- Deliberation and Acting for Reasons.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):209-239.details
|
|
Duty, Desire and the Good Person: Towards a Non‐Aristotelian Account of Virtue.Nomy Arpaly - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):59-74.details
|
|
Book Forum on In Praise of Desire.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (2):425-432.details
|
|
Supererogation and Intentions of the Agent.Alfred Archer - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (2):447-462.details
|
|
Evil and moral detachment: further reflections on The Mirror Thesis.Alfred Archer - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (2):201-218.details
|
|
Deliberative Sincerity and the Opacity of the Self.Erik A. Anderson - 2020 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (3):422-440.details
|
|
Slips.Santiago Amaya - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):559-576.details
|
|
Character and Environment: The Status of Virtues in Organizations.Miguel Alzola - 2008 - Journal of Business Ethics 78 (3):343-357.details
|
|
Being Sympathetic to Bad-History Wrongdoers.Craig K. Agule - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1):147-169.details
|
|
Justice for Children: Autonomy Development and the State.Harry Adams - 2008 - State University of New York Press.details
|
|
Forgiveness and Moral Luck.Daniel Telech - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.details
|
|
Explaining away epistemic skepticism about culpability.Gunnar Björnsson - 2013 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 141–164.details
|
|
Autonomy and Depression.Lubomira Radoilska - 2012 - In K. W. M. Fulford (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press. pp. 1155-1170.details
|
|
Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Cameron Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
|
|
Irrational Intentionality.Benjamin L. S. Nelson - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Autonomy and Mental Health.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2022 - In Ben Colburn (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Autonomy. New York, NY: Routledge.details
|
|
Self-control, Attention, and How to live without Special Motivational Powers.Sebastian Watzl - 2022 - In M. Brent & Lisa Miracchi (eds.), Mental Action and the Conscious Mind. Routledge. pp. 272-300.details
|
|
"Acting on" instead of" stepping back": Hegel's conception of the relation between motivations and the free will.Christopher Yeomans - 2010 - Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 15 (cialidad y subjetividad humanas):377-387.details
|
|
Know How and Acts of Faith.Paulina Sliwa - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 246-263.details
|
|
The Problem of Morally Repugnant Beliefs.Declan Smithies - 2023 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics, volume 18. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 218-241.details
|
|
Nietzsche’s Humean (all-too-Humean) Theory of Motivation.Neil Sinhababu - 2018 - In The Nietzchean Mind. Routledge. pp. 161-176.details
|
|
Actual Control - Demodalising Free Will.David Heering - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
|
|
The Epistemic Condition.Daniel J. Miller - 2023 - In Maximilian Kiener (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Responsibility. Routledge.details
|
|
Autonomy, Oppression, and Respect.Andrea Wilson - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherstdetails
|
|
Communicating Praise.Daniel Telech - 2023 - In Maximilian Kiener (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Responsibility. Routledge.details
|
|
Embracing Incoherence.Claire Field - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-29.details
|
|
Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
What does incommensurability tell us about agency?Luke Elson - 2021 - In Henrik Andersson & Anders Herlitz (eds.), Value Incommensurability: Ethics, Risk. And Decision-Making. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 181-198.details
|
|
Agency and Mistakes.Santiago Amaya - 2022 - In Luca Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 149-150.details
|
|
Attributionist Theories of Moral Responsibility.Matthew Talbert - 2022 - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 50-70.details
|
|
Respecting each other and taking responsibility for our biases.Elinor Mason - 2018 - In Marina Oshana, Katrina Hutchison & Catriona Mackenzie (eds.), Social Dimensions of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oup Usa.details
|
|
Negligence: its moral significance.Santiago Amaya - 2022 - In Manuel Vargas & John Doris (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
A Plea for Epistemic Excuses.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant Fabian Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Nonhuman Moral Agency: A Practice-Focused Exploration of Moral Agency in Nonhuman Animals and Artificial Intelligence.Dorna Behdadi - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburgdetails
|
|
The Philosophy of Online Manipulation.Michael Klenk & Fleur Jongepier (eds.) - 2022 - Routledge.details
|
|
The effective and ethical development of artificial intelligence: An opportunity to improve our wellbeing.James Maclaurin, Toby Walsh, Neil Levy, Genevieve Bell, Fiona Wood, Anthony Elliott & Iven Mareels - 2019 - Melbourne VIC, Australia: Australian Council of Learned Academies.details
|
|
Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind.Joshua May - 2018 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.details
|
|
Difficult Cases and the Epistemic Justification of Moral Belief.Joshua Schechter - 2017 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12.details
|
|
The Goals of Moral Worth.Nathan Robert Howard - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.details
|
|
The Philosophy of Generative Linguistics.Peter Ludlow - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Autonomy as an Ideal for Neuro-Atypical Agency: Lessons from Bipolar Disorder.Elliot Porter - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Kentdetails
|
|
A Disjunctive Account of Desire.Kael McCormack - 2022 - Dissertation, University of New South Walesdetails
|
|
Natural Compatibilists Should Be Theological Compatibilists.Taylor Cyr - forthcoming - In Peter Furlong & Leigh Vicens (eds.), Theological Determinism: New Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 119-132.details
|
|
Creditworthiness and Matching Principles.Jonathan Way - 2017 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 7. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The epistemic condition for moral responsibility.Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Reasons for action: Internal vs. external.Stephen Finlay & Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Moral responsibility.Andrew Eshleman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Autonomy in moral and political philosophy.John Christman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Implicit bias.Michael Brownstein - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|