An important open problem in Reverse Mathematics is the reduction of the first-order strength of the base theory from IΣ1IΣ1 to IΔ0+expIΔ0+exp. The system ERNA, a version of Nonstandard Analysis based on the system IΔ0+expIΔ0+exp, provides a partial solution to this problem. Indeed, weak Königʼs lemma and many of its equivalent formulations from Reverse Mathematics can be ‘pushed down’ into ERNA, while preserving the equivalences, but at the price of replacing equality with ‘≈’, i.e. infinitesimal proximity . The logical principle (...) corresponding to weak Königʼs lemma is the universal transfer principle from Nonstandard Analysis. Here, we consider the intermediate and mean value theorem and their uniform generalizations. We show that ERNAʼs Reverse Mathematics mirrors the situation in classical Reverse Mathematics. This further supports our claim from Sanders [19] that the Reverse Mathematics of ERNA plus universal transfer is a copy up to infinitesimals of that of WKL0. We discuss some of the philosophical implications of our results. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued, firstly, that Kuhnian revolutions in mathematics are logically possible, in the sense of not being inconsistent with the nature of mathematics; and, secondly, that Kuhnian revolutions are actually possible, in the sense that a Kuhnian paradigm for mathematics can be exhibited which would, if accepted by the mathematical community, produce a full Kuhnian revolution. These two arguments depend on first proving that a shift from a classical conception of mathematics to an intuitionist conception would (...) be incommensurable, that is, that some classical statements, possessing meanings which cannot be preserved in the intuitionist language, would become unintelligible. The vague but intriguing thesis is then tentatively advanced that Kuhnian revolutions are even historically possible, in the sense that only what we might call ‘accidental’ historical factors may have prevented mathematics from undergoing just such a Kuhnian revolution in the early years of the twentieth century. (shrink)

Errett Bishop's work in constructive mathematics is overwhelmingly regarded as a turning point for mathematics based on intuitionistic logic. It brought new life to this form of mathematics and prompted the development of new areas of research that witness today's depth and breadth of constructive mathematics. Surprisingly, notwithstanding the extensive mathematical progress since the publication in 1967 of Errett Bishop's Foundations of Constructive Analysis, there has been no corresponding advances in the philosophy of constructive mathematics Bishop style. The aim of (...) this paper is to foster the philosophical debate about this form of mathematics. I begin by considering key elements of philosophical remarks by Bishop, especially focusing on Bishop's assessment of Brouwer. I then compare these remarks with ``traditional'' philosophical arguments for intuitionistic logic and argue that the latter are in tension with Bishop's views. ``Traditional'' arguments for intuitionistic logic turn out to be also in conflict with significant recent developments in constructive mathematics. This rises pressing questions for the philosopher of mathematics, especially with regard to the possibility of offering alternative philosophical arguments for constructive mathematics. I conclude with the suggestion to look anew at Bishop's own remarks for inspiration. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Theories of sets such as Zermelo Fraenkel set theory are usually presented as the combination of two distinct kinds of principles: logical and set-theoretic principles. The set-theoretic principles are imposed ‘on top’ of first-order logic. This is in agreement with a traditional view of logic as universally applicable and topic neutral. Such a view of logic has been rejected by the intuitionists, on the ground that quantification over infinite domains requires the use of intuitionistic rather than classical logic. In (...) the following, I consider constructive set theories, which use intuitionistic rather than classical logic, and argue that they manifest a distinctive interdependence or an entanglement between sets and logic. In fact, Martin-Löf type theory identifies fundamental logical and set-theoretic notions. Remarkably, one of the motivations for this identification is the thought that classical quantification over infinite domains is problematic, while intuitionistic quantification is not. The approach to quantification adopted in Martin-Löf’s type theory is subtly interconnected with its predicativity. I conclude by recalling key aspects of an approach to predicativity inspired by Poincaré, which focuses on the issue of correct quantification over infinite domains and relate it back to Martin-Löf type theory. (shrink)

The corpus of physical theory is a paradigm of knowledge. The evolution of modern physical theory constitutes the clearest exemplar of the growth of knowledge. If the development of physical theory does not constitute an example of progress and growth in what we know about the Universe nothing does. So anyone interested in the theory of knowledge must be interested consequently in the evolution and content of physical theory. Crucial to the conception of physics as a paradigm of knowledge is (...) the way in which physical theory provides explanations of a vast diversity of natural phenomena on the basis of a very few fundamental principles. A central problem for the epistemologist is therefore what is theoretical explanation in physics? Here we can get good insight from what Redhead has said. Indeed one could agree with almost everything Redhead says and simply endorse much of his careful and extensive defence of the covering law account of explanation in the physical sciences at least as an ideal. However I shall, I fear, try the reader's patience by extending some of the considerations he introduced and raising those issues where we disagree, especially in the important area of statistical explanation. (shrink)

A number of examples of studies from the field ‘The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice’ (PMP) are given. To characterise this new field, three different strands are identified: an agent-based, a historical, and an epistemological PMP. These differ in how they understand ‘practice’ and which assumptions lie at the core of their investigations. In the last part a general framework, capturing some overall structure of the field, is proposed.

We try to recast in modern terms a choice principle conceived by Beppo Levi, who called it the Approximation Principle. Up to now, there was almost no discussion about Levi’s contribution, due to the quite obscure formulation of AP the author has chosen. After briefly reviewing the historical and philosophical surroundings of Levi’s proposal, we undertake our own attempt at interpreting AP. The idea underlying the principle, as well as the supposed faithfulness of our version to Levi’s original intention, are (...) then discussed. Finally, an application of AP to a property of metric spaces is presented, with the aim of showing how AP may work in contexts where other forms of choice are commonly at use. (shrink)

It is shown, within constructive mathematics, that the unit ball B1 of the set of bounded operators on a Hilbert space H is weak-operator totally bounded. This result is then used to prove that the weak-operator continuity of the mapping T → AT on B1 is equivalent to the existence of the adjoint of A.

The main result of this paper is a weak constructive version of the uniform continuity theorem for pointwise continuous, real-valued functions on a convex subset of a normed linear space. Recursive examples are given to show that the hypotheses of this theorem are necessary. The remainder of the paper discusses conditions which ensure that a sequentially continuous function is continuous. MSC: 03F60, 26E40, 46S30.

Two classically equivalent, but constructively inequivalent, strict convexity properties of a preference relation are discussed, and conditions given under which the stronger notion is a consequence of the weaker. The last part of the paper introduces uniformly rotund preferences, and shows that uniform rotundity implies strict convexity. The paper is written from a strictly constructive point of view, in which all proofs embody algorithms. MSC: 03F60, 90A06.

We examine, from a constructive perspective, the relation between the complements of S, T, and S ∩ T in X, where X is either a metric space or a normed linear space. The fundamental question addressed is: If x is distinct from each element of S ∩ T, if s ϵ S, and if t ϵ T, is x distinct from s or from t? Although the classical answer to this question is trivially affirmative, constructive answers involve Markov's principle and (...) the completeness of metric spaces. (shrink)

Two new notions of compactness, each classically equivalent to the standard classical one of sequential compactness, for apartness spaces are examined within Bishop-style constructive mathematics.

A characterisation of a type of weak-operator continuous linear functional on certain linear subsets of B, where H is a Hilbert space, is derived within Bishop-style constructive mathematics.

The nature of modern constructive mathematics, and its applications, actual and potential, to classical and quantum physics, are discussed.

An axiomatic development of the theory of apartness and nearness of a point and a set is introduced as a framework for constructive topology. Various notions of continuity of mappings between apartness spaces are compared; the constructive independence of one of the axioms from the others is demonstrated; and the product apartness structure is defined and analysed.

An axiomatic development of the theory of apartness and nearness of a point and a set is introduced as a framework for constructive topology. Various notions of continuity of mappings between apartness spaces are compared; the constructive independence of one of the axioms from the others is demonstrated; and the product apartness structure is defined and analysed.

It is proved, within Bishop's constructive mathematics , that, in the context of a Hilbert space, the Open Mapping Theorem is equivalent to a principle that holds in intuitionistic mathematics and recursive constructive mathematics but is unlikely to be provable within BISH.

The constructive functional calculus for a sequence of commuting selfadjoint operators on a separable Hilbert space is shown to be independent of the orthonormal basis used in its construction. The proof requires a constructive criterion for the absolute continuity of two positive measures in terms of test functions.

claims that constructive mathematics is inadequate for spacetime physics and hence that constructive mathematics cannot be considered as an alternative to classical mathematics. He also argues that the contructivist must be guilty of a form of a priorism unless she adopts a strong form of anti-realism for science. Here I want to dispute both claims. First, even if there are non-constructive results in physics this does not show that adequate constructive alternatives could not be formulated. Secondly, the constructivist adopts a (...) 'philosophy first' approach that Hellman rejects. This deep difference means that the viability of constructive mathematics cannot yet be decided by determining whether current scientific theories require classical mathematics. We need to decide which approach is most appropriate before we can even determine how we should go about deciding whether we should be constructive or classical mathematicians. (shrink)

We introduce the notion of a convex tree. We show that the binary expansion for real numbers in the unit interval ) is equivalent to weak König lemma ) for trees having at most two nodes at each level, and we prove that the intermediate value theorem is equivalent to \ for convex trees, in the framework of constructive reverse mathematics.

We study the system IFP of intuitionistic fixed point logic, an extension of intuitionistic first-order logic by strictly positive inductive and coinductive definitions. We define a realizability interpretation of IFP and use it to extract computational content from proofs about abstract structures specified by arbitrary classically true disjunction free formulas. The interpretation is shown to be sound with respect to a domain-theoretic denotational semantics and a corresponding lazy operational semantics of a functional language for extracted programs. We also show how (...) extracted programs can be translated into Haskell. As an application we extract a program converting the signed digit representation of real numbers to infinite Gray code from a proof of inclusion of the corresponding coinductive predicates. (shrink)

We show constructively that every quasi-convex, uniformly continuous function \ with at most one minimum point has a minimum point, where C is a convex compact subset of a finite dimensional normed space. Applications include a result on strictly quasi-convex functions, a supporting hyperplane theorem, and a short proof of the constructive fundamental theorem of approximation theory.

The notions of permutable and weak-permutable convergence of a series|$\sum _{n=1}^{\infty }a_{n}$|of real numbers are introduced. Classically, these two notions are equivalent, and, by Riemann’s two main theorems on the convergence of series, a convergent series is permutably convergent if and only if it is absolutely convergent. Working within Bishop-style constructive mathematics, we prove that Ishihara’s principle BD-|$\mathbb {N}$|implies that every permutably convergent series is absolutely convergent. Since there are models of constructive mathematics in which the Riemann permutation theorem for (...) series holds but BD-|$\mathbb{N}$|does not, the best we can hope for as a partial converse to our first theorem is that the absolute convergence of series with a permutability property classically equivalent to that of Riemann implies BD-|$\mathbb {N}$|. We show that this is the case when the property is weak-permutable convergence. (shrink)

Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, a (...) position which has profound implications for many linguists as well as for philosophers. We should not search for one true logic, since there are many. (shrink)

Consequence is at the heart of logic; an account of consequence, of what follows from what, offers a vital tool in the evaluation of arguments. Since philosophy itself proceeds by way of argument and inference, a clear view of what logical consequence amounts to is of central importance to the whole discipline. In this book JC Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what thay call logical pluralism, the view that there is more than one genuine deductive consequence relation, a (...) position which has profound implications for many linguists as well as for philosophers. We should not search for one true logic, since there are many. (shrink)

In the early 1920s, the German mathematician David Hilbert (1862–1943) put forward a new proposal for the foundation of classical mathematics which has come to be known as Hilbert's Program. It calls for a formalization of all of mathematics in axiomatic form, together with a proof that this axiomatization of mathematics is consistent. The consistency proof itself was to be carried out using only what Hilbert called “finitary” methods. The special epistemological character of finitary reasoning then yields the required justification (...) of classical mathematics. Although Hilbert proposed his program in this form only in 1921, various facets of it are rooted in foundational work of his going back until around 1900, when he first pointed out the necessity of giving a direct consistency proof of analysis. Work on the program progressed significantly in the 1920s with contributions from logicians such as Paul Bernays, Wilhelm Ackermann, John von Neumann, and Jacques Herbrand. It was also a great influence on Kurt Gödel, whose work on the incompleteness theorems were motivated by Hilbert's Program. Gödel's work is generally taken to show that Hilbert's Program cannot be carried out. It has nevertheless continued to be an influential position in the philosophy of mathematics, and, starting with the work of Gerhard Gentzen in the 1930s, work on so-called Relativized Hilbert Programs have been central to the development of proof theory. (shrink)

Intersemiotic translation (IT) was defined by Roman Jakobson (The Translation Studies Reader, Routledge, London, p. 114, 2000) as “transmutation of signs”—“an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems.” Despite its theoretical relevance, and in spite of the frequency in which it is practiced, the phenomenon remains virtually unexplored in terms of conceptual modeling, especially from a semiotic perspective. Our approach is based on two premises: (i) IT is fundamentally a semiotic operation process (semiosis) and (ii) (...) IT is a deeply iconic-dependent process. We exemplify our approach by means of literature to dance IT and we explore some implications for the development of a general model of IT. (shrink)

This book intends to show that radical naturalism, nominalism and strict finitism account for the applications of classical mathematics in current scientific theories. The applied mathematical theories developed in the book include the basics of calculus, metric space theory, complex analysis, Lebesgue integration, Hilbert spaces, and semi-Riemann geometry. The fact that so much applied mathematics can be developed within such a weak, strictly finitistic system, is surprising in itself. It also shows that the applications of those classical theories to the (...) finite physical world can be translated into the applications of strict finitism, which demonstrates the applicability of those classical theories without assuming the literal truth of those theories or the reality of infinity. Both professional researchers and students of philosophy of mathematics will benefit greatly from reading this book. (shrink)

The volume includes twenty-five research papers presented as gifts to John L. Bell to celebrate his 60th birthday by colleagues, former students, friends and admirers. Like Bell’s own work, the contributions cross boundaries into several inter-related fields. The contributions are new work by highly respected figures, several of whom are among the key figures in their fields. Some examples: in foundations of maths and logic ; analytical philosophy, philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics and decision theory and foundations of economics. (...) Most articles are contributions to current philosophical debates, but contributions also include some new mathematical results, important historical surveys, and a translation by Wilfrid Hodges of a key work of arabic logic. (shrink)

In this paper we study intrinsic notions of “computability” for open and closed subsets of Euclidean space. Here we combine together the two concepts, computability on abstract metric spaces and computability for continuous functions, and delineate the basic properties of computable open and closed sets. The paper concludes with a comprehensive examination of the Effective Riemann Mapping Theorem and related questions.

This paper explores how to explain the applicability of classical mathematics to the physical world in a radically naturalistic and nominalistic philosophy of mathematics. The applicability claim is first formulated as an ordinary scientific assertion about natural regularity in a class of natural phenomena and then turned into a logical problem by some scientific simplification and abstraction. I argue that there are some genuine logical puzzles regarding applicability and no current philosophy of mathematics has resolved these puzzles. Then I introduce (...) a plan for resolving the logical puzzles of applicability. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to investigate some problems of using finite (or *finite) computational arguments and of the nonstandard notion of an infinitesimal. We will begin by looking at the canonical example illustrating the distinction between classical and constructive analysis, the Intermediate Value Theorem.

We discuss the foundations of constructive mathematics, including recursive mathematics and intuitionism, in relation to classical mathematics. There are connections with the foundations of physics, due to the way in which the different branches of mathematics reflect reality. Many different axioms and their interrelationship are discussed. We show that there is a fundamental problem in BISH (Bishop’s school of constructive mathematics) with regard to its current definition of ‘continuous function’. This problem is closely related to the definition in BISH of (...) ‘locally compact’. Possible approaches to this problem are discussed. Topology seems to be a key to understanding many issues. We offer several new simplifying axioms, which can form bridges between the various branches of constructive mathematics and classical mathematics (‘reuniting the antipodes’). We give a simplification of basic intuitionistic theory, especially with regard to so-called ‘bar induction’. We then plead for a limited number of axiomatic systems, which differentiate between the various branches of mathematics. Finally, in the appendix we offer BISH an elegant topological definition of ‘locally compact’, which unlike the current definition is equivalent to the usual classical and/or intuitionistic definition in classical and intuitionistic mathematics, respectively. (shrink)

In intuitionistic analysis, a subset of a Polish space like or is called positively Borel if and only if it is an open subset of the space or a closed subset of the space or the result of forming either the countable union or the countable intersection of an infinite sequence of (earlier constructed) positively Borel subsets of the space. The operation of taking the complement is absent from this inductive definition, and, in fact, the complement of a positively Borel (...) set is not always positively Borel itself (see Veldman, 2008a). The main result of Veldman (2008a) is that, assuming Brouwer's Continuity Principle and an Axiom of Countable Choice, one may prove that the hierarchy formed by the positively Borel sets is genuinely growing: every level of the hierarchy contains sets that do not occur at any lower level. The purpose of the present paper is a different one: we want to explore the truly remarkable fine structure of the hierarchy. Brouwer's Continuity Principle again is our main tool. A second axiom proposed by Brouwer, his Thesis on Bars is also used, but only incidentally. (shrink)

Locatedness is one of the fundamental notions in constructive mathematics. The existence of a positivity predicate on a locale, i.e. the locale being overt, or open, has proved to be fundamental in constructive locale theory. We show that the two notions are intimately connected.Bishop defines a metric space to be compact if it is complete and totally bounded. A subset of a totally bounded set is again totally bounded iff it is located. So a closed subset of a Bishop compact (...) set is Bishop compact iff it is located. We translate this result to formal topology. ‘Bishop compact’ is translated as compact and overt. We propose a definition of locatedness on subspaces of a formal topology, and prove that a closed subspace of a compact regular formal space is located iff it is overt. Moreover, a Bishop-closed subset of a complete metric space is Bishop compact — that is, totally bounded and complete — iff its localic completion is compact overt.Finally, we show by elementary methods that the points of the Vietoris locale of a compact regular locale are precisely its compact overt sublocales.We work constructively, predicatively and avoid the use of the axiom of countable choice. (shrink)

For a long time people have been trying to develop probability theory starting from ‘finite’ events rather than collections of infinite events. In this way one can find natural replacements for measurable sets and integrable functions, but measurable functions seemed to be more difficult to find. We present a solution. Moreover, our results are constructive.

We show that numerous distinctive concepts of constructive mathematics arise automatically from an “antithesis” translation of affine logic into intuitionistic logic via a Chu/Dialectica construction. This includes apartness relations, complemented subsets, anti-subgroups and anti-ideals, strict and non-strict order pairs, cut-valued metrics, and apartness spaces. We also explain the constructive bifurcation of some classical concepts using the choice between multiplicative and additive affine connectives. Affine logic and the antithesis construction thus systematically “constructivize” classical definitions, handling the resulting bookkeeping automatically.

We are logical pluralists who hold that the right logic is dependent on the domain of investigation; different logics for different mathematical theories. The purpose of this article is to explore the ramifications for our pluralism concerning normativity. Is there any normative role for logic, once we give up its universality? We discuss Florian Steingerger’s “Frege and Carnap on the Normativity of Logic” as a source for possible types of normativity, and then turn to our own proposal, which postulates that (...) various logics are constitutive for thought within particular practices, but none are constitutive for thought as such. (shrink)

Should weak forms of the axiom of choice really be accepted within constructive mathematics? A critical view of the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation, accompanied by the intention to include nondeterministic algorithms, leads us to subscribe to Richman's appeal for dropping countable choice. As an alternative interpretation of intuitionistic logic, we propose to renew dialogue semantics.

Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism (2006) characterises pluralism about logical consequence in terms of the different ways cases can be selected in the analysis of logical consequence as preservation of truth over a class of cases. This is not the only way to understand or to motivate pluralism about logical consequence. Here, I will examine pluralism about logical consequence in terms of different standards of proof. We will focus on sequent derivations for classical logic, imposing two different restrictions on classical (...) derivations to produce derivations for intuitionistic logic and for dual intuitionistic logic. The result is another way to understand the manner in which we can have different consequence relations in the same language. Furthermore, the proof-theoretic perspective gives us a different explanation of how the one concept of negation can have three different truth conditions, those in classical, intuitionistic and dual-intuitionistic models. (shrink)