- The Practical Origins of Ideas: Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering (Open Access).Matthieu Queloz - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):531-558.details
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Bots: Some Less-Considered Epistemic Problems.Benjamin Winokur - 2023 - Social Epistemology 37 (5):713-725.details
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Proof Paradoxes, Agency, and Stereotyping.Aness Kim Webster - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):355-373.details
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Uncoordinated Norms of Belief.Oliver Traldi - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):625-637.details
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The Natural Probability Theory of Stereotypes.Jacob Stegenga - forthcoming - Diametros:1-27.details
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Perlocutionary Silencing: A Linguistic Harm That Prevents Discursive Influence.David C. Spewak Jr - 2023 - Hypatia 38 (1):86-104.details
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Reconsidering the Rule of Consideration: Probabilistic Knowledge and Legal Proof.Tim Smartt - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):303-318.details
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Threatening Quality of Will.David Shoemaker - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-20.details
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The Normative Connection Between Paternalism and Belief.Stephanie Sheintul - 2023 - The Journal of Ethics 27 (1):97-114.details
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Rumination and Wronging: The Role of Attention in Epistemic Morality.Catharine Saint-Croix - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):491-514.details
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Rehabilitating Statistical Evidence.Lewis Ross - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):3-23.details
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Regrettable beliefs.Mica Rapstine - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2169-2190.details
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Moral hinges and steadfastness.Chris Ranalli - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):379-401.details
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Ben Baker (2021). Reporte evaluativo de un manuscrito (hipotético) para un libro introductorio a la filosofía.Fredy Prieto - 2023 - Cuestiones de Filosofía 9 (32):171-188.details
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Why You Ought to Defer: Moral Deference and Marginalized Experience.Savannah Pearlman & Williams Elizabeth - 2022 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 8 (2).details
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Bias and interpersonal skepticism.Robert Pasnau - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):154-175.details
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A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
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Castoriadis, racist and anti-racist ontologies.Toula Nicolacopoulos & George Vassilacopoulos - 2020 - Thesis Eleven 161 (1):76-88.details
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Privacy rights and ‘naked’ statistical evidence.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3777-3795.details
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How Privacy Rights Engender Direct Doxastic Duties.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 56 (4):547-562.details
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How Not to Deal with the Tragic Dilemma.Joshua Mugg - 2020 - Social Epistemology 34 (3):253-264.details
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Resisting Pessimism Traps: The Limits of Believing in Oneself.Jennifer M. Morton - 2021 - Wiley: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):728-746.details
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What it means to respect individuality.Xiaofei Liu & Ye Liang - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2579-2598.details
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'Extremely Racist' and 'Incredibly Sexist': An Empirical Response to the Charge of Conceptual Inflation.Shen-yi Liao & Nat Hansen - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):72-94.details
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Banks, Bosses, and Bears: A Pragmatist Argument Against Encroachment.Stephanie Leary - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):657-676.details
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On the Site of Predictive Justice.Seth Lazar & Jake Stone - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Algorithms and the Individual in Criminal Law.Renée Jorgensen - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):1-17.details
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The Structure of Bias.Gabbrielle M. Johnson - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1193-1236.details
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Algorithmic bias: on the implicit biases of social technology.Gabbrielle M. Johnson - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9941-9961.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408.details
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What should relational egalitarians believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2021 - Sage Publications: Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.details
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What should relational egalitarians believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2022 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.details
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The structure of moral encroachment.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5-6):1793-1812.details
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What You're Rejecting When You're Expecting.Blake Hereth - 2023 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry (3):1-12.details
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On statistical criteria of algorithmic fairness.Brian Hedden - 2021 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 49 (2):209-231.details
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Video on demand: what deepfakes do and how they harm.Keith Raymond Harris - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13373-13391.details
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Is Racism Essentially Systemic?Michael O. Hardimon - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (4):369-380.details
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Equalized Odds is a Requirement of Algorithmic Fairness.David Gray Grant - 2023 - Synthese 201 (3).details
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What is a speaker owed?Sanford C. Goldberg - 2022 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 50 (3):375-407.details
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Social Epistemic Normativity: The Program.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2020 - Episteme 17 (3):364-383.details
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Can the Demands of Justice Always Be Reconciled with the Demands of Epistemology? Testimonial Injustice and the Prospects of a Normative Clash.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):537-558.details
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Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk.Georgi Gardiner - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):481-511.details
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Moral encroachment and reasons of the wrong kind.James Fritz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3051-3070.details
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Encroachment on Emotion.James Fritz - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):515-533.details
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The Morality of Gossip: A Kantian Account.Cécile Fabre - 2023 - Ethics 134 (1):32-56.details
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III—Doxastic Wrongs, Non-Spurious Generalizations and Particularized Beliefs.Cécile Fabre - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (1):47-69.details
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Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5687-5718.details
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No Harm, Still Foul: On the Effect-Independent Wrongness of Slurring.Ralph Difranco & Andrew Morgan - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (3):471-489.details
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