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  1. added 2018-09-20
    Higher-Level Knowledge, Rational and Social Levels Constraints of the Common Model of the Mind.Antonio Lieto, William G. Kennedy, Christian Lebiere, Oscar Romero, Niels Taatgen & Robert West - forthcoming - Procedia Computer Science.
    In his famous 1982 paper, Allen Newell [22, 23] introduced the notion of knowledge level to indicate a level of analysis, and prediction, of the rational behavior of a cognitive arti cial agent. This analysis concerns the investigation about the availability of the agent knowledge, in order to pursue its own goals, and is based on the so-called Rationality Principle (an assumption according to which "an agent will use the knowledge it has of its environment to achieve its goals" [22, (...)
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  2. added 2015-07-28
    Knowledge Bases and Neural Network Synthesis.Todd R. Davies - 1991 - In Hozumi Tanaka (ed.), Artificial Intelligence in the Pacific Rim: Proceedings of the Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence. IOS Press. pp. 717-722.
    We describe and try to motivate our project to build systems using both a knowledge based and a neural network approach. These two approaches are used at different stages in the solution of a problem, instead of using knowledge bases exclusively on some problems, and neural nets exclusively on others. The knowledge base (KB) is defined first in a declarative, symbolic language that is easy to use. It is then compiled into an efficient neural network (NN) representation, run, and the (...)
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  3. added 2015-04-16
    Systematicity and Conceptual Pluralism.Fernando Martinez-Manrique - 2014 - In Paco Calvo John Symons (ed.), The Architecture of Cognition: Rethinking Fodor and Pylyshyn's Systematicity Challenge. MIT Press. pp. 305-334.
    The systematicity argument only challenges connectionism if systematicity is a general property of cognition. I examine this thesis in terms of properties of concepts. First, I propose that Evans's Generality Constraint only applies to attributions of belief. Then I defend a variety of conceptual pluralism, arguing that concepts share two fundamental properties related to centrality and belief-attribution, and contending that there are two kinds of concepts that differ in their compositional properties. Finally, I rely on Dual Systems Theory and on (...)
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