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What Robots Can and Can’t Be

Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers (1992)

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  1. A Normative Approach to Artificial Moral Agency.Dorna Behdadi & Christian Munthe - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (2):195-218.
    This paper proposes a methodological redirection of the philosophical debate on artificial moral agency in view of increasingly pressing practical needs due to technological development. This “normative approach” suggests abandoning theoretical discussions about what conditions may hold for moral agency and to what extent these may be met by artificial entities such as AI systems and robots. Instead, the debate should focus on how and to what extent such entities should be included in human practices normally assuming moral agency and (...)
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  • (1 other version)Dancing with pixies: strong artificial intelligence and panpsychism.John Mark Bishop - 2002 - In John Mark Bishop & John Preston (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. London: Oxford University Press. pp. 360-379.
    The argument presented in this paper is not a direct attack or defence of the Chinese Room Argument (CRA), but relates to the premise at its heart, that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, via the closely associated propositions that semantics is not intrinsic to syntax and that syntax is not intrinsic to physics. However, in contrast to the CRA’s critique of the link between syntax and semantics, this paper will explore the associated link between syntax and physics. The main (...)
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  • By Disanalogy, Cyberwarfare Is Utterly New.Selmer Bringsjord & John Licato - 2015 - Philosophy and Technology 28 (3):339-358.
    We provide an underlying theory of argument by disanalogy, in order to employ it to show that cyberwarfare is fundamentally new. Once this general case is made, the battle is won: we are well on our way to establishing our main thesis: that Just War Theory itself must be modernized. Augustine and Aquinas had a stunningly long run, but today’s world, based as it is on digital information and increasingly intelligent information-processing, points the way to a beast so big and (...)
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  • Baars Falls Prey to the Timidity He Rejects:Commentary on Baars on Contrastive Analysis.Selmer Bringsjord - 1994 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 1.
    Baars affirms Crick and Koch's position that the timidity most cognitive scientists show in the face of consciousness is ridiculous. Unfortunately, all three succumb to a variation on the timidity they deprecate. Furthermore, Baars' own method, ``contrastic analysis,'' is at odds with the computational conception of mind that dominates contemporary cognitive science.
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  • Creative thinking presupposes the capacity for thought.James H. Fetzer - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):539-540.
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  • Précis of The creative mind: Myths and mechanisms.Margaret A. Boden - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):519-531.
    What is creativity? One new idea may be creative, whereas another is merely new: What's the difference? And how is creativity possible? These questions about human creativity can be answered, at least in outline, using computational concepts. There are two broad types of creativity, improbabilist and impossibilist. Improbabilist creativity involves novel combinations of familiar ideas. A deeper type involves METCS: the mapping, exploration, and transformation of conceptual spaces. It is impossibilist, in that ideas may be generated which – with respect (...)
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  • Turing test: 50 years later.Ayse Pinar Saygin, Ilyas Cicekli & Varol Akman - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (4):463-518.
    The Turing Test is one of the most disputed topics in artificial intelligence, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. This paper is a review of the past 50 years of the Turing Test. Philosophical debates, practical developments and repercussions in related disciplines are all covered. We discuss Turing's ideas in detail and present the important comments that have been made on them. Within this context, behaviorism, consciousness, the 'other minds' problem, and similar topics in philosophy of mind are discussed. We (...)
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  • Ethical robots: the future can heed us. [REVIEW]Selmer Bringsjord - 2008 - AI and Society 22 (4):539-550.
    Bill Joy’s deep pessimism is now famous. Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us, his defense of that pessimism, has been read by, it seems, everyone—and many of these readers, apparently, have been converted to the dark side, or rather more accurately, to the future-is-dark side. Fortunately (for us; unfortunately for Joy), the defense, at least the part of it that pertains to AI and robotics, fails. Ours may be a dark future, but we cannot know that on the basis of (...)
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  • Empirical status of Block's phenomenal/access distinction.Bruce Mangan - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):153-154.
    P/A (Block's phenomenal/access) confounds a logical distinction with an empirical claim. Success of P/A in its logical role has almost no bearing on its plausibility as an empirical thesis (i.e., that two kinds of consciousness exist). The advantage of P/A over a single-consciousness assumption is unclear, but one of Block's analogies for P (liquid in a hydraulic computer) may be used to clarify the notion of consciousness as cognitive “hardware.”.
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  • P-consciousness presentation/a-consciousness representation.Denise Gamble - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):149-150.
    P-Consciousness is to be understood in terms of an immediate fluctuating continuum that is a presentation of raw experiential matter against which A-consciousness acts to objectify, impose form or make determinate “thinkable” contents. A representationalises P but P is not itself representational, at least in terms of some concepts of “representation.” Block's arguments fall short of establishing that P is representational and, given the sort of cognitive science assumptions he is working with, he is unable to account for the aspect (...)
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  • A refutation of Penrose's Godelian case against artificial intelligence.Selmer Bringsjord - 2000
    Having, as it is generally agreed, failed to destroy the computational conception of mind with the G\"{o}delian attack he articulated in his {\em The Emperor's New Mind}, Penrose has returned, armed with a more elaborate and more fastidious G\"{o}delian case, expressed in and 3 of his {\em Shadows of the Mind}. The core argument in these chapters is enthymematic, and when formalized, a remarkable number of technical glitches come to light. Over and above these defects, the argument, at best, is (...)
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  • John Searle, the mystery of consciousness.Selmer Bringsjord - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (3):457-459.
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  • Are we evolved computers?: A critical review of Steven Pinker's how the mind works. [REVIEW]Selmer Bringsjord - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):227 – 243.
    Steven Pinker's How the mind works (HTMW) marks in my opinion an historic point in the history of humankind's attempt to understand itself. Socrates delivered his "know thyself" imperative rather long ago, and now, finally, in this behemoth of a book, published at the dawn of a new millennium, Pinker steps up to have psychology tell us what we are: computers crafted by evolution - end of story; mystery solved; and the poor philosophers, having never managed to obey Socrates' command, (...)
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  • Clarifying the logic of anti-computationalism: Reply to Hauser. [REVIEW]Selmer Bringsjord - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (1):111-113.
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  • Animals, zombanimals, and the total Turing test: The essence of artificial intelligence.Selmer Bringsjord - 2000 - Journal of Logic Language and Information 9 (4):397-418.
    Alan Turing devised his famous test (TT) through a slight modificationof the parlor game in which a judge tries to ascertain the gender of twopeople who are only linguistically accessible. Stevan Harnad hasintroduced the Total TT, in which the judge can look at thecontestants in an attempt to determine which is a robot and which aperson. But what if we confront the judge with an animal, and arobot striving to pass for one, and then challenge him to peg which iswhich? (...)
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  • Creativity, the Turing test, and the (better) Lovelace test.Selmer Bringsjord, P. Bello & David A. Ferrucci - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (1):3-27.
    The Turing Test is claimed by many to be a way to test for the presence, in computers, of such ``deep'' phenomena as thought and consciousness. Unfortunately, attempts to build computational systems able to pass TT have devolved into shallow symbol manipulation designed to, by hook or by crook, trick. The human creators of such systems know all too well that they have merely tried to fool those people who interact with their systems into believing that these systems really have (...)
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  • In defense of impenetrable zombies.Selmer Bringsjord - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):348-351.
    Moody is right that the doctrine of conscious inessentialism is false. Unfortunately, his zombie-based argument against , once made sufficiently clear to evaluate, is revealed as nothing but legerdemain. The fact is -- though Moody has convinced himself otherwise -- certain zombies are impenetrable: that they are zombies, and not conscious beings like us, is something beyond the capacity of humans to divine.
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  • Author's response.Ned Block - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1).
    The distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness arises from the battle between biological and computational approaches to the mind. If P = A, the computationalists are right; but if not, the biological nature of P yields its scientific nature.
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  • Ordinary Devices: Reply to Bringsjord's `Clarifying the Logic of Anti-Computationalism: Reply to Hauser'1.Larry Hauser - 2000 - Minds and Machines 10 (1):115-117.
    What Robots Can and Can't Be (hereinafter Robots) is, as Selmer Bringsjord says "intended to be a collection of formal-arguments-that-border-on-proofs for the proposition that in all worlds, at all times, machines can't be minds" (Bringsjord, forthcoming). In his (1994) "Précis of What Robots Can and Can't Be" Bringsjord styles certain of these arguments as proceeding "repeatedly . . . through instantiations of" the "simple schema".
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  • Creativity, combination, and cognition.Terry Dartnall - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):537-537.
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  • (2 other versions)Given the Web, What is Intelligence, Really?Selmer Bringsjord & Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu - 2012 - Metaphilosophy 43 (4):464-479.
    This article argues that existing systems on the Web cannot approach human-level intelligence, as envisioned by Descartes, without being able to achieve genuine problem solving on unseen problems. The article argues that this entails committing to a strong intensional logic. In addition to revising extant arguments in favor of intensional systems, it presents a novel mathematical argument to show why extensional systems can never hope to capture the inherent complexity of natural language. The argument makes its case by focusing on (...)
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  • In Defense of the Unprovability of the Church-Turing Thesis.Selmer Bringsjord - unknown
    One of us has previously argued that the Church-Turing Thesis (CTT), contra Elliot Mendelson, is not provable, and is — light of the mind’s capacity for effortless hypercomputation — moreover false (e.g., [13]). But a new, more serious challenge has appeared on the scene: an attempt by Smith [28] to prove CTT. His case is a clever “squeezing argument” that makes crucial use of Kolmogorov-Uspenskii (KU) machines. The plan for the present paper is as follows. After covering some necessary preliminaries (...)
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  • How minds can be computational systems.William J. Rapaport - 1998 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 10 (4):403-419.
    The proper treatment of computationalism, as the thesis that cognition is computable, is presented and defended. Some arguments of James H. Fetzer against computationalism are examined and found wanting, and his positive theory of minds as semiotic systems is shown to be consistent with computationalism. An objection is raised to an argument of Selmer Bringsjord against one strand of computationalism, namely, that Turing-Test± passing artifacts are persons, it is argued that, whether or not this objection holds, such artifacts will inevitably (...)
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  • Art for art's sake.Alan Garnham - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):543-544.
    This piece is a commentary on a precis of Maggie Boden's book "The creative mind" published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
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  • Superminds: People Harness Hypercomputation, and More.Mark Phillips, Selmer Bringsjord & M. Zenzen - 2003 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer Verlag.
    When Ken Malone investigates a case of something causing mental static across the United States, he is teleported to a world that doesn't exist.
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  • The generative-rules definition of creativity.Joseph O'Rourke - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):547-547.
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  • What's biological about the continuity?Justin Leiber - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):654-655.
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  • Private states and animal communication.Chris Mortensen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):658-659.
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  • The outside route to the inside story.Marc N. Branch - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):644-645.
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  • Is consciousness necessary to high-level control systems?Maurizio Tirassa - 1994 - [Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)].
    Building on Bringsjord's (1992, 1994) and Searle's (1992) work, I take it for granted that computational systems cannot be conscious. In order to discuss the possibility that they might be able to pass refined versions of the Turing Test, I consider three possible relationships between consciousness and control systems in human-level adaptive agents.
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  • Computation, among other things, is beneath us.Selmer Bringsjord - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (4):469-88.
    What''s computation? The received answer is that computation is a computer at work, and a computer at work is that which can be modelled as a Turing machine at work. Unfortunately, as John Searle has recently argued, and as others have agreed, the received answer appears to imply that AI and Cog Sci are a royal waste of time. The argument here is alarmingly simple: AI and Cog Sci (of the Strong sort, anyway) are committed to the view that cognition (...)
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  • Moralische Roboter: Humanistisch-philosophische Grundlagen und didaktische Anwendungen.André Schmiljun & Iga Maria Schmiljun - 2024 - transcript Verlag.
    Brauchen Roboter moralische Kompetenz? Die Antwort lautet ja. Einerseits benötigen Roboter moralische Kompetenz, um unsere Welt aus Regeln, Vorschriften und Werten zu begreifen, andererseits um von ihrem Umfeld akzeptiert zu werden. Wie aber lässt sich moralische Kompetenz in Roboter implementieren? Welche philosophischen Herausforderungen sind zu erwarten? Und wie können wir uns und unsere Kinder auf Roboter vorbereiten, die irgendwann über moralische Kompetenz verfügen werden? André und Iga Maria Schmiljun skizzieren aus einer humanistisch-philosophischen Perspektive erste Antworten auf diese Fragen und entwickeln (...)
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  • Creativity: Myths? Mechanisms.Michel Treisman - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):554-555.
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  • Creativity: A framework for research.Margaret A. Boden - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):558-570.
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  • The Zombie Attack on the Computational Conception of Mind.Selmer Bringsjord - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):41-69.
    Is it true that if zombies---creatures who are behaviorally indistinguishable from us, but no more conscious than a rock-are logically possible, the computational conception of mind is false? Are zombies logically possible? Are they physically possible? This paper is a careful, sustained argument for affirmative answers to these three questions.
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  • The creative mind versus the creative computer.Robert W. Weisberg - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):555-557.
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  • How do we know when private events control behavior?Kurt Salzinger - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):660-661.
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  • Against the moral Turing test: accountable design and the moral reasoning of autonomous systems.Thomas Arnold & Matthias Scheutz - 2016 - Ethics and Information Technology 18 (2):103-115.
    This paper argues against the moral Turing test as a framework for evaluating the moral performance of autonomous systems. Though the term has been carefully introduced, considered, and cautioned about in previous discussions :251–261, 2000; Allen and Wallach 2009), it has lingered on as a touchstone for developing computational approaches to moral reasoning :98–109, 2015). While these efforts have not led to the detailed development of an MTT, they nonetheless retain the idea to discuss what kinds of action and reasoning (...)
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  • The role of convention in the communication of private events.Chris Moore - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):656-657.
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  • Toward a formal philosophy of hypercomputation.Selmer Bringsjord & Michael Zenzen - 2002 - Minds and Machines 12 (2):241-258.
    Does what guides a pastry chef stand on par, from the standpoint of contemporary computer science, with what guides a supercomputer? Did Betty Crocker, when telling us how to bake a cake, provide an effective procedure, in the sense of `effective' used in computer science? According to Cleland, the answer in both cases is ``Yes''. One consequence of Cleland's affirmative answer is supposed to be that hypercomputation is, to use her phrase, ``theoretically viable''. Unfortunately, though we applaud Cleland's ``gadfly philosophizing'' (...)
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  • Animal models: Nature made us, but was the mold broken?David Lubinski & Travis Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):664-680.
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  • Is The Connectionist-Logicist Debate One of AI's Wonderful Red Herrings?Selmer Bringsjord - 1991 - Journal of Theoretical and Experimental Artificial Intelligence 3:319-49.
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  • Creativity, madness, and extra strong Al.K. W. M. Fulford - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):542-543.
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  • The assessment of intentionality in animals.Thomas R. Zentall - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):663-663.
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  • Behaviorism, introspection and the mind's I.Jay Moore - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):657-658.
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  • Animal modeling in psychopharmacological contexts.Hugh LaFollette & Niall Shanks - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):653-654.
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  • Searle's abstract argument against strong AI.Andrew Melnyk - 1996 - Synthese 108 (3):391-419.
    Discussion of Searle's case against strong AI has usually focused upon his Chinese Room thought-experiment. In this paper, however, I expound and then try to refute what I call his abstract argument against strong AI, an argument which turns upon quite general considerations concerning programs, syntax, and semantics, and which seems not to depend on intuitions about the Chinese Room. I claim that this argument fails, since it assumes one particular account of what a program is. I suggest an alternative (...)
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  • (1 other version)Why did evolution engineer consciousness?Selmer Bringsjord & Ron Noel - 1998 - In Gregory R. Mulhauser (ed.), Evolving Consciousness. John Benjamins.
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  • Individual differences, developmental changes, and social context.Dean Keith Simonton - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):552-553.
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  • Conscious thought processes and creativity.Maria F. Ippolito - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):546-547.
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