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  1. Frege über Merkmale von Begriffen.Rami Dolf - 2022 - Siegener Beiträge Zur Geschichte Und Philosophie der Mathematik 16:133-173.
    In this paper I want to show that two proposals to determine Frege’s notion of a mark (Merkmal) of concepts that are made in the relevant literature face some serious interpretative and systematic problems. The main problem of both conceptions is that they cannot be properly applied to those explicit examples of complex concepts that are given in Frege’s works. The first of these conceptions interprets marks as analytic components of a concept, the second as defining parts of a concept. (...)
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  2. Understanding Frege’s notion of presupposition.Thorsten Sander - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12603-12624.
    Why did Frege offer only proper names as examples of presupposition triggers? Some scholars claim that Frege simply did not care about the full range of presuppositional phenomena. This paper argues, in contrast, that he had good reasons for employing an extremely narrow notion of ‘Voraussetzung’. On Frege’s view, many devices that are now construed as presupposition triggers either express several thoughts at once or merely ‘illuminate’ a thought in a particular way. Fregean presuppositions, in contrast, are essentially tied to (...)
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  3. What Frege asked Alex the Parrot: Inferentialism, Number Concepts, and Animal Cognition.Erik Nelson - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (2):206-227.
    While there has been significant philosophical debate on whether nonlinguistic animals can possess conceptual capabilities, less time has been devoted to considering 'talking' animals, such as parrots. When they are discussed, their capabilities are often downplayed as mere mimicry. The most explicit philosophical example of this can be seen in Brandom's frequent comparisons of parrots and thermostats. Brandom argues that because parrots (like thermostats) cannot grasp the implicit inferential connections between concepts, their vocal articulations do not actually have any conceptual (...)
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  4. Frege’s Unmanageable Thing.Michael Price - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):368-413.
    _ Source: _Volume 95, Issue 3, pp 368 - 413 Frege famously maintained that concepts are not objects. A key argument of Frege’s for this view is, in outline, as follows: if we are to account for the unity of thought, concepts must be deemed _unsaturated_; since objects are, by contrast, saturated entities, concepts cannot be objects. The author investigates what can be made of this argument and, in particular, of the unsaturated/saturated distinction it invokes. Systematically exploring a range of (...)
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  5. Frege, Russell, Ramsey and the Notion of an Arbitrary Function.Gabriel Sandu - 2015 - In Gabriel Sandu, Marco Panza & Hourya Benis-Sinaceur (eds.), Functions and Generality of Logic: Reflections on Dedekind's and Frege's Logicisms. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.
    The paper argues that unlike Ramsey, Frege and Russell lacked the idea of an arbitrary function and this had important consequences for their foundational programs.
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  6. The Function is Unsaturated.Richard Heck & Robert May - 2013 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of The History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    An investigation of what Frege means by his doctrine that functions (and so concepts) are 'unsaturated'. We argue that this doctrine is far less peculiar than it is usually taken to be. What makes it hard to understand, oddly enough, is the fact that it is so deeply embedded in our contemporary understanding of logic and language. To see this, we look at how it emerges out of Frege's confrontation with the Booleans and how it expresses a fundamental difference between (...)
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  7. Against Fantology.Barry Smith - 2005 - In Johann C. Marek Maria E. Reicher (ed.), Experience and Analysis. HPT&ÖBV. pp. 153-170.
    The analytical philosophy of the last hundred years has been heavily influenced by a doctrine to the effect that the key to the correct understanding of reality is captured syntactically in the ‘Fa’ (or, in more sophisticated versions, in the ‘Rab’) of standard first order predicate logic. Here ‘F’ stands for what is general in reality and ‘a’ for what is individual. Hence “f(a)ntology”. Because predicate logic has exactly two syntactically different kinds of referring expressions—‘F’, ‘G’, ‘R’, etc., and ‘a’, (...)
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  8. It.Barry Smith - 1980 - In Rudolf Haller & Wolfgang Grassl (eds.), Language, Logic and Philosophy. Reidel. pp. 342–345.
    A brief study of the logical, linguistic, psychological and ontological problem of ‘impersonalia’, which is to say of assertions such as ‘it’s raining’ or ‘es blitzt’ which seem to have no subject. Such assertions cause problems not only for defenders of traditional subject-predicate views of assertive sentences, but also for those, such as Frege, who defended a view in terms of functions and arguments.
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