The hypothesis of a theoretical unity between On Sophistical Refutations and Prior Analytics presents a major challenge to scholars attempting to unify the criteria of analysis. This paper examines this problem and proposes a middle ground between the perspectives of Woods and Boger to address this crucial question: If a unitary and coherent theory of deduction exists, why does not the technical apparatus of syllogistic modes for analyzing fallacies appear in SE? This paper makes useful contributions to the discussion on (...) the internal unity of Aristotle's logical writings on around categorical syllogistics and the doctrine of sophistical refutations. (shrink)

I discuss the exact meaning of the thesis according to which the object of scientific knowledge is necessary. The thesis is expressed by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics, in his definition of scientific knowledge. The traditional interpretation understands this definition as depending on two parallel and independent requirements, the causality requirement and the necessity requirement. Against this interpretation, I try to show, through the examination of several passages that refer to the definition of scientific knowledge, that the necessity requirement specifies (...) more exactly the causality requirement: what cannot be otherwise is the explanatory relation between the explanandum and the cause by which it is what it is. (shrink)

This is a translation, made by myself, of the paper to be published in Portuguese in the journal Discurso, 2020, in honour of the late professor Oswaldo Porchat. I discuss what Aristotle was trying to encode when he said that the object of scientific knowledge is necessary, or that what we know (scientifically) cannot be otherwise etc. The paper is meant as a continuation of previous papers—orientated towards a book on the Posterior Analytics—and thus does not discuss in much detail (...) key passages, as the very definition of scientific knowledge in APo I.2, or passages from APo I.4 and I.6 (for these, I refer to my previous papers). This paper is mainly focused on Aristotle’s references to his notion of scientific knowledge both in other passages from the APo and in other treatises. I intend to show that there is a progressive, intrinsic relation between the two requirements by which scientific knowledge is defined. It is not true that each of these requirements stems from a different source. The Causal-Explanatory requirements gives Aristotle the general heading. Then, the Necessity Requirement ranges over the explanatory relation between explanans and explanandum and thereby specifies what sort of cause is sctricly required for having scientific knowledge of a given explanandum. Now, Aristotle was also concerned with the necessary truth of the elemental predications that constitute a demonstration. My claim that the Necessity Requirement ranges over the explanatory relation does not ignore that concern, and does not deny it. My claim is that Aristotle’s main focus, and main concern, consists in stressing that the explanatory factor to be captured in scientific knowledge of a given explanandum is such that cannot be otherwise. (shrink)

Our object of study in this dissertation is the paralogism due to the concomitant ( which we’ll call abreviated “PDC”). This paralogism is analysed by Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations as a false argument. Our study about this paralogismo is divided into four chapters. Trough the first chapter we pretend to answer an important question about the PDC’s appearance. Although this paralogism is a false argument, it possess certain similarity with arguments recognized as good by the one refuted. This similarity (...) would be the reason why debaters are refuted by the PDC. Identifying the nature of this similarity is relevant to comprehend how this paralogism’s appearance can be deceitful. The content of the second chapter can be better undestood as a deepening of our interest for the subjective or psychological dimension present in the studies about the paralogisms in the Sophistical Refutations. This deepening results in the description of a mental phenomenon which we call “parallel computation”. The parallel computation consists in a rational effort (although it is a misguided one) by the one who is refuted when he tries to make sense of the logical and semantical traits of an argument. This interpretation is motivated by a set of false presumptions held by the refuted one. In the third chapter we present a case study, turning our attention to an instance of the PDC, the triangle paralogism. By studying the relevant passages for the interpretation of this paralogism we put forward what we understand to be exegetical constraints. Afterward, making use of these constraints as evaluative parameters, we analyse some reconstitution proposals of the triangle paralogism. In the final part of our dissertation we analyse the content of the chapter 24 of SE. In this chapter Aristotle presents us with a inferential principle which isn’t satisfied by any of the PDC’s instance. The interpretation of this principle is a cause of huge controversy in the secondary literature. In order to make a contribution to the specialized debate of this point we test two interpretative hyphotesis of this principle’s content, the referential and the intensional interpretation. (shrink)

Our aim is to argue for a deflationary interpretation of Aristotelian dialectic in the Topics, showing that dialectic is, for Aristotle, a specific sort of regulated debate, in contrast to a widely spread kind of interpretation which conceives dialectic as a method of philosophical investigation. Our claim is that an analysis carefully conducted of certain key texts does provide us with sufficient evidences for defending that the Topics is a handbook which codifies an existent art. This codification has a descriptive (...) character and reveals the rules of the debate, what is the specific kind of argument used in it, how premises are obtained and the predicative relation of the propositions used by the debaters. The mastery of the techniques required by the debate is not grounded in any sort of particular knowledge, rather in linguistic competence. It is by doing a technical usage of this competence that the Topics can be useful for philosophy. (shrink)