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  1. The Active Powers of the Human Mind.Ruth Boeker - 2023 - In Aaron Garrett & James A. Harris (eds.), Scottish Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, Volume II: Method, Metaphysics, Mind, Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 255–292.
    This essay traces the development of the philosophical debates concerning active powers and human agency in eighteenth-century Scotland. I examine how and why Scottish philosophers such as Francis Hutcheson, George Turnbull, David Hume, and Henry Home, Lord Kames, depart from John Locke’s and other traditional conceptions of the will and how Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart reinstate Locke’s distinction between volition and desire. Moreover, I examine what role desires, passions, and motives play in the writings of these and other Scottish (...)
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  2. Liberty and Suspension in Locke's Essay.Matthew A. Leisinger - 2022 - Locke Studies 21:26–55.
    I argue for two controversial claims about Locke’s account of liberty in Essay 2.21. The first claim is that Locke does not identify liberty with freedom of action. Instead, Locke places further conditions on liberty beyond to the power to perform or forbear an action at will. The second (and closely related) claim is that Locke takes the power to suspend and examine desire to be necessary for liberty—in other words, that possession of the power to suspend and examine desire (...)
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  3. Locke's Moral Psychology.Ruth Boeker - 2021 - In Jessica Gordon-Roth & Shelley Weinberg (eds.), The Lockean Mind. New York, NY: Routledge.
    In this chapter, I discuss Locke’s contributions to moral psychology. I begin by examining how we acquire moral ideas, according to Locke. Next, I ask what explains why we act morally. I address this question by showing how Locke reconciles hedonist views concerning moral motivation with his commitment to divine law theory. Then I turn to Shaftesbury’s criticism that Locke’s moral view is a self-interested moral theory that undermines virtue. In response to the criticism I draw attention to Locke’s Christian (...)
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  4. The modern guise of the good.Francesco Orsi - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (1):1-4.
    The guise of the good is the claim that whatever I desire or intentionally do is seen by me as good in some respect. Historical scholarship has so far predominantly focused on ancient and medieval...
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  5. Locke’s Diagnosis of Akrasia.Matthew A. Leisinger - 2020 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 2 (1):6.
    I argue for a new interpretation of Locke’s account of akrasia. On this interpretation, akrasia occurs on Locke’s account because certain cognitive biases endemic to the human mind dispose us to privilege present over future happiness. As a result, we end up irrationally pursuing present pleasure and the removal of present pain even as we simultaneously judge that doing so runs contrary to our own greater good. In this sense, I argue that Locke seeks to diagnose akrasia by identifying its (...)
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  6. Locke’s arguments against the freedom to will.Matthew A. Leisinger - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (4):642-662.
    In sections 2.21.23-25 of An Essay concerning Human Understanding, John Locke considers and rejects two ways in which we might be “free to will”, which correspond to the Thomistic distinction between freedom of exercise and freedom of specification. In this paper, I examine Locke’s arguments in detail. In the first part, I argue for a non-developmental reading of Locke’s argument against freedom of exercise. Locke’s view throughout all five editions of the Essay is that we do not possess freedom of (...)
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  7. Locke and Leibniz on Freedom and Necessity.Idan Shimony & Yekutiel Shoham - 2016 - In Wenchao Li (ed.), Für Unser Glück oder das Glück Anderer: Vortrage des X. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses, vol. 5. Olms. pp. Vol. 1, 573-588.
    Locke and Leibniz are often classified as proponents of compatibilist theories of human freedom, since both maintain that freedom is consistent with determinism and that the difference between being and not being free turns on how one is determined. However, we will argue in this paper that their versions of compatibilism are essentially different and that they have significantly distinct commitments to compatibilism. To this end, we will first analyze the definitions and examples for freedom and necessity that Locke and (...)
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  8. Locke on the Power to Suspend.Julie Walsh - 2014 - Locke Studies 14:121-157.
    My aim in this paper is to determine how Locke understands suspension and the role it plays in his view of human liberty. To this end I, 1) discuss the deficiencies of the first edition version of ‘Of Power’ and why Locke needed to include the ability to suspend in the second edition, then 2) analyze Locke’s definitions of the power to suspend with a focus on his use of the terms ‘source’, ‘hinge’, and ‘inlet’ to describe the power. I (...)
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  9. Reply to Rickless.Antonia LoLordo - 2013 - Locke Studies 13:53-62.
    This is my response to Sam Rickless's review article on my book, Locke's Moral Man.
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  10. 'Things for Actions': Locke's Mistake in 'Of Power'.Julie Walsh - 2010 - Locke Studies 10:85-94.
    In a letter to William Molyneux John Locke states that in reviewing his chapter 'Of Power' for the second edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding he noticed that he had made one mistake which, now corrected, has put him "into a new view of things" which will clarify his account of human freedom. Locke says the mistake was putting “things for actions” on p.123 of the first edition, a page on which the word 'things' does not appear (The Correspondence (...)
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  11. Locke’s compatibilism: Suspension of desire or suspension of determinism?Charles T. Wolfe - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harry Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility. MIT Press.
    In Book II, chapter xxi of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, on ‘Power’, Locke presents a radical critique of free will. This is the longest chapter in the Essay, and it is a difficult one, not least since Locke revised it four times without always taking care to ensure that every part cohered with the rest. My interest is to work out a coherent statement of what would today be termed ‘compatibilism’ from this text – namely, a doctrine which seeks (...)
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  12. Review of Yaffe's Liberty Worth the Name. [REVIEW]S. Rickless - 2001 - Locke Studies 1:235-55.
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  13. John Locke ja G. W. Leibniz heikkotahtoisuudesta.Markku Roinila - 1998 - Ajatus 55:37-56.
    This paper discusses the topic of weakenss of the will or akrasia in Leibniz, especially in the context of Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain. I argue that Leibniz can be seen as supporting both the weak and the strong forms of akrasia in book II of the work.
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  14. Making Sense of Locke’s Confession.Andrea Guardo - manuscript
    After having given in the "Essay" a definition of freedom which straightforwardly entails its compatibility with – among other things – God's foreknowledge, Locke surprisingly writes in a 1693 letter to Molyneux that he does not see how human liberty can coexist with divine prescience. I argue that the confession to Molyneux can be made consistent with the "Essay"'s definition by embracing the view that the problem Locke had in mind when he drafted it was not a problem concerning the (...)
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