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  1. added 2019-01-16
    The Pareto Argument for Inequality Revisited.A. R. J. Fisher & Edward F. McClennen - manuscript
    One of the more obscure arguments for Rawls’ difference principle dubbed ‘the Pareto argument for inequality’ has been criticised by G. A. Cohen (1995, 2008) as being inconsistent. In this paper, we examine and clarify the Pareto argument in detail and argue (1) that justification for the Pareto principles derives from rational selfinterest and thus the Pareto principles ought to be understood as conditions of individual rationality, (2) that the Pareto argument is not inconsistent, contra Cohen, and (3) that the (...)
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  2. added 2018-07-18
    On Arguments From Self-Interest for the Nash Solution and the Kalai Egalitarian Solution to the Bargaining Problem.Luc Bovens - 1987 - Theory and Decision 23 (3):231-260.
    I argue in this paper that there are two considerations which govern the dynamics of a two-person bargaining game, viz. relative proportionate utility loss from conceding to one's opponent's proposal and relative non-proportionate utility loss from not conceding to one's opponent's proposal, if she were not to concede as well. The first consideration can adequately be captured by the information contained in vNM utilities. The second requires measures of utility which allow for an interpersonal comparison of utility differences. These considerations (...)
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  3. added 2017-03-21
    Where Did Mill Go Wrong? Why the Capital-Managed Rather Than the Labor-Managed Enterprise is the Predominant.Schwartz Justin - 2012 - Ohio State Law Journal 73:220-85.
    In this Article, I propose a novel law and economics explanation of a deeply puzzling aspect of business organization in market economies. Why are virtually all firms organized as capital-managed and -owned (capitalist) enterprises rather than as labor-managed and -owned cooperatives? Over 150 years ago, J.S. Mill predicted that efficiency and other advantages would eventually make worker cooperatives predominant over capitalist firms. Mill was right about the advantages but wrong about the results. The standard explanation is that capitalist enterprise is (...)
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  4. added 2016-07-11
    Game Theory and the Self-Fulfilling Climate Tragedy.Matthew Kopec - 2017 - Environmental Values 26 (2):203-221.
    Game theorists tend to model climate negotiations as a so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’. This is rather worrisome, since the conditions under which such commons problems have historically been solved are almost entirely absent in the case of international greenhouse gas emissions. In this paper, I will argue that the predictive accuracy of the tragedy model might not stem from the model’s inherent match with reality but rather from the model’s ability to make self-fulfilling predictions. I then sketch some possible (...)
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  5. added 2016-06-29
    What is Wrong with Nimbys? Renewable Energy, Landscape Impacts and Incommensurable Values.Anne Schwenkenbecher - 2017 - Environmental Values 26 (6):711-732.
    Local opposition to infrastructure projects implementing renewable energy (RE) such as wind farms is often strong even if state-wide support for RE is strikingly high. The slogan “Not In My BackYard” (NIMBY) has become synonymous for this kind of protest. This paper revisits the question of what is wrong with NIMBYs about RE projects and how to best address them. I will argue that local opponents to wind farm (and other RE) developments do not necessarily fail to contribute their fair (...)
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  6. added 2014-12-23
    Social Norms, The Invisible Hand, and the Law.Jonny Anomaly & Geoffrey Brennan - 2014 - University of Queensland Law Journal 33 (2).
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  7. added 2014-03-19
    Are Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Indeterminate?Christian List - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (2):229 - 260.
    On the orthodox view in economics, interpersonal comparisons of utility are not empirically meaningful, and "hence" impossible. To reassess this view, this paper draws on the parallels between the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility and the problem of translation of linguistic meaning, as explored by Quine. I discuss several cases of what the empirical evidence for interpersonal comparisonsof utility might be and show that, even on the strongest of these, interpersonal comparisons are empirically underdetermined and, if we also deny (...)
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  8. added 2013-03-28
    Giochi di altruismo. L'approccio evoluzionistico alla cooperazione umana.Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa - 2012 - In Matt Ridley (ed.), Le Origini della Virtù. IBL Libri. pp. 7--38.
    This is the introductory essay to the Italian translation of Matt Ridley's "The origins of virtue", surveying the game-theoretic and evolutionary approaches to the emergence and evolution of cooperation and altruism.
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