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(1 other version)Turingův test: filozofické aspekty umělé inteligence.Filip Tvrdý - 2011 - Dissertation, Palacky Universitydetails
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Recursive Functions and Metamathematics: Problems of Completeness and Decidability, Gödel's Theorems.Rod J. L. Adams & Roman Murawski - 1999 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer Verlag.details
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Fast-Collapsing Theories.Samuel A. Alexander - 2013 - Studia Logica (1):1-21.details
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A Machine That Knows Its Own Code.Samuel A. Alexander - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (3):567-576.details
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On Some Properties of Humanly Known and Humanly Knowable Mathematics.Jason L. Megill, Tim Melvin & Alex Beal - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (1):81-88.details
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Gödel's incompleteness theorems and computer science.Roman Murawski - 1997 - Foundations of Science 2 (1):123-135.details
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Logic and limits of knowledge and truth.Patrick Grim - 1988 - Noûs 22 (3):341-367.details
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On the philosophical relevance of Gödel's incompleteness theorems.Panu Raatikainen - 2005 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 59 (4):513-534.details
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Consistency, mechanicalness, and the logic of the mind.Qiuen Yu - 1992 - Synthese 90 (1):145-79.details
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(1 other version)Maximen V / Maxims V.Kurt Gödel - 2023 - De Gruyter.details
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Self-referential theories.Samuel A. Alexander - 2020 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 85 (4):1687-1716.details
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A Metasemantic Challenge for Mathematical Determinacy.Jared Warren & Daniel Waxman - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):477-495.details
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On the necessary philosophical premises of the Goedelian arguments.Fano Vincenzo & Graziani Pierluigi - unknowndetails
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(1 other version)Are we paraconsistent? on the luca-penrose argument and the computational theory of mind.Jason L. Megill - 2004 - Auslegung 27 (1):23-30.details
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The Anti-Mechanist Argument Based on Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems, Indescribability of the Concept of Natural Number and Deviant Encodings.Paula Quinon - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):243-266.details
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Physics of brain-mind interaction.John C. Eccles - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):662-663.details
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Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind.Jon Cogburn & Jason Megil - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (3):423-439.details
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Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem and the Anti-Mechanist Argument: Revisited.Yong Cheng - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):159-182.details
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(1 other version)Menschen, maschinen und gödels theorem.Rosemarie Rheinwald - 1991 - Erkenntnis 34 (1):1 - 21.details
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Mechanism, truth, and Penrose's new argument.Stewart Shapiro - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (1):19-42.details
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Understanding, Expression and Unwelcome Logic.Štěpán Holub - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):183-202.details
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Generalized quantifiers.Dag Westerståhl - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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On the Anti-Mechanist Arguments Based on Gödel’s Theorem.Stanisław Krajewski - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne 34 (1):9-56.details
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Ideen zu einer Kritik ‚algorithmischer‘ Rationalität.Dieter Mersch - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (5):851-873.details
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A Computational Learning Semantics for Inductive Empirical Knowledge.Kevin T. Kelly - 2014 - In Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (eds.), Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics. Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. pp. 289-337.details
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Self-knowledge and embedded operators.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Analysis 56 (4):202-209.details
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