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Value Receptacles

Noûs 49 (2):322-332 (2015)

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  1. Why Care About Non-Natural Reasons?Richard Chappell - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):125-134.
    Are non-natural properties worth caring about? I consider two objections to metaethical non-naturalism. According to the intelligibility objection, it would be positively unintelligible to care about non-natural properties that float free from the causal fabric of the cosmos. According to the ethical idlers objection, there is no compelling motivation to posit non-natural normative properties because the natural properties suffice to provide us with reasons. In both cases, I argue, the objection stems from misunderstanding the role that non-natural properties play in (...)
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  • Moral Sunk Costs.Seth Lazar - 2018 - The Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273):841–861.
    Suppose that you are trying to pursue a morally worthy goal, but cannot do so without incurring some moral costs. At the outset, you believed that achieving your goal was worth no more than a given moral cost. And suppose that, time having passed, you have wrought only harm and injustice, without advancing your cause. You can now reflect on whether to continue. Your goal is within reach. What's more, you believe you can achieve it by incurring—from this point forward—no (...)
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  • Sufficientarianism and the Separateness of Persons.Shlomi Segall - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):142-155.
    Utilitarians are said to be indifferent between interpersonal and intrapersonal transfers. In doing so, they fail to register the separateness of persons. This ‘separateness of persons’ objection has been traditionally used against utilitarianism, but more recently against prioritarianism. In this paper, I examine how yet another distributive view, namely sufficientarianism, fares in this respect. Sufficientarians famously believe that while inequality as such does not matter, what does matter is that all individuals meet some adequate threshold. It is often taken for (...)
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  • Moral Status and Agent-Centred Options.Seth Lazar - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (1):83-105.
    If we were required to sacrifice our own interests whenever doing so was best overall, or prohibited from doing so unless it was optimal, then we would be mere sites for the realisation of value. Our interests, not ourselves, would wholly determine what we ought to do. We are not mere sites for the realisation of value — instead we, ourselves, matter unconditionally. So we have options to act suboptimally. These options have limits, grounded in the very same considerations. Though (...)
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  • Conservative Value.Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin - 2016 - The Monist 99 (4):352-371.
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  • Expression and Indication in Ethics and Political Philosophy.Dustin Crummett - 2019 - Res Publica 25 (3):387-406.
    We sometimes have reasons to perform actions due to what they would communicate. Those who have discussed such reasons have understood what an action ‘communicates’ as what it conventionally expresses. Brennan and Jaworski argue that when a convention ensures that expressing the appropriate thing would be costly, we should change or flout the convention. I argue that what really matters is often what attitudes we indicate rather than conventionally express, using social science to show that indicating our attitudes is often (...)
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  • Consequentialism and Respect: Two Strategies for Justifying Act Utilitarianism.Ben Eggleston - forthcoming - Utilitas:1-18.
    Most arguments in support of act utilitarianism are elaborations of one of two basic strategies. One is the consequentialist strategy. This strategy relies on the consequentialist premise that an act is right if and only if it produces the best possible consequences and the welfarist premise that the value of a state of affairs is entirely determined by its overall amount of well-being. The other strategy is based on the idea of treating individuals respectfully and resolving conflicts among individuals in (...)
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  • Moral Sunk Costs.Seth Lazar - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273):841-861.
    Suppose that you are trying to pursue a morally worthy goal, but cannot do so without incurring some moral costs. At the outset, you believed that achieving your goal was worth no more than a given moral cost. And suppose that, time having passed, you have wrought only harm and injustice, without advancing your cause. You can now reflect on whether to continue. Your goal is within reach. What's more, you believe you can achieve it by incurring—from this point forward—no (...)
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