- The power of explicit knowing.Deanna Kuhn - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):722-723.details
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Do you have to be right to redescribe?Susan Goldin-Meadow & Martha Wagner Alibali - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):718-719.details
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Précis of Beyond modularity: A developmental perspective on cognitive science.Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):693-707.details
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Representational change, generality versus specificity, and nature versus nurture: Perennial issues in cognitive research.Stellan Ohlsson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):724-725.details
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Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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Smelling lessons.Clare Batty - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):161-174.details
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A representational account of olfactory experience.Clare Batty - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):511-538.details
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What the Nose Doesn't Know: Non-Veridicality and Olfactory Experience.Clare Batty - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):10-17.details
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Philosophy of mind: critical concepts in philosophy.Sean Crawford (ed.) - 2011 - New York: Routledge.details
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The Spatial Content of Experience.Brad Thompson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):146-184.details
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Is there a role for representational content in scientific psychology?Frances Egan - 2009 - In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 14.details
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Semantic externalism and the mechanics of thought.Carrie Figdor - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (1):1-24.details
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Representational redescription and cognitive architectures.Antonella Carassa & Maurizio Tirassa - 1994 - Carassa, Antonella and Tirassa, Maurizio (1994) Representational Redescription and Cognitive Architectures. [Journal (Paginated)] 17 (4):711-712.details
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Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant.Martin Davies - 1998 - In C. Macdonald, Barry C. Smith & C. J. G. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 321-363.details
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Metaphysics, method, and the mouth: Philosophical lessons of speech perception.J. D. Trout - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):261-291.details
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Perception and action: Alternative views.Susan Hurley - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):3-40.details
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Chomsky and Egan on computational theories of vision.Arnold Silverberg - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (4):495-524.details
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Content, computation, and individuation.Keith Butler - 1998 - Synthese 114 (2):277-92.details
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Individualism, twin scenarios and visual content.M. J. Cain - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):441-463.details
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Computation, external factors, and cognitive explanations.Amir Horowitz - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):65-80.details
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Emdedded systems vs. individualism.Michael Losonsky - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (3):357-71.details
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Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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The semantic view of computation and the argument from the cognitive science practice.Alfredo Paternoster & Fabrizio Calzavarini - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-24.details
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Comment on Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne, Narrow Content.Alex Byrne - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):3017-3026.details
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How to think about mental content.Frances Egan - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):115-135.details
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Representation in Cognitive Science.Nicholas Shea - 2018 - Oxford University Press.details
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What Is the Problem of Perception?Tim Crane - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):237-264.details
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Computation, individuation, and the received view on representation.Mark Sprevak - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):260-270.details
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The Problem of Perception in Analytic Philosophy.Tim Crane - unknowndetails
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The risks of rationalising cognitive development.Beatrice de Gelder - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):713-714.details
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Redescribing development.Ellin Kofsky Scholnick - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):727-728.details
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The challenge of representational redescription.Thomas R. Shultz - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):728-729.details
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1. Marr on Computational-Level Theories Marr on Computational-Level Theories (pp. 477-500).Oron Shagrir, John D. Norton, Holger Andreas, Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen, Aris Spanos, Eckhart Arnold, Elliott Sober, Peter Gildenhuys & Adela Helena Roszkowski - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (4):477-500.details
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Naturalising Representational Content.Nicholas Shea - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):496-509.details
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Nonconceptual content.Josefa Toribio - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):445–460.details
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The Problem of Perception.Tim Crane - 2005 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Individualism and Marr’s Computational Theory of Vision.Keith Butler - 1996 - Mind and Language 11 (4):313-37.details
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Externalism about mental content.Joe Lau - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Exorcising the Myth of the Given: the idea of doxasticism.Refeng Tang - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-32.details
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Externalism and Internalism in the Philosophy of Mind.Robert A. Wilson - 2017 - Oxford Bibliographies.details
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Minds and morals.Sarah Sawyer - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):393-408.details
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Developmental psychology for the twenty-first century.David Estes - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):715-716.details
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Redescription of intentionality.Norman H. Freeman - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):717-718.details
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Levels of Explanation Vindicated.Víctor M. Verdejo & Daniel Quesada - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (1):77-88.details
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Why neural correlates of consciousness are fine, but not enough.Ruediger Vaas - 1999 - Anthropology and Philosophy 3 (3):121-141.details
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Why we view the brain as a computer.Oron Shagrir - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):393-416.details
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A clearer vision.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (1):131-53.details
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Wie viel Geschichte steckt in sprachlichen Bedeutungen?Gerson Reuter - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (5):744-763.details
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Where redescriptions come from.David R. Olson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):725-725.details
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A Fodorian guide to Switzerland: Jung and Piaget combined?Péter Bodor & Csaba Pléh - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (4):709-710.details
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