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Don’t know, don’t care?Zoë A. Johnson King - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):413-431.details
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Moral and Factual Ignorance: a Quality of Will Parity.Anna Hartford - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (5):1087-1102.details
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Moral responsibility and manipulation: on a novel argument against historicism.Alfred R. Mele - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3143-3154.details
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Satisficing Consequentialism Still Doesn't Satisfy.Joe Slater - 2020 - Utilitas 32 (1):108-117.details
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Guidance, epistemic filters, and non‐accidental ought‐doing.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):172-183.details
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Nietzsche and Moral Psychology.Daniel Telech & Brian Leiter - 2016 - In Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 103-115.details
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Beyond accuracy: Epistemic flaws with statistical generalizations.Jessie Munton - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):228-240.details
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The epistemic condition for moral responsibility.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason, by Susanne Mantel.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):983-990.details
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One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):302-317.details
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The Moral Worth of Intentional Actions.Laura Tomlinson - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):704-723.details
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Aiming for Moral Mediocrity.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (3):347-368.details
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Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason, by Susanne Mantel. Review for Mind. [REVIEW]Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Mind.details
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Requirements of intention in light of belief.Carlos Núñez - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2471-2492.details
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Active desire.Uku Tooming - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):945-968.details
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Manipulation and constitutive luck.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2381-2394.details
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Nonhuman Animals Are Morally Responsible.Asia Ferrin - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):135-154.details
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Animals and the agency account of moral status.Marc G. Wilcox - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1879-1899.details
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What Should we Believe About Free Will?Jeremy Byrd - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):505-522.details
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Implicit bias.Michael Brownstein - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Essays in Philosophical Moral Psychology.Antti Kauppinen - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Helsinkidetails
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Why Cognitive Sciences Do Not Prove That Free Will Is an Epiphenomenon.Andrea Lavazza - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.details
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Moral Hedging and Responding to Reasons.Amelia Hicks - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):765-789.details
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Rightly or for Ill: The Ethics of Individual Memory.Alison Reiheld - 2018 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 28 (4):377-410.details
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Negligence: its moral significance.Santiago Amaya - 2022 - In Manuel Vargas & John Doris (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.details
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Quality of Reasons and Degrees of Responsibility.Hannah Tierney - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):661-672.details
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Accidentally Doing the Right Thing.Zoe Johnson King - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):186-206.details
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Free actions as a natural kind.Oisín Deery - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):823-843.details
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Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Cameron Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
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Cruel jokes and normative competence.David Shoemaker - 2018 - Social Philosophy and Policy 35 (1):173-195.details
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The Predicament of Choice.Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12. Oxford University Press. pp. 294-313.details
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Moral Diversity and Moral Responsibility.Brian Kogelmann & Robert H. Wallace - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (3):371-389.details
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Sentimentalism about Moral Understanding.Nathan Robert Howard - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1065-1078.details
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Making Do Without : A Response to Arpaly, Tiberius, and Kane.John M. Doris - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):771-790.details
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Responsibility for Reason-Giving: The Case of Individual Tainted Reasoning in Systemic Corruption.Emanuela Ceva & Lubomira Radoilska - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):789-809.details
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Consequentialism and Moral Worth.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (2):117-136.details
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Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
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Recklessness and Uncertainty: Jackson Cases and Merely Apparent Asymmetry.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (4):391-413.details
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La teoría de la ética triuna: premisas básicas e implicaciones.Darcia Narváez - 2010 - Postconvencionales: Ética, Universidad, Democracia 2:74-96.details
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Accountability and the thoughts in reactive attitudes.Jada Twedt Strabbing - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3121-3140.details
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Implicit attitudes and the ability argument.Wesley Buckwalter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2961-2990.details
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Manipulation and Degrees of Blameworthiness.Martin Montminy & Daniel Tinney - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (3-4):265-281.details
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Responsibility Beyond Belief: The Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility.Christopher Michael Cloos - 2018 - Dissertation, details
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Agency, Teleological Control and Robust Causation.Marius Usher - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):302-324.details
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Agency regarding our reasons.Patrick Fleming - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):136-157.details
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Précis of Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind.Joshua May - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42 (e146):1-60.details
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Straight Thinking in Warped Environments.Endre Begby - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):489-500.details
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Respect and the reality of apparent reasons.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3129-3156.details
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An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.details
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