- The New Evil Demon Problem at 40.Peter J. Graham - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Knowledge and Action: What Depends on What?Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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Evidentialism.Giada Fratantonio - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.details
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Agentive Modals and Agentive Modality: A Cautionary Tale.Timothy Kearl & Robert H. Wallace - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2):139–155.details
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Epistemic control without voluntarism.Timothy R. Kearl - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):95-109.details
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Understanding of the norm of political discourse.Emma C. Gordon - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-13.details
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Scepticism about epistemic blame.Tim Smartt - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1813-1828.details
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The Paradox of Graded Justification.Logins Arturs - forthcoming - Episteme:1-32.details
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Evidence, reasons, and knowledge in the reasons-first program.Paul Silva & Sven Bernecker - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):617-625.details
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You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.details
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Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
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Acting on Knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 163-181.details
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Epistemic Blame and the New Evil Demon Problem.Cristina Ballarini - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2475-2505.details
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Refitting the mirrors: on structural analogies in epistemology and action theory.Lisa Miracchi & J. Adam Carter - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-28.details
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Justification and the knowledge-connection.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1973-1995.details
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(1 other version)Reliabilist Epistemology.Alvin Goldman & Bob Beddor - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):423-441.details
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Epistemic blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (8):e12762.details
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Knowledge is the Norm of Assertion.Matthew A. Benton - 2024 - In Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 329-339.details
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Standing to epistemically blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11355-11375.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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Evidence-Coherence Conflicts Revisited.Alex Worsnip - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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A puzzle about fickleness.Elise Woodard - 2020 - Noûs 56 (2):323-342.details
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Suspending judgment the correct way.Luis Rosa - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (10):2001-2023.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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There is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame.Cameron Boult - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):518-534.details
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Two faces of rationality.Vishnu Sridharan - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):11103-11124.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge-First Theories of Justification.Paul Silva - 2020 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Generic Moral Grounding.Julian Jonker - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):23-38.details
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Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Arturs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
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Knowledge‐first functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.details
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Rational Requirements and the Primacy of Pressure.Daniel Fogal - 2020 - Mind 129 (516):1033-1070.details
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A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):493-503.details
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Justifications and excuses in epistemology.Daniel Greco - 2019 - Noûs 55 (3):517-537.details
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Rationality and Truth.Stewart Cohen & Juan Comesaña - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality. Oxford University PRess.details
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Whither Evidentialist Reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 307-25.details
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Rationality, Appearances, and Apparent Facts.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 14 (2).details
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The demon that makes us go mental: mentalism defended.Jonathan Egeland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3141-3158.details
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Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3593-3609.details
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An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.details
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A Plea for Falsehoods.Juan Comesaña - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):247-276.details
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Four arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Douven, I. ed. Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).details
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Knowledge-First Evidentialism about Rationality.Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant Fabian Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.details
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Justified Belief: Knowledge First‐Style.Christoph Kelp - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):79-100.details
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Basic Knowledge First.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):343-361.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge-how is the Norm of Intention.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1703-1727.details
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The Externalist’s Guide to Fishing for Compliments.Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):691-728.details
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Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.details
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Is there an epistemic norm of practical reasoning?Davide Fassio - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2137-2166.details
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