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  1. added 2019-01-23
    Hume's Legacy: A Cognitive Science Perspective.Mark Collier - 2018 - In Angela Coventry & Alex Sager (eds.), The Humean Mind. Routledge. pp. 434-445.
    Hume is an experimental philosopher who attempts to understand why we think, feel, and act as we do. But how should we evaluate the adequacy of his proposals? This chapter examines Hume’s account from the perspective of interdisciplinary work in cognitive science.
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  2. added 2017-08-06
    El principio de semejanza en Hume. Hacia una fundamentación filosófica de los derechos humanos.Mario Edmundo Chávez Tortolero - 2017 - Logos. Revista de Filosofía 129 (año 45):151-164.
    En el presente artículo se propone una interpretación del pensamiento de Hume para la comprensión de temas y problemas filosóficos que Hume, en su tiempo, no tuvo en consideración, pero que el día de hoy son relevantes. En primer lugar, se analiza el principio de semejanza y se postula la tesis de la unidad de las percepciones a partir de dicho principio. En segundo lugar, mediante un razonamiento analógico se trata de aplicar la doctrina de las percepciones en Hume para (...)
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  3. added 2016-12-21
    Kaila's Reception of Hume.Jani Hakkarainen - 2012 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 89:147-162.
    In this paper, I discuss Eino Kaila's (1890-1958) understanding of David Hume. Kaila was one of the leading Finnish philosophers of the 20th century and a correspondent of the Vienna Circle. He introduced logical empiricism into Finland and taught Georg Henrik von Wright. Final draft.
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  4. added 2016-04-25
    Deleuze Transcendental Empiricism as Exercise of Thought: Hume’s Case.Emilian Margarit - 2012 - Meta 4 (2):377-403.
    This paper aims to clarify the program of Deleuze’s work on Hume’s philosophy. Also, I plan to make clear the operational meaning of Deleuze’s own hallmark regarding his approaches to philosophy. I start to follow Deleuze’s plot by engendering three functions of his interpretation of Hume’s Treatise that will be the area of three thematic chapters. The first tries to sort the polemical function of empiricism that is launched through Deleuze’s Hume; the second attempts to figure the domain of subjectivity (...)
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  5. added 2015-01-12
    Hume and the Mechanics of Mind : Impressions, Ideas, and Association.David Owen - 2009 - In David Fate Norton & Jacqueline Anne Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Cambridge University Press.
    Hume introduced important innovations concerning the theory of ideas. The two most important are the distinction between impressions and ideas, and the use he made of the principles of association in explaining mental phenomena. Hume divided the perceptions of the mind into two classes. The members of one class, impressions, he held to have a greater degree of force and vivacity than the members of the other class, ideas. He also supposed that ideas are causally dependent copies of impressions. And, (...)
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  6. added 2015-01-12
    Why History Matters: Associations and Causal Judgment in Hume and Cognitive Science.Mark Collier - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (3):175-188.
    It is commonly thought that Hume endorses the claim that causal cognition can be fully explained in terms of nothing but custom and habit. Associative learning does, of course, play a major role in the cognitive psychology of the Treatise. But Hume recognizes that associations cannot provide a complete account of causal thought. If human beings lacked the capacity to reflect on rules for judging causes and effects, then we could not (as we do) distinguish between accidental and genuine regularities, (...)
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