Results for 'Tim Smartt'

537 found
Order:
  1. Scepticism about epistemic blame.Tim Smartt - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1813-1828.
    I advocate scepticism about epistemic blame; the view that we have good reason to think there is no distinctively epistemic form of blame. Epistemologists often find it useful to draw a distinction between blameless and blameworthy norm violation. In recent years, this has led several writers to develop theories of ‘epistemic blame.’ I present two challenges against the very idea of epistemic blame. First, everything that is supposedly done by epistemic blame is done by epistemic evaluation, at least according to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  2. Arbitrariness Arguments against Temporal Discounting.Tim Smartt - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (3):302-308.
    Craig Callender [2022] provides a novel challenge to the non-arbitrariness principle. His challenge plays an important role in his argument for the rational permissibility of a non-exponential temporal discounting rate. But the challenge is also of wider interest: it raises significant questions about whether we ought to accept the non-arbitrariness principle as a constraint on rational preferences. In this paper, I present two reasons to resist Callender’s challenge. First, I present a reason to reject his claim that the non-arbitrariness principle (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3. Epistemic blame as relationship modification: reply to Smartt.Cameron Boult - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):387-396.
    I respond to Tim Smartt’s (2023) skepticism about epistemic blame. Smartt’s skepticism is based on the claims that (i) mere negative epistemic evaluation can better explain everything proponents of epistemic blame say we need epistemic blame to explain; and (ii) no existing account of epistemic blame provides a plausible account of the putative force that any response deserving the label “blame” ought to have. He focuses primarily on the prominent “relationship-based” account of epistemic blame to defend these claims, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  4. In Defence of Psychologism.Tim Crane - 2014 - In Aspects of Psychologism. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
    The term ‘psychologism’ is normally used for the doctrine that logical and mathematical truths must be explained in terms of psychological truths (see Kusch 1995 and 2011). As such, the term is typically pejorative: the widespread consensus is that psychologism in this sense is a paradigm of philosophical error, a gross mistake that was identified and conclusively refuted by Frege and Husserl.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  5. Relativity and the Causal Efficacy of Abstract Objects.Tim Juvshik - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (3):269-282.
    Abstract objects are standardly taken to be causally inert, however principled arguments for this claim are rarely given. As a result, a number of recent authors have claimed that abstract objects are causally efficacious. These authors take abstracta to be temporally located in order to enter into causal relations but lack a spatial location. In this paper, I argue that such a position is untenable by showing first that causation requires its relata to have a temporal location, but second, that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  6. The Limits of Realism.Tim Button - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
    Tim Button explores the relationship between words and world; between semantics and scepticism. -/- A certain kind of philosopher – the external realist – worries that appearances might be radically deceptive. For example, she allows that we might all be brains in vats, stimulated by an infernal machine. But anyone who entertains the possibility of radical deception must also entertain a further worry: that all of our thoughts are totally contentless. That worry is just incoherent. -/- We cannot, then, be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  7. Is Pain “All in your Mind”? Examining the General Public’s Views of Pain.Tim V. Salomons, Richard Harrison, Nat Hansen, James Stazicker, Astrid Grith Sorensen, Paula Thomas & Emma Borg - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (3):683-698.
    By definition, pain is a sensory and emotional experience that is felt in a particular part of the body. The precise relationship between somatic events at the site where pain is experienced, and central processing giving rise to the mental experience of pain remains the subject of debate, but there is little disagreement in scholarly circles that both aspects of pain are critical to its experience. Recent experimental work, however, suggests a public view that is at odds with this conceptualisation. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  8. A fictionalist theory of universals.Tim Button & Robert Trueman - 2024 - In Peter Fritz & Nicholas K. Jones, Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
    Universals are putative objects like wisdom, morality, redness, etc. Although we believe in properties (which, we argue, are not a kind of object), we do not believe in universals. However, a number of ordinary, natural language constructions seem to commit us to their existence. In this paper, we provide a fictionalist theory of universals, which allows us to speak as if universals existed, whilst denying that any really do.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  9. (1 other version)There is No Question of Physicalism.Tim Crane & D. H. Mellor - 1990 - Mind 99 (394):185-206.
    Many philosophers are impressed by the progress achieved by physical sciences. This has had an especially deep effect on their ontological views: it has made many of them physicalists. Physicalists believe that everything is physical: more precisely, that all entities, properties, relations, and facts are those which are studied by physics or other physical sciences. They may not all agree with the spirit of Rutherford's quoted remark that 'there is physics; and there is stamp-collecting',' but they all grant physical science (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   212 citations  
  10. On the Duty to Be an Attention Ecologist.Tim Aylsworth & Clinton Castro - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (1):1-22.
    The attention economy — the market where consumers’ attention is exchanged for goods and services — poses a variety of threats to individuals’ autonomy, which, at minimum, involves the ability to set and pursue ends for oneself. It has been argued that the threat wireless mobile devices pose to autonomy gives rise to a duty to oneself to be a digital minimalist, one whose interactions with digital technologies are intentional such that they do not conflict with their ends. In this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  11. The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
    The phenomenology of agency has, until recently, been rather neglected, overlooked by both philosophers of action and philosophers of consciousness alike. Thankfully, all that has changed, and of late there has been an explosion of interest in what it is like to be an agent. 1 This burgeoning field crosses the traditional boundaries between disciplines: philosophers of psychopathology are speculating about the role that unusual experiences of agency might play in accounting for disorders of thought and action; cognitive scientists are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   66 citations  
  12. (1 other version)The Nonconceptual Content of Experience.Tim Crane - 1992 - In The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136-57.
    Some have claimed that people with very different beliefs literally see the world differently. Thus Thomas Kuhn: ‘what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous visual—conceptual experience has taught him to see’ (Kuhn 1970, p. ll3). This view — call it ‘Perceptual Relativism’ — entails that a scientist and a child may look at a cathode ray tube and, in a sense, the first will see it while the second won’t. The (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   184 citations  
  13. Decision-Making Capacity and Authenticity.Tim Aylsworth & Jake Greenblum - 2024 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 21 (3):1-9.
    There is wide consensus among bioethicists about the importance of autonomy when determining whether or not a patient has the right to refuse life-saving treatment (LST). In this context, autonomy has typically been understood in terms of the patient’s ability to make an informed decision. According to the traditional view, decision-making capacity (DMC) is seen as both necessary and sufficient for the right to refuse LST. Recently, this view has been challenged by those who think that considerations of authenticity and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. Against Cumulative Type Theory.Tim Button & Robert Trueman - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (4):907-49.
    Standard Type Theory, STT, tells us that b^n(a^m) is well-formed iff n=m+1. However, Linnebo and Rayo have advocated the use of Cumulative Type Theory, CTT, has more relaxed type-restrictions: according to CTT, b^β(a^α) is well-formed iff β > α. In this paper, we set ourselves against CTT. We begin our case by arguing against Linnebo and Rayo’s claim that CTT sheds new philosophical light on set theory. We then argue that, while CTT ’s type-restrictions are unjustifiable, the type-restrictions imposed by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  15. (1 other version)Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?Tim Crane - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.
    It is widely agreed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e., that it has representational content. Many philosophers take this to mean that like belief, experience has propositional content, that it can be true or false. I accept that perceptual experience has intentionality; but I dispute the claim that it has propositional content. This claim does not follow from the fact that experience is intentional, nor does it follow from the fact that experiences are accurate or inaccurate. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   164 citations  
  16. Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Tim Bayne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.
    The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say ’No’, whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say ’Yes’. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the liberal view that high-level content can (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   173 citations  
  17. Artifacts and mind-dependence.Tim Juvshik - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9313-9336.
    I defend the intention-dependence of artifacts, which says that something is an artifact of kind K only if it is the successful product of an intention to make an artifact of kind K. I consider objections from two directions. First, that artifacts are often mind- and intention-dependent, but that this isn’t necessary, as shown by swamp cases. I offer various error theories for why someone would have artifact intuitions in such cases. Second, that while artifacts are necessarily mind-dependent, they aren’t (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  18. (1 other version)Intentionality as the mark of the mental.Tim Crane - 1998 - In Tim Crane , Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press. pp. 229-251.
    ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would ipso facto cease to exist’.1 Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena. Brentano’s originality does not lie in pointing out the existence of intentionality, or in inventing the terminology, which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   112 citations  
  19. Summary of "Elements of Mind" and Replies to Critics.Tim Crane - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):223-240.
    Elements of Mind (EM) has two themes, one major and one minor. The major theme is intentionality, the mind’s direction upon its objects; the other is the mind–body problem. I treat these themes separately: chapters 1, and 3–5 are concerned with intentionality, while chapter 2 is about the mind–body problem. In this summary I will first describe my view of the mind–body problem, and then describe the book’s main theme. Like many philosophers, I see the mind–body problem as containing two (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   162 citations  
  20. Relational egalitarianism, future generations, and arguments from overlap.Tim Meijers & Dick Timmer - 2025 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 28 (3):443-463.
    Relational egalitarianism holds that people should live together as equals. We argue against the received wisdom amongst both friends and foes of relational egalitarianism that it fails to provide a theory of intergenerational justice. Instead, we argue that relational egalitarianism is concerned with social equality amongst future contemporaries, and that this commitment gives rise to duties of justice for current generations that can be grounded in the idea of generational overlap. In doing so, we argue that that the scope of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Function essentialism about artifacts.Tim Juvshik - 2021 - Philosophical Studies (9):2943-2964.
    Much recent discussion has focused on the nature of artifacts, particularly on whether artifacts have essences. While the general consensus is that artifacts are at least intention-dependent, an equally common view is function essentialism about artifacts, the view that artifacts are essentially functional objects and that membership in an artifact kind is determined by a particular, shared function. This paper argues that function essentialism about artifacts is false. First, the two component conditions of function essentialism are given a clear and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  22. What is Distinctive About Human Thought? (An Inaugural Lecture Given at the University of Cambridge, December 2010).Tim Crane - manuscript
    Descartes famously argued that animals were mere machines, without thought or consciousness. Few would now share this view. But if other animals have conscious lives, what are they like, how do they differ from ours, and how would we ever know anything about them? This lecture will address this question by looking at the kinds of thoughts we might share with animals, and looking at philosophical and empirical arguments for how our thoughts might differ from theirs.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Comments on Damasio, Eliot & Hauser.Tim Crane - unknown
    A distinctive feature of recent popular science writing is the parade of books by distinguished scientists – from Roger Penrose to Francis Crick and Gerald Edelman – which attempt solutions to the traditional problems of mind and consciousness. The Feeling of What Happens by neuroscientist Antonio Damasio lies squarely in this tradition, as did his earlier Descartes’ Error. These books, like those of Penrose, Crick and others, attempt a difficult double task: to explain scientific results to the general reader and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Brentano on Intentionality.Tim Crane - 2017 - In Uriah Kriegel, The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 41-48.
    Brentano’s account of what he called intentionale Inexistenz — what we now call intentionality — is without question one of the most important parts of his philosophy, and one of the most influential ideas in late 19th-century philosophy. Here I will explain how this idea figures in Brentano’s central text, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Brentano 1995a). I will then briefly explain how Brentano’s ideas about intentionality evolved after the first publication of this work in 1874, and how they were (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  25. The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.Tim Crane - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith, Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.
    Newcomers to the philosophy of mind are sometimes resistant to the idea that pain is a mental state. If asked to defend their view, they might say something like this: pain is a physical state, it is a state of the body. A pain in one’s leg feels to be in the leg, not ‘in the mind’. After all, sometimes people distinguish pain which is ‘all in the mind’ from a genuine pain, sometimes because the second is ‘physical’ while the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   115 citations  
  26. Mathematical Internal Realism.Tim Button - 2022 - In Sanjit Chakraborty & James Ferguson Conant, Engaging Putnam. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter. pp. 157-182.
    In “Models and Reality” (1980), Putnam sketched a version of his internal realism as it might arise in the philosophy of mathematics. Here, I will develop that sketch. By combining Putnam’s model-theoretic arguments with Dummett’s reflections on Gödelian incompleteness, we arrive at (what I call) the Skolem-Gödel Antinomy. In brief: our mathematical concepts are perfectly precise; however, these perfectly precise mathematical concepts are manifested and acquired via a formal theory, which is understood in terms of a computable system of proof, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  27. Level theory, part 1: Axiomatizing the bare idea of a cumulative hierarchy of sets.Tim Button - 2021 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 27 (4):436-460.
    The following bare-bones story introduces the idea of a cumulative hierarchy of pure sets: 'Sets are arranged in stages. Every set is found at some stage. At any stage S: for any sets found before S, we find a set whose members are exactly those sets. We find nothing else at S.' Surprisingly, this story already guarantees that the sets are arranged in well-ordered levels, and suffices for quasi-categoricity. I show this by presenting Level Theory, a simplification of set theories (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  28. Deflationary metaphysics and ordinary language.Tim Button - 2020 - Synthese 197 (1):33-57.
    Amie Thomasson and Eli Hirsch have both attempted to deflate metaphysics, by combining Carnapian ideas with an appeal to ordinary language. My main aim in this paper is to critique such deflationary appeals to ordinary language. Focussing on Thomasson, I draw two very general conclusions. First: ordinary language is a wildly complicated phenomenon. Its implicit ontological commitments can only be tackled by invoking a context principle; but this will mean that ordinary language ontology is not a trivial enterprise. Second: ordinary (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  29. Epistemic Cans.Tim Kearl & Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    We argue that S is in a position to know that p iff S can know that p. Thus, what makes position-to-know-ascriptions true is just a special case of what makes ability-ascriptions true: compossibility. The novelty of our compossibility theory of epistemic modality lies in its subsuming epistemic modality under agentive modality, the modality characterizing what agents can do.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. Consequentialism, Collective Action, and Causal Impotence.Tim Aylsworth & Adam Pham - 2020 - Ethics, Policy and Environment 23 (3):336-349.
    This paper offers some refinements to a particular objection to act consequentialism, the “causal impotence” objection. According to proponents of the objection, when we find circumstances in which severe, unnecessary harms result entirely from voluntary acts, it seems as if we should be able to indict at least one act among those acts, but act consequentialism appears to lack the resources to offer this indictment. Our aim is to show is that the most promising response on behalf of act consequentialism, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  31. Abstract Objects, Causal Efficacy, and Causal Exclusion.Tim Juvshik - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):805-827.
    objects are standardly taken to be causally inert, but this claim is rarely explicitly argued for. In the context of his platonism about musical works, in order for musical works to be audible, Julian Dodd argues that abstracta are causally efficacious in virtue of their concrete tokens participating in events. I attempt to provide a principled argument for the causal inertness of abstracta by first rejecting Dodd’s arguments from events, and then extending and generalizing the causal exclusion argument to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  32. (1 other version)The Given.Tim Crane - 2013 - In Joseph K. Schear, Mind, reason, and being-in-the-world: the McDowell-Dreyfus debate. New York: Routledge. pp. 229-249.
    In The Mind and the World Order, C.I. Lewis made a famous distinction between the immediate data ‘which are presented or given to the mind’ and the ‘construction or interpretation’ which the mind brings to those data (1929: 52). What the mind receives is the datum – literally, the given – and the interpretation is what happens when we being it ‘under some category or other, select from it, emphasise aspects of it, and relate it in particular and unavoidable ways’ (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  33. Numbers without aggregation.Tim Henning - 2023 - Noûs (3):755-777.
    Suppose we can save either a larger group of persons or a distinct, smaller group from some harm. Many people think that, all else equal, we ought to save the greater number. This article defends this view (with qualifications). But unlike earlier theories, it does not rely on the idea that several people's interests or claims receive greater aggregate weight. The argument starts from the idea that due to their stakes, the affected people have claims to have a say in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  34. Artifactualization without Physical Modification.Tim Juvshik - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (4):545-572.
    Much recent discussion has focused on the nature of artifacts, particularly on whether they have essences. While it is often held that artifacts are intention-dependent and necessarily have functions, it is equally commonly held, though far less discussed, that artifacts are the result of physical modification of some material objects. This paper argues that the physical modification condition on artifacts is false. First, it formulates the physical modification condition perspicuously for the first time. Second, it offers counterexamples to this condition, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  35. Critical Thinking Education and Debiasing.Tim Kenyon & Guillaume Beaulac - 2014 - Informal Logic 34 (4):341-363.
    There are empirical grounds to doubt the effectiveness of a common and intuitive approach to teaching debiasing strategies in critical thinking courses. We summarize some of the grounds before suggesting a broader taxonomy of debiasing strategies. This four-level taxonomy enables a useful diagnosis of biasing factors and situations, and illuminates more strategies for more effective bias mitigation located in the shaping of situational factors and reasoning infrastructure—sometimes called “nudges” in the literature. The question, we contend, then becomes how best to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  36. From Choice to Chance? Saving People, Fairness, and Lotteries.Tim Henning - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):169-206.
    Many authors in ethics, economics, and political science endorse the Lottery Requirement, that is, the following thesis: where different parties have equal moral claims to one indivisible good, it is morally obligatory to let a fair lottery decide which party is to receive the good. This article defends skepticism about the Lottery Requirement. It distinguishes three broad strategies of defending such a requirement: the surrogate satisfaction account, the procedural account, and the ideal consent account, and argues that none of these (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  37. In Defense of Sensitivity.Tim Black & Peter Murphy - 2007 - Synthese 154 (1):53-71.
    The sensitivity condition on knowledge says that one knows that P only if one would not believe that P if P were false. Difficulties for this condition are now well documented. Keith DeRose has recently suggested a revised sensitivity condition that is designed to avoid some of these difficulties. We argue, however, that there are decisive objections to DeRose’s revised condition. Yet rather than simply abandoning his proposed condition, we uncover a rationale for its adoption, a rationale which suggests a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  38. (1 other version)The Waterfall Illusion.Tim Crane - 1988 - Analysis 48 (June):142-47.
    If you stare for a period of time at a scene which contains movement in one direction, and then turn your attention to an object in a scene which contains no movement, this object will appear to move in the opposite direction to that of the original movement. The effect can be easily achieved by attaching a piece of paper with a spiral drawn on it to the spinning turntable of a record player, and then turning the turntable off while (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  39. The Mental Causation Debate.Tim Crane - 1995 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (Supplementary):211-36.
    This paper is about a puzzle which lies at the heart of contemporary physicalist theories of mind. On the one hand, the original motivation for physicalism was the need to explain the place of mental causation in the physical world. On the other hand, physicalists have recently come to see the explanation of mental causation as one of their major problems. But how can this be? How can it be that physicalist theories still have a problem explaining something which their (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   79 citations  
  40. On the social nature of artefacts.Tim Juvshik - 2024 - Theoria 89 (6):910-932.
    Recent work in metaphysics has focused on the nature of artefacts, most accounts of which assume that artefacts depend on the intentions of their individual makers. Artefacts are thus importantly different from institutional kinds, which involve collective intentions. However, recent work in social ontology has yielded renewed focus on the social dimensions of various kinds, including artefacts. As a result, some philosophers have suggested that artefacts have a distinctly social dimension that goes beyond their makers' individual intentions but which stops (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  41. There's no time like the present.Tim Button - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):130–135.
    No-futurists ('growing block theorists') hold that that the past and the present are real, but that the future is not. The present moment is therefore privileged: it is the last moment of time. Craig Bourne (2002) and David Braddon-Mitchell (2004) have argued that this position is unmotivated, since the privilege of presentness comes apart from the indexicality of 'this moment'. I respond that no-futurists should treat 'x is real-as-of y' as a nonsymmetric relation. Then different moments are real-as-of different times. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  42. (1 other version)Intentional Objects.Tim Crane - 2001 - Ratio 14 (4):298-317.
    Is there, or should there be, any place in contemporary philosophy of mind for the concept of an intentional object? Many philosophers would make short work of this question. In a discussion of what intentional objects are supposed to be, John Searle...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  43. Structure and Categoricity: Determinacy of Reference and Truth Value in the Philosophy of Mathematics.Tim Button & Sean Walsh - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (3):283-307.
    This article surveys recent literature by Parsons, McGee, Shapiro and others on the significance of categoricity arguments in the philosophy of mathematics. After discussing whether categoricity arguments are sufficient to secure reference to mathematical structures up to isomorphism, we assess what exactly is achieved by recent ‘internal’ renditions of the famous categoricity arguments for arithmetic and set theory.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  44. Realistic structuralism's identity crisis: A hybrid solution.Tim Button - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):216–222.
    Keränen (2001) raises an argument against realistic (ante rem) structuralism: where a mathematical structure has a non-trivial automorphism, distinct indiscernible positions within the structure cannot be shown to be non-identical using only the properties and relations of that structure. Ladyman (2005) responds by allowing our identity criterion to include 'irreflexive two-place relations'. I note that this does not solve the problem for structures with indistinguishable positions, i.e. positions that have all the same properties as each other and exactly the same (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  45. All the Difference in the World.Tim Crane - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (162):1-25.
    The celebrated "Twin Earth" arguments of Hilary Putnam (1975) and Tyler Burge (1979) aim to establish that some intentional states logically depend on facts external to the subjects of those states. Ascriptions of states of these kinds to a thinker entail that the thinker's environment is a certain way. It is not possible that the thinker could be in those very intentional states unless the environment is that way...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  46. Bare Land: Alienation as Deracination in Anna Tsing and John Steinbeck.Tim Christiaens - 2024 - In Re-imagining Class. pp. 257-277.
    In The Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins, Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing explains how bare land is formed. Capitalism produces ‘ruins’ by stripping living beings of the capacity to form their own ecological relations, a necessary condition for the reproduction of life. Contemporary capitalism alienates living beings from ecological relations, i.e. capitalism generates “the ability to stand alone, as if the entanglements of living did not matter. Through alienation, people and things become (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. (1 other version)The Origins of Qualia.Tim Crane - 2000 - In Tim Crane & Sarah Patterson, History of the Mind-Body Problem. New York: Routledge.
    The mind-body problem in contemporary philosophy has two parts: the problem of mental causation and the problem of consciousness. These two parts are not unrelated; in fact, it can be helpful to see them as two horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the causal interaction between mental and physical phenomena seems to require that all causally efficacious mental phenomena are physical; but on the other hand, the phenomenon of consciousness seems to entail that not all mental phenomena are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  48. Every now and then, no-futurism faces no sceptical problems.Tim Button - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):325–332.
    Tallant (2007) has challenged my recent defence of no-futurism (Button 2006), but he does not discuss the key to that defence: that no-futurism's primitive relation 'x is real-as-of y' is not symmetric. I therefore answer Tallant's challenge in the same way as I originally defended no-futurism. I also clarify no-futurism by rejecting a common mis-characterisation of the growing-block theorist. By supplying a semantics for no-futurists, I demonstrate that no-futurism faces no sceptical challenges. I conclude by considering the problem of how (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  49. Is There a Perceptual Relation?Tim Crane - 2006 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne, Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 126-146.
    P.F. Strawson argued that ‘mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as … an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us’ (1979: 97). He began his defence of this very natural idea by asking how someone might typically give a description of their current visual experience, and offered this example of such a description: ‘I see the red light of the setting sun filtering through the black and thickly clustered branches of the elms; I see the dappled deer (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   115 citations  
  50. Why are all the sets all the sets?Tim Button - manuscript
    Necessitists about set theory think that the pure sets exists, and are the way they are, as a matter of necessity. They cannot explain why the sets (de rebus) are all the sets. This constitutes the Ur-Objection against necessitism; it is the primary motivation cited by potentialists about set theory. -/- At least three families of potentialism draw motivation from the Ur-Objection. Contingentists think that any things could form a set even if they actually did not. Prioritists think that sets (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 537