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The virtue of curiosity

Episteme 17 (1):105-120 (2020)

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  1. Intellectual Virtues and the Epistemic Value of Truth.Duncan Pritchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5515-5528.
    The idea that truth is the fundamental epistemic good is explained and defended. It is argued that this proposal has been prematurely rejected on grounds that are both independently problematic and which also turn on an implausible way of understanding the proposal. A more compelling account of what it means for truth to be the fundamental epistemic good is then developed, one that treats the intellectual virtues, and thereby virtuous inquiry, as the primary theoretical notion.
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  • The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility.Mark Alfano, Michael Patrick Lynch & Alessandra Tanesini (eds.) - 2021 - Routledge.
    Humility is a vital aspect of political discussion, social media and self-help, whilst recent empirical research has linked humility to improved well-being, open-mindedness and increased accuracy in assessing persuasive messages. It is also a topic central to research and discussion in philosophy, applied ethics and religious studies. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility is the first collection to present a comprehensive overview the philosophy of humility, whilst also covering important interdisciplinary topics. Comprising forty-one chapters by an international team of (...)
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  • A Novel Understanding of the Nature of Epistemic Vice.Alkis Kotsonis - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-16.
    My aim in this paper is to present and discuss a novel understanding of the nature of epistemic vice. I highlight that epistemic vice such as excessive curiosity, gossip and excessive inquisitiveness do not obstruct the acquisition, transmission and retention of knowledge and are not characterized by a deficiency of epistemic desires or vicious epistemic motivations. However, I argue that such traits ought to be classified as epistemic vices because the agent who possesses them causes epistemic harm to other agents (...)
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  • Beyond the Basics of Emotions.Paul Bloomfield - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 3 (1):24-30.
    While emotions can play positive, contributory roles in our cognition and our lives, they frequently have the opposite effect. Michael Brady’s otherwise excellent introduction to the topic of emotion is unbalanced because he does not attend to harms emotions cause. The basic problem is that emotions have a normative aspect: they can be justified or unjustified and Brady does not attend to this. An example of this is Brady’s discussion of curiosity as the emotional motivation for knowledge. More importantly, while (...)
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  • The Curious Case of the Excellent Gossiper.Alkis Kotsonis - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-16.
    My main aim in this paper is to examine whether gossip should be categorized as an epistemically valuable character trait. Gossip satisfies the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for an acquired character trait to be classified as an intellectual virtue under the responsibilist understanding of the concept of virtue. The excellent gossiper is motivated to acquire epistemic goods through gossiping, reliably successful in acquiring epistemic goods through gossiping, competent at the activity of gossiping and good at judging when, with whom (...)
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