Zeno’s arrow does not move “in the now” (Phys. VI 8, 239b2) or, equivalently, “in the place it is” (DK 29 B 4). Zeno concludes from this that the arrow does not move at all. In Aristotle (ibid. 9, 239b5–9, 31–33), Zeno’s argument takes the form of an invalid inference from instants to periods of time. Insofar as it fails to bring out an inconsistency in Aristotle’s account of motion, the paradox is thus eliminated. That instantaneous motion is a contradiction (...) in terms belongs to the common ground Aristotle shares with Zeno. That’s why information concerning Zeno’s relevant argument must be sought elsewhere (see section 3). Aristotle’s discussion of the Arrow pertains to the conclusions drawn from the denial of instantaneous motion. But the argument he refutes is of his own making, or so I will argue (section 2). In particular, Aristotle fails to address the presentist commitment adumbrated in his account, which would leave nothing beyond the denial of instantaneous motion for Zeno to prove. Presentism is no option in Phys. VI where a tenseless account of time and motion is offered. I will argue that Aristotle’s account of the tenses in De interpretatione is prone to Zeno’s argument if the present is conceived as an instant – which it arguably is not (section 4). (shrink)

In this paper I show that one of the most fruitful ways of employing paradoxes has been as a philosophical method that forces us to reconsider basic assumptions. After a brief discussion of recent understandings of the notion of paradoxes, I show that Zeno of Elea was the inventor of paradoxes in this sense, against the background of Heraclitus’ and Parmenides’ way of argumentation: in contrast to Heraclitus, Zeno’s paradoxes do not ask us to embrace a paradoxical reality; and in (...) contrast to Parmenides, Zeno shows common assumptions to be internally problematic, not just in light of Eleatic positions. (shrink)

The paper explores the interrelations between Pindar, Heraclitus and the Hippocratic author with regard to ideas of the body, the soul and dreams. I shall consider Pindar’s fr.131b as an overlooked testimony of the poet’s interest in a non-Homeric conceptualization of the soul. I will suggest reading Heraclitus’ fragments B26 and B21 together and offer a new interpretation of the latter. Furthermore, I will compare Pindar’s fr. 131b with the HippocraticOn Regimen(4. 86, 87) and Pindar’s fr. 133 withOn Regimen(4. 92) (...) respectively, in order to highlight unnoticed similarities. (shrink)

El siguiente ensayo tiene como objetivo principal la investigación sobre la génesis y conformación del término «λόγος» en el inicio de la tradición de la metafísica occidental. La amplitud, evolución y varianza del uso del término en la literatura y el pensamiento griego en sus orígenes, muestran la conexión y el enraizamiento del proyecto metafísico griego con la cosmovisión helénica, la visión teogónica y el pensar poético.

The aim of this critical note is to discuss Heraclitus' use of analogy as a pattern of thought not only with argumentative value but also ontological and epistemological status. Heraclitus' analogy is of two kinds and is expressed in the use of the adverbs ὥσπερ ("as") and ὅκωσπερ ("just as"). The first is used as an explanatory device, while the second denotes the ontological homogeneity of logos. Analogy reveals not only the inherent opposition of logos in each single thing, but (...) also the interdependent common interrelation between things. (shrink)

En este artículo presentamos una posible vía para interpretar las nociones de posibilidad y necesidad desarrolladas en el seno de la lógica megárico-estoica como operadores modales aléticos. Se introducirá la semántica megárico-estoica como trasfondo metafísico de las definiciones de necesidad y posibilidad y se ofrecerán argumentos para abandonar las interpretaciones predominantes que incluyen variables temporales ad hoc. Tras proponer la lectura de las definiciones diodóricas desde una semántica modal relacional se señalará una serie de temas que merecen ser revisitados desde (...) esta óptica. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 29, Issue 3, Page 624-633, September 2021.

Ontology is the name of the philosophical discipline that provides answers about what there is. The view laid out in the paper, i.e. austere realism, is realistic in that it defends the existence of a thought and language independent world. It is also inclined towards austerity in that it does not take this world to be as richly ontologically populated with entities as common sense initially presupposes. Yet it is a view that results from common sense taking a reflexive attitude (...) about its ontological commitments. Despite its austere consequences, according to this view, many thoughts and sentences expressed by common sense are true, provided that truth is not considered as direct correspondence, i.e. not as the ultimate ontological correspondence to the world. This is enabled by the construal of truth as indirect correspondence that merges the world and contextually operative semantic standards. Such a combined ontological cum semantic view seems a plausible and a well defendable position. (shrink)

The paper takes off from the problem of finding a proper content for the relation of identity as it holds or fails to hold among ordinary things or substances. The necessary conditions of identity are familiar, the sufficient conditions less so. The search is for conditions at once better usable than the Leibnizian Identity of Indiscernibles (independently suspect) and strong enough to underwrite all the formal properties of the relation.It is contended that the key to this problem rests at the (...) level of metaphysics and epistemology alike with a sortalist position. Sortalism is the position which insists that, if the question is whether a and b are the same, it has to be asked what are they? Any sufficiently specific answer to that question will bring with it a principle of activity or functioning and a mode of behaviour characteristic of some particular kind of thing by reference to which questions of persistence or non-persistence through change can be adjudicated.These contentions are illustrated by reference to familiar examples such as the human zygote, the Ship of Theseus and Shoemaker's Brown-Brownson. The first example is hostage for a mass of unproblematical cases. The problems presented by the second and third sort of examples arise chiefly (it is claimed) from an incompleteness in our conceptions of the relevant sort—the what the thing in question is. That incompleteness need not prevent us from knowing perfectly well which thing we are referring to. In the concluding section, sortalism is defended against various accusations of anthropocentrism.The paper touches on the interpretation of Heraclitus, Leibniz's theory of clear indistinct ideas, the difficulties of David Lewis's ‘perdurantist’ or stroboscopic view of persistence, four-dimensionalism, and the relation of personal identity both to experiential memory and to the particular bodily physiognomy of a subject. At some points—as in connection with the so-called Only a and b rule—the paper corrects, supplements or extends certain theses or formulations proposed in the author's Sameness and Substance Renewed (2001). (shrink)

In our article, we will focus on an analysis of the relationship between man and the cosmos, set against the backdrop of ancient Greek ideas about the origin of the world. On the one hand, we will deal with the images of the creation of the world provided in Greek mythology and the religious tradition associated with it (in particular Hesiod); on the other hand, we will approach the anthropomorphic elements within the framework of philosophical cosmogonies (Plato’s dialogue, the Timaeus). (...) Our aim is to show that Greek philosophical thought was never able to fully relinquish this anthropomorphism but nonetheless it did move away from a purely mythological tradition (as found in Hesiod and the pre-Socratics) and, in some measure towards a more scientific interpretation of the cosmos (as found in Plato). (shrink)

Este artículo constituye una revisión de las aportaciones de los primeros filósofos presocráticos milesios desde su propio marco conceptual y creencias. Desde esta perspectiva, e intentando identificar las interpretaciones añadidas a través de las propias fuentes directas e indirectas de su transmisión, se analizará la relación entre lo húmedo y la vida en Tales de Mileto, la explicación de Anaximandro sobre el origen de la vida y del hombre, y la densidad como criterio cuantitativo y cualitativo en Anaxímenes.

For Heidegger, Hegel understands being, ‘the highest actuality’, as the categories which pervade and thereby form all objects and events. Since, Heidegger argues, the categories are, in Hegel, present-at-hand, Hegel conceives of being as presence-at-hand. This is a problem, for Heidegger, because it entails the full transparency and knowability of being, whereas, in his view, being is partially hidden and unknowable. I consider the objection to this Heideggerian critique of Hegel that Hegelian logic understands being not only as the list (...) of categories but also as their derivation and movement from pure being to the absolute idea, which (derivation and movement) establish being not only as presence but also as implication. Since being-as-implication is (a) not presence-at-hand and (b) necessary to being, it cannot be said that Hegel's account of being turns it into full transparency and knowability. Heidegger's critique should, therefore, be rejected. I argue that this objection is unsuccessful because there is strong evidence in the Logic that Hegel ‘subordinates’ being-as-implication to presence-at-hand. Implication's way of being is, in Hegel, only a collapse into presence-at-hand and hence ‘merely a modification of presence’. Consequently, Heidegger's critique of Hegel should not be rejected based on the objection. I conclude the article with a remark on the relation between language and being-as-implication. I argue that Hegel's account of being-as-implication in language disrespects the autonomy of being-as-implication therein and that Haas's argument for such an autonomy based on the phenomenon of the syntactic ellipsis of ‘is’ fails to undermine Hegel's account. (shrink)

Levinas maintains that there is a lasting significance to hedonism if we consider the important role of pleasures for our embodied existence. In this essay, we go back to Plato to explore the nature of pleasure, different kinds of pleasures, and their contribution to the good life. The good life is a considerate mixture of pleasures which requires knowing, understanding and remembering. Pleasures take us to the most basic level of existence which the Presocratics can help us understand through their (...) idea of elements. With the help of Levinas, we can expand the concept of elements to include elemental states. As a result, we see how our embodied existence opens us up to various levels of otherness. (shrink)

Heraclitus is generally recognised as the first of the Greek thinkers to develop a psychology, but the understanding of his psychology is held back by the assumptions that his soul is a life-principle and is ‘comprehensive’ of the various faculties we regard as psychological. The fragment that best displays the revolutionary character of Heraclitus’ soul doctrine, from a properly psychological viewpoint, is B 85. I offer an extended analysis of this fragment in order to bear out the claims, firstly, that (...) psyche or ‘soul’ for Heraclitus is the intelligence alone, divine in origin, and secondly that thumos (primarily as the seat of desire) is a better candidate for his biological life-principle, whose exigencies are at odds with those of soul. I also offer some reflections on why, despite Heraclitus’ multifaceted influence on fifth-century thought, and despite the coherence of his psychology, this ‘revolution’ never quite took hold. (shrink)

The discovery of incommensurability by the Pythagoreans is usually ascribed to geometric or arithmetic questions, but already Tannery stressed the hypothesis that it had a music-theoretical origin. In this paper, I try to show that such hypothesis is correct, and, in addition, I try to understand why it was almost completely ignored so far.

Aristotle presented an influential conception of the universe consisting of a sphere of fixed stars with a spherical Earth at its centre. A spherical conception of heaven and Earth appears also in Plato’s writings. In presocratic cosmology, the idea of a spherical universe appears probably first in the thoughts of the Pythagoreans and Parmenides. But while there is no surviving evidence for the cosmology of early Pythagoreans, various sources mention in relation to Parmenides a solid surrounding part and a spherical (...) Earth at the centre of the universe. Being, which Parmenides had likened to a sphere, may have moreover in a cosmological sense referred to ‘heaven.’ Furthermore, we can observe in presocratic cosmologies a development which shows that the cosmology of heavenly sphere appeared in the fifth century BCE. Although Parmenides is commonly thought to have influenced especially ontology, one can argue that it was he who introduced the concept of a heavenly sphere to cosmology, a notion which in Aristotle’s thought evolved into the notion of a sphere of fixed stars forming the boundary of the world. (shrink)

Trust indicates positive effects on mental and social health in the work environment. In this study it was aimed to analyze the bidirectionality of trust and knowledge sharing variables over time. Results showed that there is a time pattern in the relationship between the two measures, where in time 1 (initial stage) participants have higher trust through knowledge sharing. In time 2 (middle stage) trust decreases and finally in time 3 (matured stage) it again increases. Finally, implications of the study (...) and how knowledge sharing can be an antecedent to trust building atleast in the initial stage is discussed. (shrink)

A number of aspects of the cosmology of Anaximenes of Miletus have not yet been convincingly explained, but we can assume that a starting point was the notion of a universe stretching only between a flat earth and heaven. This gave the cosmology its “meteorological” character: heavenly bodies were viewed as ignited evaporations of moisture. They were thought of as moving only above the earth’s surface, and their rising and setting were explained as an optical illusion. Similar approaches appear not (...) only in the Greek epic tradition but even in the writings of Xenophanes. It can therefore be assumed that Anaximenes’s conception is representative of contemporary Ionian explanations of cosmological events. (shrink)

Los objetos sensibles y el hombre, que constituyen el mundo sometido a alteración o cambios, poseen una estructura, organización y dinámicas propias por las cuales se intuye la presencia de causas o principios que dotan a ambos de tales atributos. De aquí que el límite y la medida representen condiciones de orden establecidas por el mundo ideal, un orden que actúa como causa de la armonía y la proporción que conforman todo el mundo visible. El orden ontológico y cósmico que (...) aquí se plantea proyecta también disposiciones éticas en el plano antropológico, disposiciones que obedecen a un intento explicativo de la realidad en su totalidad y que en el presente texto se intentan dilucidar. (shrink)

The strange and challenging stretch of dialectic with which Plato’s Sophist begins and ends has confused and frustrated readers for generations, and despite receiving a fair amount of attention, there is no consensus regarding even basic issues concerning this method. Here I offer a new account of bifurcatory division as neither joke nor naïve method, but instead a valuable, propaedeutic method that Plato offers to us readers as a means of embarking upon the kind of mental gymnastics that will stretch (...) us properly in preparation for further, more challenging dialectical work. Considering several interpretive issues, I argue that bifurcatory division is a process of collective inquiry into the common through which an account, both definitional and taxonomical, is discovered. Depending on the level of understanding exhibited by the inquirers, this account may or may not allow for noetic understanding of the object in the deepest sense. (shrink)

This paper advances a version of the theory whereby logic had deep origins in democracy, by re-reading Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen. Democracy, ‘the government by debate’, called political (and scientific) attention to the inferential abilities of citizens and to politicians’ ability of taking advantage of them. Sophists, in particular, discovered that people’s inferences follow constant repeatable forms, that these forms have impact on choices and decisions concerning public good, and then by dominating them you dominate politics in democracy. With the (...) Encomium Gorgias launched these ideas, so laying the ground for Aristotle’s science of deduction. (shrink)

_ The Concept of Presocratic Philosophy: Its Origins, Development and Significance _, by André Laks. Translated by Glenn W. Most. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018. Pp. x + 137.

The earliest recorded philosophical use of the term "phusis" occurs in the fragments of Heraclitus (most notably at B1 and B123). Phusis, in the non-philosophical writings relevant to Heraclitus’s time (e.g. from Homer to Aeschylus and Pindar), was generally used to characterize the external physical appearance of something. Heraclitus, on the other hand, seems to have used the term in the completely opposite manner: an object’s phusis is hidden (kruptesthai) and greater (kreissōn) than the external appearance (B123 and B54). Despite (...) this difference, Heraclitus’s use has an affinity with the common use in his time: phusis is used to characterize things. In B1, for example, Heraclitus makes it clear that he is interested in explaining the nature of each thing as opposed to some cosmic principle of Nature. By examining various fragments, I make the case that the phusis of a thing, for Heraclitus, can be defined as the set of opposites necessarily inherent in an object upon which all objects of that kind depend for their existence. The interesting result is that Heraclitus’s novel use of phusis happens to be the foundation for one of the ways in which opposites form a unity. This particular thesis states that there are essential properties inherent in objects which are pairs of opposites sufficient to determine the unity of the object in question. If this is right, then we can read some fragments which contain descriptions of worldly objects (e.g. bows, lyres, rivers, barley drinks etc.) in a new light. These descriptions of worldly objects might not be meant to stand as metaphoric symbols for cosmic principles, as is often thought; rather, they can be read as instances of Heraclitus attempting to do a metaphysics of objects. (shrink)

Modern thought would present only an incomplete and fragmentary picture of philosophy to us if we were to regard it as being completely disconnected from the elemental forces and sources of Greek philosophy. The corrective aspect that protects it from any such attempt at unmethodical isolation is, however, given within itself and in its own content. Its own inner progress necessarily leads it back to the principles and questions that distinguished Greek speculation, which it embodied in typical forms. The thought (...) of the modern age proves its specificity in the fact that, notwithstanding the richness of content that it gains, it remains conscious of its relatedness to these basic logical forms and strives to return to them of its own accord. They will thus themselves appear to us of their own accord and incite us to regard their contents, if we just allow ourselves to follow the course of the investigation. (shrink)

What is Leucippus and Democritus’ theory of the beginning of life? How, if at all, did Leucippus and Democritus distinguish different kinds of living things? These questions are challenging in part because these Atomists claim that all living beings – including plants – have a share of reason and understanding. We answer these questions by examining the extant evidence concerning their views on embryology, the soul and respiration, and sense perception, thereby giving an overview of life and lifeforms in early (...) Greek atomism. We show, first, that the generation of all living beings happens through the combining of miniature copies of their parents’ atomic structures. Second, we argue that the Atomists take respiration to mark the beginning of life. Yet they do not consider respiration nor being ensouled to distinguish humans, animals, and plants from each other. Finally, because Leucippus and Democritus make little distinction between sense perception and thought, these too cannot sharply distinguish between different kinds of living beings. We conclude that Leucippus and Democritus advocated a less anthropocentric and more holistic view of the cosmos. (shrink)

A number of Democritean fragments may loosely be called ‘political’, concerned as they are with questions to do with the πλις – with government, with the duties and dangers of public office, with justice, law and order. The majority of them have been preserved in chapters of Stobaeus’ anthology entitled ‘On the State’ , ‘On Laws and Customs’ , ‘On Government’.

One of the most striking features of Giordano Bruno’s philosophy is the marriage of universal animation with atomism. This unusual combination produced an extraordinary image of the universe, which was governed by the World-Soul and its universal intellect along with an infinite number of living atoms or corpuscles, animated by their internal spiritual principle. After examining Bruno’s principal arguments on the World-Soul, universal animation and living atoms or corpuscles, this article explores two possible sources among the works of his near-contemporaries. (...) The first author, Agostino Steuco, tried to reconcile the doctrine of the World-Soul with Christianity, integrating the idea of Anaxagoras on the cosmic mind as the demiurgic agent of the universe. The second figure, Jacob Schegk, further elaborated his unusual atomistic or corpuscular reinterpretation of this Presocratic philosopher’s ideas. (shrink)

We critically reconsider an old hypothesis of the role of the dekad in Pythagorean philosophy. Unlike Zhmud, we claim that: 1) the dekad did play a role in Philolaus’ astronomical system, and 2) Aristotle did not project Plato’s theory of the ten eidetic numbers onto the Pythagoreans. We claim that the dekad, as the τέλειος ἀριθμός, should be understood in Philolaus’ philosophy as completeness and the basis of counting in Greek – as in most other languages – in a decimal (...) system. Additionally, we argue that the number ten is not even a candidate for the τέλειος ἀριθμός in Plato’s philosophy. As a final result of our discussion, we compare and contrast Philolaus’, Plato’s, and Speusippus’ accounts of completeness in relation to numbers. (shrink)

Karl Popper identified Xenophanes of Colophon (570−478 BCE) as the originator of the method of conjectures and refutations. This essay explores this claim, and the methods of both philosophers (section 1). Disparagement (ancient and modern) of Xenophanes has been misguided (section 2). Xenophanes, a critical rationalist and realist, pioneered philosophy of religion (section 3) and epistemology (section 4), but his method was not confined to falsificationism, and appears compatible with inductivism and abductionism (section 5). The method employed by Popper in (...) interpreting Herodotus in support of his conjectures about Xenophanes is typical of the multiple-strand reasoning characteristic of the humanities, and is as much inductivist or abductionist as refutationist (section 6). Popper’s theories about Xenophanes are convincing; but even if Popperians would claim that Popper’s refutationism largely fits the natural sciences, his application of it to history is implausible, and conflicts with own practice (section 7). An appendix reflects on Popper’s interest in cultured refugees. (shrink)

Розглядається давньогрецьке поняття істини щодо мови та мовних контекстів. Істина представляється як металінгвістичний контекст, який породжує численні смислові об’єкти, що функціонують як семантичні поля. Аналізується уявлення про істину як семантичну структуру у зв’язку з особливостями використання поняття ἀλήθεια в античній філософії, пропонується програма дослідження поняття істини у давньогрецькій мові. Дослідження є першим наближенням до реконструкції алетіології давньогрецької філософії класичного періоду. Для цього передбачається розглянути поняття ἀλήθεια як семантичну домінанту або наддомінанту, за якою слідують її приватні локалізації. Необхідною складовою такого дослідження (...) є також систематизація та класифікація контекстів, у яких використовується дане поняття. Мова йде про контексти істини, або про саму істину як суму контекстів, у яких протікає життя людини. Тут істина може розглядатися, в одному випадку, як конгломерат, хаотичне поєднання розрізнених елементів або ж як система смислових зв’язків, що охоплюють різні області дискурсу, де природна мова виступає в якості першоджерела, матеріалу, мега-нарративу, вихідного для будь-якого можливого розгляду істини. (shrink)

More collaborative work in the humanities could be instrumental in helping to break down the traditional rigid boundaries between academic divisions and disciplines in modern universities. The value of the traditional model of the solitary humanities scholar or the collaborative science paradigm should not be discounted. However, increasing the use of collaborative and interdisciplinary research models in the humanities would promote new forms of scholarship and also help to create a better, more integral and inclusive world.

Those who have had the benefit of a reasonably lengthy familiarity with the philosophy of religion, and more particularly with the God question, may be so kind to a speaker long in exile from philosophy and only recently returned, as to subscribe, initially at least, to the following rather enormous generalization: meaning and truth, which to most propositions are the twin forces by which they are maintained, turn out in the case of claims about God, to be the centrifugal forces (...) by which they disintegrate. In simpler language, the greater the amount of intelligible meaning that can be given to the idea of God, the less grounds there would appear to be for assuming let alone asserting, that God exists, at least as a being distinguishable from all the things in this empirical world which are the source of the range of meanings available to us; on the other hand, the more we insist that God exists, a being over and above the things that make up this empirical world the less the amount of commonly available meaning we appear to be able to apply to God. Or, to put this in a manner which might obviate an obvious objection to it; either everything we know is tout ensemble, God, and then nothing in the world that we know is distinctively divine; or else nothing in this world is God, and then nothing that we appear to be able to know is God. That same formulation will work, it should be noted, even if we substitute for ‘things in the world’, ‘an aspect or aspects of things in the world’. (shrink)

In this article, it is argued that, although there is significant debate over the nature of Anaxagoras' response to Parmenides, it is likely that Anaxagoras advances his physical theory in opposition to Parmenides' Numerical Monism. It is unlikely that Anaxagoras aims to develop a theory that harmonizes with the Predicational Monism that is sometimes ascribed to Parmenides. In addition, it is argued that, although some modern scholars suggest that Anaxagoras posits nous as a planning cause, no compelling argument has yet (...) been advanced against Plato's interpretation, according to which Anaxagoras is not a proponent of teleological explanation. (shrink)

In this article, both Anaxagoras' theory of multiple worlds and the principles of his theory of matter are examined. It is argued that the five principles, which are set out explicitly in the extant fragments, (No Becoming, Indefinite Types, Universal Mixture, Predominance, and Infinite Divisibility) form a consistent set. Further, it is argued that the principle of Homoeomereity, which Anaxagoras attributes to Anaxagoras, is consistent with Anaxagoras' other principles and is likely to be a genuine principle of Anaxagoras' physics.

A Constructivist Foundation of the Objects of Scientific Empirical Theories. The following considerations are guided by the assumption that the objects of any scientific empirical theory are constructs as well as the theories themselves, the construction of these object-constructs being fundamentally dependent on the theories' functioning in the provision of practically relevant empirical explanations. The relevance of these explanations consists in their contribution to the improvement of at least one practical capacity through enabling the invention of at least one improving (...) kind of practical actions. In an excursus on the origination and the development of the notion of theory within human history the view is held, in contrast to Aristotle, that theorization has always aimed at practical relevance, however in a broader sense of "practical" than that in which Aristotle uses the term "πρακτικός", and that only the practical functions of theory-construction have changed over the times, and their object-constructs correspondingly. The latest form of theory with the above-mentioned function in the development of social practice is the scientific explanatory empirical theory with the descriptive empirical theory now no longer fulfilling a practical function of its own, but only a service-function of data acquisition for the explanatory theory. The object-constructs of strictly scientific empirical theories in the sense of explanatory theories for the improvement of practical capacities are here considered to be empirical quasi-actions, those of the dependent descriptive empirical theories either quasi-instruments or quasi-products or quasi-materials of the respective kind of quasi-actions of the explanatory theory. The empirical quasi-action is here conceived as the latest in a sequence of developing object-constructs that have resulted from different and successively more effective attempts at better survival of human beings and even from prehuman stages of evolution. The author envisages a differentiation of empirical quasi-actions into further sub-categories to provide the conceptual bases for the construction of objects of new kinds of scientific explanatory empirical theories that might become practically relevant for the improvement of new kinds of practical capacities to be preferably improved for the advancement of social practice: Beside the already relevant category of empirical processes (as I named it) are here proposed the further categories of empirical originations of meaning and of empirical originations of practical actions as conceptual bases for object-constructs of future scientific empirical theories. (shrink)

The hypothesis formulated by Usener and Diels that Theophrastus’ De sensibus is a crucial source of relevant sections of the Placita is insufficiently supported by the evidence. Of the fifteen Placita chapters dealing with sense perception and cognition, only a few are related to the treatise.

This paper focuses on a particular conception of embodied cognition to argue that this cognitive approach can be found in Empedocles in inchoate form. It is assumed that the defining features setting apart embodied cognition from the rest of the cognitive sciences are that the body: (a) significantly constrains the embodied agent’s cognitive skills, (b) regulates the coordination of action and cognition, and (c) serves an integral function in the transmission of cognitive data. Empedocles’ epistemological fragments are examined vis-à-vis these (...) specifications, and the conclusion is reached that Empedocles can safely be regarded as a distant precursor of embodied cognition. (shrink)

We discuss a number of fundamental aspects of modern cosmological concepts, from the phenomenological, observational, theoretical and epistemic points of view. We argue that the modern cosmology, despite a great advent, in particular in the observational sector, is yet to solve important problems, posed already by the classical times. In particular the stress is put on discerning the scientific features of modern cosmological paradigms from the more speculative ones, with the latter immersed in some aspects deeply into mythological world picture. (...) We finally discuss the principal paradigms, which are present in the modern cosmological studies and evaluate their epistemic merits. (shrink)

As a crucial source for Presocratic theories of sense perception, Theophrastus’ De sensibus deserves a closer scrutiny than the placement among A-fragments, as often suggested or instigated. This paper proposes to refine our terminology for labelling the varying quality of reporting within the A-fragments has. It supplements the existing criticism of Diels’ division by analysing neglected features. A reassessment of the assumptions underlying the terms ‘fragment’ and ‘paraphrase’ can contribute to dissolving the sharp distinction between A- and B-fragments in DK. (...) It advocates, not equality for A-fragments, but a more inclusive and accurate evaluation of the passages. (shrink)

Przedmiotem artykułu są teorie pierwszych ontologów greckich: Ksenofanesa, Parmenidesa i Melissosa na temat bytu, jego jedności i tożsamości, z uwzględnieniem niektórych poglądów Zenona. Naczelnym problemem artykułu jest pytanie o naturę relacji bytu względem świata u filozofów eleackich. Celem jest opis sposobu rozumienia tego powiązania, zaproponowanego przez każdego z nich. W rezultacie analiz porównawczych, opierając się na badaniu zachowanych fragmentów tekstów starożytnych, okazało się, że Ksenofanes jest autorem koncepcji Jedno-Boga tożsamego ze światem, zaś Parmenides sformułował oryginalną teorię bytu transcendującego świat cielesny, (...) ale stanowiącego jego rację tożsamości jako całości. Przedstawiona w artykule interpretacja poglądów Parmenidesa stanowi ujęcie odmienne od powszechnie przyjmowanego. Melissos natomiast wykorzystując Parmenidejski sposób rozumienia bytu jako czegoś jednego umieszcza go w świecie. Zbliża to poglądy Melissosa do poglądów Ksenofanesa. Każda z tych teorii nastręcza jednak wielu problemów interpretacyjnych, wynikających przede wszystkim z niewielkiej ilości tekstów źródłowych. ------------------------- Zgłoszono: 06/11/2022. Zrecenzowano: 13/12/2022. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 20/12/2022. (shrink)

The most contentious issue in current debates about human enhancement is whether it properly belongs to human aspiration to outstrip our human ceiling in cognition and longevity so radically that the result would not be improved human beings but instead "posthumans." Transhumanists answer strongly in the affirmative and hence vigorously support our directing available and foreseeable technologies to that end. According to Nick Bostrom, transhumanism is "an outgrowth of secular humanism and the Enlightenment." Our "ceasing to be human is [not] (...) in any way problematic" as long as we are "replaced by something better".Of the two main lines of technological approach that... (shrink)

Empedocles’ B100 contains an analogy between a girl handling a clepsydra and respiration. This article argues that proposals to establish Love or Persephone as the girl’s respiratory equivalent are rendered unlikely by differences between their respective causal roles. Rather than her gender, this article emphasises the importance of the girl’s age: Empedocles required a playful child to handle the clepsydra. This child’s play results in the extra phase of submerging the clepsydra while the upper vent is open, which Empedocles needed (...) to form a parallel for the first static phase of respiration. (shrink)

On those occasions on which one gives an interpretation of a work both scanty in remains and obscure in meaning I would take it to be appropriate to insist that one's task is not to argue that one's interpretation is certainly correct but rather to argue that it is probably correct. It is accordingly not my task to argue that it is not possible that other interpretations of Parmenides’ Way of Truth are correct. Nor do I increase the likelihood of (...) my own by decreasing that of theirs.I seek to give an interpretation which is rich enough to disclose the springs of monism. I am primarily concerned to show how we may understand those arguments which leave us with the conclusion that there is only one thing to know. (shrink)

In a recent discussion note1 C. D. C. Reeve investigates the reasons for Heraclitus assigning a primary position to fire, as contrasted with the other substances like earth and water which go to make up the physical universe. Reeve considers and rejects other reasons for the primacy of fire that have been put forward, such as the symbolic associations of fire, the role of fire in governing the universe, or the claim that everything becomes fire at some time or other. (...) Rather, Reeve argues, the primacy of fire in Heraclitus' physical theory can be explained purely in terms of that physical theory. (shrink)

According to the influential Plato-Aristotle account, Parmenides advocates holistic monism (‘all things are one’), and Xenophanes anticipated him by advocating some version of monotheism. Over the last half-century or so, Parmenides studies have disputed this vulgate by arguing that Parmenides’ focus is on the nature of ‘what is’ (to eon), rather than on ‘the One’. Correspondingly, there has developed a tendency to minimize the philosophical importance of Xenophanes, by viewing him primarily as a reformer of Greek religious beliefs and as (...) social critic. I argue that a close study of Xenophanes shows that he had developed a coherent naturalist or physicalist world-view. And this also allows us to gain deeper insights into Parmenides, by viewing the latter as generalizing Xenophanes’ critique of peculiarly ‘anthropist’ (or anthropomorphist) bias in our approach to the universe.Dedication: to Dan Graham. (shrink)

The paper deals with the mythological background for the philosophical concept of being. Against this background the early development of this concept and its conditions are shown. Also, some attention will be paid to certain linguistic aspect behind this process.