- The phenomenology of hypo- and hyperreality in psychopathology.Zeno Van Duppen - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):423-441.details
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Delusions and Not-Quite-Beliefs.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):29-37.details
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Is Having Contradictory Beliefs Possible? Discussion and Critique of Arguments for the Psychological Principle of Non-Contradiction.Maciej Tarnowski - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne—English Supplement 31:91-126.details
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Czy posiadanie sprzecznych przekonań jest możliwe? Omówienie i krytyka argumentów za psychologiczną zasadą niesprzeczności.Maciej Tarnowski - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (2):323-353.details
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Is There a Right to Hold a Delusion? Delusions as a Challenge for Human Rights Discussion.Mari Stenlund - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):829-843.details
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Forum Internum Revisited: Considering the Absolute Core of Freedom of Belief and Opinion in Terms of Negative Liberty, Authenticity, and Capability.Mari Stenlund & Pamela Slotte - 2018 - Human Rights Review 19 (4):425-446.details
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A Patchier Picture Still: Biases, Beliefs and Overlap on the Inferential Continuum.Sophie Stammers - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1829-1850.details
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Beliefs and biases.Shannon Spaulding - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7575-7594.details
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The mental lives of zombies.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.details
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Delusions and madmen: against rationality constraints on belief.Declan Smithies, Preston Lennon & Richard Samuels - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-30.details
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Can Anosognosia for Hemiplegia be Explained as Motivated Self-Deception?Andrew C. Sims - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):337-353.details
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Mad Belief?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):13-17.details
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No excuses for moral realism.Hanno Sauer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):553-578.details
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Social epistemological conception of delusion.Alessandro Salice & Kengo Miyazono - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1831-1851.details
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On the nature, pathology, and etiology of delusions: comments on Miyazono’s delusions and beliefs.Eisuke Sakakibara - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-8.details
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Irrationality and Pathology of Beliefs.Eisuke Sakakibara - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (2):147-157.details
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Imagined and delusional pain.Jennifer Radden - 2021 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 12 (2):151-166.details
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Aiming at the truth and aiming at success.Lubomira Radoilska - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):111-126.details
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Can Dispositionalism About Belief Vindicate Doxasticism About Delusion?José Eduardo Porcher - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (3):379-404.details
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Between scientific and empathetic understanding: The case of auditory verbal hallucination.Shivam Patel - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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The Empirical Case against Infallibilism.T. Parent - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):223-242.details
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Delusional Predictions and Explanations.Matthew Parrott - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):325-353.details
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The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions.Paul Noordhof & Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10277-10309.details
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The Causal Role Argument against Doxasticism about Delusions.Kengo Miyazono & Lisa Bortolotti - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):30-50.details
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Précis of Delusions and Beliefs: A Philosophical Inquiry.Kengo Miyazono - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):1-5.details
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Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Delusions of Control.Shaun Gallagher - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):865-879.details
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Bias in Science: Natural and Social.Joshua May - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3345–3366.details
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Neither Fish nor Fowl: Implicit Attitudes as Patchy Endorsements.Neil Levy - 2014 - Noûs 49 (4):800-823.details
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Am I a Racist? Implicit Bias and the Ascription of Racism.Neil Levy - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268):534-551.details
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Addiction as a disorder of belief.Neil Levy - 2014 - Biology and Philosophy 29 (3):337-355.details
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Cognitive Phenomenology: In Defense of Recombination.Preston Lennon - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Mapping the Patient’s Experience: An Applied Ontological Framework for Phenomenological Psychopathology.Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen & Janna Hastings - 2020 - Phenomenology and Mind 18:200-219.details
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Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership.Timothy Lane - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):251-286.details
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A puzzle about visualization.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):145-173.details
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Delusion and Abnormality in Belief Evaluation.Yukihiro Nobuhara - 2014 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 47 (2):1-16.details
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Delusions in the phenomenological perspective.Andrzej Kapusta - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):113-125.details
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Disordered existentiality: Mental illness and Heidegger’s philosophy of Dasein.Schmid Jelscha - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):485-502.details
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Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness.Robert J. Howell & Brad Thompson - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):103-127.details
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Delusions, Illusions and Inference under Uncertainty.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Mind and Language 28 (1):57-71.details
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I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience.Marie Guillot - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-31.details
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Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.details
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Belief’s minimal rationality.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3263-3282.details
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The rationality of eating disorders.Stephen Gadsby - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (3):732-749.details
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Self-Deception and the Second Factor: How Desire Causes Delusion in Anorexia Nervosa.Stephen Gadsby - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):609-626.details
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Delusions, Levels of Belief, and Non-doxastic Acceptances.Keith Frankish - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):23-27.details
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Comments on Gendler’s, “the epistemic costs of implicit bias”.Andy Egan - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):65-79.details
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Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings.Richard Dub - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):27-60.details
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The Sense of Agency and the Epistemology of Thinking.Casey Doyle - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2589-2608.details
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Imaginative Beliefs.Joshua Myers - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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La realidad habla por sí sola”. Cuando exhibir fuertes convicciones no es propiamente una virtud (“Reality Speaks for Itself ”. When Exhibiting Strong Convictions is Not Properly a Virtue).Montanari Pietro - 2023 - Open Insight 14 (32):165-212.details
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