- Sensing mind-independence.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14931-14949.details
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Naïve Realism With or Without the Content View: Response to Giananti.Ivan V. Ivanov - 2021 - Topoi 41 (1):221-225.details
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Deflating the hard problem of consciousness by multiplying explanatory gaps.Işık Sarıhan - 2024 - Ratio 37 (1):1-13.details
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In favor of an ecological account of color.Scott Huettel - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):33-33.details
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Epistemic internalism and perceptual content: how a fear of demons leads to an error theory of perception.Robert J. Howell - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2153-2170.details
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Turning the zombie on its head.Amir Horowitz - 2009 - Synthese 170 (1):191 - 210.details
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Perceptual Existentialism Sustained.Christopher S. Hill - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1-20.details
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Perceptual Existentialism Sustained.Christopher S. Hill - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (6):1391-1410.details
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That which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact: Moore on phenomenal relationism.Benj Hellie - 2007 - European Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):334-66.details
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Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):289--324.details
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Representationalism and the Intentionality of Moods.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1515-1526.details
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Byrne and Hilbert's chromatic ether.C. L. Hardin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):32-33.details
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Parallels between hearing and seeing support physicalism.Stephen Handel & Molly L. Erickson - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):31-32.details
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Phenomenal properties are luminous properties.Geoffrey Hall - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11001-11022.details
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Do metamers matter?Martin Hahn - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):30-31.details
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The Invalidity of the Argument from Illusion and the Argument from Appearance.Zhiwei Gu - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-22.details
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Propositional Intentionalism and the Argument from Appearance.Zhiwei Gu - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (2):697-715.details
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Non‐Propositional Attitudes.Alex Grzankowski - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (12):1123-1137.details
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The Impossibility of Skepticism.Daniel Greco - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):317-358.details
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Perception, force, and content.Dominic Gregory - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.details
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Consciousness and perceptual attention: A methodological argument.Massimo Grassia - 2004 - Essays in Philosophy 5 (1):1-23.details
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Consciousness and the limits of memory.Joseph Gottlieb - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5217-5243.details
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Cartesian Imperativism.Joseph Gottlieb & Saja Parvizian - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):702-725.details
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The Way Things Look: a Defence of Content.Andrea Giananti - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (3):541-562.details
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Perception, Content, Generality.Andrea Giananti - 2020 - Theoria 86 (2):245-267.details
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Appearances and the Metaphysics of Sensible Qualities: A Response to Ivanov.Andrea Giananti - 2020 - Topoi 39 (4):1011-1015.details
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Please mind the gappy content.Johan Gersel - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):219-239.details
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Neo‐pragmatism, Representationalism and the Emotions.Joshua Gert - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):454-478.details
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A realistic colour realism.Joshua Gert - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):565 – 589.details
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Representationalism, peripheral awareness, and the transparency of experience.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):39-56.details
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Appearance and Illusion.James Genone - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):339-376.details
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Are color experiences representational?Todd Ganson - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):1-20.details
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Imprecise color constancy versus color realism.Brian V. Funt - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):29-30.details
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What Experience Cannot Teach Us About Time.Akiko M. Frischhut - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):143-155.details
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High-level properties and visual experience.William Fish - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):43-55.details
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Quaderns de filosofia IV, 2.Quad Fia - 2017 - Quaderns de Filosofia 4 (2).details
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Perceptual objects may have nonphysical properties.Aaron Ben-Ze’ev - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-23.details
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Perception as a contentful relation.Daniel E. Kalpokas - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):740-754.details
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Mendola's Internalism.Gary Ebbs - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (2):248-257.details
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Externalists Should Be Sense-Datum Theorists.Matt Duncan - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (2):338-355.details
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Consideraciones sobre la percepción desde la perspectiva enactiva.Ana Lorena Dominguez Rojas - 2020 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 24 (1):29-49.details
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The double content of perception.John Dilworth - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):225-243.details
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Representationalism and indeterminate perceptual content.John Dilworth - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):369-387.details
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Brentano and the parts of the mental: a mereological approach to phenomenal intentionality.Arnaud Dewalque - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):447-464.details
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Intentionalism and intransitivity.Max Deutsch - 2005 - Synthese 144 (1):1-22.details
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Pourquoi le représentationnalisme ne peut pas résoudre le « problème difficile » de la conscience phénoménale.François Kammerer - 2011 - RÉPHA, revue étudiante de philosophie analytique 4:45-53.details
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Is There a Perceptual Relation?Tim Crane - 2006 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experiences. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 126-146.details
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Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Sartre on affectivity.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2017 - In Alix Cohen & Robert Stern (eds.), Thinking about the Emotions : A Philosophical History. Oxford University Press.details
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Decoupling Accuracy from Fitness.Roberto de sá Pereira - 2023 - Argumenta 1:1-14.details
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