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Bent Not Broken: Why Exemplification Simpliciter Remains a Problem for Eternalist Endurantism.Daniel Giberman - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):947-966.details
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The Identity Theory of Powers Revised.Joaquim Giannotti - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):603-621.details
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Powers, Processes, and Time.Giacomo Giannini - 2021 - Erkenntnis (6):1-25.details
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New powers for Dispositionalism.Giacomo Giannini - 2021 - Synthese 199:2671-2700.details
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Fundamentality and minimalist grounding laws.Joaquim Giannotti - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2993-3017.details
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Why Correspondence Truth Will Not Go Away.Gerald Vision - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (1):104-131.details
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A liberal conception of multiple realizability.Eric Funkhouser - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):467-494.details
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Second-order relations and nomic regularities.Toby Friend - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (10):3089-3107.details
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Laws are conditionals.Toby Friend - 2016 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (1):123-144.details
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Truthmakers (are indexed combinations).Wolfgang Freitag - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):228-248.details
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Mathematics as a science of non-abstract reality: Aristotelian realist philosophies of mathematics.James Franklin - 2022 - Foundations of Science 27 (2):327-344.details
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Review of Keith Hossack, Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number: What Numbers Are and How They Are Known. [REVIEW]James Franklin - 2022 - Philosophia Mathematica 30 (1):127-129.details
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Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Vol. 5. [REVIEW]Graeme A. Forbes - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):571-577.details
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Operators Solve the Many Categories Problem with Universals.Peter Forrest - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (5):747-762.details
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Fictional Possibilities Grounded in Foundational Nominalism.Peter Forrest - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):1-16.details
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Exemplification and Parthood.Peter Forrest - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (2):323-341.details
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Plurals and Mereology.Salvatore Florio & David Nicolas - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (3):415-445.details
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The 'requirement of total evidence' and its role in phylogenetic systematics.Kirk Fitzhugh - 2006 - Biology and Philosophy 21 (3):309-351.details
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Phylogenetic Inference and the Misplaced Premise of Substitution Rates.Kirk Fitzhugh - 2021 - Acta Biotheoretica 69 (4):799-819.details
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Structural universals.A. R. J. Fisher - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (10):e12518.details
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Priority monism, partiality, and minimal truthmakers.A. R. J. Fisher - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):477-491.details
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Musical Works as Structural Universals.A. R. J. Fisher - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1245-67.details
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Monismo anômalo: uma reconstrução e revisão da literatura.Marcelo Fischborn - 2014 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 18 (1):53-66.details
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Instantiation in Trope Theory.A. R. J. Fisher - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2):153-164.details
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Donald C. Williams’s defence of real metaphysics.A. R. J. Fisher - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (2):332-355.details
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C.D. Broad on Things and Processes: A Process Ontology of Tropes.A. R. J. Fisher - 2022 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 39 (4):385-406.details
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Against libertarianism.Alicia Finch - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):475-493.details
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An argument against nominalism.Francesco Maria Ferrari - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.details
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Is Mereology Ontologically Innocent? Well, it Depends….Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):395-424.details
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The Bundle Theory is compatible with distinct but indiscernible particulars.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):72-81.details
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To B- or not to B- a relation.Robert E. Pezet - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):635-654.details
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The Problem of Temporal Unity: an Examination of the Problem and Case Study on Ersatzer Presentism.Robert E. Pezet - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):791-821.details
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An Explanatory Virtue for Endurantist Presentism.Robert E. Pezet - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):157-182.details
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Property Reductive Emergent Dualism.Jeff Engelhardt - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):63-75.details
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Interactive, Inclusive Substance Dualism.Jeff Engelhardt - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1149-1165.details
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Emergent Substances, Physical Properties, Action Explanations.Jeff Engelhardt - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (6):1125-1146.details
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Dispositions manifest themselves: an identity theory of properties.Kristina Engelhard - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13497-13522.details
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Actualism, Presentism and the Grounding Objection.Nina Emery - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (1):23-43.details
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The really big questions.Brian Ellis, Phil Dowe, Brian Skyrms & John Forge - 1999 - Metascience 8 (1):63-85.details
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On the Phenomenon of “Dog- Wise Arrangement”.Crawford L. Elder - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):132–155.details
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On the Phenomenon of “Dog‐Wise Arrangement”.Crawford L. Elder - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):132-155.details
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On the Reality and Causal Efficacy of Familiar Objects.Crawford L. Elder - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):737-749.details
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Physicalism and the fallacy of composition.Crawford L. Elder - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):332-43.details
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Mental causation versus physical causation: No contest.Crawford L. Elder - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):110-127.details
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Against universal mereological composition.Crawford Elder - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):433-454.details
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Property counterparts and natural class trope nominalism.Douglas Ehring - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):443 – 463.details
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Twenty-one arguments against propensity analyses of probability.Antony Eagle - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (3):371–416.details
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Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.details
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Why pan-dispositionalism is incompatible with metaphysical naturalism.Travis Dumsday - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78 (1):107-122.details
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