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  1. The Paradox of Empathy.L. A. Paul - 2021 - Episteme 18 (3):347-366.
    A commitment to truth requires that you are open to receiving new evidence, even if that evidence contradicts your current beliefs. You should be open to changing your mind. However, this truism gives rise to the paradox of empathy. The paradox arises with the possibility of mental corruption through transformative change, and has consequences for how we should understand tolerance, disagreement, and the ability to have an open mind. I close with a discussion of how understanding this paradox provides a (...)
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  • Is Morality a Gadget? Nature, Nurture and Culture in Moral Development.Cecilia Heyes - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4391-4414.
    Research on ‘moral learning’ examines the roles of domain-general processes, such as Bayesian inference and reinforcement learning, in the development of moral beliefs and values. Alert to the power of these processes, and equipped with both the analytic resources of philosophy and the empirical methods of psychology, ‘moral learners’ are ideally placed to discover the contributions of nature, nurture and culture to moral development. However, I argue that to achieve these objectives research on moral learning needs to overcome nativist bias, (...)
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  • Emphasising an Embodied Phenomenological Sense of the Self and the Social in Education.Malcolm Thorburn & Steven A. Stolz - 2021 - British Journal of Educational Studies 69 (3):365-380.
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  • Communicating Your Point of View.Paul Faulkner - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  • Knowing What an Experience Is Like and the Reductive Theory of Knowledge‐Wh.Kevin Lynch - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (3):252-275.
    This article discusses a kind of knowledge classifiable as knowledge-wh but which seems to defy analysis in terms of the standard reductive theory of knowledge-wh ascriptions, according to which they are true if and only if one knows that p, where this proposition is an acceptable answer to the wh-question ‘embedded’ in the ascription. Specifically, it is argued that certain cases of knowing what an experience is like resist such treatment. I argue that in some of these cases, one can (...)
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