This article explores the defense Indian Buddhist texts make in support of their conceptions of lives that are good for an individual. This defense occurs, largely, through their analysis of ordinary experience as being saturated by subtle forms of suffering . I begin by explicating the most influential of the Buddhist taxonomies of suffering: the threefold division into explicit suffering , the suffering of change , and conditioned suffering . Next, I sketch the three theories of welfare that have been (...) most influential in contemporary ethical theory. I then argue that Buddhist texts underdetermine which of these theories would have been accepted by ancient Indian Buddhists. Nevertheless, Buddhist ideas about suffering narrow the shape any acceptable theory of welfare may take. In my conclusion, I argue that this narrowing process itself is enough to reconstruct a philosophical defense of the forms of life endorsed in Buddhist texts. (shrink)

This essay explores selected examples of puns and etymologizing in the Pali canon. It argues that they do not solely serve a satirical intent, but are sophisticated rhetorical devices, skilfully employed by the Buddha to induce a reflective awareness in the listeners and persuade them into accepting his view. Their rhetorical function and efficacy is investigated, while foregrounding a new interpretation of the Aggaññasutta.

A confluence of scholarly interest has resulted in a revival of Thomistic scholarship across the world. Several areas in the investigation of St. Thomas Aquinas, however, remain under-explored. This volume contributes to two of these neglected areas. First, the volume evaluates the contemporary relevance of St. Thomas's views for the philosophy and practice of education. The second area explored involves the intersections of the Angelic Doctor’s thought and the numerous cultures and intellectual traditions of the East. Contributors to this section (...) examine the reception, creative appropriation, and various points of convergence between St. Thomas and the East. (shrink)

Buddhist teachings and practices can be viewed as a journey of soteriological transformation, where language, as a tool for the analysis of views, occupies a place of special significance and importance. This article examines how the concept of non-duality, from the Madhyamaka perspective, has served as a powerful rhetorical device with the explicit aim of fostering soteriological transformation. Among the various expressions representative of the Madhyamaka perspective, two are particularly explored in this article for their facilitation of soteriological transformation: the (...) expression of ‘neither a dharma nor a not-dharma’ and the teaching that ‘one should let go even of dharmas, still more so not-dharmas’ . I argue that the Madhyamaka expression of ‘neither A nor not-A’ is hardly ever just about conforming to any linguistic conventions. It is about gaining liberation from linguistic conventions and unexamined remarks. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article examines Michel Foucault’s views concerning the ethical salience of critique and compares those views to the Buddhist Madhyamaka tradition. As a critic of the Enlightenment, Foucault’s approach to ethics vacillated between deconstructing moral concepts such as “self” and “freedom,” and affirming them as the basis of an ethics conceived as “self-fashioning.” Madhyamaka thought provides a critical account of social reality that resonates with Foucault, particularly concerning the emancipatory potential of critique, but it arrives at different ethical conclusions, (...) viewing compassion rather than vertiginous freedom as the outcome of any thorough critique of the self. (shrink)

Dependent-origination, possibly the most fundamental Buddhist philosophical principle, is generally understood as a description of all that exists. Mental as well as physical phenomena are believed to come into being only in relation to, and conditioned by, other phenomena. This paper argues that such an understanding of pratītya-samutpāda is mistaken with regard to the earlier meanings of the concept. Rather than relating to all that exists, dependent-origination related originally only to processes of mental conditioning. It was an analysis of the (...) self, not of reality, embedded in the Upaniṣadic search for the ātman. The teaching also possessed important ontological implications regarding the nature of the relation between consciousness and reality. These implications suggest that rather than things being conditioned by other things, they are actually conditioned by consciousness. (shrink)

This study explores some of the connections between the presentation of religious ideas and the use of concessive clauses and sentences in Pāli Buddhist literature. Special emphasis is placed on the linguistic construction kiñcāpi... atha kho.... Although this is widely understood to be a concessive and correlative construction and is often translated in ways that adequately reproduce the meaning of the Pāli, still it is the case that the kiñcāpi... atha kho... construction is sometimes misrepresented. Surprisingly, misrepresentations of said construction (...) are especially prevalent in an ever-growing body of work related to one Pāli text in particular, the Tevijja Sutta. This has helped to obscure the extent to which the sutta is a response to developments in Brahmanical theology external to the text itself. This study examines this unwelcome situation and proposes a remedy. (shrink)

This paper aims to lay bare the underlying logical structure of early Buddhist moral thinking. It argues that moral vocabulary in the Pali Suttas varies depending on the kind of agent under discussion and that this variance reflects an understanding that the phenomenology of moral experience also differs on the same basis. An attempt is made to spell this out in terms of attachment. The overall picture of Buddhist ethics that emerges is that of an agent-based moral contextualism. This account (...) does not imply that the prescription for moral conduct differs according to class of agent, but rather that the correct description of moral experience does. Further it implies that the descriptions of the moral experiences of different classes of agent differ phenomenologically, rather than in terms of overt behavioral characteristics. While most of the discussion is centered on the distinction between ordinary persons and disciples in higher training, the paper concludes with a brief exploration of the problematic moral experience of the arahat. (shrink)

This paper examines the puruṣa concept in the Caraka Saṃhitā, an early text of Ayurveda, and its relation to Indic thinking about phenomenal worldhood. It argues that, contrary to the usual interpretation, early Ayurveda does not consider the person to be a microcosmic replication of the macrocosmos. Instead, early Ayurveda asserts that personhood is worldhood, and thus the person is non-different from the phenomenal totality of his existence. This is confirmed by the CS’s several definitions of puruṣa, which are alternately (...) posed in terms familiar to Vaiśeṣika, early Sāṃkhya, early Buddhism, and Upaniṣadic monism. It is likewise confirmed by the Ayurvedic logic of sāmānya, which governs the meaning of the list of person-to-world correspondences in CS 4.5 and its often misinterpreted claim, puruṣo’yam lokasaṃmitaḥ. Finally it is confirmed in the program of Ayurvedic therapeutics, which aims at establishing various kinds of “appropriateness” for the sake of effecting samayoga—the “harmonious joining” of person and world. (shrink)

According to Arti Dhand, it can be argued that all Indian ethics have been primarily virtue ethics. Many have indeed jumped on the virtue bandwagon, providing prima facie interpretations of Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist canons in virtue terms. Others have expressed firm skepticism, claiming that virtues are not proven to be grounded in the nature of things and that, ultimately, the appeal to virtue might just well be a mere façon de parler. In this paper, we aim to advance the (...) discussion of Indian virtue ethics. Our intent is not to provide a catch-all interpretation of the different Indian schools. Our goal is, more modestly, to offer a theory of virtues in Indian philosophies, as a framework for theorists and interpreters who see these diverse traditions as amenable to systematic virtue analysis. Our theory grounds virtues in the reality of genuine moral dispositions and in a system of beliefs where morality is understood as transformative in nature. (shrink)

This paper examines the problem of sameness in terms of being it the classical problem of personal identity and various philosophical positions on the existence of the self as a substantive subject. I call this subject an ethical Self, which involves different notions of ego, being, substance, and personhood. The denial of the existence of a permanent self by philosophers like Hume and Buddhists does not seem justified in regard to one's identity or sameness over time. The no-self theorists do (...) not provide any strong ground for how to explain the notion of personhood and one's actions in a moral space without accepting a substantive self as a doer that continues over time. They certainly seem to have failed in establishing a logical connection between their no-self theories on the one hand and the necessity of an ethical self in their philosophical accounts on the other. Rejecting the no-self theory in defense of the self theory of personal identity, I conclude this paper with a note that sameness of a person over time is the prerequisite of morality, law, and present and future plans and that there is no harm in considering a permanent self, as Jīva of Jainism, to solve the problem of personal identity. There is also no harm in preferring the self theory over the no-self theory since the former, unlike the latter, does give a meaning to spirituality and transcendence. (shrink)

There is a consensus in the contemporary literature that mindfulness is a kind of attention. From here the literature divides into two opposing camps:the ‘Quietists’ and the ‘Cognitivists’. For the...

In the paper a comparative analysis of Chan Buddhist meditation and the early Buddhist meditation has been conducted. In the first part the meditational instructions present in Zuochan yi and the corresponding texts of Chinese Buddhism have been demonstrated. Subsequently, based on those texts, the ideal type of Chan Buddhist meditation is created. The second part consists of the analysis of Aṭṭhaka‑vagga with the corresponding motifs from the other Pali Canon Suttas. The last part consists of a comparative analysis of (...) the ideal type of Chan Buddhist meditation and meditation as shown in Aṭṭhaka‑vagga. The whole of the analysis aims at demonstrating the topos common for the early Buddhist tradition and Chan Buddhism. (shrink)

Buddhist scholars in the West broadly agree with the proposition that Buddhism has a philosophical tradition, in many respects comparable to Western ones, while many claim that it also has a practical or empirical dimension that Western philosophies, especially the analytic tradition, lack. There is also a scholarly consensus that an implicit metaphysical system serves as the foundation for the doctrines and practices of early Buddhism as represented in the Pāli suttas. However, Buddhist scholarship to date has not distinguished clearly (...) between philosophical speculations, on the one hand, and on the other, teachings based on experience and practice. This study explores early Buddhist texts’ concept of “domain” (viṣaya/visaya, 境界), which encompasses both an experiential domain and a linguistic framework; i.e., a word is only valid within its own domain, and fails to refer beyond it. As such, it closely resembles Rudolf Carnap’s ideas of “internal” and “external” questions regarding linguistic frameworks, and his suggestion that metaphysical questions, considered as external questions, are meaningless and cannot be answered. More specifically, the Buddha’s refusal to directly answer the “unanswered” questions may indicate that early Buddhism took an attitude similar to Carnap’s rejection of metaphysics. Moreover, textual evidence suggests that teachings such as impermanence and dependent origination, though they may appear to be “metaphysical” to modern readers, are in fact empirical in the context of the early suttas. (shrink)

With the naturalist worldview having become widely accepted, the trend of naturalistic Buddhism has likewise become popular in both academic and religious circles. In this article, I preliminarily reflect on this naturalized approach to Buddhism in two main sections. In section 1, I point out that the Buddha rejects theistic beliefs that claim absolute power over our destiny, opting instead to encourage us to inquire intellectually and behave morally. The distinguishing characteristics of naturalism such as a humanistic approach, rational enquiry, (...) empirical observation, as well as a pragmatic and realistic outlook can all be seen in the Buddha’s teachings. In section 2, however, I advance arguments to show that while the Buddha is opposed to theistic doctrines, his views are not entirely in accordance with the presuppositions of naturalism. Firstly, the Buddha’s foremost concern is not purely intellectual in nature—the purpose of his teachings is to realize a soteriological goal through spiritual practice. Secondly, naturalism tends to subscribe to ‘self-being,’ while the Buddha holds all things to exist conditionally and impermanently. Because of the dependent nature of all things, it is not possible to discover their essence through reduction. Thirdly, naturalized philosophy would be a kind of belief-habit that follows from certain preconditioned assumptions. But the Buddha encourages us to re-examine our conceptual proliferation leading to biased views, as that ultimately leads to suffering. I conclude by proposing a broader naturalist outlook that would allow for a more inclusive conception of the natural world that would take the axiological dimension of human transcendence into account and increase an overall understanding of human potentiality. (shrink)

ABSTRACT ‘Mind moment analysis’ is a professional counselling technique rooted in early Buddhist teachings. Employing the process of cognition discussed in Madhupiṇḍika Sutta as its theoretical foundation, mind moment analysis takes form in seven iterative steps for the therapeutic practitioner to help clients deconstruct disturbing mental phenomena, detach from mental turbulence and discern wholesome and unwholesome mind acts. After cultivating stability and clarity of mind, practitioners collaborate with clients to investigate the root causes of craving beneath conceptual proliferations and mindfully (...) choose constructive thoughts, thereby resulting in reduced suffering. This paper introduces the theoretical background of mind moment analysis, uses a case example of this therapeutic intervention with sample transcript verbatim to illustrate each step, and discusses the treatment components of the intervention. (shrink)

General opinion holds that the Abhidhamma treats the Buddha’s teachings in terms of ultimate realities, i.e. dhammas, and that conventional constructs such as persons fall outside the primary concern of the Abhidhamma. The present paper re-examines this ultimate-conventional dichotomy drawn between dhammas and persons and argues that this dichotomy does not hold true for the canonical Abhidhamma in Pali. This study explores how various types of persons are interpreted and approached by the Abhidhamma material, including Abhidhamma texts such as the (...) Puggalapaññatti and a number of suttas in the Aṅguttara Nikāya that are identified in this paper as proto- Abhidhamma. (shrink)

Seemingly contrary ideas of Nirvana are found in early Buddhist literature. Whereas some texts describe one who attains Nirvana as being conscious of everything, others depict Nirvana as a state in which consciousness has no object but emptiness or Nirvana. In this paper I deal with this paradox of Nirvana consciousness by exploring the correlations between several statements in early Buddhist texts. A number of sutta passages are cited to show that they contain doctrinal elements which, when considered collectively, may (...) cast valuable light on how to reconcile this paradox. Two pivotal notions are ‘non-abiding consciousness’ and ‘consciousness that is infinite, pervasive all around’. These two notions are connected to each other and seem to subsume or bridge the two strikingly distinct forms of Nirvana consciousness mentioned above. Nirvana consciousness said to be ‘non-abiding’, which is analogous to ‘without object’, does ‘not abide’ in any objects in the sense that it does not cling to them or rest on them. The ‘infinite, all-pervasive’ consciousness, based on stopping normal consciousness, does not depend on any sense objects, and hence it is unconditioned by them and operates unhindered. Nirvana consciousness thus constitutes the infinite realization free from all conditioning and hindrance. This resonates with the idea that one who attains Nirvana is conscious of everything. (shrink)

The Buddhist Nikāya Suttas frequently mention the concept of fear (bhaya) and related synonyms. This concept does not receive much scholarly attention by subsequent Buddhist philosophers. Recent scholars identify a ‘paradox of fear’ in several traditions of classical Indian Buddhism (Brekke 1999, Finnigan 2019, Giustarini 2012). Each scholar points out, in their respective textual contexts, that fear is evaluated in two ways; one positive and the other negative. Brekke calls this the “double role” of fear (1999: 443). Each also identify (...) fear as purposely elicited to motivate acts aimed at achieving fearlessness, where freedom from fear is characteristic of nibbāna. They all find this puzzling. Finnigan asks: “Why would one purposefully incite fear if one’s goal is its elimination?” (2019: 221). Giustarini says that fear has a “contradictory nature” (2012: 513); Brekke calls it “the paradox of fear” (1999: 442). This article introduces the ‘paradox of fear’ as it appears in the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva and the Nikāya suttas. It then critically examines Brekke and Giustarini’s proposed solutions. It argues that they get some things right in ways that are both supported by the Nikāyas and relevant to Śāntideva but that they leave some important questions unanswered. The article contends that these questions are best answered if fear is analysed as appropriate when its objects are related to karma and rebirth. (shrink)

The concept of clinging is absolutely central to early Buddhist thought. This article examines the concept from both a phenomenological and a metaphysical perspective and attempts to understand how it relates to the non-self doctrine and to the ultimate goal of Nibbāna. Unenlightened consciousness is consciousness centered on an ‘I’. It is also consciousness that is conditioned by and bound up with a being in the world. From a phenomenological perspective, clinging gives birth to the illusion of self, or what (...) is called the ‘conceit of “I am”’. From a metaphysical perspective, clinging binds consciousness to a worldly being. Seen in the first way, Nibbāna is ‘centerless’ consciousness. Seen in the second, it is unconditioned consciousness. Viewed in either way, Nibbāna is a state of consciousness reached through the eradication of clinging. (shrink)

The present paper is the third in a series dedicated to uncovering the canonical sources of Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacarita and, to the extent possible, the monk-poet’s sectarian affiliation. Whereas parts I and II focused on Chapter 16’s indebtedness to (Mūla)sarvāstivāda Vinaya and/or Sūtra literature, this third part inquires into the sources of Aśvaghoṣa’s account of the Buddha’s enlightenment in Chapter 14 (whose first 31 verses have been preserved in their Sanskrit original). Detailed analysis reveals this chapter’s intimate relationship with T. 189, (...) a (Mūla)sarvāstivāda (?) biographical sūtra extant in Chinese translation only, but also with textual materials that have come to belong to Mūlasarvāstivāda literature and, as already demonstrated by Kajiyama Yūichi, with the Nagar(opam)asūtra of the Saṃyuktāgama. Among these likely sources, some provide a lively description of the five destinies, others relate to the iconographic prescriptions laid down for drawing the so-called Wheel of saṃsāra/existence, while yet others spell out the doctrine of dependent origination. The detailed comparison of these materials is followed by an admittedly speculative attempt to assess the relationship between these sources. (shrink)

This article announces the discovery of a Sinhalese version of the traditional meditation ( borān yogāvacara kammaṭṭhāna ) text in which the Consciousness or Mind, personified as a Princess living in a five-branched tree (the body), must understand the nature of death and seek the four gems that are the four noble truths. To do this she must overcome the cravings of the five senses, represented as five birds in the tree. Only in this way will she permanently avoid the (...) attentions of Death, Māra, and his three female servants, Birth, Sickness and Old Age. In this version of the text, when the Princess manages not to succumb to these three, Māra comes and snatches her from her tree and rapes her. The Buddha then appears to her to explain the path to liberation. The text provides a commentary, padārtha , which explains the details of the symbolism of the fruit in terms of rebirth and being born, the tree in terms of the body, etc. The text also offers interpretations of signs of impending death and prognostications regarding the next rebirth. Previously the existence of Khmer and Lānnā versions of this text have been recorded by Francois Bizot and Francois Lagirarde, the former publishing the text as Le Figuier a cinq branches (Le figuier à cinq branches, 1976). The Sinhalese version was redacted for one of the wives of King Kīrti Śrī Rājasiṅha of Kandy by the monk Varañāṇa Mahāthera of Ayutthayā. This confirms earlier speculation that this form of borān/dhammakāya meditation was brought to Sri Lanka with the introduction of the Siyam Nikāya in the mid-eighteenth century. It also shows that in Sri Lanka, as in Ayutthayā, this form of meditation—which in the modern period was to be rejected as ‘unorthodox’—was promoted at the highest levels of court and Saṅgha. (shrink)

Mindfulness-based interventions have proved effective in reducing various clinical symptoms and in improving general mental health and well-being. The investigation of the mechanisms of therapeutic change needs methods for assessment of mindfulness. Existing self-report measures have, however, been strongly criticized on various grounds, including distortion of the original concept, response bias, and other. We propose a psychophysiological method for the assessment of the mindfulness learned through time-limited mindfulness-based therapy by people who undergo meditation training for the first time. We use (...) the individual pre-post-therapy changes (dERPi) in the event-related brain potentials (ERPs) recorded in a passive meditation task as a measure of increased mindfulness. dERPi is computed through multivariate assessment of individual participant's ERPs. We tested the proposed method in a group of about 70 recurrently depressed participants, randomly assigned in 1.7:1 ratio to mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) or cognitive therapy (CT). The therapy outcome was measured by the long-term change (dDS) relative to baseline in the depression symptoms (DS) assessed weekly, for 60 weeks, by an online self-report questionnaire. We found a strong, highly significant, negative correlation (r = -0.55) between dERPi (mean = 0.4) and dDS (mean = -0.7) in the MBCT group. Compared to this result, the relationship between dDS and the other (self-report) measures of mindfulness we used was substantially weaker and not significant. So was also the relationship between dERPi and dDS in the CT group. The interpretation of dERPi as a measure of increased mindfulness was further supported by positive correlations between dERPi and the other measures of mindfulness. In this study, we also replicated a previous result, namely, the increase (dLCNV) of the late contingent negative variation (LCNV) of the ERP in the MBCT group, but not in the control group (in this case, CT). We interpreted dLCNV as a measure of increased meditative concentration. The relationship between dLCNV and dDS was, however, very week, which suggests that concentration might be relatively unimportant for the therapeutic effect of mindfulness. The proposed psychophysiological method could become an important component of a "mindfulness test battery" together with self-report questionnaires and other newly developed instruments. (shrink)

Vows play a central role in Buddhist thought and practice. Monastics are obliged to know and conform to hundreds of vows. Although it is widely recognized that vows are important for guiding practitioners on the path to enlightenment, we argue that they have another overlooked but equally crucial role to play. A second function of the vows, we argue, is to facilitate group harmony and cohesion to ensure the perpetuation of the dhamma and the saṅgha. However, the prominence of vows (...) in the Buddhist tradition seems at odds with another central part of the doctrine. For vows, like other promises, seem to involve representing a persisting self as the individual who undertakes the vow. And to explicitly appeal to a persisting self conflicts with one of the most important philosophical commitments of Buddhism – the no self view. We argue though that once we articulate the details of how vows generate behavior that conforms to them, we can see that no appeal to the self is required to internalize and act on vows. (shrink)

This paper will attempt to establish a framework for the term vedanā. Then it will present the range of the different feeling tones: pleasant, unpleasant and neutral. It will point out that ‘neutral’ feeling tone can be defined in different ways as either non-existing, indeterminate, indifference or the beginning of equanimity. Following this, vedanā will be discussed in the context of the five nāma factors: contact, feeling-tone, perception, intention and attention. This paper will suggest that mindfulness can be of benefit (...) because it possibly gives rise to what is referred to in the early Pāli texts as ‘unwordly pleasant’ feeling tones. The paper concludes by making a connection between the practice of mindfulness of feeling-tones and the cultivation of the ethical precepts as an antidote to unskilful reactive patterns that arise in relation to vedana. (shrink)

RESUMO Este artigo objetiva ser uma breve introdução à práxis soteriológica budista, enfatizando, num primeiro momento, as quatro nobres verdades, aquele conjunto de intuições fundamentais formuladas pelo Buda desde o seu primeiro sermão; depois se descreve o nobre óctuplo caminho, o conjunto de práticas ensinadas pelo Buda para a consecução da experiência do despertar; finalmente, descrevem-se os estágios do caminho tanto no ambiente theravādin quanto na tradição mahāyāna. ABSTRACT This article aims at being a brief introduction to the soteriological praxis (...) of Buddhism, underscoring, firstly, the four noble truths, that set of cornerstone intuitions propounded by the Buddha since his first sermon; then, the noble eightfold path, the set of practices that aims at the experience of awakening taught by the Buddha is described; finally, the stages of the way are described, both in the theravādin tradition as well as in mahāyāna's. (shrink)

Una conoscenza adeguata del Buddismo è essenziale per l’educazione e la cultura di chiunque non voglia essere un altro membro alienato di un’eredità che cammina senza pensarci nel mezzo di una rivoluzione tecnologica. Secondo i modelli e i valori della nostra cultura occidentale, siamo più abituati a guardare verso l’esterno che verso noi stessi. Altre culture possono aiutarci ad ampliare e approfondire la nostra visione della realtà e della vita. Se qualcuno ti chiede del Buddismo, rispondi che è un'antica dottrina (...) umanistica. Il Buddismo primitivo è questo e non molte altre cose di cui sentiamo e leggiamo. Diciamo inoltre che questa dottrina non è difficile da comprendere ma veramente difficile da praticare. Per capirlo con la nostra mente occidentale, non è necessario parlare fluentemente sanscrito e pali o consultare papiri e pergamene nei sotterranei dei musei. Non è necessario radersi i capelli o indossare abiti orientali. Non devi mangiare gambi di bambù, farti tatuaggi sul corpo, creare un soprannome hindi, mettere mandala nel tuo ufficio, accendere incenso in tutta la casa e pronunciare mantra al tramonto per lo stupore del tuo cane. Questo testo non parla di esoterismo, rituali mistici immaginari, immersioni politeistiche, programmi di auto-aiuto online, religioni esotiche e miracolose, o altre fantasie attuali, oneste o meno, create per sfruttare la sofferenza che portiamo come esseri umani. Solo una dottrina umanistica chiamata Buddismo, razionalmente comprensibile. Sappiate però che per praticarlo bisognerebbe dedicare tutta la vita senza restrizioni. In questo risiede il fascino che il Buddismo offre alle nostre menti. -/- . (shrink)

Buda no construyó una religión; Estudió filosofía y ciencias. Fue el precursor del realismo científico, el psicoanálisis, la filosofía analítica, el existencialismo, el feminismo, la epistemología, la teoría y crítica del conocimiento, la psicología social, la psicología positiva, el conservacionismo ecológico y conceptos relacionados con la materia y la energía que sólo muy recientemente la física cuántica pudo demostrar. . Conocer adecuadamente qué es el budismo es fundamental para la formación y la cultura de cualquier persona que no quiera ser (...) simplemente un extraterrestre más en una manada que camina a ciegas en medio de una revolución tecnológica. Es posible comprender el budismo desde sus cimientos a través del lenguaje y el conocimiento modernos, y establecer sus relaciones con el pensamiento contemporáneo y sus referentes. Esto permite profundizar y ampliar nuestra percepción sobre la compatibilidad de estos antiguos principios con nuestras modernas formas de vida y conocimiento. El estudio necesario para ello es bastante laborioso. El budismo es un tema que subyace a una gigantesca montaña literaria y cultural. Cuanto más cerca estemos de su concepto original, más profunda y voluminosa será la excavación que tendremos que hacer. (shrink)

Адекватные знания о буддизме необходимы для образования и культуры любого человека, который не хочет быть просто еще одним отчужденным членом стада, слепо идущего среди технологической революции. Ранний буддизм можно понять с помощью современного языка и знаний и установить его связь с современной мыслью и ее источниками. Благодаря этому становится возможным углубить и расширить наше представление о совместимости этих тысячелетних принципов с нашим современным образом жизни и познания. Требуемое для этого исследование достаточно трудоемкое. Буддизм — это предмет, лежащий в основе гигантской (...) литературной и культурной горы. Чем ближе мы подходим к его первоначальной концепции, тем более глубокие и объемные раскопки нам предстоит провести. (shrink)

What might be the fundamental psychology of intelligence naturally selected in biological evolution to minimize, prevent, and cure social and personal issues like war, crime, commit suicide, homicide, theft, drug addictions, and so on? How to achieve a higher level of well-being? I found a primary cognitive limiting factor called mind viruses (MV)(more than 3000) which regresses intelligence and well-being and makes the grand delusion: remedies are healthy mind viruses(HMV)(3000). Here, I show the disclosed core of early Buddhist teachings (on (...) learning, training the mind, and behavior on the 8-fold psychological course psychologically 'program' for better (intelligent) decisions. A theoretical 3D graph might represent the state of evolution of intelligence, nature, nurture, X-ultra quantum unique consciousness particle (X-UQUPC), and psychological well-being with the psychological time of a person. To this hypothesis, if the afterlife occurs, the natural selection of vacant zygote/early embryo neurons of the next life and their quality might depend on the finally evolved X-ultra quantum genomic particle of consciousness (X-UQGPC). Therefore, the quality, including the species of the new life and its nurture in the universe/s, depends on the quality of the finally evolved X-UQGPC. Such natural selection of a new nurturing environment for future (promising)life might be uncertain and, therefore, a high risk of finding a life-consciousness in great nature and nurture. However, there may be more mysterious issues to be solved in future research; therefore, the article might not discuss a theory of everything on the central theme. -/- . (shrink)

This paper pursues two lines of inquiry. First, drawing on evidence from clinical literature on borderline states of consciousness, I propose a new categorical framework for liminal states of consciousness associated with certain forms of meditative attainment; second, I argue for dissociating phenomenal character from phenomenal content in accounting for the etiology of nonconceptual states of awareness. My central argument is that while the idea of nonconceptual awareness remains problematic for Buddhist philosophy of mind, our linguistic and categorizing practices cannot (...) be adequately explained without considering the ways in which the first-person phenomenology grounds a more basic level of cognitive and affective sensing. (shrink)

Buda não ergueu uma religião; fez filosofia e ciência. Foi o precursor do realismo científico, da psicanálise, da filosofia analítica, do existencialismo, do feminismo, da epistemologia, da teoria e crítica do conhecimento, da psicologia social, da psicologia positiva, do preservacionismo ecológico e de conceitos relativos à matéria e à energia que só muito recentemente a física quântica pôde comprovar. Saber adequadamente o que é Budismo é essencial para a formação e cultura de qualquer pessoa que não queira ser simplesmente mais (...) um alienado numa manada que caminha às cegas em meio a uma revolução tecnológica. É possível compreender o budismo de raiz através da linguagem e do conhecimento modernos, e estabelecer suas relações com o pensamento contemporâneo e suas referências. Com isso se torna possível aprofundar e ampliar nossa percepção a respeito da compatibilidade desses princípios milenares com nossas formas modernas de vida e conhecimento. O estudo necessário para isso é bastante trabalhoso. Budismo é um tema subjacente a uma gigantesca montanha literária e cultural. Quanto mais próximos estivermos do seu conceito original, mais profunda e volumosa será a escavação que temos que fazer. (shrink)

To seek fundamental truths, analytic metaphysicians generally start with observed phenomena. From here they typically move outwards, using discursive thought to posit scientifically informed theories about the ultimate reality behind appearances. Mystics, too, seek to uncover the reality behind appearances. However, their meditative methods typically start with experience and go inwards to a fundamental reality sometimes described as a pure conscious unity. Analytic metaphysicians may be tempted to dismiss the mystical approach as unworthy of investigation. In this paper I will (...) outline and address four challenges that sceptics are likely to advance, arguing that none is persuasive. I shall also attempt to clarify the role and scope of meditation in establishing the viability of mystical data in the construction of any potential metaphysic about fundamental reality. (shrink)

A collection of essays, mostly original, on the actual and possible positions on free will available to Buddhist philosophers, by Christopher Gowans, Rick Repetti, Jay Garfield, Owen Flanagan, Charles Goodman, Galen Strawson, Susan Blackmore, Martin T. Adam, Christian Coseru, Marie Friquegnon, Mark Siderits, Ben Abelson, B. Alan Wallace, Peter Harvey, Emily McRae, and Karin Meyers, and a Foreword by Daniel Cozort.

What happens to the inner light of consciousness with the death of the individual body and brain? Reductive materialism assumes it simply fades to black. Others think of consciousness as indicating a continuation of self, a transformation, an awakening or even alternatives based on the quality of life experience. In this issue, speculation drawn from theoretic research are presented. -/- Table of Contents Epigraph: From “The Immortal”, Jorge Luis Borges iii Editor’s Introduction: I Killed a Squirrel the Other Day, Gregory (...) M. Nixon iv-xi Research Essays The Tilde Fallacy and Reincarnation: Variations on a "Skeptical" Argument Teed Rockwell 862-881 Death, Consciousness, and Phenomenology, Steve Bindeman 882-899 The Idealist View of Consciousness After Death, Bernardo Kastrup 900-909 Consciousness, a Cosmic Phenomenon—A Hypothesis, Eva Déli 910-930 The Theory of a Natural Afterlife: A Newfound, Real Possibility for What Awaits Us at Death, Bryon K. Ehlmann 931-950 Near-Death Cases Desegregating Non-Locality/Disembodiment via Quantum Mediated Consciousness: An Extended Version of the Cell-Soul Pathway, Contzen Pereira & J Shashi Kiran Reddy 951-968 On the Possible Existence of Quantum Consciousness After Brain Death, Massimo Pregnolato & Alfredo Pereira Jr. 969-991 Science and Postmortem Survival, Edward F. Kelly 992-1011 Explorations ISS Theory: Cosmic Consciousness, Self, and Life Beyond Death in a Hyperdimensional Physics, Chris H. Hardy 1012-1035 Does the Consciousness End, Remain Awake, or Transform After Death? Radivoj Stankovich (with Micho Durdevich) 1036-1050 Big Bang Spirituality, Life, and Death, Ken Bausch 1051-1063 Death, Consciousness and the Quantum Paradigm, Ronald Peter Glasberg 1064-1077 Living With Limits: The Continuum of Consciousness, Donald Brackett 1078-1098 Mysticism, Consciousness, Death, Mike Sosteric 1099-1118 What Dies? Eternalism and the Afterlife in William James, Jonathan Bricklin 1119-1140 Theories of Consciousness and Death: Does Consciousness End, Continue, Awaken, or Transform When the Body Dies? Roger Cook 1141-1153 It’s the Other Way Around: Matter is a Form of Consciousness and Death is the End of the Illusion of Life in the World, James P. Kowall & Pradeep B. Deshpande 1154-1208 Statements A Feminine Vision for the World Consciousness, & a New Outrageous Ontology, Lorna Green 1209-1217 The Mask of Eternity: The Quest for Immortality and the Afterlife, Iona Miller 1218-1228 Are We Really “such stuff as dreams are made on”? Chris Nunn 1229-1225 Is the Afterlife a Non-Question? (Let's Hope Not), Deepak Chopra 1226-1230 Life After Death? An Improbable Essay, Stuart Kauffman 1231-1236. (shrink)

This article explores the role of weakness of will in the Indian Buddhist tradition, and in particular within Śāntideva’s Introduction to the Practice of Awakening. In agreement with Jay Garfield, I argue that there are important differences between Aristotle’s account of akrasia and Buddhist moral psychology. Nevertheless, taking a more expanded conception of weakness of will, as is frequently done in contemporary work, allows us to draw significant connections with the pluralistic account of psychological conflict found in Buddhist texts. I (...) demonstrate this by showing how Amélie Rorty’s expanded treatment of akrasia as including emotional response and perceptual classification allows us to recognize that one of the purposes of many of Śāntideva’s meditations is to treat various forms of akratic response. (shrink)

Imagine a character, Mary Analogue, who has a complete theoretical knowledge of her subject matter: the illusory nature of self. Suppose that when presenting her paper on no self at a conference she suffers stage-fright – a reaction that implies she is under an illusion of the very self whose existence she denies. Might there be something defective about her knowledge of no self? The Buddhist tradition would claim that Mary Analogue, despite her theoretical omniscience, lacks deep ‘insight knowledge’ into (...) the reality of no self. The only way for her to gain insight, and thereby improve her epistemic status, would be to divest her mind of the self-illusion. In this paper, I offer an analysis of what could be epistemically involved in the process of acquiring such insight knowledge whereby one becomes, in Buddhist parlance, ‘awakened’. (shrink)

Throughout the history of philosophy, ethics has often been a source of guidance on how to live a meaningful life. Accordingly, when the ethical foundations of mindfulness are considered, an important question arises concerning the role of meditation in providing meaning. The present article proposes a new theoretical route for understanding the links between mindfulness meditation and meaningfulness by employing the terminology of Susan Wolf’s contemporary philosophical account of a meaningful life. It opens by examining the question of what kinds (...) of life-meanings are made available by Buddhist doctrine, considering the two alternatives of a cosmic, human-independent meaning of life versus the subjective meanings that humans give to their individual lives. After surveying current psychological theories that aim to explain the correlation between mindfulness as a trait and meaning in life, all of which see mindfulness as a mediating factor in the production of meaning, I argue that Wolf’s framework offers a promising theoretical basis for clarifying the relationship between mindfulness and meaning in that it explains why mindfulness has a direct bearing on meaning in life. I then show that mindfulness meditation, as understood in Buddhism, can respond to some of the philosophical worries that arise from Wolf’s theory, specifically her concern with the standards for securing the objective value of meaningful activities and projects. My claim is that mindfulness meditation is representative of a broader class of activities that are non-subjectively valuable insofar as they are required for any exploration of objective meaning or standards of values, as well as for engagement in objectively valuable projects and activities. (shrink)

Em Warranted Christian Belief (2000), Alvin Plantinga (1932-) desenvolve sua Epistemologia Reformada (Calvinista), com o objetivo de oferecer aval (warrant) para a crença teísta (professada pelas Religiões Abraâmicas: Judaísmo, Cristianismo e Islam) e para a crença cristã clássica (uma crença cristã ecumênica aceita pelos Apóstolos de Cristo, os cristãos primitivos, os pais da Igreja, os ortodoxos, os católicos, os protestantes (os luteranos, os reformados e os arminianos) e os anabatistas). Todavia, o mais natural, que poderíamos esperar de uma Epistemologia Reformada, (...) seria uma epistemologia dedicada às crenças da Cosmovisão Reformada. Sendo assim, a questão norteadora do presente trabalho é: A Epistemologia Reformada de Plantinga é Realmente Reformada? (shrink)