within contemporary metaethics there is a family of theories that makes similar claims. These are the theories that are usually classified as forms of error theory or fictionalism though there are (...) different ways of accepting some form of the view that nothing is really write or wrong. A range of different ways of going in the light of such a realization is also proposed. The resulting taxonomy of positions is quite complicated and sometimes surprising. One surprise will be that some positions plausibly classified as error theories or forms of fictionalism do not quite seem to be forms of nihilism. (shrink)

Background: There is no doubt that strawberry diseases are one of the most important reasons that led to the destruction of strawberry plants and their crops. This leads to obvious damage to these plants and they become inedible. Discovering these diseases after a good step for proper and correct treatment. Determining the treatment with high accuracy depends on the method used in the diagnosis. Correctly, expert systems can greatly help in avoiding damage to these plants. The expert system correctly diagnoses (...) strawberry disease to make it easier for farmers to find the right treatment based on the appropriate diagnosis. Objectives: The main goal of this expert system is to get the appropriate diagnosis of disease and the correct treatment. Methods: In this paper the design of the proposed Expert System which was produced to help Farmers and students interested in agriculture strawberry in diagnosing many of the strawberry diseases such as: Leaf Spots, Grey Mold, Red Stele/Red Core, Wilt, Powdery Mildew, Alternaria Spot, Black Root Rot, Anthracnose (black spot), and Angular Leaf Spot. The proposed expert system presents an overview about strawberry diseases are given, the cause of diseases are outlined and the treatment of disease whenever possible is given out. CLIPS language was used for designing and implementing the proposed expert system. Results: The proposed strawberry diseases diagnosis expert system was evaluated by Farmers and they were satisfied with its performance. Conclusions: The Proposed expert system is very useful for Farmers with strawberry problem and students interested in agriculture strawberry. (shrink)

There is no doubt that tomato diseases are one of the important reasons that destroy the tomato plant and its crops. This leads to clear damage to these plants and they become inedible. Discovering these diseases after a good step for proper and correct treatment. Determining the treatment with high accuracy depends on the method used in the diagnosis. Correctly, expert systems can greatly help to avoid damage to these plants. The expert system diagnoses tomato disease correctly to facilitate farmers (...) to find the correct treatment based on the appropriate diagnosis. Objectives: An expert system has been established based on CLIPS to diagnose tomato plant disease. (shrink)

Background: Mint is a grassy, perennial plant, belonging to the oral platoon, fast growing and spreading, its leaves are green in color, fragrant, tart, refreshing, square-shaped leg, bifurcated, erect, ranging in height from (10 - 201 cm). Home to Europe and Asia. The mint plant has many benefits, the most important of which are pain relief, treatment of gallbladder disorders, the expulsion of gases, anti-inflammatory, and relaxing nerves. While the mint plant is the ideal option for the start of gardens, (...) it is prone to some common diseases that affect the plant's growth. Objectives: The main goal of this expert system is to get the appropriate diagnosis of disease and the correct treatment. Methods: In this paper, the design of the proposed Expert System was produced to help Farmers and those interested in agriculture in diagnosing many of the Mint diseases such as Mint rust, Verticillium wilt, Anthracnose, Powdery mildew, Black Stem Rot, Stem and stolon canker, Septoria leaf spot. The proposed expert system presents an overview of mint diseases are given, the cause of diseases outlined and the treatment of disease whenever possible is given out. CLIPS Expert System language was used for designing and implementing the proposed expert system. Results: The proposed Mint diseases diagnosis expert system was evaluated by Agricultural Students at AL Azhar University and some friends interested in agriculture and they were satisfied with its performance. Conclusions: The proposed expert system is very useful for Farmers and those interested in agriculture. (shrink)

Background: Obstetrics and gynaecology are many and common, where a woman suffers from problems related to pregnancy or her reproductive organs. Any part of her body may be affected due to some symptoms that are completely related to the reproductive organs when she is in a critical period for her, whether in her menstrual cycle, pregnancy, or disease conditions. The bulk of cases of diseases related to women and childbirth are dealt with great care and special care, as all diseases (...) related to women are considered very sensitive diseases due to the presence of the disease in sensitive and not simple places. A gynaecologist is a specialist in all diseases and problems related to the female sexual organs. They perform regular preventive medical exams, such as cervical smear tests and breast exams. It also provides consultations for women of all ages about the problems of contraception, infertility and menopause. Objectives: The objective of this expert system is to help and facilitate women in diagnosing diseases related to their obstetrics and gynaecology, a simple expert system has been designed consisting of ten various common diseases that affect women whether During or without pregnancy, Methods: In this system, the system consists of a list of some common symptoms, the correct diagnosis adopted for these diseases, and how to treat diseases in the correct way with the help of a consultant obstetrician and gynaecologist, Dr. Fathi Muhammad Al-Habibi, and these diseases are: uterine cancer, cervical cancer, Infertility, double uterus, ectopic pregnancy, endometrial cancer, female sexual dysfunction, endometriosis, faecal incontinence, female infertility, CLIPS Expert System language was used to design and implement the proposed expert system. Results: The proposed ten obstetrics and gynaecology diagnostic expert system was evaluated by medical students and they were satisfied with its performance. Conclusions: The proposed expert system is very useful for obstetricians and gynaecologists, patients with reproductive system problems, and recent graduates. (shrink)

Dear Colleagues, -/- In this editorial, we would like to share with you important developments in the European Journal of Therapeutics (Eur J Ther). -/- First of all, as the editorial team, we would like you to know that we hold frequent meetings to benefit our esteemed colleagues and continue to work with great devotion in line with our goal of taking the journal further. We have previously shared with you that we have applied to many indexes. It is with (...) great pleasure that we would like to inform you that in the last few months, more of our index applications have been approved. -/- Index Copernicus, as a result of this application, the ICV 2022 value of our journal was determined to be 100 (approved 2023-10-31) [1] BASE (Bielefeld Academic Search Engine) (approved 2023-11-30) [2] Sherpa Romeo (approved 2023-09-27) [3] MIAR (approved 2023-10-16) [4] -/- All indexes in our journal are currently included on the journal web page [5]. -/- As the editorial team, we would like to inform you that we have determined a policy on this issue for our journal [6], taking into account the recommendations of important international ethics committees such as the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) [7] and the World Association of Medical Editors (WAME) [8], which have recently become a trendy topic of discussion about AI chatbots and academic studies prepared with the support of such tools. -/- As you know, when our journal was founded in 1990 [9], it was published in two yearly issues. It is an essential responsibility for us to carry our journal, which continued its publication life with three issues a year in 2009 [10] and four issues a year in 2014 [11]. With your valuable support, we would like to announce that we will increase our journal to 6 issues a year as of 2024 (February, April, June, August, October and December) with the rapidly growing progress of our journal. -/- Unfortunately, we cannot share the names of the referees who made significant contributions to our journal in 2023 due to the changes in the article submission interface during the year and the inaccessibility of some data in the previous interface. However, we would like to emphasize again that we are grateful to all of them for their valuable contributions. Moreover, to expand our journal's referee list, we would like to remind you that competent academics who volunteer in this regard can fill out the “Become a Reviewer for the European Journal of Therapeutics” form [12]. -/- Finally, we would like to point out that we have strengthened our editorial team with an academician competent in dentistry, Fatih Sari, DDS, PhD. -/- Fatih Sari, DDS, PhD, is a new Editorial Board Member of the Eur J Ther. Dr. Sari is an Associate Professor in the Department of Prosthodontics at the Gaziantep University Faculty of Dentistry. He is a Vice Dean of the Faculty of Dentistry and Head of Clinical Departments. Dr. Sari is a prosthodontist and a member of the Turkish Dental Association. He has experience in implant-supported fixed prostheses, Cad/Cam applications and dental materials. -/- We look forward to being able to offer you a large number of high-quality and valuable articles over the coming year. In addition, we would like to thank the readers, authors and reviewers of the Eur J Ther for their continuous support. -/- Sincerely yours,. (shrink)

The translations of Holy Scripture to the local European languages in the beginning of Reformation were usually based on Latin Bible. It's language was vastly different from the dialects used by the Old Testament prophets and Christ. By raising the question of the contents of their teachings in A Theologico-Political Treatise, Spinoza underlined the necessity of basing the translations on the sources most approximate to the Hebrew versions of the parables and teachings, initially passed by oral speech only. According to (...) him, the knowledge of the Hebrew language and the traditions of the nation of Israel allowed to distinguish the essence of religion (the contents of the faith) from the tools of providing credibility to the prophecies and from means serving the consolidation of these contents (the religious cult). Up to that point, Jews and Christians alike treated the biblical message as a "sacred" script, not as a record of moral guidelines passed with a simple, common language acommodated to the sensibility of the archaic fishermen, hunters, farmers and merchants. In A Theologico-Political Treatise, Spinoza employed his own method of deciphering the chosen fragments of the Hebrew Bible, sharing the philological and historical knowledge he found useful in bringing out the universal moral guidelines, comprehensible to the "pure mind" and comprising the very meaning of faith. (shrink)

God, free will, and time: the free will offense part II Content Type Journal Article Category Article Pages 1-10 DOI 10.1007/s11153-011-9328-z Authors J. L. Schellenberg, Mount Saint Vincent University, 166 Bedford Highway, Halifax, NS B3M2J6, Canada Journal International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Online ISSN 1572-8684 Print ISSN 0020-7047.

Stein’s theory of empathy lies at the intersection of the phenomenological findings of E. Husserl and M. Scheler. By presenting the issue of “empathy” in a broader framework, including intentionality, the originality of experience, the issue of personality and the individual identity, as well as the so-called world of values, namely the culture, I argue for a dynamic, process-oriented concept of dealing with feelings, namely diapathy. -/- Koncepcja Edyty Stein rozumienia drugiego człowieka jest znana z jej dysertacji O zagadnieniu wczucia. (...) Niemniej, gruntowne przebadanie struktury osobowości ludzkiej, jakie podjęła w Filozofii psychologii i humanistyki, rzuca nowe światło na tę kwestię. Stein dokonuje swoistej syntezy Husserlowskiego prymatu prawdy i Schelerowskiej koncepcji miłości, unikając przy tym idealizmu i woluntaryzmu, którym obarczone są te stanowiska. Steinowska koncepcja znajduje kontynuację w fenomenologii M. Merleau-Ponty’ego i R. Barbarasa. (shrink)

Cambridge’deki büyük akademik cemaatin sakinleri olan bizler bir araya geldik ve hoşgörü ve onun egemen politik iklim içerisindeki yeri hakkında dostça ama ateşli bir tartışma yürüttük. Okuyucu, bizim nerelerde aynı düşüncede olmadığımızı bulmakta hiçbir zorluk çekmeyecektir. Diğer taraftan, farklı başlangıç noktalarından ve farklı yollardan hareketle yaklaşık olarak aynı yere ulaştık. Her birimiz için, egemen hoşgörü kuramı ve pratiğinin, incelendiği takdirde, korkunç politik gerçekleri gizlemeye yarayan bir maske olduğu ortaya çıktı. Kızgınlığın tonu makaleden makaleye keskin bir şekilde artmakta; belki de boş (...) yere, okuyucuların bu noktaya getiren akıl yürütmeyi takip edeceklerini umuyoruz. Nihayetinde bu kızgınlık hem kafa hem de kalpte ikamet etmektedir…. (shrink)

[ON SOME PREMISES OF HUMAN CONDUCT TOWARDS ANIMALS: REMARKS ON J.M. COETZEE'S WORKS]. O relacjach między ludźmi a zwierzętami i konieczności poszerzania praw zwierząt powiedziano już tak wiele, iż trudno jest dziś przedstawić jakiś zupełnie nowy punkt widzenia. Uważam jednak, że dla jakości debaty powinno się nagłaśniać pewne mniej znane argumenty używane w literaturze traktującej o prawach zwierząt. Argumenty te wypowiadane są niekiedy nie tyle przez filozofów praw zwierząt, czy jakichś znanych aktywistów, lecz przez intelektualistów, których praca nie ogniskuje się (...) wyłącznie na problemie relacji między ludźmi a zwierzętami. Do takich postaci należy J.M. Coetzee, urodzony w 1940 południowoafrykański pisarz, zdobywca literackiej nagrody Nobla, były profesor literatury na uniwersytecie w Kapsztadzie, który obecnie mieszka w Australii i wykłada na uniwersytecie w Adelajdzie. J.M. Coetzee poświęca wspomnianemu problemowi wiele miejsca w różnych swoich książkach i pismach. J.M. Coetzee zdaje się opierać swoje poglądy dotyczące relacji między ludźmi a zwierzętami na następujących podstawowych tezach: mimo, że zwierzęta są zdolne do odczuwania strachu, bólu oraz cierpienia, ludzie zwykle nie poczuwają się do posiadania wobec nich zobowiązań moralnych, a także nie mają wystarczającej wiedzy o zwierzętach i nie rozumieją znacznej części ich zachowań; w konsekwencji często nie okazują zwierzętom szacunku jako innym istotom żywym i traktują je głównie w kategoriach przydatności, niejednokrotnie źle a nawet okrutnie, oraz zwykle roszczą sobie prawo do wykorzystywania zwierząt dla swoich celów i do decydowania o ich życiu. Noblista zdaje się uznawać taki stan rzeczy za dalece niewłaściwy. Można zatem domniemywać, że, zdaniem J.M. Coetzee’ego, ludzki stosunek wobec zwierząt powinien być całkowicie przeciwny od przedstawionego. Powyższe stwierdzenia obarczone są jednak piętnem przypuszczenia. Choć bowiem z pewnością J.M. Coetzee należy do propagatorów praw zwierząt, nie wiadomo do końca, czy wszystkie poglądy, które wkłada w usta swoich literackich bohaterów również sam wyznaje. Postacie z książek i esejów J.M. Coetzee’ego zwykle prowadzą ze sobą dyskusje na temat relacji między ludźmi a zwierzętami. Argumenty przez nich przedstawiane są – na co zwraca uwagę choćby Peter Singer – ich argumentami. Taki zabieg literacki pozwala południowoafrykańskiemu pisarzowi na ewentualne zdystansowanie się od części poglądów wypowiadanych przez bohaterów swoich prac. (shrink)

J. S. Mill is commonly considered as a representative of psychological hedonism. However, his utilitarianism has also eudaimonic and perfectionistic aspects. Thus, various aspects are interelated with one another not only in his moral philosophy, but are present also in his political philosophy. Interpretators of Mill’s philosophy inquire: how those aspects can be reconciled and if Mill's conception can be consistent then? Main aim of the paper is to explain and justify the view, that the idea of happiness by J. (...) S. Mill based on the greatest happiness principle is founded on both traditions present in the Ancient times: eudaimonism and hedonism. I assume, that: in philosophy of J. S. Mill, formulated in the perspective of both traditions of the idea of happiness and good life, hedonism can be reconciled with eudaimonism and perfectionsm. Philosopher can be qualified as many-sided and eclectic, thus denominating his exclusively as hedonist would be incomplete and would be a result of too hasty and imprecise reading of his works. (shrink)

This paper pays tribute to the distinguished legal and political philosopher Joseph Raz, who recently passed away. I present a response to Donald Davidson on conceptual schemes which tries to imitate Raz’s writing style, which attracts me despite the difficulties it poses. The response includes a definition.

This paper considers whether the saying, “It’s who you know, not what you know” can be used instead of jargon-laden studies of inequality. I argue that it is not a good replacement in some cases and present a challenge to standard Bourdieusian explanations of inequality in some fields. The paper is written as a pastiche of the distinguished political philosopher Joseph Raz.

The monograph contains three works on research on the concept of a rejected sentence. This research, conducted under the supervision of Prof. Jerzy Słupecki by U. Wybraniec-Skardowska (1) "Theory of rejected sentences" and G. Bryll (2) "Some supplements of theory of rejected sentences" and (3) "Logical relations between sentences of empirical sciences" led to the construction of a theory rejected sentences and made it possible to formalize certain issues in the methodology of empirical sciences. The concept of a rejected sentence (...) was introduced by J. Łukasiewicz in the course of his inquiry into Aristotelian Syllogistic. It was essentialy generelized by J. Słupecki who, with reference to Tarski's axiomatic theory of deductive systems (1930), gave the formal definition of the rejection function Cn' according to which a sentence y is rejected on the base of a set of sentences X iff at least one sentence which belongs to X can be deduced from the sentence y. Słupecki proved (1959) that the function Cn', which assignes to the set X the set of sentences rejected on the basis of X, is additive and satisfies the axioms of Tarski's general theory of deductive systems. Work (1) uses not only Tarski's general theory of systems but also his the so-called enlarged theory of systems (1930). It constructs a theory T of rejected sentences (propositions), which is created from Tarski's richer theory of systems by adding one axiom and a number of definitions; among them the definition of the rejection function Cn' is fundamental one. Cn' is a function which assignes to every set X of false sentences the set Cn'X whose members are exclusively false senteces. A number of theorems which describes properties of defined concepts have been proved in T. Some of them are necessary for conducting considertions of the concluding section of (1) devoted to the empirical sentences. Section 2 of (1) deals with the theory of the unit consequenses. It is characterized by an axiom from which follow all axioms of Tarski's general theory of deductive systems, additivity and the property that the unit consequence of the set X of sentences is a unit consequence only one sentence of X. An example of unit consequence is the rejection consequence Cn'. In section 3 of (1) the dual theory T' equivalent to T is presented. In T' the primitive concept is the rejection function Cn'. The fundamental axiom of T' states that Cn' is a unit consequence. The concluding section brings a few examples of applications of the definitions and theorems of T in the domain of the scientific methodology. Work (2) corresonds to J. Słupecki paper (1959) and the theory T of rejected propositions given in work (1). In this paper some suplements of the theory T are given. Work (3) is an extension of the theory of rejected propositios given in the paper (1). It is an attempt of formalization some problems of methodology of the empirical sciences which concern to such concepts as: empirical sentence, similar sentence, generalization, inductive conclusion etc. (shrink)

Each of us is a measure. The project of advocates of change in Plato’s Theaetetus as compared with sophistic thought -/- Summary -/- One of the most intriguing motives in Plato’s Theaetetus is its historical-based division of philosophy, which revolves around the concepts of rest (represented by Parmenides and his disciples) and change (represented by Protagoras, Homer, Empedocles, and Epicharmus). This unique approach gives an opportunity to reconstruct the views of marginalized trend of early Greek philosophy - so called „the (...) sophistic movement”. Paradoxically, previous research shows little interest in sophistic thought as a source of the standpoint of advocates of change („the secret doctrine”). The roots of „the secret doctrine” were investigated in the works of Heraclitus, Aristippus, and Antisthenes or those related to “neoheracliteanism”. However, researchers did not make any significant attempt to confront this concept with the contemporary research on the sophistic movement. The conviction that sophistry was primarily humanistically oriented was one of the main reasons why researches were opposed to the fact that „the secret doctrine” could represent a true expression of Protagoras’ views. This is why J. Burnet and F. M. Cornford in their seminal works assumed that “the secret doctrine” should be attributed to Plato, who simply combined a series of loose statements into one single project. In this work, we argue that the thesis which questions the parallels between the sophists’ interests and the philosophers of nature requires a significant revision. There is ample evidence to suggest that the philosophy of nature was a part of sophists’ research. This is supported by two main arguments. First, the tutors of sophists were philosophers of nature. Second, there are numerous sources that explicitly show sophists’ interest in the physical issues. These sources include anecdotal evidence about the fact that sophists wrote works On nature. There is also information confirming that they deliberated on detailed physical issues. The analogies between the concepts attributed to the advocates of change and our knowledge about sophists from other sources is very wide and contains most elements, which are included in the project of “changeable reality” presented in Theaetetus. The deliberations on the mechanism of perception, which are close to those of flux theory of perception in Theaetetus, are present in the sources referring to Gorgias of Leontinoi, the famous sophist and rhetorician. Also, the second element of “the secret doctrine” that is the metaphysics of flux matches up with what we know about the sophists’ views from other sources. On this basis, one can deduce that – contrary to the tradition which marginalized the role of sophistic considerations on the issue of being and non-being – it was one of the major subjects of sophistic research. Its main point was the criticism of the Eleatic conception of a single and unchangeable being, which also plays a key role in the doctrine of flux in Theaetetus. The epistemological theses which are presented in Theaetetus are borne out in sophistic sources. They include the definition of knowledge as perception, the „Man-measure” formula and a number of principles, which result from these foundational theses. Sophists’ empirical preferences resonate with the theses of the advocates of change in Theaetetus. Special attention that is given to the issues of differences among people, and even to cognitive differences in one person depending on the changeable states to which a person is subject, goes well together with what we know about reciprocal influence between the sophistry and medicine. The consequences of the epistemological conception present in Theaetetus have their equivalents in sophists’ works and other testimonies. An example of these consequences may be the abolition of truth and falsehood or the abolition of contradiction, which finds its expression in the thesis ouk estin antilegein. The analogies also concern reflections on the language itself. The project of the “new language” uses categories, which were developed by sophists. These include the antithesis of nomos and physis. The general intentions of this project reflect Protagoras’ ideas, at least to the extent to which they are known from the sources reporting his thoughts on language. Plato’s Theaetetus can thus be considered a veritable treasury of sophistic motifs. Even though the problem remains unsolved and one is still not able to unambiguously decide about the author of “the secret doctrine”, one can come to a certain conclusion – even if Plato synthesized various doctrines, he must have relied in his project mostly on the elements that he borrowed from sophists. Moreover, the value of reconstructing the project of the advocates of change in Theaetetus does not consist of mere enumeration of sophistic motifs. The dialogue is key to understanding the sophistic movement, whose separate doctrines – for the lack of sources and as a result of centuries-old disregard – are usually treated as rhetorical formulae that are interpreted in many ways and have no philosophical foundations. If it is really the case that the theses attributed to Protagoras in Theaetetus were actually a part or a derivative of Protagoras’ thought, or – speaking more conservatively – if they constitute a synthesis of sophistic thought done by Plato, they could represent philosophical foundations for the most important sophistic theses: the “Man-measure” formula, the ouk estin antilegein principle, the concept of language as a tool, the idea of the relativity of good and the whole practical sphere of sophists’ activity. Contrary to the views of many researchers, we are certain that the representatives of the sophistic movement did not limit themselves only to the application of practical rules, which determined the extent of their educational or rhetorical-political activity. They were capable of creating – indeed, they did create comprehensive projects that embraced the whole thematic scope subject to philosophical reflection. (shrink)

Opening a revolutionary new era in the unification of physics, by a breakthrough understanding of space, time, particles, and cosmology… For more than a century now, physicists have been attempting to unify the whole of physics and in so doing, gain a greater understanding of our cosmos. In Microbits: A New Unified Physics, scientific philosophers M. Muslim and Nadeem Haque, describe in detail, a compelling new view of physics that unites both the micro and the macro domains of matter (...) and energy. Specifically, they deconstruct Einsteinian Special and General Relativity and aspects of Quantum Mechanics, discussing their epistemological and empirical problems by their own original analyses, as well as the crucial but neglected works of prominent, astute and intellectually fearless critics of relativity and current interpretation of Quantum Mechanics such as Professors: Thomas E. Phipps, Bo Lehnert, Herbert E. Ives, Louis De Broglie, David Bohm, Jean-Pierre Vigier, Paul Marmet, Herbert Dingle, Stephan Gift, and G. Burniston Brown. Muslim and Haque establish an understanding of the fundamental physical phenomena in our universe, based on absolute space and what they term the ‘microbit’, the smallest type of particle next to absolute nothingness, from which all matter is comprised, and likewise, all forces. In doing so, in one master-stroke, they eliminate the traditional gulf between what they consider as being the partial/faulty theories of Quantum Mechanics and Einsteinian Relativity. They extend ‘Newton’s laws’ by two more ‘laws’, that remarkably unify the whole of physics. This fresh new perspective, whose time is long overdue, makes a plethora of new predictions that are now surfacing as possibilities in experiments published by leading scientific journals. Microbits: A New Unified Physics, thus calls for a radical shift in our way of looking at the cosmos, based on evidence, consistency, causation and determinism, leading to both wider and deeper implications for humanity. Publishers ISBN: 978-0-9699605-7-7. (shrink)

This book deals with new proofs for the existence of God, solving the hard problem of consciousness and the Quranic correlation with logic and evidence on these subjects.

Sometimes, learning about the origins of a belief can make it irrational to continue to hold that belief—a phenomenon we call ‘genealogical defeat’. According to explanationist accounts, genealogical defeat occurs when one learns that there is no appropriate explanatory connection between one’s belief and the truth. Flatfooted versions of explanationism have been widely and rightly rejected on the grounds that they would disallow beliefs about the future and other inductively-formed beliefs. After motivating the need for some explanationist account, we raise (...) some problems for recent versions of explanationism. Learning from their failures, we then produce and defend a more resilient explanationism. (shrink)

Using speech act theory from the Philosophy of Language, this paper attempts to develop an ethical framework for the phenomenon of speech processing. We use the concepts of the illocutionary force and the illocutionary content of a speech act to explain the ethics of speech processing. By emphasizing the different stages involved in speech processing, we explore the distinct ethical issues that arise in relation to each stage. Input, processing, and output are the different ethically relevant stages under which a (...) spoken item or a speech navigates within the range of speech-processing modules. Employing the illocutionary force-content distinction, we specify and characterize the input-related ethical issues, the output-related ethical issues, and the processing-related ethical issues involved in speech processing. Together with illocutionary force-content distinction, we employ the data-information distinction to characterize the stage-wise ethical issues in the phenomenon of speech processing as the ethics of collecting (speech) data, the ethics of contextualizing (speech) data/information, and the ethics of releasing the con-textualized information (processed speech). Immediate ethical issues that arise from the range of speech processing modules are distinguished from distant ethical issues. We also indicate the nature of ethical issues that arise from Speaker Independent speech technologies. (shrink)

The transition of C. albicans from unicellular yeast form to filamentous form i.e., pseudohyphae and hyphae is referred to as morphogenesis. C. albicans has the ability to respond to environmental conditions and accordingly changing its cell morphology. Three main morphological forms of C. albicans are unicellular yeast, pseudohyphae and hyphae. The effect of different growth media (Horse serum medium, RPMI-1640, MSGB), incubation temperatures (34˚C, 37˚C, 40˚C) and pH values (5.4, 6.4, 7.4) on germ tube production by C. albicans was evaluated. (...) Horse serum medium noticeably promotes filamentation while RPMI-1640 medium shows moderate filamentation and MSGB media shows moderately low filamentation. The germ tube of C. albicans developed early in 1.5 hr at high temperature i.e., 40˚C. Incubation temperature of 37˚C was associated with highest germ tube formation while 34˚C shows low filamentation. A pH of 5.4 also induces low filamentation, pH 6.4 gives moderately lower than pH 7.4. A pH of 7.4 was best suited for germ tube induction. The peak of mycelium production appears between 1.5 and 6 hr after inoculation of C. albicans culture. These results suggested that environmental factors are important in selectively favoring yeast or hyphal form, most important being the growth medium, incubation temperature and external pH value. (shrink)

Hilde Lindemann argues that personhood is the shared practice of recognizing and responding to one another. She calls this practice holding. Holding, however, can fail. Holding failure, by stereotyping for example, can inhibit others’ epistemic confidence and ability to recall true beliefs as well as create an environment of racism or sexism. How might we avoid holding failure? Holding failure, I argue, has many epistemic dimensions, so I argue that moral encroachment has the theoretical tools available to avoid holding failures. (...) The goal of this paper, therefore, is to articulate and understand the epistemology of holding in an attempt to remedy holding failure. I show that the virtue of wokeness emerges from an epistemic environment tainted with moral encroachment. I argue that as long as an individual is woke, she will have a tendency to avoid holding failures. Wokeness and moral encroachment, consequently, are fundamental to the epistemology of holding and consistent proper holding. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest krytyczna analiza koncepcji J.H. Newmana, zgodnie z którą doświadczenie sumienia prowadzi jednostkę do wiary w Boga. Fenomenologiczna analiza doświadczenia moralnego prowadzi Newmana do wniosku, że doświadczenie to jest zrozumiałe tylko wtedy, jeśli zinterpretujemy sumienie jako głos Boga. Pokazuję – wbrew Newmanowi – że doświadczenie sumienia nie jest jednoznaczne. Nie da się wyjaśnić, dlaczego jednostka interpretuje je w kategoriach teistycznych, a nie jakichś innych. Potrzebne jest przyjęcie dodatkowych mechanizmów, które tłumaczą, dlaczego jednostka zinterpretowała swoje sumienie w kategoriach teistycznych. (...) Wskazuję, że w dziele Newmana można wyróżnić trzy takie mechanizmy. (shrink)

As a slew of recent work in epistemology has brought out, there is a range of cases where there's a strong temptation to say that prudential and (especially) moral considerations affect what we ought to believe. There are two distinct models of how this can happen. On the first, “reasons pragmatist” model, the relevant prudential and moral considerations constitute distinctively practical reasons for (or against) belief. On the second, “pragmatic encroachment” model, the relevant prudential and moral considerations affect what one (...) is epistemically justified in believing. The pragmatic encroachment model appears to have several advantages over reasons pragmatism, and this has led many recent philosophers to endorse the former. However, in this paper we argue that a version of reasons pragmatism can be (at least largely) saved from these purported disadvantages once paired with an independently plausible permissivism about epistemically justified outright belief. This hybrid view—“permissivist pragmatism”—holds that when there is more than one epistemically permitted doxastic attitude, practical (including moral) considerations can determine which epistemically permitted doxastic attitude one all-things-considered ought to have. This view avoids both the problems faced by simple versions of reasons pragmatism, and those that distinctively attend pragmatic encroachment, while preserving the advantages of each view. (shrink)

Much of the climate ethics discussion centers on considerations of compensatory justice and historical accountability. However, little attention is given to supporting and defending the Beneficiary Pays Principle as a guide for policymaking. This principle states that those who have benefitted from an instance of harm have an obligation to compensate those who have been harmed. Thus, this principle implies that those benefitted by industrialization and carbon emission owe compensation to those who have been harmed by climate change. Beneficiary Pays (...) is commonly juxtaposed with Polluter Pays Principle and the Ability to Pay Principle in the relevant literature. Beneficiary Pays withstands objections that raise suspicion for the latter two. (shrink)

On the dominant contemporary accounts of how practical considerations affect what we ought to believe, practical considerations either encroach on epistemic rationality by affecting whether a belief is epistemically justified, or constitute distinctively practical reasons for belief which can only affect what we ought to believe by conflicting with epistemic rationality. This paper shows that a promising alternative view can be found in a surprising source: the writings of Søren Kierkegaard. I argue that in light of two of his central (...) epistemological commitments—belief-credence dualism and epistemic permissivism about outright belief—Kierkegaard holds that practical considerations can affect what we ought to believe without either encroaching on or (necessarily) conflicting with epistemic rationality. The central idea is that practical considerations can determine which among the epistemically permitted outright doxastic attitudes one should all-things-considered adopt. In addition to constituting a novel, systematic interpretation of Kierkegaard’s account of how practical considerations affect what we ought to believe, this suggests that Kierkegaard holds a distinctive and underexplored view that constitutes a serious philosophical rival to dominant contemporary views. (shrink)

Knowledge, like other things of value, can be faked. According to Hawley (2011), know-how is harder to fake than knowledge-that, given that merely apparent propositional knowledge is in general more resilient to our attempts at successful detection than are corresponding attempts to fake know-how. While Hawley’s reasoning for a kind of detection resilience asymmetry between know-how and know-that looks initially plausible, it should ultimately be resisted. In showing why, we outline different ways in which know-how can be faked even when (...) a given performance is successful; and in doing so, we distinguish how know-how can be faked (no less than know-that) via upstream and downstream indicators of its presence, and within each of these categories, we’ll distinguish (in connection with detection resilience) both faking symptoms and (various kinds of) criteria. The unappreciated resilience of faked knowledge-how to successful detection highlights a largely overlooked dimension of social-epistemic risk – risk we face not just in our capacity as recipients of testimony, but in our capacity as both (would-be) apprentices and clients of knowledge-how. (shrink)

Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus famously defines faith as a risky “venture” that requires “holding fast” to “objective uncertainty.” Yet puzzlingly, he emphasizes that faith requires resolute conviction and certainty. Moreover, Climacus claims that all beliefs about contingent propositions about the external world “exclude doubt” and “nullify uncertainty,” but also that uncertainty is “continually present” in these very same beliefs. This paper argues that these apparent contradictions can be resolved by interpreting Climacus as a belief-credence dualist. That is, Climacus holds that (...) beliefs and credences (i.e., degrees of belief) are two irreducibly distinct types of mental states. Beliefs are resolutions that close inquiry, thereby excluding doubt and reflecting subjective certainty by disregarding the possibility of error. Credences, by contrast, reflect assessments of evidential probabilities, thereby encoding a recognition of “objective uncertainty” by acknowledging the possibility of error. In addition to solving a vexing interpretive puzzle and showing how Kierkegaard anticipates contemporary views about the nature of belief and credence, this paper demonstrates that Kierkegaard developed a sophisticated account of the nature of belief, doubt, and certainty that merits serious philosophical consideration. (shrink)

The structure is the backbone of a book. Beneath the surface, it holds everything together and imposes order on the flow. Without a coherent and logical structure, the novel’s key elements are unclear. Victorian Age is known for perfection of the novel from all corners. Though Charles Dickens and Emily Bronte have distinct places in the literary World, Yet their representation of their age has many things in common. The two novels in question “Great Expectations” and “Wuthering Heights” range from (...) Gothic tradition to migration and romance to villainy. Both of these stories can be set off and paralleled to the other. The setting, narration, plot, time era, and lover’s relationships are the elements of comparison as they form the overall structure of a novel. (shrink)

In the dimension of education quality, it has become quite popular in recent tenure, as internationally it is analyzed that education is exaggerated towards the context of faculty approach and their brilliance in the respective field. This study focused on the attitudes and beliefs that stop/encourage them to focus on the methodological shifts and the role of professional development in their lectures and make them more interesting for the students. This research is qualitative. The analytical triangulation concept has been used (...) for the collection of the data; three different sources were used to authenticate the data and the accuracy of the responses Open-ended questionnaires, Focus Groups, and interviews were the data collection method used in this research study. It has been found that there are several internal and external pressures on the faculty members that create hurdles to focus on their teaching methodologies. Too many responsibilities latch them with too much pressure and no time to think about the teaching methodologies. Further, specialists ought to ponder all facets and worries of the teaching staff and encourage the faculty members to implement innovative methods as well as improve pedagogies. (shrink)

Jack Spencer argues we should reject a decision rule called MaxRat because it's incompatible with this principle: If you know that you will choose an option, x, and you know that x is better than every other option available to you, then it is permissible for you to choose x. I agree with Spencer that defenders of MaxRat should reject this principle. However, I disagree insofar as he suggests that he and orthodox causalists are in a position to accept it. (...) Both orthodox CDT and Spencer's own theory of rational choice are incompatible with the principle as well. It is surprising to realise, but all are agreed: it can be irrational to knowingly choose the best. (shrink)

Islam' literally means submission but when the term is used in a religious context it means submission to Allah alone. Accordingly, a Muslim is one who submits to the Divine injunctions and does not deviate from them. "Al-Islam implies that you testify that there is no god but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah and you establish prayer, pay zakat, observe the fast of Ramadan, and perform pilgrimage to Holy Ka'ba at Mecca once in a lifetime if (...) you are solvent enough (to bear the expense of) journey". The most important principle in Islam is worshiping one and only one God. Islam calls for human rights; no one is better than another with his colour, race, gender, or culture. All are equal and difference among people is based on piety and doing good deeds. Islam considers all human free and has free will. Islam calls protecting environment. Islam calls all people to recognize that our life in the planet is short and that we should prepare ourselves for the second eternal life where everyone will be judged by the Creator in what he did in his first life for himself, community, and environment. In brief, the teachings of Islam are based on Quran (Holy book of God revelation to prophet Mohamed) and Prophet Mohamed (peace upon him) sayings and practices. The teachings are based on two wings: Worship: This is to follow the five pillars of Islam and believe in the 6 pillars of faith. Good deeds: This to do what is beneficial to community and to mankind. The fulfilment of these duties means the fulfilment of the remaining duties as well. That is why it is mentioned in a tradition that only these duties have been called "Islam". Language: Arabic. (shrink)

What are words? What makes two token words tokens of the same word-type? Are words abstract entities, or are they (merely) collections of tokens? The ontology of words tries to provide answers to these, and related questions. This article provides an overview of some of the most prominent views proposed in the literature, with a particular focus on the debate between type-realist, nominalist, and eliminativist ontologies of words.