Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Moral Judgments, Cognitivism and the Dispositional Nature of Belief: Why Moral Peer Intransigence is Intelligible.John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-14.
    Richard Rowland has recently argued that considerations based on moral disagreement between epistemic peers give us reason to think that cognitivism about moral judgments, i.e., the thesis that moral judgments are beliefs, is false. The novelty of Rowland’s argument is to tweak the problem descriptively, i.e., not focusing on what one ought to do, but on what disputants actually do in the light of peer disagreement. The basic idea is that moral peer disagreement is intelligible. However, if moral judgments were (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Habit and the Explanation of Action.Omar Lizardo - forthcoming - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Belief’s minimal rationality.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3263-3282.
    Many of our beliefs behave irrationally: this is hardly news to anyone. Although beliefs’ irrational tendencies need to be taken into account, this paper argues that beliefs necessarily preserve at least a minimal level of rationality. This view offers a plausible picture of what makes belief unique and will help us to set beliefs apart from other cognitive attitudes.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations