- Pictures, Plants, and Propositions.Alex Morgan - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):309-329.details
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Pictures, Plants, and Propositions.Alex Morgan - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):309-329.details
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Accounting for groups: the dynamics of intragroup deliberation.Julia Morley & J. McKenzie Alexander - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7957-7980.details
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Why beliefs are not dispositional stereotypes.Andrew Garford Moore & George Botterill - 2023 - Theoria 89 (4):483-494.details
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Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
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The reductionist ideal in cognitive psychology.Richard Montgomery - 1990 - Synthese 85 (November):279-314.details
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Why go for a computation-based approach to cognitive representation.Dimitri Coelho Mollo - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6875-6895.details
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Content Pragmatism Defended.Dimitri Coelho Mollo - 2017 - Topoi 39 (1):103-113.details
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Language as a cognitive tool.Marco Mirolli & Domenico Parisi - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (4):517-528.details
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The Conditions of Realism.Christian Miller - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:95-132.details
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Rule Following, Error Theory and Eliminativism.Alexander Miller - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):323-336.details
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Applying the causal theory of reference to intentional concepts.John Michael & Miles MacLeod - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (2):212-230.details
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The Methodologically Flawed Discussion about Deep Disagreement.Guido Melchior - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.details
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Interpretation and knowledge maximization.Aidan McGlynn - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):391-405.details
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Brain: Functionality, Dynamism and Intentionality.Pascual Martínez Freire - 2016 - Studia Poliana 18:13-26.details
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Saving psychological solipsism.J. Christopher Maloney - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 61 (March):267-83.details
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Arguments from reference and the worry about dependence.Ron Mallon - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 160-183.details
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Thought experiments and philosophical knowledge.Edouard Machery - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (3):191-214.details
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Précis of doing without concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.details
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Mental representation from the bottom up.Dan Lloyd - 1987 - Synthese 70 (January):23-78.details
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Formalism , Behavioral Realism and the Interdisciplinary Challenge in Sociological Theory.Omar Lizardo - 2009 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 39 (1):39-80.details
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David braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson, the philosophy of mind and cognition.Mary Litch - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (2):295-300.details
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O que é Behaviorismo sobre a mente?Filipe Lazzeri - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):249-277.details
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Boyle’s Reductive Occasionalism.Daniel Layman - 2019 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 1 (1):2.details
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The Conceptual Impossibility of Free Will Error Theory.Andrew J. Latham - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):99-120.details
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The persistence of the subjective in neuropsychopharmacology: observations of contemporary hallucinogen research.Nicolas Langlitz - 2010 - History of the Human Sciences 23 (1):37-57.details
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Inside Doubt: On the Non-Identity of the Theory of Mind and Propositional Attitude Psychology. [REVIEW]David Landy - 2005 - Minds and Machines 15 (3-4):399-414.details
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Evolutionary debunking: the Milvian Bridge destabilized.Christos Kyriacou - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2695-2713.details
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Are Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Self-Debunking?Christos Kyriacou - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1351-1366.details
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The Conscious Semiotic Mind.Piotr Konderak - 2017 - Studia Semiotyczne 31 (1):67-89.details
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Person as scientist, person as moralist.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.details
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Is folk psychology different?Jonathan Knowles - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (2):199-230.details
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Intentional action in folk psychology: An experimental investigation.Joshua Knobe - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (2):309-325.details
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Does intentional psychology need vindicating by cognitive science?Jonathan Knowles - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (3):347-377.details
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∈ : Formal concepts in a material world truthmaking and exemplification as types of determination.Philipp Keller - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Genevadetails
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The computational account of belief.Lawrence J. Kaye - 1994 - Erkenntnis 40 (2):137-53.details
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No Intentions in the Brain: A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Science of Intention.Annemarie Kalis - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.details
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Self-deception and the selectivity problem.Marko Jurjako - 2013 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):151-162.details
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Knowledge of Rules, Causal Systematicity, and the Language of Thought.Jürgen Schröder - 1998 - Synthese 117 (3):313 - 330.details
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Beliefs are Object-Attribute Associations of Varying Strength.Jonathan Jong - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (3):284-301.details
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Won’t Get Fooled Again: Wittgensteinian Philosophy and the Rhetoric of Empiricism.Russell P. Johnson - 2020 - Sophia 59 (2):345-363.details
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The Belief Illusion.J. Christopher Jenson - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):965-995.details
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Representing as Adapting.Benjamin Jarvis - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (1):17-39.details
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What is a cognitive ontology, anyway?Annelli Janssen, Colin Klein & Marc Slors - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (2):123-128.details
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Are there essential forms in the social domain?Ludger Jansen - 2023 - Ratio 36 (4):306-318.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Réponses à mes critiques.Pierre Jacob - 2007 - Philosophiques 34 (1):173-181.details
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In defense of folk psychology.Frank Jackson & Philip Pettit - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (1):31-54.details
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Hornsby and Baker on the physicalist orthodoxy.Frank Jackson - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):188-192.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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