- Is scientific theory-commitment doxastic or practical?Ward E. Jones - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):325 - 344.details
|
|
Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
|
|
The Epistemic Value of Understanding-why.Xingming Hu - 2023 - Episteme 20 (1):125-141.details
|
|
On Reflection.Leon Horsten - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa083.details
|
|
On the Dynamics of Institutional Agreements.Andreas Herzig, Tiago de Lima & Emiliano Lorini - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):321 - 355.details
|
|
On the dynamics of institutional agreements.Andreas Herzig, Tiago Lima & Emiliano Lorini - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):321-355.details
|
|
Knowledge and acceptance.Roman Heil - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-17.details
|
|
Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge.Allan Hazlett - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):461-478.details
|
|
Reasoning About Collectively Accepted Group Beliefs.Raul Hakli & Sara Negri - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (4):531-555.details
|
|
Rethinking Religious Epistemology.Amber L. Griffioen - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (1):21-47.details
|
|
The importance of belief in argumentation: belief, commitment and the effective resolution of a difference of opinion.David M. Godden - 2010 - Synthese 172 (3):397-414.details
|
|
Presumption as a Modal Qualifier: Presumption, Inference, and Managing Epistemic Risk.David Godden - 2017 - Argumentation 31 (3):485-511.details
|
|
On the adaptive advantage of always being right (even when one is not).Nathalia L. Gjersoe & Bruce M. Hood - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):521-522.details
|
|
Self-Deception as Pretense.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.details
|
|
Ersatz Belief and Real Belief.Jerome Gellman - 2019 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 6 (1):39-53.details
|
|
Liberalismo político y reciprocidad: justificación epistémica de creencias versus justificación moral de acciones.Mariano Garreta Leclercq - 2012 - Isegoría 46:279-294.details
|
|
Deliberación moral, creencia y aceptación.Mariano Garreta Leclercq - 2018 - Análisis Filosófico 38 (1):5-32.details
|
|
Belief’s minimal rationality.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3263-3282.details
|
|
Do the self-deceived get what they want?Eric Funkhouser - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):295-312.details
|
|
The cognitive attitude of rational trust.Karen Frost-Arnold - 2014 - Synthese 191 (9).details
|
|
Consider the source: One step in assessing premise acceptability. [REVIEW]James B. Freeman - 1996 - Argumentation 10 (4):453-460.details
|
|
Dual systems and dual attitudes.Keith Frankish - 2012 - Mind and Society 11 (1):41-51.details
|
|
Deciding to Believe Again.Keith Frankish - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):523 - 547.details
|
|
Delusions, Levels of Belief, and Non-doxastic Acceptances.Keith Frankish - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):23-27.details
|
|
Dual-Process and Dual-System Theories of Reasoning.Keith Frankish - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):914-926.details
|
|
Conscious thinking, acceptance, and self-deception.Keith Frankish - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (1):20-21.details
|
|
A matter of opinion.Keith Frankish - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):423-442.details
|
|
Adaptive misbelief or judicious pragmatic acceptance?Keith Frankish - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):520.details
|
|
A pragmatic, existentialist approach to the scientific realism debate.Curtis Forbes - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3327-3346.details
|
|
Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.details
|
|
Can Fictionalists Have Faith?Finlay Malcolm - 2018 - Religious Studies 54 (2):215-232.details
|
|
Collective Scientific Knowledge.Melinda Fagan - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):821-831.details
|
|
El conocimiento como una actividad colectiva.Ángeles Eraña & Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia - 2016 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 51:9-36.details
|
|
Trust and the doxastic family.Pascal Engel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):17-26.details
|
|
Is epistemic agency possible?Pascal Engel - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):158-178.details
|
|
Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.details
|
|
De modalibus non disputat asinus.Pascal Engel - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (1):157-.details
|
|
Replies.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1577-1597.details
|
|
Disagreement in philosophy.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-16.details
|
|
Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings.Richard Dub - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):27-60.details
|
|
Non-factive Understanding: A Statement and Defense.Yannick Doyle, Spencer Egan, Noah Graham & Kareem Khalifa - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 50 (3):345-365.details
|
|
Laura Goodship on Priest's principle R.Andrew Doherty - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):480 – 490.details
|
|
Degrees of Acceptance.Alexander Dinges - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly (3):578-594.details
|
|
Inquiry Tickets: Values, Pursuit, and Underdetermination.Marina DiMarco & Kareem Khalifa - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (5):1016-1028.details
|
|
False endoxa and fallacious argumentation.Colin Guthrie King - 2013 - Logical Analysis and the History of Philosophy 15:185–199.details
|
|
The Nature of Desire.Federico Lauria & Julien Deonna (eds.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
G. F. Stout and the Psychological Origins of Analytic Philosophy.Maria Sandra Van der Schaar - 2013 - London, England: Palgrave McMillan.details
|
|
Counterfactuals and Scientific Realism.Michael J. Shaffer - 2012 - London and Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.details
|
|
Theorizing about Christian Faith in God with John Bishop.Daniel J. McKaughan & Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2023 - Religious Studies 59 (Special Issue 3):410-433.details
|
|
Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|