- The Inconceivability Argument.Brian Cutter - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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Fred’s red: on the objectivity and physicality of mental qualities.Sam Coleman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-27.details
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Not All Structure and Dynamics are Equal.Garrett Mindt - 2021 - Entropy 23 (9).details
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Consciousness and Categorical Properties.Christopher Devlin Brown - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):365-387.details
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Spatiotemporal functionalism v. the conceivability of zombies.David J. Chalmers - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):488-497.details
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Russellian Physicalism and its Dilemma.Lok-Chi Chan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178:2043-2062.details
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Fundamental mentality in a physical world.Christopher Devlin Brown - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2841-2860.details
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The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Chalmers v Chalmers.Daniel Stoljar - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):469-487.details
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Reducing Uncertainty: Understanding the Information-Theoretic Origins of Consciousness.Garrett Mindt - 2020 - Dissertation, Central European Universitydetails
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Russellian Physicalism, Phenomenal Concepts, and Revelation.Christopher Devlin Brown - forthcoming - Philosophia.details
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Neo-Naturalism, Conciliatory Explanations, and Spatiotemporal Surprises.Uziel Awret - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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Answering the Difference-Maker Problem for Russellian Physicalism.Christopher Devlin Brown - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (3):1111-1127.details
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(1 other version) Dualism: How Epistemic Issues Drive Debates About the Ontology of Consciousness.Brie Gertler - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Russellian monism and mental causation.Torin Alter & Sam Coleman - 2019 - Noûs 55 (2):409-425.details
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Russellian Monism and Structuralism About Physics.Torin Alter & Derk Pereboom - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1409-1428.details
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The Compatibility of the Structure-and-Dynamics Argument and Phenomenal Functionalism about Space.Luke Roelofs - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):44-52.details
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Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Russellian Monism and Ignorance of Non-structural Properties.Justin Mendelow - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-28.details
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Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood.Janko Nešić - 2022 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 35 (3):243-259.details
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A Relativistic Theory of Consciousness.Nir Lahav & Zachariah A. Neemeh - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.details
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Powerful qualities, the conceivability argument and the nature of the physical.Henry Taylor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1895-1910.details
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An Argument for Micropsychism: If There is a Conscious Whole, There Must be Conscious Parts.Arjen Rookmaaker - 2024 - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy 38 (1-2):57-90.details
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Against the Middle Ground: Why Russellian Monism is Unstable.Brian Cutter - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (2):109-129.details
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Powerful Qualities, Phenomenal Concepts, and the New Challenge to Physicalism.Henry Taylor - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):53-66.details
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Qualia: The Knowledge Argument.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2002 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Binding Problem for Strong Experiential Monism.Santtu Heikkinen - 2022 - Sophia 61 (4):795-809.details
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