Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Emotional Clichés and Authentic Passions: A Phenomenological Revision of a Cognitive Theory of Emotion.Kym Maclaren - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):45-65.
    This paper argues for an understanding of emotion based upon Merleau-Ponty's conceptions of embodiment and passivity. Through a critical assessment of cognitive theories of emotion, and in particular Solomon's theory, it argues (1) that there is a sense in which emotions may be judgments, so long as we understand such judgments as bodily enactments of meaning, but (2) that even understood in this way, the notion of judgment (or construal) can only account for a subset of emotions which I call (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Secular Transformation of Pride and Humility in the Moral Philosophy of David Hume.Kirstin April Carlson McPherson - unknown
    In this dissertation I examine Hume’s secular re-definition and re-evaluation of the traditional Christian understanding of pride and humility as part of his project to establish a fully secular account of ethics and to undermine what he thought to be the harmful aspects of religious morality. Christians traditionally have seen humility, understood as receptivity to God, to be crucial for individual and social flourishing, and pride as the root of individual and social disorder. By contrast, Hume, who conceives of pride (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Feeling, Impulse and Changeability: The Role of Emotion in Hume's Theory of the Passions.Katharina A. Paxman - unknown
    Hume’s “impressions of reflection” is a category made up of all our non-sensory feelings, including “the passions and other emotions.” These two terms for affective mental states, ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’, are both used frequently in Hume’s work, and often treated by scholars as synonymous. I argue that Hume’s use of both ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’ in his discussions of affectivity reflects a conceptual distinction implicit in his work between what I label ‘attending emotions’ and ‘fully established passions.’ The former are the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Simple Duality: Humean Passions.Hsueh Qu - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (S1):98-116.
    Hume views the passions as having both intentionality and qualitative character, which, in light of his Separability Principle, seemingly contradicts their simplicity. I reject the dominant solution to this puzzle of claiming that intentionality is an extrinsic property of the passions, arguing that a number of Hume’s claims regarding the intentionality of the passions (pride and humility in particular) provide reasons for thinking an intrinsic account of the intentionality of the passions to be required. Instead, I propose to resolve this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Pride and Hume's Sensible Knave.James King - 1999 - Hume Studies 25 (1/2):123-137.
    Whether the sensible knave can take pride in herself is a question not merely curious but potentially devastating for Hume's moral theory. Hume assuredly classifies knavery a vice, but given his doctrine that it belongs to virtue to produce pride, then if she can take pride in herself qua knave, the knave is positioned to claim that knavery is, and ought to be recognized as, a virtue. And if this is true, then either Hume is mistaken to have classified knavery (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Hume’s Mature Account of the Indirect Passions.Amyas Merivale - 2009 - Hume Studies 35 (1-2):185-210.
    Hume’s Dissertation on the Passions stands to Book 2 of his Treatise as the first and second Enquiries stand to Books 1 and 3 respectively. However, while the two Enquiries are evidently substantial reworkings of their Treatise ancestors, containing much that is different and new, the Dissertation appears to consist merely of superficially adapted excerpts from Treatise Book 2. I argue that this first impression is mistaken, by showing how Hume’s view of the indirect passions is modified in the later (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Hume's Moral Theory. [REVIEW]Páll S. Árdal - 1983 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (2):293-303.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Agency Without Avoidability: Defusing a New Threat to Frankfurt’s Counterexample Strategy1.Seth Shabo - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):505-522.
    In this paper, I examine a new line of response to Frankfurt’s challenge to the traditional association of moral responsibility with the ability to do otherwise. According to this response, Frankfurt’s counterexample strategy fails, not in light of the conditions for moral responsibility per se, but in view of the conditions for action. Specifically, it is claimed, a piece of behavior counts as an action only if it is within the agent’s power to avoid performing it. In so far as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Pride Versus Self-Respect.Adam Morton - forthcoming - In Joseph Adam Carter (ed.), the moral psychology of pride.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Meaning, Evidence, and Objectivity.Olivia Sultanescu - 2021 - In Syraya Chin-Mu Yang & Robert H. Myers (eds.), Donald Davidson on Action, Mind and Value. pp. 171-184.
    This chapter addresses the question of what, according to the conception of meaning offered by Donald Davidson, makes expressions meaningful. It addresses this question by reflecting on Kathrin Glüer’s recent response to it. It argues that Glüer misconstrues both the evidence for meaning that the radical interpreter must rely on and the way in which the principle of charity must be deployed. The articulation of the correct construal of the evidence and the principle reveals the thoroughly non-reductionist aspect of Davidson’s (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Explaining Expressions of Emotion.Peter Goldie - 2000 - Mind 109 (433):25-38.
    The question is how to explain expressions of emotion. It is argued that not all expressions of emotion are open to the same sort of explanation. Those expressions which are actions can be explained, like other sorts of action, by reference to a belief and a desire; however, no genuine expression of emotion is done as a means to some further end. Certain expressions of emotion which are actions can also be given a deeper explanation as being expressive of a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Commitment and Attunement.Craig DeLancey - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):579-594.
    Heidegger’s view of attunement, and evolutionary theories of emotion, would appear to be wholly independent accounts of affects. This paper argues that we can understand the phenomenology of attunement and the evolutionary functionalist theory of emotions as distinct perspectives on those same emotions. The reason that the two perspectives are distinct is that some affects can act as commitment mechanisms, and this requires them to be experienced in a way that obscures their ultimate functional role. These perspectives are potentially mutually (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Interpretivism, First-Person Authority, and Confabulation.Eivind Balsvik - 2017 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 47 (4-5):311-329.
    Psychological experiments allegedly show that people have a tendency to confabulate explanations of their behavior, because their conscious selves do not know why they do what they do, and therefore create the explanations that make most sense. This article explains why confabulation is neither a threat to interpretivist social science nor a threat to the presumption of first-person authority in Davidson’s interpretation theory. The reason is that the interpretative endeavor, which is necessary in order to identify and provide evidence for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Emotion: Animal and Reflective.Hichem Naar - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (4):561-588.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Finite Agents, Sublime Feelings: Response to Hanauer.Katerina Deligiorgi - 2016 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 74 (2):199-202.
    Tom Hanauer's thoughtful discussion of my article “The Pleasures of Contra-purposiveness: Kant, the Sublime, and Being Human” puts pressure on two important issues concerning the affective phenomenology of the sublime. My aim in that article was to present an analysis of the sublime that does not suffer from the problems identified by Jane Forsey in “Is a Theory of the Sublime Possible?”. I argued that Kant's notion of reflective judgment can help with this task, because it allows us to capture (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hume, Personal Identity, and the Experimental Method.Adam Grzeliński - 2018 - Ruch Filozoficzny 74 (3):89.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Love and Benevolence in Hutcheson's and Hume's Theories of the Passions.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2004 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (4):631 – 653.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • In Praise of Self: Hume's Love of Fame.M. G. F. Martin - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):69-100.
    In this paper I discuss Hume’s theory of pride and the ‘remarkable mechanism’ of sympathy. In the first part of the paper I outline the ways in which Hume’s theory can accommodate the sense in which the passions are directed on things or possess intentionality while still holding to his view that passions are simple feelings. In the second part of the paper I consider a problem internal to Hume’s account of pride which arises in his discussion of the love (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Modern Greatness of Soul in Hume and Smith.Andrew J. Corsa - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
    I contend that Adam Smith and David Hume offer re-interpretations of Aristotle’s notion of greatness of soul, focusing on the kind of magnanimity Aristotle attributes to Socrates. Someone with Socratic magnanimity is worthy of honor, responds moderately to fortune, and is virtuous—just and benevolent. Recent theorists err in claiming that magnanimity is less important to Hume’s account of human excellence than benevolence. In fact, benevolence is a necessary ingredient for the best sort of greatness. Smith’s “Letter to Strahan” attributes this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume’s Metaethics.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.
    Most naturalists think that the belief/desire model from Hume is the best framework for making sense of motivation. As Smith has argued, given that the cognitive state (belief) and the conative state (desire) are separate on this model, if a moral judgment is cognitive, it could not also be motivating by itself. So, it looks as though Hume and Humeans cannot hold that moral judgments are states of belief (moral cognitivism) and internally motivating (moral internalism). My chief claim is that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Annette Baier on Reason and Morals in Hume's Philosophy. [REVIEW]Clarence Sholé Johnson - 1995 - Dialogue 34 (2):367-.
    Annette Baier should have entitled her book A Progress of Reason and Sentiments instead of A Progress of Sentiments, because one of her chief concerns is the role and significance of reason in Hume's philosophy. She says in the Preface that her aim in the book is “to present Hume's work as exhibiting a progress of thought and sentiment, and acquiring ‘new force as it advances‘” (p. viii). Because the issue of reason in Hume's philosophy is central to her concern, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Real Emotions.Craig DeLancey - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):467-487.
    I argue that natural realism is the best approach to explaining some emotional actions, and thus is the best candidate to explain the relevant emotions. I take natural realism to be the view that these emotions are motivational states which must be identified by using (not necessarily exclusively) naturalistic discourse which, if not wholly lacking intentional terms, at least does not require reference to belief and desire. The kinds of emotional actions I consider are ones which continue beyond the satisfaction (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Impossibility of Psycho-Physical Laws.David Brooks - 1980 - Philosophical Papers 9 (October):21-45.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Can Emotions Have Abstract Objects? The Example of Awe.Fredericks Rachel - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):733-746.
    Can we feel emotions about abstract objects, assuming that abstract objects exist? I argue that at least some emotions can have abstract objects as their intentional objects and discuss why this conclusion is not just trivially true. Through critical engagement with the work of Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt, I devote special attention to awe, an emotion that is particularly well suited to show that some emotions can be about either concrete or abstract objects. In responding to a possible objection, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed Emotions.Demian Whiting - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):281-303.
    Abstract: The ‘feeling theory of emotion’ holds that emotions are to be identified with feelings. An objection commonly made to that theory of emotion has it that emotions cannot be feelings only, as emotions have intentional objects. Jack does not just feel fear, but he feels fear-of-something. To explain this property of emotion we will have to ascribe to emotion a representational structure, and feelings do not have the sought after representational structure. In this paper I seek to defend the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • The Movement of Feeling and the Genesis of Character in Hume.Katharina Paxman - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (3):569-593.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark