- Does IBE Require a ‘Model’ of Explanation?Frank Cabrera - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):727-750.details
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Representational Kinds.Joulia Smortchkova & Michael Murez - 2020 - In Joulia Smortchkova, Krzysztof Dołęga & Tobias Schlicht (eds.), What Are Mental Representations? New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Against reductive ethical naturalism.Justin Klocksiem - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):1991-2010.details
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Abductively Robust Inference.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):20-29.details
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Folk Psychology and the Bayesian Brain.Joe Dewhurst - 2017 - In Metzinger Thomas & Wiese Wanja (eds.), Philosophy and Predictive Processing. MIND Group.details
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Dynamic permissivism.Abelard Podgorski - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1923-1939.details
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Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the concept of belief.Hans Rott - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2695–2720.details
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Reasons and Entailment.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):353-374.details
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Can there be a Bayesian explanationism? On the prospects of a productive partnership.Frank Cabrera - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1245–1272.details
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Should scientific realists be platonists?Jacob Busch & Joe Morrison - 2016 - Synthese 193 (2):435-449.details
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Storia e teorie dell'intenzionalità.Simone Gozzano - 1997details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.details
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Intuitions, Disagreement and Referential Pluralism.James Andow - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):223-239.details
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Coherence, Probability and Explanation.William Roche & Michael Schippers - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (4):821-828.details
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TRUE Is False and Why It Matters.Robert Fischer - unknowndetails
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(2 other versions)Seemings and Justification: An Introduction.Chris Tucker - 2013 - In Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 1-29.details
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Induction and inference to the best explanation.Ruth Weintraub - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):203-216.details
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Knowledge entails dispositional belief.David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):19-50.details
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Explanationist Plasticity and the Problem of the Criterion.Ted Poston - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (3):395-419.details
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The Abductivist Reply to Skepticism.James R. Beebe - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):605-636.details
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Naturalism, normativity, and explanation: Some scientistic biases of contemporary naturalism.Guy Axtell - 1993 - Metaphilosophy 24 (3):253-274.details
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Default privilege and bad lots: Underconsideration and explanatory inference.Kareem Khalifa - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):91 – 105.details
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Researching to improve theory, policy and practice. An essay review of Viviane Robinson, Problem‐based Methodology: Research for the Improvement of Practice, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1993.J. C. Walker - 1996 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 28 (2):55-68.details
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Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality.Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.details
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Against Arguments from Reference.Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):332 - 356.details
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Realism without parochialism.Phillip Bricker - 2020 - In Modal Matters: Essays in Metaphysics. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 40-76.details
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Induction and scientific realism: Einstein versus Van Fraassen part one: How to solve the problem of induction.Nicholas Maxwell - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):61-79.details
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The Flight to Reference, or How Not to Make Progress in the Philosophy of Science.Michael A. Bishop & Stephen P. Stich - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (1):33-49.details
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BonJour’s Abductivist Reply to Skepticism.James R. Beebe - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (2):181-196.details
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The ontology of concepts: Abstract objects or mental representations?Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):561-593.details
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(2 other versions)Intentionality and naturalism.Stephen P. Stich & Stephen Laurence - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):159-82.details
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Tacit beliefs and other doxastic attitudes.Pat A. Manfredi - 1993 - Philosophia 22 (1-2):95-117.details
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What is a theory of mental representation?Stephen Stich - 1992 - Mind 101 (402):243-61.details
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Defusing eliminative materialism: Reference and revision.Maurice K. D. Schouten & Huib Looren de Jong - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):489-509.details
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(1 other version)Seemings as sui generis.Blake McAllister - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):3079-3096.details
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Explanation and the Nature of Scientific Knowledge.Kevin McCain - 2015 - Science & Education 24 (7-8):827-854.details
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(1 other version)A Deductive Argument for the Representational Theory of Thinking.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):404-420.details
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Knowledge, Naturalism, and Cognitive Ethology: Kornblith’s Knowledge and its Place in Nature.José Luis Bermúdez - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (2):299-316.details
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Explanationist evidentialism.Kevin McCain - 2013 - Episteme 10 (3):299-315.details
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Abduction-Prediction Model of Scientific Inference Reflected in a Prototype System for Model-based Diagnosis.John R. Josephson - 1998 - Philosophica 61 (1).details
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Epistemic value: Truth or explanation?David Resnik - 1994 - Metaphilosophy 25 (4):348-361.details
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(1 other version)Realism and the epistemological significance of inference to the best explanation.Hamid Vahid - 2001 - Dialogue (Canadian Philosophical Association) 40 (3):487-507.details
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(1 other version)Bursting Bealer’s Bubble: How the Starting Points Argument Begs the Question of Foundationalism Against Quine.Michael J. Shaffer & Jason A. Warnick - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):87-106.details
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How hard are the sceptical paradoxes?Alex Byrne - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):299–325.details
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Purpose and content.J. T. Whyte - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):45-60.details
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Deciding to Believe Again.Keith Frankish - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):523 - 547.details
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The normativity of the mental.Nick Zangwill - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):1-19.details
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(1 other version)Skepticism, abductivism, and the explanatory gap.Ram Neta - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):296-325.details
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The Explication Defence of Arguments from Reference.Mark Pinder - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (6):1253-1276.details
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Thin, fine and with sensitivity: a metamethodology of intuitions.James Andow - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-21.details
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