Theories of epistemology make reference—via the perspective of an observer—to the structure of information transfer, which generates reality, of which the observer himself forms a part. It can be shown that any epistemological approach which implies the participation of tautological structural elements in the information transfer necessarily leads to an antinomy. Nevertheless, since the time of Aristotle the paradigm of mathematics—and thus tautological structure—has always been a hidden ingredient in the various concepts of knowledge acquisition or general theories of information (...) transfer. We hold that Darwin’s Evolutionary Theory is the first scientific theory which consistently presupposes a non-tautological structure for the information transfer and, at the same time, keeps it strictly distinct from the tautological metric of scientific observation. The consequences of this technique—namely the dissociation of information from intentionality—have not yet been fully drawn. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 9, Issue 2, pp 159 - 176 The purpose of this paper is the analysis of the Plotinian and Iamblichean reading of the Aristotelian theory of abstraction, and its relationship with the status of mathematical entities, as they were conceived within a Platonic model, according to which mathematical objects are ontological autonomous and separate.

The opening argument in the Metaphysics M.2 series targeting separate mathematical objects has been dismissed as flawed and half-hearted. Yet it makes a strong case for a point that is central to Aristotle’s broader critique of Platonist views: if we posit distinct substances to explain the properties of sensible objects, we become committed to an embarrassingly prodigious ontology. There is also something to be learned from the argument about Aristotle’s own criteria for a theory of mathematical objects. I hope to (...) persuade readers of Metaphysics M.2 that Aristotle is a more thoughtful critic than he is often taken to be. (shrink)

Drawing on recent scholarship and delving systematically into Iamblichean texts, these ten papers establish Iamblichus as the great innovator of Neoplatonic philosophy who broadened its appeal for future generations of philosophers.

This book investigates Aristotle’s views on abstraction and explores how he uses it. In this work, the author follows Aristotle in focusing on the scientific detail first and then approaches the metaphysical claims, and so creates a reconstructed theory that explains many puzzles of Aristotle’s thought. Understanding the details of his theory of relations and abstraction further illuminates his theory of universals. Some of the features of Aristotle’s theory of abstraction developed in this book include: abstraction is a relation; perception (...) and knowledge are types of abstraction; the objects generated by abstractions are relata which can serve as subjects in their own right, whereupon they can appear as items in other categories. The author goes on to look at how Aristotle distinguishes the concrete from the abstract paronym, how induction is a type of abstraction which typically moves from the perceived individuals to universals and how Aristotle’s metaphysical vocabulary is "relational.’ Beyond those features, this work also looks at how of universals, accidents, forms, causes and potentialities have being only as abstract aspects of individual substances. An individual substance is identical to its essence; the essence has universal features but is the singularity making the individual substance what it is. These theories are expounded within this book. One main attraction in working out the details of Aristotle’s views on abstraction lies in understanding his metaphysics of universals as abstract objects. This work reclaims past ground as the main philosophical tradition of abstraction has been ignored in recent times. It gives a modern version of the medieval doctrine of the threefold distinction of essence, made famous by the Islamic philosopher, Avicenna. (shrink)

In the present article, we consider the question of the primary elements in Plato’s Timaeus, the components of the whole universe reduced, by an extraordinarily elegant construction, to two right triangles. But how does he reconcile such a model with the infinite diversity of the universe? A large part of this study is devoted to Cornford’s explanation in his commentary of the Timaeus and its shortcomings, in order to finally propose a revised one, which we think to be entirely consistent (...) with Plato’s text. This analysis is an essential step for the understanding of the connection between the sensible world and the mathematical principles that underlies Timaeus’ cosmological account. (shrink)

Modern logicians have sought to unlock the modal secrets of Aristotle's Syllogistic by assuming a version of essentialism and treating it as a primitive within the semantics. These attempts ultimately distort Aristotle's ontology. None of these approaches make full use of tests found throughout Aristotle's corpus and ancient Greek philosophy. I base a system on Aristotle's tests for things that can never combine (polarity) and things that can never separate (inseparability). The resulting system not only reproduces Aristotle's recorded results for (...) the apodictic syllogistic in the Prior Analytics but it also generates rather than assumes Aristotle's distinctions among 'necessary', 'essential' and 'accidental'. By developing a system around tests that are in Aristotle and basic to ancient Greek philosophy, the system is linked to a history of practices, providing a platform for future work on the origins of logic. (shrink)

One of the hardest questions to answer for a (Neo)platonist is to what extent and how the changing and unreliable world of sense perception can itself be an object of scientific knowledge. My dissertation is a study of the answer given to that question by the Neoplatonist Proclus (Athens, 411-485) in his Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. I present a new explanation of Proclus’ concept of nature and show that philosophy of nature consists of several related subdisciplines matching the ontological stratification (...) of nature. Moreover, I demonstrate that for Proclus philosophy of nature is a science, albeit a hypothetical one, which takes geometry as its methodological paradigm. I also offer an explanation of Proclus’ view of what is later called the mathematization of physics, i.e. the role of the substance of mathematics, as opposed to its method, in explaining the natural world. Finally, I discuss Proclus’ views of the discourse of philosophy of nature and its iconic character. (shrink)

La filosofía de las matemáticas de Aristóteles es una investigación acerca de tres asuntos diferentes pero complementarios: el lugar epistemológico de las matemáticas en el organigrama de las ciencias teoréticas o especulativas; el estudio del método usado por el matemático para elaborar sus doctrinas, sobre todo la geometría y la aritmética; y la averiguación del estatuto ontológico de las entidades matemáticas. Para comprender lo peculiar de la doctrina aristotélica es necesario tener en cuenta que su principal interés está en poner (...) en relación la matemática con la filosofía primera u ontología y la física, y salvaguardar el campo de conocimiento propio de cada una de ellas. (shrink)

One of the key features of modern mathematics is the adoption of the abstract method. Our goal in this paper is to propose an explication of that method that is rooted in the history of the subject.

There is little agreement about Aristotle’s philosophy of geometry, partly due to the textual evidence and partly part to disagreement over what constitutes a plausible view. I keep separate the questions ‘What is Aristotle’s philosophy of geometry?’ and ‘Is Aristotle right?’, and consider the textual evidence in the context of Greek geometrical practice, and show that, for Aristotle, plane geometry is about properties of certain sensible objects—specifically, dimensional continuity—and certain properties possessed by actual and potential compass-and-straightedge drawings qua quantitative and (...) continuous. For their part, the objects of stereometry are potential sensible three-dimensional figures qua quantitative and continuous. (shrink)

: Metaphysics B considers two sets of views that hypostatize mathematicals. Aristotle discusses the first in his B.2 treatment of aporia 5, and the second in his B.5 treatment of aporia 12. The former has attracted considerable attention; the latter has not. I show that aporia 12 is more significant than the literature suggests, and specifically that it is directly addressed in M.2 – an indication of its importance. There is an immediate problem: Aristotle spends most of M.2 refuting the (...) view that mathematicals are separate; but the B.5 mathematicals are inherent. I argue that the B.5 inherence is compatible with the M.2 separateness, and further, that aporia 12 is more than just a puzzle about the hypostatization of mathematicals. It is also a puzzle about the ontological status of mathematicals relative to sensibles. (shrink)

In the first argument of Metaphysics Μ.2 against the Platonist introduction of separate mathematical objects, Aristotle purports to show that positing separate geometrical objects to explain geometrical facts generates an ‘absurd accumulation’ of geometrical objects. Interpretations of the argument have varied widely. I distinguish between two types of interpretation, corrective and non-corrective interpretations. Here I defend a new, and more systematic, non-corrective interpretation that takes the argument as a serious and very interesting challenge to the Platonist.

I argue here that a properly Platonic theory of the nature of number is still viable today. By properly Platonic, I mean one consistent with Plato's own theory, with appropriate extensions to take into account subsequent developments in mathematics. At Parmenides 143a-4a the existence of numbers is proven from our capacity to count, whereby I establish as Plato's the theory that numbers are originally ordinal, a sequence of forms differentiated by position. I defend and interpret Aristotle's report of a Platonic (...) distinction between form and mathematical numbers, arguing that mathematical numbers alone are cardinals, by reference to certain non-technical features of a set-theoretical approach and other considerations in philosophy of mathematics. Finally I respond to the objections that such a conception of number was unavailable in antiquity and that this theory is contradicted by Aristotle's report in Metaph . XIII that Platonic numbers are collections of units. I argue that Aristotle reveals his own misinterpretation of the terms in which Plato's theory was expressed. (shrink)

Resumen En el presente artículo se explora la pertenencia de los libros M y N al programa general de la Metafísica de Aristóteles. Los libros XIII y XIV han quedado en el trasfondo de la Metafísica, como una suerte de agregado editorial, del cual se puede prescindir para la comprensión de la propuesta aristotélica. En el presente artículo, sin embargo, se asume un punto de partida diferente, que consiste en integrar estos libros al núcleo de la propuesta de la Metafísica, (...) enten diendo que ellos son claves para completar el panorama de la teoría general de la sustancia, o ousiología, que guía todos los libros metafísicos. De este modo, la discusión de M y N sobre números y principios viene a concluir la cuestión de la sustancia como causa y principio, anunciada desde el inicio de la Metafísica y desarrollada en sus libros centrales.This article explores the belonging of books M and N to the generalprogram of Aristotle's Metaphysics. Books XIII and XIV have remained in the background of Metaphysics, as a kind of editorial aggregate, which can be dispensed with for the understanding of the Aristotelian proposal. In this article, however, a different startingpoint is assumed, which consists in integrating these books into the core of the proposal of Metaphysics, understanding that they are key to completing the panorama of the general theory of substance, or ousiology, which guides all metaphysical books. Thus, the discussion of numbers and principles within M and N concludes the question of substance as cause and principle, announced from the beginning of Metaphysics and developed in its central books. (shrink)

Near the beginning of De Gen. et Cor. II.1, Aristotle claims that the generation and corruption of all naturally constituted substances are “not without the perceptible bodies”. It is not clear what he intends by this. In this paper I offer a new interpretation of this assertion. I argue that the assumption behind the usual reading, namely, that these “perceptible bodies” ought to be distinguished from the naturally constituted substances, is flawed, and that the assertion is best understood as a (...) claim that Aristotle has established in the second half of the first book of the De Gen. et Cor. (shrink)

ABSTRACTTwo distinct domains of philosophic enquiry are selected in order to disclose the core dynamics and concerns of a particular mode of “aesthetic skepsis”. Aspects of philosophy of cosmology and philosophy of infinity are considered in ways that serve to discipline the diminution of “belief” and the cultivation of creativity. The journey begins with a skeptic ego that is phenomenologically “empty” but wedded to a rhetoric of “darkness and light.” The result is a skepsis that needs to recapture and reconfigure (...) aesthetics and art in order to represent and communicate itself. “Skepoiesis” is a “subtle knot”: it actively manifests as a “need for art” as well as enquiries into the problematics of philosophical aesthetics from the standpoint of creative skepsis. (shrink)