- Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness.Anthony I. Jack & T. Shallice - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):161-196.details
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Eliminativism, meaning, and qualitative states.Henry Jacoby - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (March):257-70.details
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A conjecture concerning the ranking of the sciences.Paul Humphreys - 1990 - Topoi 9 (2):157-160.details
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What Does the Nation of China Think About Phenomenal States?Bryce Huebner, Michael Bruno & Hagop Sarkissian - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):225-243.details
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Commonsense concepts of phenomenal consciousness: Does anyone care about functional zombies?Bryce Huebner - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):133-155.details
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The Importance of a Consideration of Qualia to Imagery and Cognition.Timothy L. Hubbard - 1995 - Consciousness and Cognition 5 (3):327-358.details
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Functionalism and token physicalism.Terence Horgan - 1984 - Synthese 59 (June):321-38.details
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Analytic functionalism without representational functionalism.Terence Horgan - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):51-51.details
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Collectively ill: a preliminary case that groups can have psychiatric disorders.Ginger A. Hoffman - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2217-2241.details
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Collectively ill: a preliminary case that groups can have psychiatric disorders.Ginger A. Hoffman - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2217-2241.details
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Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalism.Christopher S. Hill - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):50-51.details
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In defense of type materialism.Christopher S. Hill - 1984 - Synthese 59 (June):295-320.details
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Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. [REVIEW]Christopher S. Hill - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):511-518.details
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A Tribute to Karen Neander.Christopher Hill & Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Biological Theory 16 (4):195-202.details
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Unraveling introspection.John Heil - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):49-50.details
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My brain, my mind, and I: Some philosophical assumptions of mind-uploading.Michael Hauskeller - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (01):187-200.details
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First-person current.Paul L. Harris - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):48-49.details
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Know my own mind? I should be so lucky!Jennifer M. Gurd & John C. Marshall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):47-48.details
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On behalf of phenomenological parity for the attitudes.Keith Gunderson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):46-47.details
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Debate: What is Personhood in the Age of AI?David J. Gunkel & Jordan Joseph Wales - 2021 - AI and Society 36:473–486.details
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Cognitive Science.Rick Grush - 2002 - In Peter Machamer & Michael Silberstein (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 272–289.details
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Realizing race.Aaron M. Griffith - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1919-1934.details
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Blocking Kripke’s Argument Against the Type-Identity Theory of Mind.Simone Gozzano - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):371-391.details
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Self-ascription of belief and desire.Robert M. Gordon - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):45-46.details
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Theories and illusions.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):90-100.details
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Theories and qualities.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):44-45.details
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How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.details
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Functionalism, the theory-theory and phenomenology.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):101-108.details
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Competing accounts of belief-task performance.Alvin I. Goldman - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):43-44.details
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Triviality arguments against functionalism.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):273 - 295.details
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The Cartesian Aspects of Semantic Naturalism (in Lithuanian).Mindaugas Gilaitis - 2017 - Problemos 91:7-16.details
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Qualia: They’re Not What They Seem.John Gibbons - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (3):397-428.details
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Awareness, understanding, and functionalism.N. Georgalis - 1996 - Erkenntnis 44 (2):225-56.details
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P-consciousness presentation/a-consciousness representation.Denise Gamble - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):149-150.details
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Who are “we”?: Animalism and conjoined twins.Robert Francescotti - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (4):422-442.details
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Maximality, Function, and the Many.Robert Francescotti - 2019 - Metaphysica 20 (2):175-193.details
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Stoljar’s Dilemma and Three Conceptions of the Physical: A Defence of the Via Negativa.Raphaël Fiorese - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (2):201-229.details
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Commentary: The Concept of a Bewusstseinskultur.Sascha Benjamin Fink - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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What could cognition be, if not human cognition?: Individuating cognitive abilities in the light of evolution.Carrie Figdor - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (6):1-21.details
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Why literalism is still the best game in town: Replies to Drayson, Machery, and Schwitzgebel.Carrie Figdor - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (5):687-693.details
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Quaderns de filosofia IV, 2.Quad Fia - 2017 - Quaderns de Filosofia 4 (2).details
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Goldman has not defeated folk functionalism.James H. Fetzer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):42-43.details
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Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap.Todd E. Feinberg & Jon Mallatt - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.details
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Against Radical Enactivism’s narrowmindedness about phenomenality.Juan Camilo Espejo-Serna - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):213-228.details
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Recall or regeneration of past mental states: Toward an account in terms of cognitive processes.K. Anders Ericsson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):41-42.details
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Gestalt psychology and the philosophy of mind.William Epstein & Gary Hatfield - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):163-181.details
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Species-specific properties and more narrow reductive strategies.Ronald P. Endicott - 1993 - Erkenntnis 38 (3):303-21.details
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Resolving arguments by different conceptual traditions of realization.Ronald Endicott - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (1):41-59.details
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Post-structuralist angst - critical notice: John Bickle, Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave.Ronald Endicott - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):377-393.details
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The demand for contrastive explanations.Nadine Elzein - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1325-1339.details
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