- (1 other version)The scrambler: An argument against representationalism.Stephen Biggs - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 215-236.details
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Is the Self a Social Construct?Dan Zahavi - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (6):551-573.details
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Conceptual qualia and communication.Fabian Dorsch & Gianfranco Soldati - 2005 - In Gilian Crampton Smith (ed.), The Foundations of Interaction Design. pp. 1-14.details
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Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.details
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Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated.Peter Carruthers - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):76-111.details
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Are our concepts CONSCIOUS STATE and CONSCIOUS CREATURE vague?Michael V. Antony - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):239 - 263.details
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(1 other version)Suffering without subjectivity.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (2):99-125.details
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Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.details
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The embodied self-awareness of the infant: A challenge to the theory-theory of mind.Dan Zahavi - 2004 - In Dan Zahavi, T. Grunbaum & Josef Parnas (eds.), The Structure and Development of Self-Consciousness: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. John Benjamins.details
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The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness.Simon Prosser - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):319 - 349.details
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(1 other version)Personal Level Representation.Uriah Kriegel - 2012 - ProtoSociology 28:77-114.details
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Externalism about mental content.Joe Lau - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Inverted qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Perception without awareness.Fred Dretske - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 147--180.details
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The functional role of consciousness: A phenomenological approach.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):171-93.details
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Representational theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Consciousness and Intentionality.Charles Siewert - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Self-reflexive thoughts.Gilbert Harman - 2006 - Philosophical Issues 16 (1):334-345.details
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Consciousness, higher-order content, and the individuation of vehicles.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Synthese 134 (3):477-504.details
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Conscious perceptual experience as representational self-prompting.John Dilworth - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):135-156.details
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Consciousness-dependence and the explanatory gap.Neil Campbell Manson - 2002 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):521-540.details
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Consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Theories of consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):58-64.details
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Pains and holes: comments on (Casser and Schiller 2021).Nathan William Davies - manuscriptdetails
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Taking Phenomenology at Face Value: The Priority of State Consciousness in Light of the For-me-ness of Experience.Alberto Barbieri - 2023 - Argumenta.details
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Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Contrasts, and Externalism.Thomas Raleigh - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):602-627.details
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Conciencia, primera persona y contenido no conceptual (en) Contenido y fenomenología de la percepción. Aproximaciones filosóficas.Miguel Angel Sebastian - 2020 - Barcelona, España: Gedisa. Edited by A. Y. Cervieri Pelaez.details
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Materialism and the Moral Status of Animals.Jonathan Birch - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):795-815.details
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Introspection Is Signal Detection.Jorge Morales - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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A Hole in the Box and a Pain in the Mouth.Laurenz C. Casser & Henry Ian Schiller - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa091.details
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Whose Consciousness? Reflexivity and the Problem of Self-Knowledge.Christian Coseru - 2020 - In Mark Siderits, Ching Keng & John Spackman (eds.), Buddhist Philosophy of Consciousness: Tradition and Dialogue. Boston: Brill | Rodopi. pp. 121-153.details
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Consciousness and information integration.Berit Brogaard, Dimitria Electra Gatzia & Bartek Chomanski - 2021 - Synthese 198:763-792.details
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(1 other version)How Rich is the Illusion of Consciousness?François Kammerer - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):499-515.details
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Subjectivity as Self-Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (3-4):88-111.details
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Consciousness as Inner Sensation: Crusius and Kant.Jonas Jervell Indregard - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.details
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The Resilience of a Refined Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness.Lee-Anna T. Sangster - unknowndetails
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Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism.Philip Goff - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 198-222.details
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‘What it is Like’ Talk is not Technical Talk.Jonathan Farrell - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):50-65.details
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(2 other versions)VI. Emotional Feelings and Intentionalism.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:105-111.details
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Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Physicalist Theories of Consciousness.Andrew Bailey - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):481-509.details
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Kant’s and Husserl’s agentive and proprietary accounts of cognitive phenomenology.Julia Jansen - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):161-172.details
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Replacing Functional Reduction with Mechanistic Explanation.Markus I. Eronen - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):125-153.details
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Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.details
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Brentano's Dual‐Framing Theory of Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):79-98.details
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Imagination and the Will.Fabian Dorsch - 2005 - Dissertation, University College Londondetails
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(1 other version)Explanation and the Hard Problem.Wayne Wright - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (2):301-330.details
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For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not.Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel - 2016 - In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of mind and phenomenology. New York: Routledge. pp. 36-53.details
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(1 other version)Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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On the evolution of conscious attention.Harry Haroutioun Haladjian & Carlos Montemayor - 2015 - Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 22 (3):595-613.details
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Nonhuman Animals: Not Necessarily Saints or Sinners.C. E. Abbate - 2014 - Between the Species 17 (1):1-30.details
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