- Counterevidentials.Laura Caponetto & Neri Marsili - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Assertion remains strong.Peter van Elswyk & Matthew A. Benton - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):27-50.details
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"Knowledge First" and Its Limits.Tammo Lossau - 2022 - Dissertation, Johns Hopkins Universitydetails
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An expressivist solution to Moorean paradoxes.Wolfgang Freitag & Nadja-Mira Yolcu - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5001-5024.details
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Lying, speech acts, and commitment.Neri Marsili - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3245-3269.details
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Assertion and the Future.Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-504.details
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Moorean Assertions and Their Normative Function.Voin Milevski - 2020 - Acta Analytica 35 (4):531-541.details
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Representing knowledge.Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (1):97-143.details
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Philosophie des modalités épistémiques (la logique assertorique revisitée).Fabien Schang - 2007 - Dissertation, Nancy Universitédetails
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Moore's Paradox and Assertion.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - In Goldberg Sanford (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
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Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?Vladimir Krstić - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):642–660.details
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The norm of assertion: Empirical data.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Cognition 177 (C):165-171.details
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Hedged Assertion.Matthew A. Benton & Peter Van Elswyk - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263.details
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To Believe is to Know that You Believe.Eric Marcus - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (3):375-405.details
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Belief, assertion and Moore’s Paradox.Timothy Chan - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):395-414.details
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Empirical evidence claims are a priori.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2821-2834.details
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The absurdities of Moore's paradoxes.John N. Williams - 1982 - Theoria 48 (1):38-46.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and action.Ishani Maitra & Brian Weatherson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):99-118.details
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Epistemic dimensions of personhood.Simon Evnine - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Moorean absurdities and the nature of assertion.John N. Williams - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):135 – 149.details
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Moore’s Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):10-23.details
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Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.details
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Inferences from Utterance to Belief.Martín Abreu Zavaleta - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):301-322.details
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(1 other version)Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Davidson was Almost Right about Lying.Don Fallis - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):337-353.details
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Two claims about epistemic propriety.E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):471-488.details
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(1 other version)Moore's paradox and Crimmins's case.David Rosenthal - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):167-171.details
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(1 other version)Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion: An Essay in Philosophical Science.John Turri - 2016 - Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.details
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Seventh Quadrennial Fellows Conference of the Center for Philosophy of Science.-Preprint Volume- - unknowndetails
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Logical and Practical Contradictions.Bernard Peach - 1953 - Analysis 14 (2):43 - 50.details
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Informativeness and Moore's Paradox.Peter Pagin - 2008 - Analysis 68 (1):46-57.details
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Knowing What One Knows.Richard Taylor - 1955 - Analysis 16 (3):63 - 65.details
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Recent Work on Assertion.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4):365-380.details
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