- The Sensory Content of Perceptual Experience.Jacob Berger - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (4):446-468.details
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The Functional Mapping Hypothesis.Michael Pauen - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):107-118.details
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(1 other version)Is the Sense‐Data Theory a Representationalist Theory?Fiona Macpherson - 2014 - Ratio 27 (4):369-392.details
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Sosa on the normativity of belief.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):617-624.details
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The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology.Declan Smithies - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):731-743.details
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Experiences of linguistic understanding as epistemic feelings.Anna Drożdżowicz - 2021 - Mind and Language 38 (1):274-295.details
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Affectivism about intuitions.Slawa Loev - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-24.details
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Does the Folk Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness Exist?Michał Wyrwa - 2022 - Diametros 19 (71):46-66.details
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¿Hemos respondido la pregunta "¿Puede pensar una máquina?"?Gonzalez Rodrigo - 2019 - In Discusiones Fundamentales en Filosofía de la Mente: Voces Locales. Valparaíso: Universidad de Valparaíso. pp. 71-95.details
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Bevissthet.Mette Kristine Hansen - 2020 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 55 (4):253-268.details
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Other minds are neither seen nor inferred.Mason Westfall - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11977-11997.details
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Time and intentionality.Maxime Doyon & Thiemo Breyer - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (3):405-411.details
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(1 other version)What is it like to think about oneself? De Se thought and phenomenal intentionality.Kyle Banick - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):919-932.details
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Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Cognitive Contact.Christopher A. Young - unknowndetails
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(1 other version)There is nothing it is like to see red: holism and subjective experience.Anthony F. Peressini - 2017 - Synthese:1-30.details
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‘What it is Like’ Talk is not Technical Talk.Jonathan Farrell - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):50-65.details
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(1 other version)Consciousness and intentionality.Charles Siewert - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Intentionality.Pierre Jacob - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Experimental Phenomenology of Perception. A Collective Reflection on the Present and Future of this Approach.Roberto Burro & Ivana Bianchi - 2022 - Gestalt Theory 44 (3):279-288.details
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Crane and the mark of the mental.Andrea Raimondi - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):683-693.details
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Self-Esteem, Social Esteem, and Pride.Alessandro Salice - 2020 - Emotion Review 12 (3):193-205.details
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Cognitive phenomenology and metacognitive feelings.Santiago Arango-Muñoz - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (2):247-262.details
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A defense of liberalism in the epistemology of perception.Megan Feeney - 2019 - Dissertation, Rutgers Universitydetails
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A cognitive account of agentive awareness.Myrto Mylopoulos - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (5):545-563.details
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A puzzle about desire.Jared Peterson - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3655-3676.details
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017details
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Solely Generic Phenomenology.Ned Block - 2015 - Open MIND 2015.details
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On a Neglected Aspect of Agentive Experience.Andrew Sims - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (4):1313-1330.details
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Semantic mechanisms may be responsible for developing synesthesia.Aleksandra Mroczko-Wä…Sowicz & Danko Nikolić - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8:1-13.details
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On the safety and danger of ‘viral’ information from the perspective of the epistemological subject.Peter Gurský - 2021 - Ethics and Bioethics (in Central Europe) 11 (3-4):126-141.details
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How anxiety induces verbal hallucinations.Matthew Ratcliffe & Sam Wilkinson - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 39:48-58.details
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Nonconceptual Content.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content. Cham: Springer.details
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Narrow mental content.Curtis Brown - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Philosophical empathy.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2021 - Continental Philosophy Review 54 (2):219-235.details
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Mind and Object. An Essay on Intentionality.Patrik Engisch - 2017 - Dissertation, Université de Fribourgdetails
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First-Person Investigations of Consciousness.Brentyn Ramm - 2016 - Dissertation, The Australian National Universitydetails
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Varieties of Cognition-Arousal Theory.Rainer Reisenzein - 2017 - Emotion Review 9 (1):17-26.details
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The case for mind perception.Somogy Varga - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3).details
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(1 other version)Exploring conceptual thinking and pure concepts from a first person perspective.Renatus Ziegler & Ulrich Weger - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2019 (5):947-972.details
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Fenomenologia cognitiva.Marta Jorba - 2017 - Quaderns de Filosofia 4 (2).details
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How to defend the phenomenology of attitudes.Jared Peterson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2609-2629.details
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(6 other versions)Quaderns de filosofia IV, 2.Quad Fia - 2017 - Quaderns de Filosofia 4 (2).details
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(1 other version)Review of : Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Andreas Elpidorou, Walter Hopp : Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches, Routledge: London, 2016.Maxime Doyon - 2017 - Husserl Studies 33 (2):183-190.details
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Külpe on Cognitive Attitudes.Arnaud Dewalque - 2017 - Discipline filosofiche. 27 (2):157-176.details
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(1 other version)Against phenomenal externalism.Elisabetta Sacchi & Alberto Voltolini - 2017 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 49 (145):25-48.details
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