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The Two-Envelope Paradox

Analysis 55 (1):6 - 11 (1995)

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  1. Making Ado Without Expectations.Mark Colyvan & Alan Hájek - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):829-857.
    This paper is a response to Paul Bartha’s ‘Making Do Without Expectations’. We provide an assessment of the strengths and limitations of two notable extensions of standard decision theory: relative expectation theory and Paul Bartha’s relative utility theory. These extensions are designed to provide intuitive answers to some well-known problems in decision theory involving gaps in expectations. We argue that both RET and RUT go some way towards providing solutions to the problems in question but neither extension solves all the (...)
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  • Rationality and Irrationality: Proceeedings of the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium, 13-19 August 2000, Kirchberg Am Wechsel.Berit Brogaard & Barry Smith (eds.) - 2001 - Öbv&Hpt.
    This volume consists of the invited papers presented at the 23rd International Wittgenstein Conference held in Kirchberg, Austria in August 2000. Among the topics treated are: truth, psychologism, science, the nature of rational discourse, practical reason, contextualism, vagueness, types of rationality, the rationality of religious belief, and Wittgenstein. Questions addressed include: Is rationality tied to special sorts of contexts? ls rationality tied to language? Is scientific rationality the only kind of rationality? Is there something like a Western rationality? and: Could (...)
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  • The Enigma Of Probability.Nick Ergodos - 2014 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 2 (1):37-71.
    Using “brute reason” I will show why there can be only one valid interpretation of probability. The valid interpretation turns out to be a further refinement of Popper’s Propensity interpretation of probability. Via some famous probability puzzles and new thought experiments I will show how all other interpretations of probability fail, in particular the Bayesian interpretations, while these puzzles do not present any difficulties for the interpretation proposed here. In addition, the new interpretation casts doubt on some concepts often taken (...)
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  • The Two-envelope Paradox: Asymmetrical Cases.Chunghyoung Lee - 2013 - Mind 122 (485):1-26.
    In the asymmetrical variant of the two-envelope paradox, the amount in envelope A is determined first, and then the amount in envelope B is determined to be either twice or half the amount in A by flipping a fair coin. Contra the common belief that B is preferable to A in this case, I show that the proposed arguments for this common belief all fail, and argue that B is not preferable to A if the expected values of the amounts (...)
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  • Perspectives on a Pair of Envelopes.Piers Rawling - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (3):253-277.
    The two envelopes problem has generated a significant number of publications (I have benefitted from reading many of them, only some of which I cite; see the epilogue for a historical note). Part of my purpose here is to provide a review of previous results (with somewhat simpler demonstrations). In addition, I hope to clear up what I see as some misconceptions concerning the problem. Within a countably additive probability framework, the problem illustrates a breakdown of dominance with respect to (...)
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  • Harming as causing harm.Elizabeth Harman - 2009 - In David Wasserman & Melinda Roberts (eds.), Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem. Springer. pp. 137--154.
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  • Le paradoxe Des deux enveloppes et le choix de l'indifférence.Paul Franceschi - unknown
    I present in this paper a solution to the Two-Envelope Paradox. I begin with stating the paradox and describing some related experiments. I justify then the fact that choosing either envelope is indifferent. I also point out the flaw in the reasoning inherent to the two-envelope paradox.
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  • Misadventures in conditional expectation: The two-envelope problem. [REVIEW]Carl G. Wagner - 1999 - Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):233-241.
    Several fallacies of conditionalization are illustrated, using the two-envelope problem as a case in point.
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  • The two-envelope paradox: An axiomatic approach.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):239-248.
    There has been much discussion on the two-envelope paradox. Clark and Shackel (2000) have proposed a solution to the paradox, which has been refuted by Meacham and Weisberg (2003). Surprisingly, however, the literature still contains no axiomatic justification for the claim that one should be indifferent between the two envelopes before opening one of them. According to Meacham and Weisberg, "decision theory does not rank swapping against sticking [before opening any envelope]" (p. 686). To fill this gap in the literature, (...)
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  • A Tale of Two Envelopes.Bernard D. Katz & Doris Olin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):903-926.
    This paper deals with the two-envelope paradox. Two main formulations of the paradoxical reasoning are distinguished, which differ according to the partition of possibilities employed. We argue that in the first formulation the conditionals required for the utility assignment are problematic; the error is identified as a fallacy of conditional reasoning. We go on to consider the second formulation, where the epistemic status of certain singular propositions becomes relevant; our diagnosis is that the states considered do not exhaust the possibilities. (...)
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  • No expectations.Mark Colyvan - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):695-702.
    The Pasadena paradox presents a serious challenge for decision theory. The paradox arises from a game that has well-defined probabilities and utilities for each outcome, yet, apparently, does not have a well-defined expectation. In this paper, I argue that this paradox highlights a limitation of standard decision theory. This limitation can be (largely) overcome by embracing dominance reasoning and, in particular, by recognising that dominance reasoning can deliver the correct results in situations where standard decision theory fails. This, in turn, (...)
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  • The two-envelope paradox.Michael Clark & Nicholas Shackel - 2000 - Mind 109 (435):415--442.
    Previous claims to have resolved the two-envelope paradox have been premature. The paradoxical argument has been exposed as manifestly fallacious if there is an upper limit to the amount of money that may be put in an envelope; but the paradoxical cases which can be described if this limitation is removed do not involve mathematical error, nor can they be explained away in terms of the strangeness of infinity. Only by taking account of the partial sums of the infinite series (...)
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  • On Uncertainty.Brian Weatherson - 1998 - Dissertation, Monash University
    This dissertation looks at a set of interconnected questions concerning the foundations of probability, and gives a series of interconnected answers. At its core is a piece of old-fashioned philosophical analysis, working out what probability is. Or equivalently, investigating the semantic question of what is the meaning of ‘probability’? Like Keynes and Carnap, I say that probability is degree of reasonable belief. This immediately raises an epistemological question, which degrees count as reasonable? To solve that in its full generality would (...)
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  • Decision Theory Unbound.Zachary Goodsell - 2024 - Noûs 58 (3):669-695.
    Countenancing unbounded utility in ethics gives rise to deep puzzles in formal decision theory. Here, these puzzles are taken as an invitation to assess the most fundamental principles relating probability and value, with the aim of demonstrating that unbounded utility in ethics is compatible with a desirable decision theory. The resulting theory frames further discussion of Expected Utility Theory and of principles concerning symmetries of utility.
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  • Unbounded Utility.Zachary Goodsell - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
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  • On Two Arguments for Fanaticism.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2023 - Noûs 58 (3):565-595.
    Should we make significant sacrifices to ever-so-slightly lower the chance of extremely bad outcomes, or to ever-so-slightly raise the chance of extremely good outcomes? *Fanaticism* says yes: for every bad outcome, there is a tiny chance of extreme disaster that is even worse, and for every good outcome, there is a tiny chance of an enormous good that is even better. I consider two related recent arguments for Fanaticism: Beckstead and Thomas's argument from *strange dependence on space and time*, and (...)
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  • A St Petersburg Paradox for risky welfare aggregation.Zachary Goodsell - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):420-426.
    The principle of Anteriority says that prospects that are identical from the perspective of every possible person’s welfare are equally good overall. The principle enjoys prima facie plausibility, and has been employed for various theoretical purposes. Here it is shown using an analogue of the St Petersburg Paradox that Anteriority is inconsistent with central principles of axiology.
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  • Why punitive intent matters.Nathan Hanna - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):426-435.
    Many philosophers think that punishment is intentionally harmful and that this makes it especially hard to morally justify. Explanations for the latter intuition often say questionable things about the moral significance of the intent to harm. I argue that there’s a better way to explain this intuition.
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  • Infinite Prospects.Jeffrey Sanford Russell & Yoaav Isaacs - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):178-198.
    People with the kind of preferences that give rise to the St. Petersburg paradox are problematic---but not because there is anything wrong with infinite utilities. Rather, such people cannot assign the St. Petersburg gamble any value that any kind of outcome could possibly have. Their preferences also violate an infinitary generalization of Savage's Sure Thing Principle, which we call the *Countable Sure Thing Principle*, as well as an infinitary generalization of von Neumann and Morgenstern's Independence axiom, which we call *Countable (...)
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  • The nonidentity problem and the two envelope problem: When is one act better for a person than another?Melinda A. Roberts - 2009 - In David Wasserman & Melinda Roberts (eds.), Harming Future Persons: Ethics, Genetics and the Nonidentity Problem. Springer. pp. 201--228.
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  • Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding.Frank Arntzenius, Adam Elga & John Hawthorne - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):251 - 283.
    We pose and resolve several vexing decision theoretic puzzles. Some are variants of existing puzzles, such as 'Trumped' (Arntzenius and McCarthy 1997), 'Rouble trouble' (Arntzenius and Barrett 1999), 'The airtight Dutch book' (McGee 1999), and 'The two envelopes puzzle' (Broome 1995). Others are new. A unified resolution of the puzzles shows that Dutch book arguments have no force in infinite cases. It thereby provides evidence that reasonable utility functions may be unbounded and that reasonable credence functions need not be countably (...)
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  • Opening Two Envelopes.Paul Syverson - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (4):479-498.
    In the two-envelope problem, one is offered a choice between two envelopes, one containing twice as much money as the other. After seeing the contents of the chosen envelope, the chooser is offered the opportunity to make an exchange for the other envelope. However, it appears to be advantageous to switch, regardless of what is observed in the chosen envelope. This problem has an extensive literature with connections to probability and decision theory. The literature is roughly divided between those that (...)
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  • Envelopes and indifference.Graham Priest & Greg Restall - unknown
    Consider this situation: Here are two envelopes. You have one of them. Each envelope contains some quantity of money, which can be of any positive real magnitude. One contains twice the amount of money that the other contains, but you do not know which one. You can keep the money in your envelope, whose numerical value you do not know at this stage, or you can exchange envelopes and have the money in the other. You wish to maximise your money. (...)
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  • (1 other version)Waging War on Pascal’s Wager.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):27-56.
    Pascal’s Wager is simply too good to be true—or better, too good to be sound. There must be something wrong with Pascal’s argument that decision-theoretic reasoning shows that one must (resolve to) believe in God, if one is rational. No surprise, then, that critics of the argument are easily found, or that they have attacked it on many fronts. For Pascal has given them no dearth of targets.
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  • Two Envelopes and Binding.Casper Storm Hansen - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):508-518.
    This paper describes a way of defending a modification of Eckhardt's [2013] solution to the Two Envelopes Paradox. The defence is based on ideas from Arntzenius, Elga, and Hawthorne [2004].
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  • What's in the Two Envelope Paradox?A. D. Scott & M. Scott - 1997 - Analysis 57 (1):34-41.
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  • Trying to Resolve the Two-Envelope Problem.Casper J. Albers, Barteld P. Kooi & Willem Schaafsma - 2005 - Synthese 145 (1):89-109.
    After explaining the well-known two-envelope paradox by indicating the fallacy involved, we consider the two-envelope problem of evaluating the factual information provided to us in the form of the value contained by the envelope chosen first. We try to provide a synthesis of contributions from economy, psychology, logic, probability theory (in the form of Bayesian statistics), mathematical statistics (in the form of a decision-theoretic approach) and game theory. We conclude that the two-envelope problem does not allow a satisfactory solution. An (...)
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  • Conditionals, Probabilities, and Utilities: More on Two Envelopes.B. D. Katz & D. Olin - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):171-183.
    Sutton ( 2010 ) claims that on our analysis (2007), the problem in the two-envelope paradox is an error in counterfactual reasoning. In fact, we distinguish two formulations of the paradox, only one of which, on our account, involves an error in conditional reasoning. According to Sutton, it is conditional probabilities rather than subjunctive conditionals that are essential to the problem. We argue, however, that his strategy for assigning utilities on the basis of conditional probabilities leads to absurdity. In addition, (...)
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  • Rationality applied: resolving the two envelopes problem.Christian Hugo Hoffmann - 2023 - Theory and Decision 94 (4):555-573.
    The Two Envelopes Problem is a beautiful and quite confusing problem in decision theory which is ca. 35 years old and has provoked at least 150 papers directly addressing the problem and displaying a surprising variety of different responses. This paper finds decisive progress in an approach of Priest and Restall in 2003, contends that the recent papers having appeared since did not really go beyond that paper, argues further that Priest’s and Restall’s solution is still not complete, and proposes (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Two Envelope Paradox and Infinite Expectations.Frank Arntzenius & David McCarthy - 1997 - Analysis 57 (1):42-50.
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  • (1 other version)Waging War on Pascal's Wager.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):27-56.
    Pascal’s Wager is simply too good to be true—or better, too good to be sound. There must be something wrong with Pascal’s argument that decision-theoretic reasoning shows that one must believe in God, if one is rational. No surprise, then, that critics of the argument are easily found, or that they have attacked it on many fronts. For Pascal has given them no dearth of targets.
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  • Biased information and the exchange paradox.Anubav Vasudevan - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2455-2485.
    This paper presents a new solution to the well-known exchange paradox, or what is sometimes referred to as the two-envelope paradox. Many recent commentators have analyzed the paradox in terms of the agent’s biased concern for the contents of his own arbitrarily chosen envelope, claiming that such bias violates the manifest symmetry of the situation. Such analyses, however, fail to make clear exactly how the symmetry of the situation is violated by the agent’s hypothetical conclusion that he ought to switch (...)
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