This is a prepublication version of my book Objects and Attitudes. The book develops a novel semantics of attitude reports, modal sentences, and quotation based on the view that sentences semantically act as predicates of various attitudinal and modal objects, entities like claims, requests, promises, obligations, and permissions, rather than standing for abstract propositions playing the role of objects. The approach develops truthmaker semantics for attitudinal and modal objects and has a wide range of applications to issues in philosophy of (...) language, semantics, and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This thesis focuses on the evolution of human social norm psychology. More precisely, I want to show how the emergence of our distinctive capacity to follow social norms and make social normative judgments is connected to the lineage explanation of our capacity to form shared intentions, and how such capacity is related to a diverse cluster of prototypical moral judgments. I argue that in explaining the evolution of this form of normative cognition we also require an understanding of the developmental (...) trajectory of this capacity. For this purpose, the thesis is organized as follow. In the first chapter, I make some methodological remarks and provide the general overview and plan for the dissertation. In the second chapter, I explain what my explanatory target is and why it matters. On the view I am defending, shared intentional psychology gives rise to a special form of psychology that enables us to engage in social normative thinking. These norms are represented as shared intentional states. Moral psychology, in contrast, is more diverse. For moral judgments define a quite heterogeneous class of mental states—although some moral judgments may involve the representation and execution of norms, certainly not all of them do. I show that although much of our distinctive social norm psychology can be explained within the framework of shared intentionality, moral judgments cannot be unified in the same way. In the third chapter, I provide the baseline of social-cognitive capacities that serve as starting point for my lineage explanation. I argue that hominin social cognition was for a very long period of our evolutionary history essentially a matter of low-level cognitive and motivational processes. On this picture, bottom-up affective processes regulated the social lives of early hominins without requiring any special top-down mechanism of normative thinking such as a capacity for understanding and representing social norms. In the fourth chapter, I argue that human-like social norm psychology evolved as a result of the selective pressures that gave rise to shared intentionality, especially the demands that came from collective hunting. Yet collective hunting was not the whole story of the evolution of shared intentionality, for our capacity to form shared intentional mental states emerged from the interplay between the selective pressures that led to cooperative breeding in humans as well as organized, goal-oriented, collective hunting. Thus, I propose an evo-devo account of shared intentionality and its normative dimension since I argue that explaining the evolution of this particular form of normative thinking crucially depends on information about the developmental trajectory of this capacity. Finally, in the fifth chapter, I focus on how social norms are acquired and how the way we learn them gives rise to some prototypical cluster of moral judgments. Thus, this chapter returns to some of themes and arguments of the first chapter by explaining how the distinction between moral judgments and nonmoral judgments can be culturally transmitted. (shrink)

To explain the phenomenon that certain English verbs resist passivization, Pinker proposed a semantic constraint on the passive in the adult grammar: The greater the extent to which a verb denotes an action where a patient is affected or acted upon, the greater the extent to which it is compatible with the passive. However, a number of comprehension and production priming studies have cast doubt upon this claim, finding no difference between highly affecting agent-patient/theme-experiencer passives and non-actional experiencer theme passives. (...) The present study provides evidence that a semantic constraint is psychologically real, and is readily observed when more fine-grained independent and dependent measures are used. We conclude that a semantic constraint on the passive must be incorporated into accounts of the adult grammar. (shrink)

In this thesis, I aim to motivate a particular philosophy of mathematics characterised by the following three claims. First, mathematical sentences are generally speaking false because mathematical objects do not exist. Second, people typically use mathematical sentences to communicate content that does not imply the existence of mathematical objects. Finally, in using mathematical language in this way, speakers are not doing anything out of the ordinary: they are performing straightforward assertions. In Part I, I argue that the role played by (...) mathematics in our scientific explanations is a purely expressive one, merely allowing us to say more about the physical world than we would otherwise be able to. Mathematical objects do not need to exist for mathematics to play this role. This proposal puts a normative constraint on our use of mathematical language: we ought to use mathematically presented theories to express belief only in the consequences they have for non-mathematical things. In Part II, I will argue that what the normative proposal recommends is in fact what people generally do in both pure and applied mathematical contexts. I motivate this claim by showing that it is predicted by our best general means of analysing natural language. I provide a semantic theory of applied arithmetical sentences that reveals they do not purport to refer to numbers, as well as a pragmatic theory for pure mathematical language use which reveals that pure mathematical utterances do not typically communicate content that implies the existence of mathematical objects. In conclusion, I show that the emerging hermeneutic fictionalist position is preferable to any alternative interpretation of mathematical discourse as aimed at describing a domain of independently existing abstract mathematical objects. (shrink)

This book sets out the foundations, methodology, and practice of a formal framework for the description of language. The approach embraces the trends of lexicalism and compositional semantics in computational linguistics, and theoretical linguistics more broadly, by developing categorial grammar into a powerful and extendable logic of signs. Taking Montague Grammar as its point of departure, the book explains how integration of methods from philosophy (logical semantics), computer science (type theory), linguistics (categorial grammar) and meta-mathematics (mathematical logic ) provides a (...) categorial foundation with coverage including intensionality, quantification, featural polymorphism, domains and constraints. For the first time, the book systematises categorial thinking into a unified program which is at once both logically secured, and a practical tool for pure lexical grammar development with type-theoretic semantics. It should be of interest to all those active in computational linguistics and formal grammar and is suitable for use at advanced undergraduate, postgraduate, and research levels. (shrink)

In a synesthetic metaphor, a certain perceptual mode is initially specified, but the imagery is linguistically related in terms belonging to one or more differing perceptual modes. Commonplace examples of synesthetic metaphors in English include phrases such as "loud colors", "dark sounds", and "sweet smells". Tabulations of the frequency of types of synesthesia and synesthetic metaphors in English reveals that for physiological synesthesia, colored sounds are most common; in English literature, synesthetic metaphors employed for descriptions of tactile sound predominate. Of (...) the various senses, hearing is most frequently expanded and elaborated upon by both synesthetic sensory perceptions and synesthetic metaphors. Synesthetic "visual hearing", which antedates language, may have influenced language development. (shrink)

La discusión acerca de funciones es de larga data en filosofía. Normalmente se describe a la revolución científica del siglo XVII como eliminando las causas finales y la teleología de la física. Sin embargo, el lenguaje funcional cumple un papel central en ciertas áreas de la práctica biológica. Esto ha llevado a muchos filósofos a intentar elucidar el concepto de función, en algunos casos para defender la relevancia de estos usos, en otros para mostrar que se trata de meras formas (...) de hablar que podrían ser eliminadas sin pérdida de ningún tipo de información relevante. El objetivo principal de este trabajo es mostrar la necesidad de apelar a conceptos funcionales para una reconstrucción adecuada de la teoría de la selección natural darwiniana. Pues, se utiliza lenguaje funcional en la conceptualización del campo de aplicación de esta teoría, y tal campo debe ser determinable con independencia la teoría de la selección natural. (shrink)

We examine several cases of object movement from various languages, and demonstrate that the syntactic behavior of objects can be derived from certain conditions on LF representations. Conditions on LF relevant to the distribution of arguments are identified as relative scope fixing and type mismatch repair. These two conditions interact with the multiple semantic types that may be assigned to NPs (cf. Partee 1987) to induce movement of certain objects out of the VP, universally by LF and parametrically in the (...) overt syntax. Diesing's (1992b) Mapping Hypothesis combined with the multiple NP types predicts that quantificational NPs in object position will have to undergo movement by LF. This movement is forced by the principles of semantic composition as a mechanism of type mismatch resolution. The existential closure operation over VP is claimed to be genuinely unselective: any NP that introduces a free variable and does not receive an existential interpretation must move out of the scope of existential closure (and thus out of the VP) by LF. Pronouns are variables, limited in semantic type assignment, that by virtue of their definiteness cannot be bound by existential closure and must move out of its scope. In Egyptian Arabic, object pronouns escape from the VP via attachment to a verb that raises to adjoin to an Aspect inflectional head above the VP. The movement of object pronouns and definite/specific NPs in Scandinavian is also associated with verb movement. (shrink)

The proponents of strong lexicalism hold the view that “words” are formed in the lexicon and are opaque for the syntax ((Dowty 1979), (DiSciullo and Williams 1987), (Jackendoff 1990) and many others). Modular morphology, on the other hand, offers the possibility that at least some words are partially formed in the syntax ((Baker 1988), (Borer 1988), (Hale and Keyser 1994), (Chomsky 1995) and many others). In (Stechow 1995) and (Stechow 1996) it has been argued that facts observed with German wieder (...) “again” cannot be accounted for within the framework of strong lexicalism and therefore favour the second position. The authors of this paper want to check these claims by investigating the behaviour of the German adverb fast “ almost”, the other classical adverb to which the method of decomposition has been applied in the linguistic literature (cf. (McCawley 1971)). Most adverbs cannot look into lexical decomposition structures, but some can. In order to have a suitable name, let us call these D-adverbs. Again and almost are the prototypical representatives of this class. The method adopted is to investigate whether fast has access to different aspects of verbal meaning depending on its position. Following (Dowty 1979), resultative verbs and prepositions are decomposed into BECOME + XP, where XP is the result state. Agentive verbs contain an additional AGENT part. Other thematic relations connecting the subject and the event are HOLDER and cause. If the syntax tells us that an adverb like wieder or fast must have wide scope with respect to BECOME, then we expect other readings than in a configuration where fast can have narrow scope with respect to BECOME. In other words, the motivation for decomposition is syntactic and semantic. The idea is that certain function projections in the classical VP have a meaning and hence scopally interact with adverbs. (shrink)

Ways of Scope Taking is concerned with syntactic, semantic and computational aspects of scope. Its starting point is the well-known but often neglected fact that different types of quantifiers interact differently with each other and other operators. The theoretical examination of significant bodies of data, both old and novel, leads to two central claims. (1) Scope is a by-product of a set of distinct Logical Form processes; each quantifier participates in those that suit its particular features. (2) Scope interaction is (...) further constrained by the semantics of the interacting operators. The arguments are developed using Minimalist syntax, Generalized Quantify theory, Discourse Representation Theory, and algebraic semantics. The contributors (Beghelli, Ben-Shalom, Doetjes, Farkas, Gutiérrez Rexach, Honcoop, Stabler, Stowell, Szabolcsi and Zwarts) make tightly related theoretical assumptions and focus on related empirical phenomena, which include the direct and inverse scope of quantifiers, distributivity, negation, modal and intensional contexts, weak islands, event-related readings, interrogatives, wh/quantifier interactions, and Hungarian syntax. An introduction to the formal semantics background is provided. Audience: Linguists, philosophers, computational and psycholinguists; advanced undergraduates, graduate students and researchers in these fields. (shrink)

Ergative languages make up a substantial percentage of the world’s languages. They have a case system which distinguishes the subject of a transitive verb from that of an intransitive, grouping the latter with the object — that is, the object of a transitive verb and the subject of an intransitive verb are in the same case, which we refer to as the nominative. However, ergative languages differ from one another in important ways. In Greenlandic Eskimo the nominative, whether it is (...) a subject or an object, is syntactically prominent in the clause, much like a subject in English; but in Warlpiri, the nominative is not prominent, more like an object. The variable prominence of the nominative manifests itself as well in the semantics, e.g., default scope of indefinite and quantified nominals. Using data from Greenlandic Eskimo and Warlpiri, and from Hindi, which represents a split ergative system, this paper develops a general theory of case which explains the observed differences amongst ergative languages. In addition, the theory is designed to account for the accusative language type, represented by English. (shrink)

We analyze Case in terms of independent constraints on syntactic structures — namely, the Projection Principle (inherent Case), the ECP (marked structural Case), and the theory of extended projections (the nominative, a Caseless nominal projection). The resulting theory accounts for (1) the government constraint on Case assignment, (2) all major Case systems (accusative, ergative, active, three-way, and split), (3) Case alternations (passive, antipassive, and ECM), and (4) the Case of nominal possessors. Structural Case may correlate with pronominal agreement because the (...) former can, and the latter must, involve antecedent-government by a functional head. However, neither phenomenon implies the other. (shrink)

Using a version of situation semantics, this article argues that bare and complex demonstratives are interpreted as individual concepts.

Principles of communication allow the listener to infer (upon hearing (1) that unless the speaker believed that (1alt) were false, the speaker would have uttered (1alt).

It is well known that in certain environments the scope of a moved quantifier phrase can be determined at either its pre-movement position (“scope reconstruction”) or its postmovement position (“surface scope”). Thus the familiar ambiguity of (1) results from two choices for the scope of the moved QP. Under scope reconstruction, the scope of the moved existential QP is the sister of the pre-movement position (i.e. the sister of t, [to win the lottery]), while under surface scope it is the (...) sister of the post-movement position (i.e. [is likely t to win the lottery]). The two scope possibilities yield different semantic interpretations, corresponding to the paraphrases in (2). (1) Someone from New York is likely t to win the lottery (2) a. It is likely that there will be someone from New York who wins the lottery.. (shrink)

Along with many other languages, English has a relatively straightforward grammatical distinction between mass-occurrences of nouns and their countoccurrences. As the mass-count distinction, in my view, is best drawn between occurrences of expressions, rather than expressions themselves, it becomes important that there be some rule-governed way of classifying a given noun-occurrence into mass or count. The project of classifying noun-occurrences is the topic of Section II of this paper. Section III, the remainder of the paper, concerns the semantic differences between (...) nouns in their mass-occurrences and those in their count-occurrences. As both the name view and the mixed view are, in my opinion, subject to serious difficulties discussed in Section III.1,I defend a version of the predicate view. Traditionally, nouns in their singular count-occurrences are also analyzed as playing the semantic role of a predicate. How, then, does the predicate view preserve the intuitive difference between nouns in their mass- and those in their count-occurrences? I suggest, in Section III.2, that there are different kinds of predicates: mass-predicates, e.g. ‘is hair’, singular count-predicates, e.g. ‘is a hair’, and plural count-predicates, e.g. ‘are hairs’. Mass-predicates and count-predicates, in my view, are not reducible to each other. The remainder of Section III takes a closer look at the differences and interrelations between these different kinds of predicates. Mass-predicates and count-predicates differ from each other truth-conditionally, and these truth-conditional differences turn out to have interesting implications, in particular concerning the part-whole relation and our practices of counting. But mass- and count-predicates are also related to each other through systematic entailment relations; these entailment relations are examined in Section III.4. (shrink)

Suppose that one adopts a broadly Chomskyan perspective, in which there is a distinction between the language faculty and other cognitive faculties, including what Chomsky has recently called the “Conceptual-Intensional system”. Then there must in principle be at least three stages in this association that need to be understood. First, there is the nonlinguistic stage of conceptualizing a particular event.1 For example, while all of the participants in an event may be affected by the event in some way or another, (...) human cognizers typically focus on one or the other of those changes as being particularly salient or relevant to their interests. This participant is taken to be the “theme” or “patient” of the event, perhaps in some kind of nonlinguistic conceptual representation, such as the one developed by Jackendoff (1983, 1990b). Second, this conceptual/thematic representation is associated with a linguistic representation in which the entity seen as the patient of the event is represented as (say) an NP that is the direct object of the verb that expresses what kind of an event it was. This is the interface between language and the conceptual system. Finally, there is the possibility of adjusting this representation internally to the language system, by way of movements, chain formations, Case assignment processes, or whatever other purely syntactic processes there may be. For example, the NP that represents the theme and starts out as the direct object of the verb may become the subject if there is no other subject in the linguistic representation, either because there was no agent in the conceptual representation (as with an unaccusative verb), or because it was suppressed (as with a passive verb). (shrink)

This paper proposes a social account for the origin of the truth value and the emergence of the first declarative sentence. Such a proposal is based on two assumptions. The first is known as the social intelligence hypothesis: that the cognitive evolution of humans is first and foremost an adaptation to social demands. The second is the function-first approach to explaining the evolution of traits: before a prototype of a new trait develops and the adaptation process begins, something already existing (...) is used for a new purpose. Applied to the emergence of declarative sentences, this suggests something already existing—natural signs (which have a logical or causal relation to what they denote)—were used for the declarative function and thereby integrated (in the form of indexical objects implying a past action) into communication. I show that the display of an indexical object (such as the display of hunting trophies) can imply a conceptual structure similar to that informing the syntax of sentences. The view developed in this paper is broadly consistent with the argumentative theory of Mercier and Sperber, which suggests that reasoning is less adapted to decision making than to social purposes such as winning disputes or justifying one’s actions. In this paper I extend this view to the origin of the concept of truth. According to my proposal, the first declarative sentence (articulated in a simple sign language) emerged as a negation of a negation of an implicit statement expressed by the display of an indexical object referring to a past action. Thereby, I suggest that the binary structure of the truth value underlying any declarative sentence is founded on disagreements based on conflicts of interest. Thus, I deny that the concept of truth could have evolved for instrumental reasons such as solving problems, or through self-questioning about what one ought to believe. (shrink)

This book combines insights from philosophy and linguistics to develop a novel framework for theorizing about linguistic meaning and the role of context in interpretation. A key innovation is to introduce explicit representations of context — assignment variables — in the syntax and semantics of natural language. The proposed theory systematizes a spectrum of “shifting” phenomena in which the context relevant for interpreting certain expressions depends on features of the linguistic environment. Central applications include local and nonlocal contextual dependencies with (...) quantifiers, attitude ascriptions, conditionals, questions, and relativization. The result is an innovative, philosophically informed compositional semantics compatible with the truth-conditional paradigm. (shrink)

‘The following sentence is true only if numbers exist: The number of planets is eight. It is true; hence, numbers exist.’ So runs a familiar argument for realism about mathematical objects. But this argument relies on a controversial semantic thesis: that ‘The number of planets’ and ‘eight’ are singular terms standing for the number eight, and the copula expresses identity. This is the ‘Fregean analysis’.I show that the Fregean analysis is false by providing an analysis of sentences such as that (...) best explains the available linguistic data, and according to which no terms in purport to stand for numbers. (shrink)

This paper provides a new argument for the raising analysis of relative clauses. This argument is based on the observation that certain adjectival modifiers on the head of a relative clause can be interpreted in positions internal to the relative clause. It is shown that the raising analysis of relative clauses is able to generate the readings corresponding to the relative clause internal interpretation of adjectival modifiers and that two competing analyses of relative clauses, the matching analysis and the head (...) external analysis, are not able to do so. (shrink)

This paper concerns the question whether reflexives can have strict readings in VP-ellipsis. It is argued that the possibility for strict interpretation is determined by a syntactic factor: subordination of the elided clause relative to the antecedent clause facilitates strict interpretation, whereas coordination disfavors it. This contrast is shown to be predictable by theories of syntactic reconstruction which assume that a surface reflexive corresponds to a bound variable at the point of ellipsis reconstruction, and where the binder has scope over (...) a subordinated ellipsis but not over a coordinated ellipsis. One possibility is that the binder is the reflexive itself, moved at LF. A further factor, namely the possibility of speakers reinterpreting the ellipsis as a deep anaphor, accounts for why strict readings are in fact weakly acceptable in coordinated ellipsis. Previous accounts of ellipsis and reflexives are evaluated in light of the new data. (shrink)

This paper investigates the structure of English restrictive relative clauses. It provides support for the view that restrictive relative clauses are structurally ambiguous between two structures: the head-internal, raising structure and the matching structure, which has both an internal and an external head. We present a new test from extraposition facts that distinguishes between the raising and matching structures for relative clauses. Furthermore, this paper presents an account of the semantics of raising relative clauses which is intended to complete the (...) picture of the semantics of relative clauses. In particular, we argue that raising relative clauses are not islands for Quantifier Raising (QR) and that in these clauses there is successive cyclic movement through a CP-adjoined position. (shrink)

The possibility of extraction across awh-island is usually assumed to be dependent on whether or not the constituent in question can undergo “long” (i.e., nonlocal) Ā-movement across the island. However, the question of how to make a principled distinction between those elements which can violate locality and those which cannot is still rather controversial. I will propose that there are no well-formed locality violations in these cases, and that the grammaticality patterns observed derive from a semantic filter on the escape (...) hatch used to bypass the island. In other words, if a phrase is extracted across awh-island, it must adjoin to the island in order to get by. This adjunction site is restricted by the interpretive component: only traces which are interpreted as variables of typee can occur in this position, while higher-order variables are not allowed. This restriction is shown to capture the known facts aboutwh-island violations, as well as some less known phenomena, such as the absence of functional (and pair-list) readings acrosswh-islands. (shrink)

This paper gives an analysis of the Chinese distributivity marker dou 'all', which can occur not only with definite plural NPs but also with NPs whose determiner is a quantifier word such as mei 'every' or dabufen-de 'most'. Besides normal distributive predicates, it can also occur with certain types of collective predicates. The difficulties of giving a compositional interpretation to constructions of these kinds are discussed in detail. I show that we can solve those difficulties if we treat dou as (...) a generalized distributivity marker in the sense of Schwarzschild (1991, 1996), which distributes over the members of a plurality cover. Apart from the above topic, which is more narrowly a semantics topic, this paper also discusses some syntax-semantics interface issues related to the distribution of dou's associates. (shrink)

This squib presents two puzzles related to an ambiguity found in for-infinitival relative clauses (FIRs). FIRs invariably receive a modal interpretation even in the absence of any overt modal verb. The modal interpretation seems to come in two distinct types, which can be paraphrased by finite relative clauses employing the modal auxiliaries should and could. The two puzzles presented here arise because the availability of the two readings is constrained by factors that are not otherwise known to affect the interpretation (...) of a relative clause. Specifically, we show, first, that “strong” determiners require the FIR to be interpreted as a SHOULD-relative while “weak” determiners allow both interpretations (the Determiner-Modal Generalization). Secondly, we observe that the COULD-interpretation requires a raising (internally headed) structure for the FIR, while the SHOULD-interpretation is compatible with either a raising or a more standard matching (externally headed) structure (the Raising/Matching Generalization). (shrink)

An interesting asymmetry in syntactic change is that OV base order is commonly replaced by VO, whereas the reverse development is quite rare in languages.1 A shift to VO has taken place in several branches of the Indo-European family, as well as in Finno-Ugric. The Germanic languages conform to this trend in that the original OV order seen in its older representatives, and (in more rigid form) in modern German, Dutch, and Frisian, has given way to a consistently head-initial syntax (...) in English, Scandinavian, and Yiddish. (shrink)

The availability in universal grammar of two separate copulas of predication & identity is supported by an analysis of pseudoclefts in Welsh. A single-copula analysis of the ambiguity between predicational & specificational interpretations of pseudoclefts in English cannot be extended to Welsh, where specificational interpretation (1) is permitted by only one of three copular paradigms, all of which may have a predicational interpretation, & (2) is possible with both of the D-structures used in the single-copula analysis to distinguish between the (...) two interpretations in English. It is argued that the differences between English & Welsh with respect to the interpretation of copular constructions can only be explained by positing a dual-copula analysis for Welsh & a single-copula one for English; the data confirm the existence of a type-shifting functor in English that is realized lexically as a copula in Welsh. 47 References. J. Hitchcock. (shrink)

The arguments for LF Pied-Piping given by Nishigauchi and others are represented. It is shown that Nishigauchi's semantics for pied-piped phrases gives the wrong meaning for interrogatives. We argue that none of the arguments for LF Pied-Piping is tenable and most of the arguments against the traditional approach (unbounded wh-movement at LF) do not stand up to scrutiny. However, some data turn out to be problematic for the traditional account. The alternative considered here involves pied-piping at an intermediate level between (...) S-structure and LF. It is called WH-structure and is followed by reconstruction at LF. This proposal will combine the essential insights of Nishigauchi's idea and have all its advantages over the traditional view, without running into the problems of his approach. (shrink)

It has been suggested that hierarchically structured symbols, a remarkable feature of human language, are produced via the operation of recursive combination. Recursive combination is frequently observed in human behavior, not only in language but also in action sequences, mind-reading, technology, et cetera.; in contrast, it is rarely observed in animals. Why is it that only humans use this operation? What is the adaptability of recursive combination? We aim (1) to identify the environmental feature(s) in which recursive combination is effective (...) for survival and reproduction, and that has facilitated the evolution of this ability, and (2) to demonstrate the possible evolutionary processes of recursive combination. To achieve this, we constructed an evolutionary simulation of agents that generated products using recursive combination and used the results to explore the types of fitness functions (that reflect the kinds of adaptive environments) that give rise to this ability. We identified two types of adaptability of the recursive combination: (1) diversifiability of production and (2) diversifiability of products. Through the former, recursive combination promotes robustness against failure of production caused by inaccurate manipulations or irreversible changes. In an environment in which diversified products are preferable, sharing a portion of the production process for these products entails producing multiple products in which recursive combination plays a key role. We suppose that recursive combination works as a driving force of material culture. Finally, we discuss the possible evolutionary scenarios of recursive combination that is later generalized to encompass many aspects of human cognition, including human language. (shrink)

Since the inception of the Minimalist Program, Noam Chomsky has increasingly pushed the boundaries of a minimalist conception of grammar, one that pares the mechanisms specific to language down to the bare bones. In addition to the structure‐building operation of Merge, grammar involves some mechanism for feature interaction. Chomsky has explored several different varieties of a mechanism AGREE responsible for these kinds of feature interactions, for example feature matching, feature valuation, and feature movement, as discussed in this chapter. The Minimalist (...) Program leads to the question of whether Merge could be sufficient for narrow syntax. Actual implementations of even simple grammatical descriptions of real natural languages always appear to require more than Merge, but this chapter explores some of the ways in which various different mechanisms might be reduced to Merge, in the spirit of the Minimalist Program. (shrink)

This paper argues that parts of the lexical content of an A-bar moved phrase must be interpreted in the base position of movement. The argument is based on a study of deletion of a phrase that contains the base position of movement. I show that deletion licensing is sensitive to the content of the moved phrase. In this way, I corroborate and extend conclusions based on Condition C reconstruction by N. Chomsky and D. Fox. My result provides semantic evidence for (...) the existence of traces and gives semantic content to the A/A-bar distinction. (shrink)

In this essay I will explore the syntactic expression of the notion ‘clause’ by focusing on some syntactic and semantic properties of bare infinitive (BI) complements to perception verbs in English. I shall argue briefly that perception BI complements must be clausal, and then turn in more detail to the issue of what sort of clause the BI complement must be. It will be established that the categorical nature of the perception BI complement as IP or VP is contingent on (...) selectional properties of the perception verb, properties which may be contextually influenced by modality and negation. More specifically, an interpretative distinction between ‘vision’ and ‘non-vision’see first suggested by Napoli (1988) will be shown, contrary to her proposal, to provide the key to the contrast in the selection of clausal types. The IP/VP distinction will be shown to correlate with the viability of interpretations for the BI clause that are ‘temporally independent’ of the matrix clause. Given the IP/VP distinction, it will be demonstrated further that the peculiarly limited distribution of the expletive formativethere in BI complements may be predicted from independently motivated syntactic principles that determine clausal structure. (shrink)

In the framework of the minimalist program, the assumption that wh-in-situ move covertly to be assigned wide scope is infeasible. Rather, it is assumed that they must be interpretable in situ, and that syntactic conditions like ‘superiority’ are effects of economy, which restricts overt rather than covert movement of a wh-element. The remaining syntactic problem for this line of reasoning is the putative ECP effects of adverbial wh-adjuncts, which were the strongest evidence for covert movement. A serious semantic problem is (...) that the interpretative procedures which have been proposed for wh-in-situ – unselective binding or absorption – fail to capture correctly their interpretation. I will argue first that both problems are solved if the interpretation in situ employs choice functions, and it is the function variable, rather than an individual variable, which is long-distance bound by the question existential operator. Adverbial adjuncts, which cannot be interpreted via choice functions, cannot, therefore, be interpreted in situ. However, the concept of economy underlying the account of overt superiority effects requires both theoretical and empirical clarification (as it leaves some empirical problems unaddressed). I argue, following a proposal by Golan (1993), that in this case the economy considerations apply at the interface (‘interface economy’) and that they consider not only different derivations out of the same numeration, but also their semantic representation. (shrink)

This paper examines the stage-level/individual-level hypothesis (Kratzer 1989; Diesing 1988) from the point of view of modern Scottish Gaelic. This language exhibits two syntactically distinct predicational structures, and in particular, two distinct subject positions distinguishable on the basis of word order. While the distinction between the two positions can be shown to support the stage/individual-level hypothesis in one sense, the picture is muddied by the fact that many habitual or ‘characteristic’ sentences seem to be formed according to the stage-level subject (...) construction type.The solution proposed relies on two novel elements. First, it distinguishes the classical Davisonian event variable from the Kratzerian one hypothesized to be the hallmark of the stage-level sentence type. And secondly, it makes a strict logical separation between two types of generics: generics proper, which involve quantifying over an individual variable; and habituals, which only involve quantification over an event variable. These are represented by two distinct logical types which may nevertheless give rise to similar truth conditions in context.I show that the analysis can be made to account for tense interpretation, the scope of genericity, and the facts of syntactic complementation in Scottish Gaelic. To the extent that the solution is successful, it is evidence for a quite direct mapping between syntactic and semantic representations and for the important intuitions behind the initial Kratzer/Diesing stage vs. individual-level hypothesis. (shrink)

Like so many sciences, linguistics originated from philosophy's rib. It reached maturity and attained full independence only in the twentieth century (for example, it is a well-known fact that the first linguistics department in the UK was founded in 1944); though research which we would now classify as linguistic (especially leading to generalizations from comparing different languages) was certainly carried out much earlier. The relationship between philosophy and linguistics is perhaps reminiscent of that between an old-fashioned mother and her emancipated (...) daughter, and is certainly asymmetric. And though from philosophy's rib, empirical investigation methods have ensured that linguistics has evolved (just as in the case of the more famous rib) into something far from resembling the original piece of bone. Another side of the same asymmetry is that while linguistics focuses exclusively on language (or languages), for philosophy language seems less pervasive - philosophy of language being merely one branch among many. However, during the twentieth century this asymmetry was substantially diminished by the so called linguistic turn1, undergone by numerous philosophers – this turn was due to the realization that as language is the universal medium for our grasping and coping with the world, its study may provide the very key for all other philosophical disciplines. As for the working methods, we could perhaps picture the difference between a philosopher of language and a linguist by means of the following simile. Imagine two researchers both asked to investigate an unknown landscape. One hires a helicopter, acquires a birds-eye view of the whole landscape and draws a rough, but comprehensive map. The other takes a camera, a writing pad and various instruments, and walks around, taking pictures and making notes of the kinds of rocks, plants and animals which he finds. Whose way is the more reasonable? Well, one wants to say, neither, for they seem to be complementary.. (shrink)

This Perspective traces the evolution of certain central notions in the theory of Generative Grammar (GG). The founding documents of the field suggested a relation between the grammar, construed as recursively enumerating an infinite set of sentences, and the idealized native speaker that was essentially equivalent to the relation between a formal language (a set of well-formed formulas) and an automaton that recognizes strings as belonging to the language or not. But this early view was later abandoned, when the focus (...) of the field shifted to the grammar's strong generative capacity as recursive generation of hierarchically structured objects as opposed to strings. The grammar is now no longer seen as specifying a set of well-formed expressions and in fact necessarily constructs expressions of any degree of intuitive “acceptability.” The field of GG, however, has not sufficiently acknowledged the significance of this shift in perspective, as evidenced by the fact that (informal and experimentally-controlled) observations about string acceptability continue to be treated as bona fide data and generalizations for the theory of GG. The focus on strong generative capacity, it is argued, requires a new discussion of what constitutes valid empirical evidence for GG beyond observations pertaining to weak generation. (shrink)

This paper investigates how the distribution of negative polarity items can inform our understanding of the underlying semantic representation of constituent questions. It argues that the distribution of NPIs in questions is governed by the same logical properties that govern their distribution in declarative constructions. Building on an observation due to Guerzoni and Sharvit that strength of exhaustivity in questions correlates with the acceptability of NPIs, I propose a revision of the semantics of questions that can explain this link in (...) terms already familiar from the literature of negative polarity, namely the availability of a local downward entailing environment. I argue for a new theory of questions that takes strength of exhaustivity to be encoded internal to the question nucleus rather than in different answer-hood operators. This switch, while conceptually a simple move, has far-reaching consequences in the domain of questions. I also show how this new analysis can account for a host of issues related to NPIs, such as the subject–object asymmetry noted by Han and Siegel, the interaction between NPIs and high versus low wh-adjuncts, the varying acceptability of NPIs in the restrictor of which-phrases, and the contrast between weak and strong NPIs. (shrink)

In Basque, wh-movement can pied-pipe an entire clause. The surface syntax of clausal pied-piping structures suggests that their syntax and semantics should be similar to scope marking constructions as analyzed in the Indirect Dependency approach. However, data having to do with presupposition projection and the interpretation of how many-questions show that clausal pied-piping structures are actually more similar to their long-distance wh-movement counterparts than to scope marking constructions. I develop an analysis which takes into account these facts. Specifically, I show (...) that pied-piped clauses must reconstruct, which makes the correct prediction that clausal pied-piping, unlike long-distance wh-movement, is sensitive to negative islands. Finally, I propose that reconstruction is forced by a condition on the interpretation of traces. (shrink)

∗Thanks to J. C. Beall, Alex Byrne, Jason Decker, Tyler Doggett, Paul Elbourne, Adam Elga, Warren Goldfarb, Delia Graff, Richard Heck, Charles Parsons, Mark Richard, Susanna Siegel, Jason Stanley, Judith Thomson, Carol Voeller, Brian Weatherson, Ralph Wedgwood, Steve Yablo, Cheryl Zoll, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and discussions. Versions of this material were presented in my seminar at MIT in the Fall of 2000, and at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Parts of this paper also derive from (...) my comments on a paper of Scott Soames at the ‘Liars and Heaps’ conference at the University of Connecticut in the Fall of 2002. I am grateful for the help of these audiences, and especially to Prof. Soames. (shrink)