- Simulation and the We-Mode. A Cognitive Account of Plural First Persons.Matteo Bianchin - 2015 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 45 (4-5):442-461.details
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I Am a Lot of Things: A Pluralistic Account of the Self.Jiri Benovsky - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (1).details
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Explanation in theories of the specious present.Valtteri Arstila - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1–24.details
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Panpsychism and the First-Person Perspective: The Case for Panpsychist Idealism.Brentyn Ramm - 2021 - Mind and Matter 19 (1):75-106.details
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Sameness and the self: Philosophical and psychological considerations.Stan Klein - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology -- Perception 5:1-15.details
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The singularity: A philosophical analysis.David J. Chalmers - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (9-10):9 - 10.details
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What is it like to lack mineness? Depersonalization as a probe for the scope, nature and role of mineness.Alexandre Billon - 2023 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Marie Guillot (eds.), Self-Experience: Essays on Inner Awareness. cambridge: OUP. pp. 314-342.details
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The self and its brain.Stan Klein - 2012 - Social Cognition 30 (4):474-518.details
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Experience and Time: A Metaphysical Approach.David Builes & Michele Odisseas Impagnatiello - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not.Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of mind and phenomenology. New York: Routledge. pp. 36-53.details
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The conscious mind unified.Brandon Rickabaugh - 2020 - Dissertation, Baylor Universitydetails
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The Structures of Temporally Extended Agents.Luca Ferrero - 2022 - In Carla Bagnoli (ed.), Time in Action: The Temporal Structure of Rational Agency and Practical Thought. New York: Routledge. pp. 108-132.details
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The Subject of Experience.Galen Strawson - 2017 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The Two Selves: Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence.Stan Klein - 2014 - Oxford University Press.details
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Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Consciousness and Intentionality.Charles Siewert - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Dualism.Howard Robinson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Mineness without Minimal Selves.M. V. P. Slors & F. Jongepier - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):193-219.details
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Touching the World as It Is.Shoji Nagataki - 2016 - Humana Mente (16):97-116.details
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Is attention both necessary and sufficient for consciousness?Antonios Kaldas - 2019 - Dissertation, Macquarie Universitydetails
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First-Person Investigations of Consciousness.Brentyn Ramm - 2016 - Dissertation, The Australian National Universitydetails
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Can Consciousness be Taken Seriously When it Comes to Personal Identity?Stephen Matthew Duncan - unknowndetails
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Self in Mind. A Pluralist Account of Self-Consciousness.Raphaël Millière - 2020 - Dissertation, details
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Phenomenal Minimalist Ontology of the Self.Dmitry S. Tourko - 2021 - Антиномии 21 (4):7-30.details
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Images and Constructs: Can the Neural Correlates of Self be revealed through Radiological Analysis?Stan Klein - 2013 - International Journal of Psychological Research 6:117-132.details
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I am a lot of things: A pluralistic account of the Self.Jiri Benovsky - 2014 - Metaphysica, An International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics 15 (1):113-127.details
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Subjectivity as Self-Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (3-4):88-111.details
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Combining Minds: A Defence of the Possibility of Experiential Combination.Luke Roelofs - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Torontodetails
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The Self : a Humean bundle and/or a Cartesian substance ?Jiri Benovsky - 2009 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (1):7 - 19.details
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