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Semantic gaps and protosemantics.Benj Hellie - 2019 - In J. Acacio de Barros & Carlos Montemayor (eds.), Quanta and Mind: Essays on the Connection Between Quantum Mechanics and Consciousness. Springer Verlag.details
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Revelation and Physicalism.Nic Damnjanovic - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):69-91.details
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The Inconceivability Argument.Brian Cutter - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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A Puzzle about Further Facts.Vincent Conitzer - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):727-739.details
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Facing up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness as an Integrated Information Theorist.Robert Chis-Ciure & Francesco Ellia - 2021 - Foundations of Science 1 (1):255-271.details
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Stained Glass as a Model for Consciousness.Mihnea D. I. Capraru - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):90-103.details
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The World Just Is the Way It Is.David Builes - 2021 - The Monist 104 (1):1-27.details
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How to be a type-C physicalist.Adrian Boutel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):301-320.details
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Abduction versus conceiving in modal epistemology.Stephen Biggs & Jessica Wilson - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 8):2045-2076.details
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In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.details
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Conceptual Analysis and Epistemic Progress.Magdalena Balcerak Jackson - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3053-3074.details
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Powers and the mind–body problem.István Aranyosi - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (1):57 – 72.details
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Powers and the hard problem of consciousness: conceivability, possibility and powers.Sophie R. Allen - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (2):1-33.details
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Lightweight and Heavyweight Anti-physicalism.Damian Aleksiev - 2022 - Synthese 200 (112):1-23.details
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Phenomenal Powers.Hedda Hassel Mørch - manuscriptdetails
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Ideal Negative Conceivability and the Halting Problem.Manolo Martínez - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):979-990.details
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The Epistemology of Modality.Antonella Mallozzi, Michael Wallner & Anand Vaidya - 2021 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.details
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Filozofija uma: pregled suvremenih rasprava o umu i tijelu (Eng. Philosophy of mind: a survey of contemporary debates on the mind-body problem).Marko Jurjako & Luca Malatesti - 2022 - Rijeka: University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences.details
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Hard, Harder, Hardest.Katalin Balog - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 265-289.details
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Physicalism without supervenience.Lei Zhong - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1529-1544.details
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A naturalistic interpretation of the Kripkean modality.Feng Ye - 2009 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (3):454-470.details
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What panpsychists should reject: on the incompatibility of panpsychism and organizational invariantism.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1833-1846.details
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Do the Primary and Secondary Intensions of Phenomenal Concepts Coincide in all Worlds?Robert Schroer - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):561-577.details
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No ground to bridge the gap.Elisabetta Sassarini - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7981–7999.details
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The Zombie Attack, Perry’s Parry, and a Riposte: A Slight Softening of the “Hard Problem” of Consciousness.J. Brendan Ritchie - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):55-65.details
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Modal rationalism and the demonstrative reply to the scrutability argument against physicalism.Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 8):2107-2134.details
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Chalmers and Semantics.Panu Raatikainen - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1193-1221.details
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Passage and Perception.Simon Prosser - 2011 - Noûs 47 (1):69-84.details
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Zombies Slap Back: Why the Anti-Zombie Parody Does Not Work.Duško Prelević - 2015 - Disputatio 7 (40):25–43.details
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Physicalism as a Research Programme.Duško Prelević - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1):15-33.details
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The Five Marks of the Mental.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
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A consciousness-based quantum objective collapse model.Elias Okon & Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):3947-3967.details
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Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):1065-1085.details
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The Super Justification Argument for Phenomenal Transparency.Kevin Morris - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (4):437-455.details
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The obscurity of the physical: an objection to Chalmers’ conceivability argument.Felipe G. A. Moreira - 2020 - Filosofia Unisinos 21 (3):296-302.details
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Phenomenal transparency and the transparency of subjecthood.Kevin Morris - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):39-45.details
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Making Room for a This-Worldly Physicalism.Barbara Gail Montero & Christopher Devlin Brown - 2018 - Topoi 37 (3):523-532.details
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If consciousness causes collapse, the zombie argument fails.Mousa Mohammadian - 2021 - Synthese 199:1599–1615.details
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Why the Canberra plan won’t help you do serious metaphysics.Raamy Majeed - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4865-4882.details
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Presentation and the Ontology of Consciousness.Paul M. Livingston - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):301-331.details
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The topological realization.Daniel Kostić - 2018 - Synthese (1).details
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Mechanistic and topological explanations: an introduction.Daniel Kostić - 2018 - Synthese 195 (1).details
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Explanatory Perspectivalism: Limiting the Scope of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Daniel Kostić - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):119-125.details
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Interactionist Zombies.Jake Khawaja - 2022 - Synthese 200.details
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Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?François Kammerer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):649-667.details
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Three strands in Kripke's argument against the identity theory.Jesper Kallestrup - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1255-1280.details
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Natural Concepts, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Conceivability Argument.Jussi Jylkkä - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (3):647-663.details
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Why ‘non-mental’ won’t work: on Hempel’s dilemma and the characterization of the ‘physical’.Neal Judisch - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (3):299 - 318.details
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