The Confucian family, not only in its historical manifestations but also in the imagination of the Confucian founders, was the locus of misogynist norms and practices that have subjugated women in varying degrees. Therefore, advancing women’s well-being and equality in East Asia may seem to require radically transforming the Confucian family to approximate alternative ideal conceptions of the family in the West. This article opposes such a stance by arguing that (1) Western conceptions of the family may be neither plausible (...) nor feasible in traditionally Confucian societies and (2) the Confucian family, once reconstructed in line with Confucianism’s core ideas and values, can be conducive to a feminist future in East Asia that is uniquely Confucian. In order to support my position, not only influential contemporary Western ideal conceptions of the family from the justice perspective and care ethics, but also different interpretations of the Confucian family will be carefully examined. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that a business ethic based on the ethics of care is superior to traditional business ethics. It shall be argued that neo-liberalism is inconsistent with the ethics of care since it either excludes caring institutions or treats them as preferences to be satisfied as the ‘free’ market sees fit. Unlike traditional business ethics, a business ethic based on the ethics of care can play an important role in challenging the neo-liberal paradigm. Many (...) business issues that are treated as peripheral by traditional business ethics can thus take central stage in a business ethic based on the ethics of care. (shrink)

Virtue ethics is standardly taught and discussed as a distinctive approach to the major questions of ethics, a third major position alongside Utilitarian and Kantian ethics. I argue that this taxonomy is a confusion. Both Utilitarianism and Kantianism contain treatments of virtue, so virtue ethics cannot possibly be a separate approach contrasted with those approaches. There are, to be sure, quite a few contemporary philosophical writers about virtue who are neither Utilitarians nor Kantians; many of these find inspiration in ancient (...) Greek theories of virtue. But even here there is little unity. Although certain concerns do unite this disparate group (a concern for the role of motives and passions in good choice, a concern for character, and a concern for the whole course of an agent''s life), there are equally profound disagreements, especially concerning the role that reason should play in ethics. One group of modern virtue-theorists, I argue, are primarily anti-Utilitarians, concerned with the plurality of value and the susceptibility of passions to social cultivation. These theorists want to enlarge the place of reason in ethics. They hold that reason can deliberate about ends as well as means, and that reason can modify the passions themselves. Another group of virtue theorists are primarily anti-Kantians. They believe that reason plays too dominant a role in most philosophical accounts of ethics, and that a larger place should be given to sentiments and passions -- which they typically construe in a less reason-based way than does the first group. The paper investigates these differences, concluding that it is not helpful to speak of virtue ethics, and that we would be better off characterizing the substantive views of each thinker -- and then figuring out what we ourselves want to say. (shrink)

Will Kymlicka argues that societal culture matters to liberalism because it contributes to its members’ freedom. If so, multiculturalism that advocates group rights to sustain minority societal cultures in the liberal West is in fact entailed by liberalism, the core value of which is individual freedom. “Freedom,” then, functions as the main bridge between liberalism and multiculturalism in Kymlicka’s position. Kymlicka is correct that societal culture contributes to its members’ freedom by providing them with meaningful options. The sense of freedom (...) enabled by culture, however, is not equivalent to the notion of freedom advocated by mainstream liberalism, liberal autonomy. I argue in this paper that Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism is an inconsistent and therefore implausible theoretical construct because Kymlicka unwittingly equivocates on “freedom” in using its two distinct senses interchangeably. (shrink)

This essay critically examines a suggestion proposed by some Confucianists that Confucianism and Care Ethics share striking similarities and that feminism in Confucian societies might take “a new form of Confucianism.” Aspects of Confucianism and Care Ethics that allegedly converge are examined, including the emphasis on human relationships, and it is argued that while these two perspectives share certain surface similarities, moral injunctions entailed by their respective ideals of ren and caring are not merely distinctive but in fact incompatible.

This article introduces Designing for Care (D4C), a distinctive approach to project management and technological design informed by Care Ethics. We propose to conceptualize “care” as both the foundational value of D4C and as its guiding mid-level principle. As a value, care provides moral grounding. As a principle, it equips D4C with moral guidance to enact a caring process. The latter is made of a set of concrete, and often recursive, caring practices. One of the key assumption of D4C is (...) a relational ontology of individual and group identities, which fosters the actualization of caring practices as essentially relational and (often) reciprocal. Moreover, D4C adopts the “ecological turn” in CE and stresses the ecological situatedness and impact of concrete projects, envisioning an extension of caring from intra-species to inter-species relations. We argue that care and caring can influence directly some of the phases and practices within the management of (energy) projects and the design of sociotechnical (energy) artefacts and systems. When issues related to “value change” emerge as problematic (e.g., values trade-offs, conflicts), the mid-level guiding principle of care helps evaluate and prioritize different values at stake within specific projects. Although there may be several actors and stakeholders involved in project management and technological design, here we will focus on the professionals in charge of imagining, designing, and carrying out these processes (i.e., project managers, designers, engineers). We suggest that adopting D4C would improve their ability to capture and assess stakeholders’ values, critically reflect on and evaluate their own values, and judge which values prioritize. Although D4C may be adaptable to different fields and design contexts, we recommend its use especially within small and medium-scale (energy) projects. To show the benefits of adopting it, we envisage the application of D4C within the project management and the technological design of a community battery. The adoption of D4C can have multiple positive effects: transforming the mentality and practice of managing a project and designing technologies; enhancing caring relationships between managers, designers, and users as well as among users; achieving better communication, more inclusive participation, and more just decision-making. This is an initial attempt to articulate the structure and the procedural character of D4C. The application of D4C in a concrete project is needed to assess its actual impact, benefits, and limitations. (shrink)

In this article, I distinguish two models of personal integrity. The first, wholeheartedness, regards harmonious unity of the self as psychologically healthy and volitional consistency as ethically ideal. I argue that it does so at the substantial cost of framing ambivalence and conflict as defects of character and action. To avoid these consequences, I propose an alternate ideal of humility that construes the self as multiple and precarious and celebrates experiences of loss and transformation through which learning, growth, innovation, and (...) dynamic relationship become possible. This ideal not only sustains prospects for integrity but is more suitable than wholeheartedness for recognizing practices of contestation, such as those involving potentially destabilizing encounters with difference that is common within pluralistic societies, as vital for rich, well-lived lives. (shrink)

The theories of Locke, Hume and Kant dominate contemporary philosophical discourse on property rights. This is particularly true of applied ethics, where they are used to settle issues from biotech patents to managerial obligations. Within these theories, however, the usual criticisms of private property aren’t even as much as intelligible. Locke, Hume and Kant, I argue, develop claims about property on a model economy that I call “Frontier Town.” They and contemporary authors then apply these claims to capitalist economies. There (...) are two problems with this application: First, we’ll be considering the wrong kind of property: The only property in Frontier Town are means of life. Critics, however, object to property in concentrated capital because they associate only this kind of property with economic coercion and political power. Second, the two economies differ in central features, so that very different claims about empirical consequences and hence about fairness and merit will be plausible for each. This second problem, I argue, is a consequence of the first. I conclude that Frontier Town theories are more likely to distort than to illuminate property issues in capitalist economies. (shrink)

The article introduces readers to the study of disability, both with respect to the interdisciplinary field of disability studies and the field of philosophy of disability. We then offer an overview of three central areas of philosophical inquiry where feminist work in philosophy and disability has made significant contributions: (1) metaphysics and ontology, (2) epistemology and phenomenology, and (3) ethical, social, and political philosophy.

Ethical theories of justice and care are often presented in opposition to each other. Eleonore Stump argues that Aquinas’s moral theory has the resources to bring justice and care together. There is, however, a potential worry for her view raised by the ‘Confucian Puzzle’. The puzzle poses a moral dilemma between care and justice that serves as a test case for Stump’s picture. In this paper, I provide a brief overview of the justice and care debate along with the subsequent (...) challenges that both positions face in order to situate Aquinas’s position as Stump defends it. Next, I present the Confucian Puzzle and consider how Aquinas might respond to it. Finally, given his response, I make two claims. First, the unifying virtue of charity enables Aquinas to resolve the tension between justice and care as it appears in the Confucian Puzzle. Second, Stump’s integration thesis only obtains given what Aquinas says about charity. (shrink)

The topic of the self has long been salient in feminist philosophy, for it is pivotal to questions about personhood, identity, the body, and agency that feminism must address. In some respects, Simone de Beauvoir's trenchant observation, "He is the Subject, he is the Absolute — she is the Other," sums up why the self is such an important issue for feminism. To be the Other is to be the non-subject, the non-person, the non-agent — in short, the mere body. (...) In law, in customary practice, and in cultural stereotypes, women's selfhood has been systematically subordinated, diminished, and belittled, when it has not been outright denied. Since women have been cast as lesser forms of the masculine individual, the paradigm of the self that has gained ascendancy in U.S. popular culture and in Western philosophy is derived from the experience of the predominantly white and heterosexual, mostly economically advantaged men who have wielded social, economic, and political power and who have dominated the arts, literature, the media, and scholarship. Responding to this state of affairs, feminist philosophical work on the self has taken three main tacks: (1) critique of established views of the self, (2) reclamation of women's selfhood, and (3) reconceptualization of the self to incorporate women's experience. This entry will survey feminist perspectives on the self from all three of these angles. (shrink)

Kantian deontology is one of three classic moral theories, among virtue ethics and consequentialism. Issues in medical ethics are frequently addressed within a Kantian paradigm, at least – although not exclusively – in European medical ethics. At the same time, critical voices have pointed to deficits of Kantian moral philosophy which must be examined and discussed. It is argued that taking concrete situations and complex relationships into account is of paramount importance in medical ethics. Encounters between medical or nursing staff (...) and patients are rarely symmetrical relationships between autonomous and rational agents. Kantian ethics, the criticism reads, builds on the lofty ideal of such a relationship. In addition to the charge of an individualist and rationalist focus on autonomy, Kantian ethics has been accused of excluding those not actually in possession of these properties or of its rigorism. It is said to be focussed on laws and imperatives to an extent that it cannot appreciate the complex nuances of real conflicts. As a more detailed analysis will show, these charges are inadequate in at least some regards. This will be demonstrated by drawing on the Kantian notion of autonomy, the role of maxims and judgment and the conception of duties, as well as the role of emotions. Nevertheless the objections brought forward against Kantian moral theory can help determine, with greater precision, its strengths and shortcomings as an approach to current problems in medical ethics. (shrink)

: Seyla Benhabib's critique of Jürgen Habermas's moral theory claims that his approach is not adequate for the needs of a feminist moral theory. I argue that her analysis is mistaken. I also show that Habermas's moral theory, properly understood, satisfies many of the conditions identified by feminist moral philosophers as necessary for an adequate moral theory. A discussion of the compatibility between the model of reciprocal perspective taking found in Habermas's moral theory and that found in María Lugones's essay (...) "Playfulness, 'World'-Travelling, and Loving Perception" reinforces the claim that his moral theory holds as yet unrecognized promise for feminist moral philosophy. (shrink)

Emotionally-related live organ donation is different from almost all other medical treatments in that a family member or, in some countries, a friend contributes with an organ or parts of an organ to the recipient. Furthermore, there is a long-acknowledged but not well-understood gender-imbalance in emotionally-related live kidney donation. This article argues for the benefit of the concept of just love as an analytic tool in the analysis of emotionally-related live organ donation where the potential donor(s) and the recipient are (...) engaged in a love relation. The concept of just love is helpful in the analysis of these live organ donations even if no statistical gender-imbalance prevails. It is particularly helpful, however, in the analysis of the gender-imbalance in live kidney donations if these donations are seen as a specific kind of care-work, if care-work is experienced as a labour one should perform out of love and if women still experience stronger pressures to engage in care-work than do men. The aim of the article is to present arguments for the need of just love as an analytic tool in the analysis of emotionally-related live organ donation where the potential donor(s) and the recipient are engaged in a love relation. The aim is also to elaborate two criteria that need to be met in order for love to qualify as just and to highlight certain clinical implications. (shrink)

The perspectives of the dominant Western ethical theories, have dominated the concepts of autonomy and informed consent for many years. Recently this dominant understanding has been challenged by ethics of care which, although, also emanates from the West presents a more nuanced concept: relational autonomy, which is more faithful to our human experience. By paying particular attention to relational autonomy, particularity and Process approach to ethical deliberations in ethics of care, this paper seeks to construct a concept of informed consent (...) from the perspective of ethics of care which is here called relational autonomy-in-informed consent (RAIC). Thus, providing a broader theoretical basis for informed consent beyond the usual theoretical perspectives that are particularly Western. Care ethics provides such a broader basis because it appeals to a global perspective that encompasses lessons from other cultures, and this will help to enrich the current ideas of bioethics principles of autonomy and informed consent. This objective will be achieved by exploring the ethics of care emphasis on relationships based on a universal experience of caring; and by contrasting its concept of autonomy as relational with the understanding of autonomy in the approaches of the dominant moral theories that reflect rational, individualistic, and rights-oriented autonomy of the American liberalism. (shrink)

Should nurses have their own ethics to match specific problems met in their daily routines? How do nurses act in a society that is changing from a 'monocultural' to an 'intercultural' structure? What are the ethical consequences of these changes for their many tasks? How can the ethical aspects be taught to nurses? This article describes the current status of nursing ethics in the curriculum taught in schools of higher education for nurses in The Netherlands. Aspects of the debate on (...) nursing ethics are outlined and ideas about its future as a subject and discipline in nurse education are offered. Est-ce que le personnel infirmier doit avoir son éthique à soi pour faire face aux problèmes spécifiques dans la routine journalière? Et comment les infirmiers/ères se comportent-ils dans une société qui est en train de changer de la 'monoculture' en 'interculture'? Quels sont les conséquences éthiques de leur tâches? Comment peuvent ces aspets éthiques être enseignés aux infirmiers/ères? Cet article parle de l'état courant de l'éthique infirmier dans l'enseignement dans les écoles de l'education supérieure pour infirmiers/ères en Hollande. En plus, il donne une esquisse de la discussion sur l'éthique infirmier et donne quelques idées pour le futur de l'éthique infirmier comme sujet et discipline en soi dans l'éducation des infirmiers/ères. Sollte das Pflegepersonal seine eigene Ethik haben um den spezifischen Problemen seiner täglichen Routine gewachsen zu sein? Wie soll das Pflegepersonal in einer Gesellschaft handeln, die im Wechsel ist von einer 'Monokultur' zu einer 'Interkultur'? Was sind die ethischen Konsequenzen ihres handeln? Wie können diese ethischen Aspekte dem Pflegepersonal gelehrt werden? Dieser Artikel beschreibt den gegenwärtigen Zustand der Krankenpflege-Ethik im Lehrplan der Schulen für Höhere Ausbildung für Pflegepersonal in Holland. Er gibt auch einen Umriss über die Debatte über Krankenpflege-Ethik und formuliert einige Ideen für die Zukunft der Krankenpflege- Ethik als ein Thema und eine Disziplin in der Ausbildung des Pflegepersonals. (shrink)

Illustrating the tensions and possibilities that the notion of the ethic of care as a democratic and citizenship issue may have in discourses of citizenship education in western states is the focus of this article. I first consider some theoretical debates on the definition of an ethic of care, especially in relation to issues of justice and (im)partiality. Then, I discuss the reconceptualization of care on the basis of two related but distinct themes: the reconciliation of justice and care, and (...) the rethinking of citizenship. Following this, I lay out some implications for citizenship education and answer the question of what learning and teaching for/about a reconceptualized ethic of care can contribute to changing current perceptions of and actions towards immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers. (shrink)

In developing her ethics of care, Eva Kittay discusses the vulnerability and voluntarism models of obligation. Kittay uses the vulnerability model to demonstrate that we have some obligations to ca...

South Africa has the highest rate of foetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) in the world. The problem of alcohol abuse in pregnancy has very deep historical roots that are intertwined with the injustices of both apartheid and pre-apartheid colonialism. Much of the research that is being done in these communities is focused on identifying the epidemiological variables associated with these patterns of alcohol abuse. The underlying reasons as to why these patterns continue seem to remain largely obscured from view. In this (...) article, I apply the theory proposed by Powers and Faden of social justice as a ‘moral foundation for public health and health policy’ to the problem of FAS in South Africa. The objective of this application is two-fold: first, to critically explore the additional insights and alternative perspectives to the problem of FAS that this approach may provide and second, to assess the utility of the theory when applied directly to a specific public health problem. I conclude by noting that although this approach could result in the kind of ‘public health scope creep’ that has been criticized by various authors, it does provide fresh insights to the problem of FAS in South Africa. (shrink)

This paper examines the latest developments in feminist critiques of the seminal Theory of Justice, written by John Rawls, the late preeminent American moral philosopher. Rawls is recognized as one of the most influential moral political philosophers of the twentieth century and is increasingly relevant because of his discussions on pluralist societies. With the current diverging of liberal, conservative and libertarian philosophies among Americans, as well as the fragmentation of parties to accommodate an increasingly diverse public, a clear philosophy and (...) understanding of liberal theory is necessary for its future in American politics. The current pressure to address the needs of oppressed groups such as women and sexual minorities has created a philosophical tipping point. What is to be considered equality, how the government should involve itself, and how this will be done feasibly and throughout generations need answers defined on all sides of the discussion. Gender and sexual inequality, when considering what should be done, is one of the most significant challenges because of its effect on the traditional family, on centuries of preconceived notions of gender and sexuality, and the heavy commitment it may take to extinguish. To analyze the social contract approach and the theory of justice as fairness, I will examine and then follow Rawls’ own method of the original position to determine in which manner the family should be situated within society to result in the best accordance to the two principles. Furthermore, the arguments on the reasonability of religion in a political conception will be used to promote a fair and stable society. The overall aim is to develop a Rawlsian solution to gender equality in society that is both fair and sustainable in a pluralistic society. Focusing on the role of the family in society, I argue that Rawls’ fundamental concept of justice – “justice as fairness” – does not develop a clear and convincing stance on how gender equality will be produced in a pluralistic society. Debate has risen between feminist and liberal philosophers in distinguishing the relationship between Rawls’ two principles of justice and their intervention in family hierarchy, duties, and responsibilities. The two principles are known as: First Principle: Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: They are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society. The distinction between an indirect and direct interaction between principles of justice and the basic structures of society will shape the way the political arena promotes equality. This is the case, provided that the procedure in which Rawls utilizes is fair in itself, which has come into contention among feminist thinkers. Once the family is situated in the original position, the feasibility of the theory will be discussed within the parameters of a property-owning democracy as well as, more specifically, a deliberative democracy. This solution should bring a reflective justification for the principles abilities to deal with injustices outlined by feminists. (shrink)

This paper examines the intrinsic relation between institutions and social justice. Its starting point is that processes of institutionalization invoke societal groups to articulate justice demands which, in their turn, give rise to processes of institutional redesign. In liberal democracies, demands for justice are articulated as a pursuit for emancipation and empowerment of groups that feel excluded by dominant categorizations. The imminent presence of this twin pursuit for justice can be explained by the conceptual inconsistencies that characterize the distinction between (...) the public and private sphere. These inconsistencies also explain why demands for emancipation and empowerment are intrinsically ambiguous and inconsistent. In order to reconsider the question how institutions are to be adapted to allow for social justice while acknowledging the plurality, ambiguity and volatility of justice demands, the paper will propose an empirical and normative research agenda. (shrink)

Feminist ethics and medical ethics are critical of contemporary moral theory in several similar respects. There is a shared sense of frustration with the level of abstraction and generality that characterizes traditional philosophic work in ethics and a common commitment to including contextual details and allowing room for the personal aspects of relationships in ethical analysis. This paper explores the ways in which context is appealed to in feminist and medical ethics, the sort of details that should be included in (...) the recommended narrative approaches to ethical problems, and the difference it makes to our ethical deliberations if we add an explicitly feminist political analysis to our discussion of context. It is claimed that an analysis of gender is needed for feminist medical ethics and that this requires a certain degree of generality, i.e. a political understanding of context. (shrink)

Kai Nielsen is one of Canada’s most distinguished political philosophers. In a career spanning over 40 years, he has published more than 400 papers in political philosophy, ethics, meta-philosophy, and philosophy of religion. He has engaged much of the best work in Anglophone political philosophy, shedding light on many of the central debates and controversies of our time but throughout has remained a unique voice on the political left. _ Pessimism of the Intellect _presents a thoughtful collection of Nielsen’s essays (...) complemented by an extended reflective interview with Nielsen. This collection allows the reader to grasp the systematic scope of his thought and methodology. (shrink)

Care has increasingly been promoted as an element of successful management practice. However, an ethic of care is a normative theory that was initially developed in reference to intimate relationships, and it is unclear if it is an appropriate normative standard in business. The purpose of this review is to bridge the social scientific study of care with philosophical understandings of care and to provide a theoretical justification for care as a managerial value. We review the three different forms of (...) care advanced by the ethics literature: caring relations, organizational care, and care as a virtue. We compare these forms of care to the management litertature. In doing so, we integrate what has previously been a scattered, yet growing, body of research on care. Our review of the literature reveals that care has increasingly been studied in management in relation to an ethic of care. Yet, many of the properties of care have also played a role in other established research domains (e.g., leadership). We discuss and critique the management and ethics literatures on care, paying attention to areas of agreement or disagreeement between the two. We go on to provide a normative justification of care as a value in business. Finally, we close by suggesting directions for future research. (shrink)

Dieser Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit der Existenz von Menschen als geborene Wesen. Das Eltern-Kind-Verhältnis und in einem weiteren Schritt auch die Familie werden daraufhin untersucht, inwiefern sie ihre moralische Bedeutung aus der besonderen Situation des Kindes beziehen. Diese besondere Situation des Kindes ist gekennzeichnet durch das Faktum der ‚Natalität‘, d. h. durch ein radikales Vorherbestimmt-Sein und eine radikale Abhängigkeit der kindlichen Existenz. Vom Faktum der Natalität geht ein moralischer Appell aus, auf den die Eltern mit dem Versprechen antworten, das in (...) sie gesetzte Vertrauen nicht zu enttäuschen. (shrink)

À partir d’une critique des éthiques libérales et des modes de légitimation des inégalités sociales, les recherches sur le care ont constitué depuis une dizaine d’années en France un champ de recherches dialoguant avec les travaux de féministes étatsuniennes et notamment ceux de Carol Gilligan et Joan Tronto. Centrée sur la conception d’un sujet ontologiquement vulnérable et relationnel, cette perspective du care a affirmé l’importance morale et politique du souci d’autrui dans la préservation d’un monde commun. Des travaux transdisciplinaires se (...) sont ainsi saisis de voix étouffées ou minorées par le genre, la classe ou la race ; voix des domestiques, des aides-soignantes, des « femmes de réconfort » ou des personnes en situation de handicap. Ces travaux ont exploré des questions dévalorisées par les sciences sociales, comme le soin non médical, la dépendance ou les multiples attachements des humains aux non-humains. (shrink)

The article lays down the broad strokes of an interpretive approach to social criticism. In developing this approach, the author stresses the importance of both a pluralistic notion of social justice and a rich ideal of personal growth. While objecting to one-dimensional conceptions of social justice centering on legal equality, the author develops the idea of there being multiple "spheres of justice", including the spheres of "care" and "merit". Each of these spheres, he argues, is subject to historical interpretation. He (...) furthers this view by arguing that the social basis for these different spheres is best understood against the canvas of an ideal of self-fulfillment and individuality. Based on the elaboration of these two sets of premises—a pluralistic conception of social justice and a collective ideal of personal self-fulfillment—the article outlines the basis for and challenges inherent to the practice of interpretive social criticism. (shrink)