- Scientific progress as accumulation of knowledge: a reply to Rowbottom.Bird Alexander - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):279-281.details
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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2011 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.details
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Perceptual Justification: Factive Reasons and Fallible Virtues.Christoph9 Kelp & Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2015 - In Chienkuo Mi, Michael Slote & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue. New York: Routledge.details
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What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.details
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Epistemic Infrastructure for a Scientific Metaphysics.Amanda Bryant - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (1):27-49.details
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A knowledge-first approach to episodic memory.Christoph Hoerl - 2022 - Synthese 200 (376):1-27.details
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Externalism Explained.Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Four arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Douven, I. ed. Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).details
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Moore's Paradox and Assertion.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - In Goldberg Sanford (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
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Are there counterexamples to the consistency principle?Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Episteme:1-18.details
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Knowledge-First Evidentialism about Rationality.Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant Fabian Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Cans.Tim Kearl & Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion: An Essay in Philosophical Science.John Turri - 2016 - Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.details
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K ⊈ E.Elia Zardini - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):540-557.details
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Determinism and Judgment. A Critique of the Indirect Epistemic Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Luca Zanetti - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):33-54.details
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Deflationism about Truth-Directedness.Luca Zanetti - 2023 - Manuscrito 46 (4):2022-0069.details
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The transmission of knowledge and justification.Stephen Wright - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):293-311.details
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Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.details
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Moore’s Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):10-23.details
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Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
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Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3593-3609.details
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Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision.John Turri - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):4009-4030.details
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Two accounts of assertion.Martin Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
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Knowledge, Justification and Normative Coincidence1.Martin Smith - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):273-295.details
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Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology, by Sven Rosenkranz. [REVIEW]Martin Smith - forthcoming - Mind.details
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Credal accuracy and knowledge.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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Norms of Belief.Mona Simion, Christoph Kelp & Harmen Ghijsen - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):374-392.details
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Knowledge‐first functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.details
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Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief.Paul Silva - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2639-2664.details
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Knowing how to put knowledge first in the theory of justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):393-412.details
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The Nought Belief Paradox.Nicholas Shackel - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):523-529.details
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Strong knowledge, weak belief?Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8741-8753.details
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Partial Reliance.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (6):436-451.details
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Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8069-8090.details
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Degrees of Doxastic Justification.Moritz Schulz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2943-2972.details
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The Structure of Justification.Sven Rosenkranz - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):629-629.details
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Knowledge of Mathematics without Proof.Alexander Paseau - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):775-799.details
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Testimony, Engineered Knowledge and Internalism.Dan O’Brien - 2006 - Philosophica 78 (2).details
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Epistemic norms, all things considered.Kate Nolfi - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6717-6737.details
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Competence to know.Lisa Miracchi - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):29-56.details
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Knowledge and Other Norms for Assertion, Action, and Belief: A Teleological Account.Neil Mehta - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):681-705.details
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The Illusion of Exclusivity.Conor McHugh - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1117-1136.details
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Belief and aims.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.details
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Justification as 'Would-Be' Knowledge.Aidan McGlynn - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):361-376.details
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‘This Is the Bad Case’: What Brains in Vats Can Know.Aidan McGlynn - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):183-205.details
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Persistent burglars and knocks on doors: Causal indispensability of knowing vindicated.Artūrs Https://Orcidorg Logins - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):1335-1357.details
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Persistent burglars and knocks on doors: Causal indispensability of knowing vindicated.Artūrs Https://Orcidorg Logins - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):1335-1357.details
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Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.details
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