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  1. Perception in Dreams: A Guide for Dream Engineers, a Reflection on the Role of Memory in Sensory States, and a New Counterexample to Hume’s Account of the Imagination.Fiona Macpherson - 2024 - In Daniel Gregory & Kourken Michaelian (eds.), Dreaming and Memory: Philosophical Issues. Springer. pp. 353–381.
    I argue that dreams can contain perceptual elements in multifarious, heretofore unthought-of ways. I also explain the difference between dreams that contain perceptual elements, perceptual experiences that contain dream elements, and having a dream and a perceptual experience simultaneously. I then discuss two applications of the resulting view. First, I explain how my taxonomy of perception in dreams will allow “dream engineers”—who try to alter the content of people’s dreams—to accurately classify different dreams and explore creating new forms of perception (...)
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  2. Hume y Priestley: afinidades y tensiones en torno al materialismo.Sofia Calvente - 2024 - Materialismo, Hedonismo y Ateísmo. Nuevas Discusiones Sobre la Filosofía de la Ilustración.
    En este trabajo me ocuparé de las resonancias que tuvo el modo en el que Hume aborda la cuestión de la materialidad de la mente en uno de los materialistas más notables de las Islas Británicas del siglo XVIII, Joseph Priestley. La influencia que ejerció el enfoque humeano acerca del materialismo en la obra de Priestley no ha sido suficientemente puesta de relieve o ha sido desestimada. En buena medida, esto se debe a que Priestley tienen una actitud crítica hacia (...)
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  3. David Hume acerca del materialismo.Sofía Calvente - 2023 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 35 (2):275-299.
    Durante los siglos XVII y XVIII hubo un intenso debate en las Islas Británicas en torno al materialismo. Mi objetivo consiste en caracterizar la postura de David Hume en el marco de ese debate. Sostengo que, no obstante rechazar la metafísica sustancialista para centrarse en el estudio de las percepciones, Hume sienta una posición respecto de la relación entre mente y materia. Sin embargo, esa posición reviste cierta complejidad en tanto no es explicitada en los textos que se editaron en (...)
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  4. Simpatía, naturaleza e identidad en Hume.Fernando Infante del Rosal - 2013 - Eikasia. Revista de Filosofía 51:177-204.
    En su concepción de la simpatía Hume se desligó de sus coetáneos aportando una visión muy especial de este fenómeno, no como afecto o sentimiento, sino como factor y condición para la comunicabilidad de los afectos. La simpatía, lejos de fundarse en un rasgo moral de la naturaleza humana o en el reconocimiento de la semejanza y la proximidad, aparece como factor generador de la identidad y de los afectos, base para la constitución de lo subjetivo y lo intersubjetivo.
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  5. (1 other version)Commentary on Bozzi’s Untimely Meditations on the relation between self and non-self.Robert M. Kelly & Barry Smith - 2018 - In Ivana Bianchi & Richard Davies (eds.), Paolo Bozzi’s Experimental Phenomenology. New York: Routledge. pp. 125-129.
    Independently of whether an object of experience becomes a candidate for being a part of the self or a part of the external world, it is always given to us as just an object of experience. The observer-observed relation can be seen as a type of relation with many instances, both between the self and different objects of experience and between any given object of experience and different selves. The self is situated in a spatial grid, where the latter can (...)
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  6. Dissertação sobre as paixões.Jaimir Conte - 2011 - Princípios: Revista de Filosofia 18 (29):371-399.
    Tradução para o português da "Dissertation on passions", de David Hume. Tradução realizada com base nas seguintes edições: 1. Four Dissertations/ David Hume, edited by John Immerwahr. (Facsimile da edição de 1757 publicada por A. Millar, Thoemmes Press, 1995); 2. A Dissertation on the passions ; The natural history of religion : a critical edition /David Hume; edited by Tom L. Be auchamp. (The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume. Oxford: Ox ford University Press, 2007); 3. The Complete (...)
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  7. Hume's Table, Peacocke's Trees, the Tilted Penny and the Reversed Seeing‐in Account.Robert Schroer - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (2):209-230.
    In seeing a tilted penny, we are experientially aware of both its circularity and another shape, which I dub ‘β‐ellipticality’. Some claim that our experiential awareness of the intrinsic shapes/sizes of everyday objects depends upon our experiential awareness of β‐shapes/β‐sizes. In contrast, I maintain that β‐property experiences are the result of what Richard Wollheim calls ‘seeing‐in’, but run in reverse: instead of seeing a three‐dimensional object in a flat surface, we see a flat surface in a three‐dimensional object. Using this (...)
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  8. Reid on Favors, Injuries, and the Natural Virtue of Justice.Lewis Powell & Gideon Yaffe - 2015 - In Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.), Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 249-266.
    Reid argues that Hume’s claim that justice is an artificial virtue is inconsistent with the fact that gratitude is a natural sentiment. This chapter shows that Reid’s argument succeeds only given a philosophy of mind and action that Hume rejects. Among other things, Reid assumes that one can conceive of one of a pair of contradictories only if one can conceive of the other—a claim that Hume denies. So, in the case of justice, the disagreement between Hume and Reid is, (...)
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  9. The Vulgar Conception of Objects in "Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses".Stefanie Rocknak - 2007 - Hume Studies 33 (1):67-90.
    In this paper, we see that contrary to most readings of T 1.4.2 in the Treatise ("Of Skepticism with Regard to the Senses"), Hume does not think that objects are sense impressions. This means that Hume's position on objects (whatever that may be) is not to be conflated with the vulgar perspective. Moreover, the vulgar perspective undergoes a marked transition in T 1.4.2, evolving from what we may call vulgar perspective I into vulgar perspective II. This paper presents the first (...)
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  10. "Hume Variations" by Jerry A. Fodor. [REVIEW]Tim Crane - 2004 - The Times Literary Supplement 1.
    Contemporary philosophy has had a difficult relationship with its own history. One extreme view conceives of the task of philosophy purely in terms of solving certain given problems, and considers the history of philosophy to have no more relevance to this project than the history of physics has to physics itself. Certainly the history of philosophy is an important intellectual discipline, they argue, but just as physicists do not need to read Newton’s Principia in order to make progress, philosophers do (...)
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  11. Hume’s Science of Emotions: Feeling Theory without Tears.Mark Collier - 2011 - Hume Studies 37 (1):3-18.
    We must rethink the status of Hume’s science of emotions. Contemporary philosophers typically dismiss Hume’s account on the grounds that he mistakenly identifies emotions with feelings. But the traditional objections to Hume’s feeling theory are not as strong as commonly thought. Hume makes several important contributions, moreover, to our understanding of the operations of the emotions. His claims about the causal antecedents of the indirect passions receive support from studies in appraisal theory, for example, and his suggestions concerning the social (...)
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  12. Hume's Functionalism About Mental Kinds.Jason Zarri - manuscript
    A very common view of Hume’s distinction between impressions and ideas is that it is based on their intrinsic properties; specifically, their force and vivacity. Some interpreters have challenged this,one being David Landy (Landy 2006). He argues that for Hume the difference lies instead in the fact that impressions are not copies of anything, while ideas are copies of impressions. I regard this view as unsatisfactory, not because it is fundamentally mistaken but because (to put it in Humean terms) it (...)
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  13. Morgan’s Canon, meet Hume’s Dictum: avoiding anthropofabulation in cross-species comparisons.Cameron Buckner - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (5):853-871.
    How should we determine the distribution of psychological traits—such as Theory of Mind, episodic memory, and metacognition—throughout the Animal kingdom? Researchers have long worried about the distorting effects of anthropomorphic bias on this comparative project. A purported corrective against this bias was offered as a cornerstone of comparative psychology by C. Lloyd Morgan in his famous “Canon”. Also dangerous, however, is a distinct bias that loads the deck against animal mentality: our tendency to tie the competence criteria for cognitive capacities (...)
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  14. Hume's Labyrinth.Alan Schwerin - 2012 - Annales Philosophici 5:69 - 84.
    In the appendix to his Treatise Hume admits that his philosophy of mind is defective. Reluctantly he asserts that his thought has ensnared him in a labyrinth. Referring specifically to the section in the Treatise on personal identity and the self, the young Scot admits that he is “involv’d in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent.” (Treatise 633) My paper is a critical investigation of (...)
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  15. Hume on the Self.Alan Schwerin - 2012 - Metaphysica 13 (1):65-85.
    In the Treatise Hume argues that a person is “nothing but a bundle of perceptions”. But what precisely is the meaning of this bundle thesis of a person? In my paper, an attempt is made to articulate two plausible interpretations of this controversial view and to identify and evaluate a number of problems for this thesis that is central to Hume’s account of the self.
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  16. (2 other versions)Hume's Natural History of Justice.Mark Collier - 2011 - In Craig Taylor & Stephen Buckle (eds.), Hume and the Enlightenment. Pickering & Chatto Publishing. pp. 131-142.
    In Book III, Part 2 of the Treatise, Hume presents a natural history of justice. Self-interest clearly plays a central role in his account; our ancestors invented justice conventions, he maintains, for the sake of reciprocal advantage. But this is not what makes his approach so novel and attractive. Hume recognizes that prudential considerations are not sufficient to explain how human beings – with our propensities towards temporal discounting and free-riding – could have established conventions for social exchange and collective (...)
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  17. Imagined Causes: Hume’s Conception of Objects.Stefanie Rocknak - 2012 - Springer.
    This book provides the first comprehensive account of Hume’s conception of objects in Book I of the Treatise. What, according to Hume, are objects? Ideas? Impressions? Mind-independent objects? All three? None of the above? Through a close textual analysis, I show that Hume thought that objects are imagined ideas. However, I argue that he struggled with two accounts of how and when we imagine such ideas. On the one hand, Hume believed that we always and universally imagine that objects are (...)
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  18. Hume, Distinctions of Reason, and Differential Resemblance.Donald L. M. Baxter - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):156-182.
    Hume discusses the distinction of reason to explain how we distinguish things inseparable, and so identical, e.g., the color and figure of a white globe. He says we note the respect in which the globe is similar to a white cube and dissimilar to a black sphere, and the respect in which it is dissimilar to the first and similar to the second. Unfortunately, Hume takes these differing respects of resemblance to be identical with the white globe itself. Contradiction results, (...)
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  19. Carelessness and Inattention: mind-wandering and the physiology of fantasy from Locke to Hume.John Sutton - 2010 - In Charles T. Wolfe & Ofer Gal (eds.), The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge: Embodied Empiricism in Early Modern Science. Springer. pp. 243--263.
    1. The restless mind[1] Like us, early modern philosophers, both natural and moral, didn’t always understand the springs of their own actions. They didn’t want to feel everything they felt, and couldn’t trace the sources of all their thoughts and imaginings. Events from past experience come to mind again unwilled: abstract thought is interrupted by fantastical images, like the ‘winged horses, fiery dragons, and monstrous giants’ by which Hume exemplified ‘the liberty of the imagination’[2]. Then, as now, a failure to (...)
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  20. Empiricism, Time-Awareness, and Hume's Manners of Disposition.Adrian Bardon - 2007 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (1):47-63.
    The issue of time-awareness presents a critical challenge for empiricism: if temporal properties are not directly perceived, how do we become aware of them? A unique empiricist account of time-awareness suggested by Hume's comments on time in the Treatise avoids the problems characteristic of other empiricist accounts. Hume's theory, however, has some counter-intuitive consequences. The failure of empiricists to come up with a defensible theory of time-awareness lends prima facie support to a non-empiricist theory of ideas.
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  21. Filling the Gaps: Hume and Connectionism on the Continued Existence of Unperceived Objects.Mark Collier - 1999 - Hume Studies 25 (1 and 2):155-170.
    In Book I, part iv, section 2 of the Treatise, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," Hume presents two different answers to the question of how we come to believe in the continued existence of unperceived objects. He rejects his first answer shortly after its formulation, and the remainder of the section articulates an alternative account of the development of the belief. The account that Hume adopts, however, is susceptible to a number of insurmountable objections, which motivates a reassessment (...)
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  22. Hume's reflective return to the vulgar.James R. O'Shea - 1996 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4 (2):285 – 315.
    Each of the standard outlooks in the philosophy of perception --phenomenalism, direct realism, indirect realism, scepticism -- has thus been viewed as Hume's own considered position in the eyes of informed commentators. I argue that Hume does not ascribe univocally to any one of the traditional stances in the philosophy of perception, nor does he leave us only a schizophrenic or 'mood' scepticism. Hume attempted to resolve the traditional philosophical problem (or perhaps more accurately, to set it aside on principled (...)
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  23. Hume on identity: A defense.Jim Stone - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (2):275 - 282.
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Hume: Belief
  1. Hume's "General Rules".James Chamberlain - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    In this paper, I examine Hume’s account of an important class of causal belief which he calls “general rules”. I argue that he understands general rules, like all causal beliefs, as lively ideas which are habitually associated with our impressions or memories. However, I argue, he believes that they are unlike any reflectively produced causal beliefs in that they are produced quickly and automatically, such that they occur independently of any other processes of reasoning. Given this, I argue, Hume appears (...)
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  2. A New Scene of Thought: On Waldow's Experience Embodied[REVIEW]Graham Clay - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (2):211-220.
    In her book Experience Embodied, Anik Waldow challenges and reimagines the traditional interpretative approach to the concept of experience in the early modern period. Traditionally, commentators have emphasized early moderns’ views on the first-person perspective and eschewed the relevance of our embodiment to their epistemological outlooks. My focus here is on Waldow’s chapter on Hume, wherein she analyzes Hume’s account of our capacity for reflective moral judgment, arguing that he understands it as natural despite the countless ways in which our (...)
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  3. Hume and the Demands of Philosophy: Science, Skepticism, and Moderation by Nathan I. Sasser. [REVIEW]Charles Goldhaber - 2023 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 21 (3):313–17.
    Nathan Sasser's ‘purely practical reading of Hume’s response to skepticism’ is so natural and compelling that it is almost surprising that his new monograph, Hume and the Demands of Philosophy, offers its first systematic defence. I praise the book's clarity and concision, and then raise concerns about omitted topics, especially concerning Hume's views on the practical value of sceptical philosophy.
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  4. Hume's Skeptical Philosophy and the Moderation of Pride.Charles Goldhaber - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (6):621–36.
    Hume describes skeptical philosophy as having a variety of desirable effects. It can counteract dogmatism, produce just reasoning, and promote social cohesion. When discussing how skepticism may achieve these effects, Hume typically appeals to its effects on pride. I explain how, for Hume, skeptical philosophy acts on pride and how acting on pride produces the desirable effects. Understanding these mechanisms, I argue, sheds light on how, why, when, and for whom skeptical philosophy can be useful. It also illuminates the value (...)
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  5. Hume's Second Thoughts on Belief.Michael Jacovides - 2024 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 6.
    When we see the way that the parts of the Appendix concerning belief hang together, we can understand how and why Hume moved from saying that belief is a vivid idea to saying that belief is a sui generis feeling. In the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume retracts his claim that perceptions with the same object only vary with respect to vivacity. In material in the appendix that he tells his reader to insert in Book 1, he explains his reasons: (...)
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  6. Hume's Scepticism: Pyrrhonian and Academic by Peter S. Fosl. [REVIEW]Charles Goldhaber - 2020 - Hume Studies 46 (1):171-174.
    Peter Fosl's new monograph offers a bold reading of Hume as a "radical," "coherent," and "hybrid" skeptic, who draws influence from both the Pyrrhonian and Academic skeptical traditions. I press some concerns about whether Fosl's reading of Hume can accommodate his scientific ambitions.
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  7. Can Hume Deny Reid's Dilemma?Anthony Nguyen - 2017 - Hume Studies 43 (2):57-78.
    Reid’s dilemma concludes that, whether the idea associated with a denied proposition is lively or faint, Hume is committed to saying that it is either believed or merely conceived. In neither case would there be denial. If so, then Hume cannot give an adequate account of denial. I consider and reject Powell’s suggestion that Hume could have advanced a “Content Contrary” account of denial that avoids Reid’s dilemma. However, not only would a Humean Content Contrary account be viciously circular, textual (...)
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  8. Knowledge and Sensory Knowledge in Hume's Treatise.Graham Clay - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 10:195-229.
    I argue that the Hume of the Treatise maintains an account of knowledge according to which (i) every instance of knowledge must be an immediately present perception (i.e., an impression or an idea); (ii) an object of this perception must be a token of a knowable relation; (iii) this token knowable relation must have parts of the instance of knowledge as relata (i.e., the same perception that has it as an object); and any perception that satisfies (i)-(iii) is an instance (...)
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  9. Hume's Reality: A Lesson in Causality.Stefanie Rocknak - 2003 - In David G. Murray (ed.), Proceedings Metaphysics 2003 Second World Conference. Foundazione Idente di Studi e di Ricerca,.
    In Book I, III §9 of the Treatise, Hume makes the claim that “[all general] belief arises only from causation” (T 107). Following, he makes the even stronger claim that all general beliefs are to be thought of as beliefs in reality, and thus, all belief in reality is dependent on pre-established beliefs in both specific causal relations and the causal relation in general (T 108). In the first part of this paper, I explain Hume’s motivation behind both claims, while (...)
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  10. Hume's Legacy: A Cognitive Science Perspective.Mark Collier - 2018 - In Angela Michelle Coventry & Alex Sager (eds.), _The Humean Mind_. New York: Routledge. pp. 434-445.
    Hume is an experimental philosopher who attempts to understand why we think, feel, and act as we do. But how should we evaluate the adequacy of his proposals? This chapter examines Hume’s account from the perspective of interdisciplinary work in cognitive science.
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  11. Locke, Hume, and Reid on the Objects of Belief.Lewis Powell - 2018 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 35 (1):21-38.
    The goal of this paper is show how an initially appealing objection to David Hume's account of judgment can only be put forward by philosophers who accept an account of judgment that has its own sizable share of problems. To demonstrate this, I situate the views of John Locke, David Hume, and Thomas Reid with respect to each other, so as to illustrate how the appealing objection is linked to unappealing features of Locke's account of judgment.
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  12. Hume's scepticism regarding reason.John Asquith - 2016 - Dissertation, Oxford Brookes University
    There is a tradition perhaps as old as philosophy itself which sees the rationality of man – and in particular, the rationality of the philosopher - as both his essential and his redeeming characteristic; it can not unfairly be said that the discipline of philosophy at least is characterised by its dependence on reason. In this context, the philosophy of David Hume presents something of a stark challenge: Although interpretations vary as to the extent and nature of his scepticism, one (...)
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  13. Response to My Critics (The Sydney Sessions).Stefanie Rocknak - 2022 - Hume Studies 45 (1):77-93.
    Response to Don Baxter, Don Garrett and Jennifer Marusic regarding my book Imagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects; initially delivered at the 2016 Hume Conference in Sydney, Australia as part of the Author Meets Critics session.
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  14. Hume’s Doxastic Involuntarism.Hsueh Qu - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):53-92.
    In this paper, I examine three mutually inconsistent claims that are commonly attributed to Hume: all beliefs are involuntary; some beliefs are subject to normative appraisal; and that ‘Ought implies Can’. I examine the textual support for such ascription, and the options for dealing with the puzzle posed by their inconsistency. In what follows I will put forward some evidence that Hume maintains each of the three positions outlined above. I then examine what I call the ‘prior voluntary action’ solution. (...)
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  15. Hume.Fabian Dorsch - 2016 - In Amy Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination. New York: Routledge. pp. 40-54.
    This chapter overviews Hume’s thoughts on the nature and role of imagining and focusses primarily on three important distinctions that Hume draws among our conscious mental episodes: (i) between impressions and ideas; (ii) between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination; and (iii), among the ideas of the imagination, between ideas of the judgement and ideas of the fancy. In addition, the chapter considers Hume’s views on the imagination as a faculty of producing ideas, as well as on (...)
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  16. Frederick Schmitt, Hume's Epistemology in the Treatise: A Veritistic Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 448 pp. £55.00 hb. ISBN 9780199683116. [REVIEW]Stefanie Rocknak - 2015 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 13 (2):152-158.
    In this book, Schmitt claims that Hume, however implicitly, employs a fully-developed epistemology in the Treatise. In particular, Hume employs a “veritistic” epistemology, i.e. one that is grounded in truth, particularly, true beliefs. In some cases, these true beliefs are “certain,” are “infallible” (78) and are justified, as in the case of knowledge, i.e. demonstrations. In other cases, we acquire these beliefs through a reliable method, i.e. when they are produced by causal proofs. Such beliefs are also “certain” (69, 81) (...)
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  17. The Normativity of Experience and Causal Belief in Hume’s Treatise.Miren Boehm - 2014 - Hume Studies 39 (2):203-231.
    What is the source of normativity in Hume’s account of causal reasoning? In virtue of what are causal beliefs justified for Hume? To answer these questions, the literature appeals, almost invariably, to custom or some feature thereof. I argue, in contrast, that causal beliefs are justified for Hume because they issue from experience. Although he denies experience the title of justifying reason, for Hume experience has normative authority. I offer an interpretation of the source and nature of the normativity of (...)
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  18. Deleuze Transcendental Empiricism as Exercise of Thought: Hume’s Case.Emilian Margarit - 2012 - Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 4 (2):377-403.
    This paper aims to clarify the program of Deleuze’s work on Hume’s philosophy. Also, I plan to make clear the operational meaning of Deleuze’s own hallmark regarding his approaches to philosophy. I start to follow Deleuze’s plot by engendering three functions of his interpretation of Hume’s Treatise that will be the area of three thematic chapters. The first tries to sort the polemical function of empiricism that is launched through Deleuze’s Hume; the second attempts to figure the domain of subjectivity (...)
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  19. The Meanings of “Imagine” Part II: Attitude and Action.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (11):791-802.
    In this Part II, I investigate different approaches to the question of what makes imagining different from belief. I find that the sentiment-based approach of David Hume falls short, as does the teleological approach, once advocated by David Velleman. I then consider whether the inferential properties of beliefs and imaginings may differ. Beliefs, I claim, exhibit an anti-symmetric inferential governance over imaginings: they are the background that makes inference from one imagining to the other possible; the reverse is not true, (...)
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  20. Hume's Treatment of Denial in the Treatise.Lewis Powell - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.
    David Hume fancied himself the Newton of the mind, aiming to reinvent the study of human mental life in the same way that Newton had revolutionized physics. And it was his view that the novel account of belief he proposed in his Treatise of Human Nature was one of that work’s central philosophical contributions. From the earliest responses to the Treatise forward, however, there was deep pessimism about the prospects for his account. It is easy to understand the source of (...)
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  21. The Innateness Charge: Conception and Belief for Reid and Hume.Catherine Kemp - 2000 - Reid Studies 3 (2):43.
    Hume's notion of conception is closer to Reid's than Reid realizes and may lie behind Hume's charge in the letter to Hugh Blair (1762) that Reid's philosophy "leads us back to innate ideas".
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  22. Constancy and Coherence in 1.4.2 of Hume’s Treatise: The Root of “Indirect” Causation and Hume’s Position on Objects.Stefanie Rocknak - 2013 - The European Legacy (4):444-456.
    This article shows that in 1.4.2.15-24 of the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume presents his own position on objects, which is to be distinguished from both the vulgar and philosophical conception of objects. Here, Hume argues that objects that are effectively imagined to have a “perfect identity” are imagined due to the constancy and coherence of our perceptions (what we may call ‘level 1 constancy and coherence’). In particular, we imagine that objects cause such perceptions, via what I call ‘indirect (...)
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  23. (1 other version)A natureza da filosofia de Hume.Jaimir Conte - 2010 - Princípios 17 (28):211-236.
    Meu objetivo neste artigo é destacar algumas das ideias centrais defendidas por Hume e, a fim de caracterizar a natureza de sua filosofia, contrapor duas interpretações frequentes de sua obra: a interpretação cética e interpretação naturalista. A fim de apontar as principais razões que estão por trás dessas duas interpretações que tentam apreender a natureza da filosofia de Hume, procuro abordar inicialmente alguns dos princípios centrais da teoria humeana e, em seguida, especialmente sua análise das inferências causais. No final, argumento (...)
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  24. (1 other version)Husserl’s Phenomenologization of Hume: Reflections on Husserl’s Method of Epoché.Stefanie Rocknak - 2001 - Philosophy Today 45 (5):28-36.
    This paper argues that Husserl’s method is partially driven by an attempt to avoid certain absurdities inherent in Hume’s epistemology. In this limited respect, we may say that Hume opened the door to phenomenology, but as a sacrificial lamb. However, Hume was well aware of his self-defeating position, and perhaps, in some respects, the need for an alternative. Moreover, Hume’s “mistakes” may have incited Husserl’s discovery of the epoche, and thus, transcendental phenomenology.
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  25. General Rules and the Justification of Probable Belief in Hume’s Treatise.Jack C. Lyons - 2001 - Hume Studies 27 (2):247-278.
    An examination of the role played by general rules in Hume's positive (nonskeptical) epistemology. General rules for Hume are roughly just general beliefs. The difference between justified and unjustified belief is a matter of the influence of good versus bad general rules, the good general rules being the "extensive" and "constant" ones.
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  26. Probability and skepticism about reason in Hume's treatise.Antonia Lolordo - 2000 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (3):419 – 446.
    This paper attempts to reconstruct Hume's argument in Treatise 1.4.1, 'Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason'.
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Hume: Consciousness
  1. A Precis of Consciousness, Time, and Scepticism in Hume's Thought[REVIEW]Lorne Falkenstein - manuscript
    This is a brief overview of the main topics and conclusions of my book, _Consciousness, Time, and Scepticism in Hume's Thought_ (Routledge, 2024).
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