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  1. Moral education, emotions, and social practices.Andrés Mejía - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 57 (1):323-336.
    Paul Hirst’s idea of moral education is distinctive in the central role it attributes to social practices. For him, ethical principles and virtues should not be seen as abstract entities theoretically derived and then applied in education so that students learn to reason from those principles or live by those virtues. Instead, Hirst’s moral education incorporates an initiation into social practices and comes back to them by means of situated critical reflection from within those practices themselves. Embracing Hirst’s proposed central (...)
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  • Self-Pity as Resilience against Injustice.Dina Mendonça - 2022 - Philosophies 7 (5):105.
    This paper proposes that being able to feel self-pity is important to be resilient against injustices because it enables self-transformation. The suggestion for this reassessment of self-pity as a crucial self-conscious emotion for a more humanistic world aims to be an example of how philosophical reflection can be insightful for emotion research. The first part of the paper outlines a general introduction of philosophy of emotions and a description of how Hume’s analysis of pride changed its meaning and pertinently linked (...)
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  • A Perceptual Theory of Hope.Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    This paper addresses the question of what the attitude of hope consists in. We argue that shortcomings in recent theories of hope have methodological roots in that they proceed with little regard for the rich body of literature on the emotions. Taking insights from work in the philosophy of emotions, we argue that hope involves a kind of normative perception. We then develop a strategy for determining the content of this perception, arguing that hope is a perception of practical reasons. (...)
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  • Representationalism and the Intentionality of Moods.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1515-1526.
    It seems hard to comprehend how, during mood experience, the ‘inner’ meets the ‘outer’. The objective of this paper is to show that a currently popular attempt at providing a neat solution to that problem fails. The attempt comes under the heading of representationalism, according to which the phenomenal aspects of mood are exhausted by its representational content. I examine three accounts of intentionality developed within the representationalist camp, and I show that they incur phenomenological and metaphysical costs.
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  • The Case Against Representationalism About Moods.Amy Kind - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. New York, New York: Routledge.
    According to representationalism, the phenomenal character of a mental state reduces to its intentional content. Although representationalism seems plausible with respect to ordinary perceptual states, it seems considerably less plausible for states like moods. Here the problem for representationalism arises largely because moods seem to lack intentional content altogether. In this paper, I explore several possible options for identifying the intentional content of moods and suggest that none of them is wholly satisfactory. Importantly, however, I go on to argue that (...)
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  • Bernard Williams and the concept of shame: What makes an emotion moral?Dina Mendonça & Susana Cadilha - 2019 - Labyrinth: An International Journal for Philosophy, Value Theory and Sociocultural Hermeneutics 21 (1):99-115.
    The paper proposes a way to understand moral emotions in ethics building upon Bernard Williams' claim that feelings, emotions and sentiments are an integral part of rationality. Based upon Bernard Williams' analysis of shame we argue that the richness and thickness that it is attached to some emotions is the key to understand why some emotions have a distinct ethical resonance. The first part takes up Bernard Williams' philosophical assessment of the concept of shame establishing a general framework to show (...)
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  • Melancholy as Responding to Reasons.Mathea Slåttholm Sagdahl - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (3):331-350.
    This paper explores the nature and value of melancholy and the rationality of being in such a state. I defend a view of melancholy as a highly complex mood-like state. This complexity shows itself...
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  • Between pain and hope: Examining women’s marginality in the evangelical context.Katie Christine Gaddini - 2019 - European Journal of Women's Studies 26 (4):405-420.
    This article examines religious and gendered identities through an ethnographic study of unmarried evangelical Christian women in London. Moving away from an approach that shows that women feel empowered through their conservative, male-dominated religious environment, or else they find it constraining and leave the church, this article investigates the experiences of women who feel limited by their church, and still remain embedded in their Christian environment. The article begins by exploring the normative figure of the ideal Christian woman operative in (...)
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  • In Search for the Rationality of Moods.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2019 - In Laura Candiotto (ed.), The Value of Emotions for Knowledge. Springer Verlag. pp. 281-296.
    What it is about mood, as a specific type of affect, that makes it not easily amenable to standard models of rationality? It is commonly assumed that the cognitive rationality of an affective state is somehow depended upon how that state is related to what the state is about, its so called intentional object; but, given that moods do not seem to bear an intentional relation to an object, it is hard to see how they can be in the offing (...)
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  • Nursing Schadenfreude: The culpability of emotional construction.Michael John McNamee - 2007 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 10 (3):289-299.
    The purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of Schadenfreude - the pleasure felt at another’s misfortune - and to argue that feeling it in the course of health care work, as elsewhere, is evidence of a deficient character. In order to show that Schadenfreude is an objectionable emotion in health care work, I first offer some conceptual remarks about emotions generally and their differential treatment in Kantian and Aristotelian thought. Second, I argue that an appreciation of the (...)
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  • The Problem of Emotional Significance.Carolyn Price - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):189-206.
    What does it mean to say that an emotional response fits the situation? This question cannot be answered simply by specifying the core relational theme (loss or risk, say) associated with each emotion: we must also explain what constitutes an emotionally significant loss or risk. It is sometimes suggested that emotionally significant situations are those that bear on the subject’s interests or concerns. I accept that this claim is plausible for some emotional responses, and I propose a particular way of (...)
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  • What a difference depth makes.Dina Mendonça - 2019 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 31 (54).
    The article explores how a new dimension of emotion – depth – is crucially important for a better understanding of emotion and its connection to rationality. It begins by identifying that depth is trapped in a circularity in which deep emotions are important because they refer to deep and important aspects of people’s lives. Following Danto’s discussion of deep interpretation (1981), it suggests that it is the contrast between deep and superficial that grants emotional perspective and the ability to identify (...)
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  • Reflexivity and Meta-Emotions in the Interdisciplinary Project for a Better Understanding of Emotions.Dina Mendonça - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 5 (1):18-30.
    The localized commentary focuses on the way in which meta-emotions appear in the last chapter, and how reflexivity more generally is addressed. It shows how meta-emotions require a detailed explanation, which should capture their role and place within the interdisciplinary theoretical proposal in the already dense book. Though the commentary is limited to this specific issue, it is important to acknowledge and admire the proposal for its unity based on an interdisciplinary foundation. It highlights why every theory of emotion seems (...)
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  • Basic moods.Craig DeLancey - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):527-538.
    The hypothesis that some moods are emotions has been rejected in philosophy, and is an unpopular alternative in psychology. This is because there is wide agreement that moods have a number of features distinguishing them from emotions. These include: lack of an intentional object and the related notion of lack of a goal; being of long duration; having pervasive or widespread effects; and having causes rather than reasons. Leading theories of mood have tried to explain these purported features by describing (...)
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  • Neo-Muzak and the Business of Mood.Paul Allen Anderson - 2015 - Critical Inquiry 41 (4):811-840.
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  • How does it feel to be a citizen?Miguel Moreno & Andrés Mejía - 2016 - Ixtli 3 (5):105-137.
    Our starting point is the idea that different models of citizenship entail different ethos that define the ideal citizen, which in turn presuppose different emotions. We examine four models of citizenship: classic liberal, civic republican, deliberative democratic, and radical democratic. We suggest that their ideal citizens will be guided, respectively, by love of law, love of community or of country, love of truth and of justice, and love of the groups one belongs to and of power. Other political emotions ―such (...)
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  • Rationalities of Emotion–Defending, Distinguishing, Connecting.Sophie Rietti - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (1):38-61.
    Claims that emotions are or can be rational, and crucially enabling of rationality, are now fairly common, also outside of philosophy, but with considerable diversity both in their assumptions about emotions and their conceptions of rationality. Three main trends are worth picking out, both in themselves and for the potential tensions between them: accounts that defend a case for the rationality of emotions A) by assimilating emotions closely to beliefs or judgements; B) in terms of the very features that traditional (...)
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