This paper extends three decades of work arguing that researchers who discuss consciousness should not restrict themselves only to (adult) human minds, but should study (and attempt to model) many kinds of minds, natural and artificial, thereby contributing to our understanding of the space containing all of them. We need to study what they do or can do, how they can do it, and how the natural ones can be emulated in synthetic minds. That requires: (a) understanding sets of requirements (...) that are met by different sorts of minds, i.e. the niches that they occupy, (b) understanding the space of possible designs, and (c) understanding complex and varied relationships between requirements and designs. Attempts to model or explain any particular phenomenon, such as vision, emotion, learning, language use, or consciousness lead to muddle and confusion unless they are placed in that broader context. A methodology for making progress is summarised and a novel requirement proposed for a theory of how human minds work: the theory should support a single generic design for a learning, developing system that, in addition to meeting familiar requirements, should be capable of developing different and opposed philosophical viewpoints about consciousness, and the so-called hard problem. In other words, we need a common explanation for the mental machinations of mysterians, materialists, functionalists, identity theorists, and those who regard all such theories as attempting to answer incoherent questions. No designs proposed so far come close. (shrink)

It would be a mistake to deny commonsense intuitions a role in developing a theory of consciousness. However, philosophers have traditionally failed to probe commonsense in a way that allows these commonsense intuitions to make a robust contribution to a theory of consciousness. In this paper, I report the results of two experiments on purportedly phenomenal states and I argue that many disputes over the philosophical notion of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ are misguided—they fail to capture the interesting connection between commonsense ascriptions (...) of pain and emotion. With this data in hand, I argue that our capacity to distinguish between ‘mere things’ and ‘subjects of moral concern’ rests, to a significant extent, on the sorts of mental states that we take a system to have. (shrink)

This article reviews experimental evidence for a specific sensorimotor function which can be dissociated from higher level representations of space. It attempts to delineate this function on the basis of results obtained by psychophysical experiments performed with brain damaged and healthy subjects. Eye and hand movement control exhibit automatic features, such that they are incompatible with conscious control. In addition, they rely on a reference frame different from the one used by conscious perception. Neuropsychological cases provide a strong support for (...) this specific motor representation of space, which can be spared in patients with lesions of primary sensory systems who have lost conscious perception of visual, tactile or proprioceptive stimuli. Observation of these patients also showed that their motor behavior can be ''attracted'' by a goal only under specific conditions, that is, when the response is immediate and when no cognitive representation of this goal is elaborated at the same time. Beyond the issue of the dissociation between an implicit motor representation and more cognitive processing of spatial information, the issue of the interaction between these two systems is thus a matter of interest. It is suggested that the conscious, cognitive representation of a stimulus can contaminate or override the short-lived motor representation, but no reciprocal influence seem to occur. The interaction observed in patients can also be investigated in normals. The literature provides examples of interaction between sensorimotor and cognitive framing of space, which confirm that immediate action is not mediated by the same system as delayed action, and that elaborating a categorial representation of the action goal prevents the expression of the short-lived sensorimotor representation. It is concluded that action can be controlled by a sensory system which is specialized for on-line processing of relevant goal characteristics. The temporal constraints of this system are such that it can affect the action before a full sensory analysis of this goal has been completed. The performance obtained on the basis of this spatial sensory processing suggests that short-lived motor representations may rather be considered as real ''presentation'' of the action world, which share its metric properties. (shrink)

It is proposed that attention to an object requires the simultaneous activity of three brain regions that are interconnected by a triangular circuit. The regions are the cortical site of attentional expression, the thalamic enhancement structure, and the prefrontal area of control. It is also proposed that awareness of an object requires the additional component of attention directed to a representation of the self. The expression of attention to a self-representation may involve activations of cortical sites corresponding to the body (...) landscape and/or verbal-based memories of autobiographical episodes. As in the case of attention to objects, attention to the self is presumed to involve a triangular circuit. The proposed triangular circuit of attention is shown to be generally consistent with current knowledge of brain structures and with data from a broad range of experiments concerned with the functions of neurons in these structures. (shrink)

Zombies make trouble for physicalism. Intuitively, they seem conceivable, and many take this to support their metaphysical possibility – a result that, most agree, would refute physicalism. John Hawthorne (2002) [Philosophical Studies 109, 17–52] and David Braddon-Mitchell (2003) [The Journal of Philosophy 100, 111–135] have developed a novel response to this argument: phenomenal concepts have a conditional structure – they refer to non-physical states if such states exist and otherwise to physical states – and this explains the zombie intuition. I (...) argue that this strategy fails. The considerations Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell adduce in support of their analysis in fact do no such thing. Further, their main argument for the analysis is self-defeating: exactly similar reasoning would undermine the view it is meant to establish. Finally, on closer inspection the conditional analysis is incompatible with the zombie intuition. Thus, not only is the analysis incapable of explaining the intuition: the intuition’s plausibility indicates that the analysis is incorrect. I also suggest that the allure of the conditional-analysis strategy may derive from a questionable view about what explaining the intuition would require. (shrink)

In order to understand consciousness one would benefit from developing a more eclectic intellectual style. Consciousness is, as proposed by almost everyone except the stubborn reductionists, a truly mysterious concept. Its study and dissection merits a multidisciplinary approach. Waving this multidisciplinary flag has positively enlarged the discussion and neurologists, psychiatrists, mathematicians, and so on, have moved to the philosophy of mind arena, first with caution and now with a more powerful voice. Identifying what we mean by consciousness is a first (...) step even when we want to deny its existence. The link between consciousness and some other mental activity is a logical next step and there is abundant literature doing this, but not all of them differentiate among associated yet different phenomena. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that where consciousness is present, it is a single stream. This notion is bolstered by functions attributed to consciousness, particularly providing multi-faceted experience of a perceptual scene and contributing to the production of coherent behavior, which supposedly require consciousness to be unitary. It is believed that were the unitary structure of consciousness to break down, such that multiple streams of consciousness are present, these functions would be compromised. The split-brain syndrome is widely regarded as evidence for (...) this claim. However, the split-brain syndrome is an atypical structure of human consciousness. As such, conclusions based on the split-brain syndrome regarding the structure and functions of consciousness may be limited in generalizability. There may be cases where multiple consciousness is neither maladaptive nor anomalous but is the naturally evolved configuration, and thus may not compromise the capacity of consciousness to subserve multi-faceted experience and coherent behavior. This paper speculates on the different forms multiple consciousness may take, and demonstrates how they may be able to implement the aforementioned functions of consciousness. In doing so, the paper demonstrates that the commitment a unitary model of consciousness may be due more to anatomical constraints than functional ones. (shrink)

Declan Smithies’ The Epistemic Role of Consciousness is a defense of “Phenomenal Mentalism” according to which, necessarily, which propositions X has epistemic justification to believe at any given time is determined solely by X’s phenomenally individuated mental states at that time. Smithies offers two kinds of arguments for Phenomenal Mentalism: the ones that appeal to particular cases such as blindsight and the ones that appeal to general epistemic principles such as the JJ principle. My focus is on the former. More (...) precisely, I focus on a particular argument from below in Chapter 3, which I call “Argument from Blindsight”. According to this argument, the cases of blindsight show that consciousness is necessary for perceptual justification. In response, I raise two worries about Argument from Blindsight: first, it is difficult to find a plausible interpretation of “full rationality” according to which the premises are true and, second, the argument oscillates between empirical and stipulative discussions of blindsight in a potentially problematic manner. (shrink)

The phenomenology of the unity of consciousness can be analyzed in terms of perceptual spatial and object unity. Subject unity—what we commonly understand by “the unity of consciousness”—has no attendant phenomenology. The further, non-phenomenological, effects of unity can be analyzed in terms of the functional notion of access unity. The unity of consciousness in general can therefore be analyzed in terms of access unity. As a consequence, we can avoid the theoretical introduction of problematic notions such as subsumptive or phenomenal (...) unity. (shrink)

The contemporary standard view of phenomenal consciousness —shared by reductionists and non-reductionists alike—takes it to be a simple, ‘low-level’, ‘pre-reflective’ feature of mental states,...

The question of whether phenomenal consciousness is limited to the capacity of cognitive access remains a contentious issue in philosophy. Overflow theorists argue that the capacity of conscious experience outstrips the capacity of cognitive access. This paper demonstrates a resolution to the overflow debate is found in acknowledging a difference in phenomenological timing required by both sides. It makes clear that the “no overflow” view requires subjects to, at the bare minimum, generate an unconscious visual image of previously presented items (...) if it is to explain performance in the change detection paradigm. It then demonstrates that conscious imagery should support better task performance than unconscious imagery because of a necessary difference in representational strength. However, this contradicts empirical findings, and so a new argument for overflow is presented without requiring the premise that subjects need to obtain a specific phenomenology of presented items during change detection. (shrink)

Conscious access to fear-relevant information is mediated by threshold The present report proposed a model of access consciousness to fear-relevant information according to which there is a threshold for emotional perception beyond that the subject makes hits with no false alarm. The model was examined by having the participants performed a confidence-ratings masking task with fearful faces. Measures of the thresholds for conscious access were taken by looking at the receiver operating characteristics curves generated from a three-state low- and high-threshold (...) model by Krantz. Indeed, the analysis of the masking data revealed that the ROCs had threshold-like-nature rather continuous challenging in this fashion the classical signal-detection view on perceptual processing. Moreover, the threshold ROC curve exhibited the specific y-intercepts relevant to conscious access performance. The study suggests that the threshold can be an intrinsic property of conscious access, mediating emotional contents between perceptual states and consciousness. (shrink)

Many existing studies postulate that in developing economies philanthropy tends to dominate in the CSR orientation delivered by organizations and expected by local populations. To assess this in the emerging economy of Dubai in the United Arab Emirates, we conducted a preliminary investigation of how locals are responding to the growing number of CSR initiatives that are being implemented in the Emirate. Moreover, given that scholars have argued that Islamic principles of philanthropy should guide CSR initiatives in Muslim countries, we (...) also consider if our Emirati respondents connect CSR with Islamic philanthropy. Results from our survey of 267 local Muslim consumers in Dubai indicate that CSR is not typically equated with philanthropy. In addition, respondents displayed an appreciation of the economic benefits that CSR can generate. The implication is that organizations in Dubai no longer need to base their CSR on the platform of Islamic philanthropy as many scholars have argued. Our findings are significant for the wider Gulf region in that they suggest that in wealthy emerging nations, CSR may not be predominantly interpreted as the corporate philanthropy which is needed in poorer developing economies for the provision of infrastructure, schools, hospitals, and housing, and which in some Muslim contexts is also implemented because of local religious values. (shrink)

L’argument principal de cet article est qu’il n’y a pas d’incompatibilité entre les explications physicalistes et l’idée de conscience phénoménale. Ayant comme référence une analyse de certaines propriétés sui generis de la conscience phénoménale, nous avons l’intention de souligner que l’apparente incompatibilité entre le mental et le physique peut être éliminée. De façon plus précise, nous soutenons la thèse selon laquelle les propriétés sui generis des événements mentaux, connues comme qualia, sont des propriétés physiques. Ces propriétés constitueraient, comme l’affirme Tye, (...) les contenus représentationnels nonconceptuels de nos expériences. En outre, ces propriétés sont des inputs des processus physiques dont les outputs seraient des états intentionnels avec des contenus propositionnels.The main argument of this paper is that there is no gap between physicalist explanations and phenomenal consciousness, as a matter of principle. Based on an analysis of certain sui generis properties of phenomenal consciousness, I aim to demonstrate that the apparent explanatory gap between the mental and the physical can be eliminated. More specifically, I want to defend the claim that the so-called sui generis qualities of mental events, referred to as qualia, are physical properties. These properties would constitute, as Tye puts it, the nonconceptual representational content of our conscious experiences. Moreover, they are the input of physical processes whose output would be intentional states with propositional content. (shrink)

En el marco de un nuevo descubrimiento de la fenomenología, este trabajo ofrece diferentes argumentos para superar la clásica interpretación de Husserl considerándolo un representante prototípico del solipsismo. En primer lugar, se refuta la interpretación mentalista de Dreyfus de la fenomenología husserliana, mostrando que su programa filosófico va más allá de la tradicional dicotomía entre internalismo y externalismo; en segundo lugar, se señalan algunas de las principales contribuciones realizadas por la fenomenología de Husserl al campo de las ciencias cognitivas y (...) a la filosofía analítica de las mentes, destacando la importancia concedida a las síntesis pasivas en la llamada fenomenología genética. In the frame of a new discovery of phenomenology, the present essay offers different arguments to overcome the classical interpretation ofHusserl considering him a prototypical solipsist. First we refute Dreyfus' mentalistic misunderstanding of Husserlian phenomenology, and show that his philosophical program is beyond the traditional dichotomy between internalism and externalism. Second, it is our aim to point out some of the fundamental contributions made by Husserl's phenomenology to the cognitive sciences and analytical philosophy of mind, especially highlighting the importance attributed to passive synthesis in his genetic phenomenology. (shrink)

If, as Ned Block has argued, consciousness is a mongrel concept, then this collection resembles nothing so much as a visit to a dog pound, where one can hear all the varieties baying, at full volume. The experience is one of immersion in a voluminous excited cacophony, with much yipping and barking, some deep-throated growling, and other voices that can only be characterized as howling at the moon. What a time to be conscious! What a time to be conscious of (...) being conscious! (shrink)

Our chronically impoverished explanatory capacity in respect of P-consciousness is highly suggestive of a problem with science itself, rather than its lack of acquisition of some particular knowledge. The hidden assumption built into science is that science itself is a completed human behaviour. Removal of this assumption is achieved through a simple revision to our science model which is constructed, outlined and named ‘dual aspect science’ (DAS). It is constructed with reference to existing science being ‘single aspect science’. DAS is (...) consistent with and predictive of the very explanatory poverty that generated it and is simultaneously a seamless upgrade; no existing law of nature is altered or lost. The framework is completely empirically self-consistent and is validated empirically. DAS eliminates the behavioural inconsistencies currently inhabiting a world in which single aspect science has been inherited rather than chosen and in which its presuppositions are implemented through habit rather than by scientific examination of options by the scientists actually carrying out science. The proposed DAS framework provides a working vantage point from which an explanation of P-consciousness becomes expected and meaningful. The framework requires that we rediscover what we scientists do and then discover something new about ourselves: that how we have been doing science is not the entire story. Dual aspect science shows us what we have not been doing. (shrink)

Byrne & Hilbert's thesis, that color be associated with reflectance-type, is questioned on the grounds that it is far from clear that the human visual system is able to determine a surface's reflectance-type with sufficient accuracy. In addition, a (friendly) suggestion is made as to how to amend the definition of reflectance-type in terms of CIE (Commission Internationale de l'Eclairage) coordinates under a canonical illuminant.

The problem of nonreflectors perceived as colored is the central problem for Byrne & Hilbert's (B&H's) physicalism. Vision scientists and other interested parties need to consider the motivation for their account of “productance physicalism.” Is B&H's theory motivated by scientific concerns or by philosophical interests intended to preserve a physicalist account of color as a posteriori necessary?

consciousness. Such unconscious processing always " Cambridge, UK " tends to re?ect habitual or strong responses. From this.

Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenological philosophy, developed the concept of the so-called pure transcendental consciousness. The author of the article asks whether the concept of consciousness understood this way can constitute a model for AI consciousness. It should be remembered that transcendental consciousness is the result of the use of the phenomenological method, the essence of which is referring to experience (“back to things themselves”). Therefore, one can legitimately ask whether the consciousness that AI can achieve can possess the (...) characteristics attributed by Husserl to pure transcendental consciousness. The answer to such questions seems to be negative because AI, as created by humans, can only operate in the field of phenomena. Human intelligence, however, is capable of operating at the ontological level. In the face of difficulties in understanding the phenomenon of consciousness on a scientific basis, the question arises about the possibility of using the phenomenological concept of consciousness developed by Husserl as a starting point in analyzes aimed at answering the question about AI consciousness (The aim of the article is not to discuss in detail the contemporary state of research on consciousness. Therefore, many results currently achieved mainly in the field of neuroscience are omitted. It is just about indicating the possible application of Husserl’s transcendental concept of consciousness in research on AI consciousness). (shrink)

Cerebral energy supply is insufficient to support continuous neuronal processing of the plethora of time-constant objects that we are aware of. As a result, the brain is forced to limit processing resources to cases of change. The neuronally generated world is thus temporally discontinuous. This parallels the fact that, in all relevant microscopic fundamental equations of nature, temporal change plays a dominant role. When a scientist calculates a “solution” to such an equation, integration over time is an essential step. The (...) present Hypothesis expresses that the step from neuronal activity to phenomenal content of consciousness is reflective of a “solution:” the main source of the incomprehensibility of consciousness is proposed to result from the introduction of phenomenal time-constant entities. These are “filled-in” via integration, even though neuronal data only exists for changes to these entities. In this way, a temporally continuous picture of the world phenomenally appears. Qualia are “initial conditions,” which are required for integration and cannot be deduced from present data. Phenomenal “identity” is related to qualia. Inattentive visual perception, which is only rarely investigated, offers insights into these relationships. Introspectively, unattended vision appears rich because percepts are cumulated over long time spans, whereas attentive perception relies purely on present neuronal signals. The present Hypothesis is that a brief neuronal activity can signify long-lasting and constant phenomenal content of consciousness. Experimental support is presented that comes from discrepancies between neuronal activity and perception: transient neuronal responses to sustained stimuli, “filling-in,” change blindness, identity vs. close resemblance. (shrink)

Notwithstanding Plato’s venerable opinion, many people nowadays claim either that mirrors are not pictures, or that, if they are such, they are just transparent pictures in Kendall Walton’s sense of a particular kind of picture. In this article, however, I want to argue that mirrors are bona fide pictures. For they are grasped via what, as I assume in the article, makes a picture a picture, that is, a representation with a figurative value, namely, a depiction; namely, a certain seeing-in (...) experience. This is the sui generis perceptual experience that Richard Wollheim originally appealed to. Once this experience is suitably reconceived, one can show how it successfully applies to mirrors as well, in order to prove that they are bona fide pictures. From an aesthetical point of view, this is an important result. For it shows that the class of pictures is broader than what people nowadays think and is closer to the original intuition sustaining Plato’s opinion. (shrink)

Provides a certain conception of the target of a theory of intentionality in terms of five properties (aboutness, non-existence, aspectuality, generality, and semantic normativity) and provides a guided tour of how different styles of theories of intentionality can meet up these requirements.

Um dos grandes desafios da era da informação consiste em filtrar informações claras, rigorosas e atualizadas sobre tópicos importantes. O mesmo vale para a filosofia. Como encontrar conteúdo filosófico confiável em meio a milhares de artigos publicados diariamente na internet? Para ir ainda mais longe, como encontrar uma introdução a algum tópico com uma lista de referências bibliográficas atualizadas e que seja organizada por um especialista da área? Já que você começou a ler este livro, é provável que tenha ouvido (...) falar em algum momento da Enciclopédia Stanford de Filosofia, disponível gratuitamente na internet desde 1995. A página da Stanford faz exatamente isso. Ela cobre inúmeros verbetes sobre quase tudo em filosofia, oferecendo informação confiável sobre temas como feminismo, filosofia na América Latina, zumbis, metafísica e milhares de outros tópicos. A sugestão típica aos profissionais da filosofia que têm interesse em começar a estudar algum tópico, mas não sabem sequer por onde começar, é procurar pelo verbete relevante da Stanford. Infelizmente, o grande empecilho da página para o nosso contexto é que todos os verbetes estão disponíveis apenas em inglês, algo que cria um obstáculo a inúmeros estudantes e interessados que não dominam a língua. Neste sentido, acreditamos que esta publicação preencha um hiato importante na filosofia brasileira. Embora a filosofia no Brasil tenha se profissionalizado e expandido ao longo dos anos, há ainda lacunas em diversas áreas, e os verbetes foram aqui selecionados cuidadosamente no intuito de preencher ao menos algumas dessas lacunas. Este livro apresenta quatro verbetes cruciais para a filosofia, aqui divididos em quatro capítulos: (1) condições necessárias e suficientes, (2) referência (3) causação e (4) consciência. (shrink)

The development of increasingly intelligent and autonomous technologies will eventually lead to these systems having to face morally problematic situations. This gave rise to the development of artificial morality, an emerging field in artificial intelligence which explores whether and how artificial systems can be furnished with moral capacities. This will have a deep impact on our lives. Yet, the methodological foundations of artificial morality are still sketchy and often far off from possible applications. One important area of application of artificial (...) systems with moral capacities is geriatric care. The goal of this article is to afford the methodological foundations for artificial morality, i.e., for implementing moral capacities in artificial systems in general, and to discuss them with respect to an assistive system in geriatric care which is capable of moral learning. (shrink)

ArgumentIn this paper I present an interpretation of du Bois-Reymond’s thesis on the impossibility of a scientific explanation of consciousness and of its present importance. I reconsider du Bois-Reymond’s speech “On the limits of natural science” in the context of nineteenth-century German philosophy and neurophysiology, pointing out connections and analogies with contemporary arguments on the “hard problem of consciousness.” Du Bois-Reymond’s position turns out to be grounded on an epistemological argument and characterized by a metaphysical skepticism, motivated by the unfruitful (...) speculative tendency of contemporary German philosophy and natural science. In the final sections, I show how contemporary research can benefit from a reconsideration of this position and its context of emergence, which is a good vantage point to trace open problems in consciousness studies back to their historical development. (shrink)

I draw attention to an ambiguity of the expression ‘phenomenal consciousness’ that is an avoidable yet persistent source of conceptual confusion among consciousness scientists. The ambiguity is between what I call phenomenality and what I call conscious states, where the former denotes an abstract property and the latter denotes a phenomenon or class of its instances. Since sentences featuring these two terms have different semantic properties, it is possible to equivocate over the term ‘consciousness’. It is also possible to fail (...) to distinguish between statements that are true about conscious states in virtue of their phenomenality, and statements that are true in virtue of other properties of conscious states. I review empirically informed arguments by scientists Bernard Balleine and Anthony Dickinson, Stevan Harnad, and Jeffrey Alan Gray, arguing that each of them makes errors based on the ambiguity. I conclude with some tentative suggestions for avoiding further confusion about the ambiguity. (shrink)

What is consciousness? What is its importance and how is it to be described? The paper looks at some of the principal theories and their attempts to solve the “hard problem” of how consciousness is produced by nervous tissue, and attempts to close the “explanatory gap” between such (apparently) profoundly different things as subjective awareness and a physical brain. It ends with a tentative suggestion that, despite centuries of philosophical frustration, recent appeals to quantum physics may offer a glimmer of (...) hope. (shrink)

I argue that Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) have not answered Hardin's objection to physicalism about color concerning the unitary-binary structure of the colors for two reasons. First, their account of unitary-binary structure seems unsatisfactory. Second, pace B&H, there are no physicalistically acceptable candidates to be the hue-magnitudes. I conclude with a question about the justification of physicalism about color.

Part 1 of the thesis questions the traditional relation model of intentionality. After fixing reference on the target phenomenon, intentionality, and explaining my interest in it, I ask what sorts of things intentionality might be a relation to. I consider ordinary objects, properties, propositions and hybrid views, and conclude all make the intentional relation appear rather mysterious. From there, I move on to examine the relation view’s most prominent proponents, the tracking theorists—pointing out some challenges such views face, and concluding (...) that it might be worthwhile looking into alternatives to the relation view. Part 2 asks whether the newly emerging phenomenal intentionality movement can provide a viable alternative to the relation model of intentionality. After focusing on a specific kind of phenomenal intentionality theory—something I call modificationism—I examine three such accounts. From there I go on to discuss some common complaints/challenges these kinds of views face, and consider how they might be addressed within the modificationist framework. In Part 3, I address what I call the problem of cognitive contact: how do our contentful mental states manage to make cognitive contact with the ordinary objects (e.g. tables and chairs) that they appear to. The problem is particularly acute for any version of phenomenal intentionality that denies the relation view, and has been given very little attention in the literature. I consider how a modificationist might address this problem, and conclude that though some avenues appear promising, there is nevertheless a great deal of work to be done if modificationism, and phenomenal intentionality theory, is to overcome this problem. (shrink)

En s’appuyant sur les résultats de la psychologie évolutionniste, nous examinons les différentes fonctions importantes que puisse remplir la conscience dans les robots autonomes : action contrôlée, prise de conscience, conscience de soi, métacognition, conscience du moi. Nous distinguons l’intentionnalité intrinsèque de la conscience, mais soutenons également l’importance de la compréhension de la cognition robotique. Enfin, nous étudions le « Hard Problem » concernant les robots, c’est-à-dire la question de savoir s’ils peuvent connaître une prise de conscience subjective, dans une (...) perspective de la théorie du protophénomène. (shrink)

Dix modèles de conscience sont discutés. Les modèles en question sont proposés par des individus ne semblant pas comprendre « le problème difficile de la conscience phénoménale », vraisemblablement parce qu’ils n’ont pas de qualia eux-mêmes. Alors que les demandes des Zombies sont rejetées, la qualité de leurs commentaires et de leurs contributions augmente. La conclusion est qu’aucune solution précoce ne devrait être proposée à ce stade. Plutôt, il est suggéré que le problème devrait d’abord être pleinement examiné par les (...) scientifiques et les étudiants de toutes les universités concernées par le traitement de l’information dans le cerveau humain. Enfin, reste la question pourquoi le cerveau, lorsqu’il est dans un état particulier, vit sa propre activité de façon qualitative. La réponse à cette question contribuera probablement au développement de l’actuelle ontologie de la physique. (shrink)

Block has argued that the multiplicity of meanings ascribed to consciousness is due to the erroneous treatment of very different concepts as a single concept. Block distinguished four notions of consciousness intended to encapsulate the various meanings attributed to the term: phenomenal, access, self, and monitoring consciousness. We argue that what is common to all of these definitions is the implicit distinction between consciousness and the content of consciousness. We critically examine the term “altered state of consciousness” and argue that (...) affixing the qualifier “altered state” to consciousness results in a theoretical confusion of consciousness and its content, that is, consciousness is mistaken for the content of consciousness. We refer to this as the consciousness/content fallacy and argue that it may be avoided if one supplants “altered states of consciousness” with “altered pattern of phenomenal properties,” an extrapolation of the term “phenomenal field.” Implications of the consciousness/content fallacy for theory and research are also considered. (shrink)

Higher-Order Perception (HOP) theories in the philosophy of mind are offered as explanations of what it is that makes a mental state a conscious state. According to HOP, a mental state is conscious just in case it is itself represented in a quasi-perceptual way by an internal monitor or scanning device. We start with one of the more popular objections to HOP and a seemingly innocuous concession to it: identifying the internal monitor with the faculty of attention. We show how (...) this concession undermines HOP. (shrink)

In a recent response paper to Brogaard (2011a), Morten Overgaard and Thor Grünbaum argue that my case for the claim that blindsight subjects are not visually conscious of the stimuli they correctly identify rests on a mistaken necessary criterion for determining whether a conscious experience is visual or non-visual. Here I elaborate on the earlier argu- ment while conceding that the question of whether blindsight subjects are visually con- scious of the visual stimuli they correctly identify largely is an empirical (...) question. I conclude by sketching a method for testing whether blindsight subjects have visual con- sciousness of stimuli presented to them in their blind field. (shrink)