- Autopoietic enactivism, phenomenology and the deep continuity between life and mind.Paulo De Jesus - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):265-289.details
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Sensorimotor Theory and Enactivism.Jan Degenaar & J. Kevin O’Regan - 2017 - Topoi 36 (3):393-407.details
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Productance physicalism and a posteriori necessity.Don Dedrick - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):28-29.details
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Orange laser beams are not illusory: The need for a plurality of “real” color ontologies.Lieven Decock & Jaap van Brakel - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):27-28.details
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True color only exists in the eye of the observer.Frans W. Cornelissen, Eli Brenner & Jeroen Smeets - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):26-27.details
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Enactive appraisal.Giovanna Colombetti - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (4):527-546.details
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Perceptual variation, realism, and relativization, or: How I learned to stop worrying and love variations in color vision.Jonathan Cohen - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):25-26.details
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Spreading the joy? Why the machinery of consciousness is (probably) still in the head.Andy Clark - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):963-993.details
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Ecological considerations support color physicalism.James J. Clark - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):24-25.details
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Introduction: when embodied cognition and sport psychology team-up.Massimiliano L. Cappuccio - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):213-225.details
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Color realism and color science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.details
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Color realism redux.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):52-59.details
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Dialogue in the making: emotional engagement with materials.Ingar Brinck & Vasudevi Reddy - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (1):23-45.details
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“Color realism” shows a subjectivist' mode of thinking.Michael H. Brill - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):23-24.details
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Perceptual objects may have nonphysical properties.Aaron Ben-Ze’ev - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-23.details
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The ideomotor recycling theory for language.Arnaud Badets - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39.details
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The lowest common denominator between species for teaching behaviors.Arnaud Badets & François Osiurak - 2015 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38.details
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Perceptual variation and access to colors.Edward Wilson Averill - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):22-22.details
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The lived, living, and behavioral sense of perception.Thomas Netland - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (2):409-433.details
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Distinguishing volumetric content from perceptual presence within a predictive processing framework.Sam Wilkinson - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):791-800.details
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Confusion of sensations and their physical correlates.Richard M. Warren - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):51-51.details
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Intercorporeity and the first-person plural in Merleau-Ponty.Philip J. Walsh - 2019 - Continental Philosophy Review 53 (1):21-47.details
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Autopoietic theory, enactivism, and their incommensurable marks of the cognitive.Mario Villalobos & Simón Palacios - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):71-87.details
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Beautiful red squares.Robert Van Gulick - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):50-51.details
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The extended mind argument against phenomenal intentionality.Cody Turner - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (4):747-774.details
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Color realism and color illusions.Dejan Todorovic - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):49-50.details
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Color: A vision scientist's perspective.Davida Y. Teller - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):48-49.details
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The mindsized mashup mind isn't supersized after all.Susan A. J. Stuart - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):174-183.details
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The structure of intentionality. Insights and challenges for enactivism.Pierre Steiner - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Not thinking about the same thing. Enactivism, pragmatism and intentionality.Pierre Steiner - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-24.details
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Modelling ourselves: what the free energy principle reveals about our implicit notions of representation.Matt Sims & Giovanni Pezzulo - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7801-7833.details
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Bodily skill and internal representation in sensorimotor perception.David Silverman - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1):157-173.details
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Experiencing organisms: from mineness to subject of experience.Tobias Schlicht - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2447-2474.details
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Surreptitious substitution.Barbara Saunders - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):47-48.details
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Reflectance-to-color mappings depend critically on spatial context.Michael E. Rudd - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):46-47.details
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Color as a factor analytic approximation to nature.Adam Reeves - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):46-46.details
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Coordinating with the future: The anticipatory nature of representation. [REVIEW]Giovanni Pezzulo - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (2):179-225.details
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Have Byrne & Hilbert answered Hardin's challenge?Adam Pautz - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):44-45.details
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How to Build a Robot that is Conscious and Feels.J. Kevin O’Regan - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):117-136.details
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Discussion of J. Kevin O’Regan’s “Why Red Doesn’t Sound Like a Bell: Understanding the Feel of Consciousness”.J. Kevin O’Regan & Ned Block - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):89-108.details
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Spatial position and perceived color of objects.Romi Nijhawan - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):43-44.details
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Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of 'corporality' and 'alerting capacity'.Erik Myin - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):369-387.details
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An account of color without a subject?Erik Myin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):42-43.details
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Clarifying the problem of color realism.Barry Maund - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):40-41.details
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Can a physicalist notion of color provide any insight into the nature of color perception?Rainer Mausfeld & Reinhard Niederée - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):41-42.details
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Color nominalism, pluralistic realism, and color science.Mohan Matthen - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):39-40.details
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Surface color perception in constrained environments.Laurence T. Maloney - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):38-39.details
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Embodiment, sociality, and the life shaping thesis.Michelle Maiese - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (2):353-374.details
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Color as a material, not an optical, property.Bruce J. MacLennan - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):37-38.details
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Hue magnitudes and revelation.John Kulvicki - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):36-37.details
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