Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Homing in on Consciousness in the Nervous System: An Action-Based Synthesis.Ezequiel Morsella, Christine A. Godwin, Tiffany K. Jantz, Stephen C. Krieger & Adam Gazzaley - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:1-70.
    What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Homo Sapiens 2.0 Why We Should Build the Better Robots of Our Nature.Eric Dietrich - 2011 - In M. Anderson S. Anderson (ed.), Machine Ethics. Cambridge Univ. Press.
    It is possible to survey humankind and be proud, even to smile, for we accomplish great things. Art and science are two notable worthy human accomplishments. Consonant with art and science are some of the ways we treat each other. Sacrifice and heroism are two admirable human qualities that pervade human interaction. But, as everyone knows, all this goodness is more than balanced by human depravity. Moral corruption infests our being. Why?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Explanatory Pluralism in Cognitive Science.Rick Dale, Eric Dietrich & Anthony Chemero - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (2):739-742.
    This brief commentary has three goals. The first is to argue that ‘‘framework debate’’ in cognitive science is unresolvable. The idea that one theory or framework can singly account for the vast complexity and variety of cognitive processes seems unlikely if not impossible. The second goal is a consequence of this: We should consider how the various theories on offer work together in diverse contexts of investigation. A final goal is to supply a brief review for readers who are compelled (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • The Emotional Mind: The Affective Roots of Culture and Cognition.Stephen Asma & Rami Gabriel - 2019 - Harvard University Press.
    Tracing the leading role of emotions in the evolution of the mind, a philosopher and a psychologist pair up to reveal how thought and culture owe less to our faculty for reason than to our capacity to feel. Many accounts of the human mind concentrate on the brain’s computational power. Yet, in evolutionary terms, rational cognition emerged only the day before yesterday. For nearly 200 million years before humans developed a capacity to reason, the emotional centers of the brain were (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • From filters to fillers: an active inference approach to body image distortion in the selfie era.Simon C. Tremblay, Safae Essafi Tremblay & Pierre Poirier - 2021 - AI and Society (1):33-48.
    Advances in artificial intelligence, as well as its increased presence in everyday life, have brought the emergence of many new phenomena, including an intriguing appearance of what seems to be a variant of body dysmorphic disorder, coined “Snapchat dysmorphia”. Body dysmorphic disorder is a DSM-5 psychiatric disorder defined as a preoccupation with one or more perceived defects or flaws in physical appearance that are not observable or appear slight to others. Snapchat dysmorphia is fueled by automated selfie filters that reflect (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • From Filters to Fillers: An Active Inference Approach to Body Image Distortion in the Selfie Era.Simon C. Tremblay, Safae Essafi Tremblay & Pierre Poirier - 2020 - AI and Society (1):1-16.
    Advances in artificial intelligence, as well as its increased presence in everyday life, have brought the emergence of many new phenomena, including an intriguing appearance of what seems to be a variant of body dysmorphic disorder, coined “Snapchat dysmorphia”. Body dysmorphic disorder is a DSM-5 psychiatric disorder defined as a preoccupation with one or more perceived defects or flaws in physical appearance that are not observable or appear slight to others. Snapchat dysmorphia is fueled by automated selfie filters that reflect (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Towards a General Theory of Antirepresentationalism.Francisco Calvo Garzón - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):259-292.
    This work represents an attempt to stake out the landscape for dynamicism based on a radical dismissal of the information-processing paradigm that dominates the philosophy of cognitive science. In Section 2, after setting up the basic toolkit of a theory of minimal representationalism, I introduce the central tenets of dynamic systems theory (DST) by discussing recent research in the dynamics of embodiment (Thelen et al. [2001]) in the perseverative-reaching literature. A recent proposal on the dynamics of representation--the dynamic field approach (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Embodied Cognition is Not What You Think It Is.Andrew D. Wilson & Sabrina Golonka - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • Do We Adopt the Intentional Stance Toward Humanoid Robots?Serena Marchesi, Davide Ghiglino, Francesca Ciardo, Jairo Perez-Osorio, Ebru Baykara & Agnieszka Wykowska - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Representations in Dynamical Embodied Agents: Re-Analyzing a Minimally Cognitive Model Agent.Marco Mirolli - 2012 - Cognitive Science 36 (5):870-895.
    Understanding the role of ‘‘representations’’ in cognitive science is a fundamental problem facing the emerging framework of embodied, situated, dynamical cognition. To make progress, I follow the approach proposed by an influential representational skeptic, Randall Beer: building artificial agents capable of minimally cognitive behaviors and assessing whether their internal states can be considered to involve representations. Hence, I operationalize the concept of representing as ‘‘standing in,’’ and I look for representations in embodied agents involved in simple categorization tasks. In a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Interactions Dominate the Dynamics of Visual Cognition.Damian G. Stephen & Daniel Mirman - 2010 - Cognition 115 (1):154-165.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Causal Networks or Causal Islands? The Representation of Mechanisms and the Transitivity of Causal Judgment.Samuel G. B. Johnson & Woo-Kyoung Ahn - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (7):1468-1503.
    Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Domain-Creating Constraints.Robert L. Goldstone & David Landy - 2010 - Cognitive Science 34 (7):1357-1377.
    The contributions to this special issue on cognitive development collectively propose ways in which learning involves developing constraints that shape subsequent learning. A learning system must be constrained to learn efficiently, but some of these constraints are themselves learnable. To know how something will behave, a learner must know what kind of thing it is. Although this has led previous researchers to argue for domain-specific constraints that are tied to different kinds/domains, an exciting possibility is that kinds/domains themselves can be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Some Strangeness in the Proportion, or How to Stop Worrying and Learn to Love the Mechanistic Forces of Darkness.Eric Dietrich - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3):349-352.
    Understanding humans requires viewing them as mechanisms of some sort, since understanding anything requires seeing it as a mechanism. It is science’s job to reveal mechanisms. But science reveals much more than that: it also reveals enduring mystery—strangeness in the proportion. Concentrating just on the scientific side of Selinger’s and Engström’s call for a moratorium on cyborg discourse, I argue that this strangeness prevents cyborg discourse from diminishing us.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Developing Structured Representations.Leonidas A. A. Doumas & Lindsey E. Richland - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):384-385.
    Leech et al.'s model proposes representing relations as primed transformations rather than as structured representations (explicit representations of relations and their roles dynamically bound to fillers). However, this renders the model unable to explain several developmental trends (including relational integration and all changes not attributable to growth in relational knowledge). We suggest looking to an alternative computational model that learns structured representations from examples.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Will a Category Cue Attract You? Motor Output Reveals Dynamic Competition Across Person Construal.Jonathan B. Freeman, Nalini Ambady, Nicholas O. Rule & Kerri L. Johnson - 2008 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 137 (4):673-690.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Why We May Not Find Intentions in the Brain.Sebo Uithol, Daniel C. Burnston & Pim Haselager - 2014 - Neuropsychologia 56 (5):129-139.
    Intentions are commonly conceived of as discrete mental states that are the direct cause of actions. In the last several decades, neuroscientists have taken up the project of finding the neural implementation of intentions, and a number of areas have been posited as implementing these states. We argue, however, that the processes underlying action initiation and control are considerably more dynamic and context sensitive than the concept of intention can allow for. Therefore, adopting the notion of ‘intention’ in neuroscientific explanations (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • A Swan, and Pike, and a Crawfish Walk Into a Bar.Shimon Edelman - 2008 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Ai 20:261-268.
    The three commentaries of Van Orden, Spivey and Anderson, and Dietrich (with Markman’s as a backdrop) form a tableau that reminds me of a fable by Ivan Andreevich Krylov (1769 - 1844), in which a swan, a pike, and a crawfish undertake jointly to move a cart laden with goods. What transpires then is not unexpected: the swan strives skyward, the pike pulls toward the river, and the crawfish scrambles backward. The call for papers for the present ecumenically minded special (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Analogy as Relational Priming: The Challenge of Self-Reflection.Andrea Cheshire, Linden J. Ball & Charlie N. Lewis - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):381-382.
    Despite its strengths, Leech et al.'s model fails to address the important benefits that derive from self-explanation and task feedback in analogical reasoning development. These components encourage explicit, self-reflective processes that do not necessarily link to knowledge accretion. We wonder, therefore, what mechanisms can be included within a connectionist framework to model self-reflective involvement and its beneficial consequences.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Cognitive Science: Emerging Perspectives and Approaches.Narayanan Srinivasan - 2011 - In Girishwar Misra (ed.), Handbook of Psychology in India. Oxford University Press. pp. 46--57.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Nature of Minds, Or: Truth and Consequences.Shimon Edelman - 2008 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Ai 20:181-196.
    Are minds really dynamical or are they really symbolic? Because minds are bundles of computations, and because computation is always a matter of interpretation of one system by another, minds are necessarily symbolic. Because minds, along with everything else in the universe, are physical, and insofar as the laws of physics are dynamical, minds are necessarily dynamical systems. Thus, the short answer to the opening question is “yes.” It makes sense to ask further whether some of the computations that constitute (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Concepts a la Modal: An Extended Review of Prinz's Furnishing the Mind. [REVIEW]A. Markman & H. C. Stilwell - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):391-401.
    In Furnishing the mind, Prinz defends a view of concept representation that assumes all representations are rooted in perception. This view is attractive, because it makes clear how concepts could be learned from experience in the world. In this paper, we discuss three limitations of the view espoused by Prinz. First, the central proposal requires more detail in order to support the claim that all representations are modal. Second, it is not clear that a theory of concepts must make a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • On the Nature of Reverse Compositionality.Kent Johnson - 2006 - Erkenntnis 64 (1):37-60.
    Reverse Compositionality (RC) is the thesis that one understands a complex expression only if one understands its parts. I argue that this thesis is false for natural languages. I then argue that the phenomenon that motivates the thesis is more likely to be a fact about human sentence-processing than linguistic understanding per se. Finally, I argue that RC is not useful in the debates about prototype-style theories of concepts in which it figures heavily.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Concepts in Change.Anna-Mari Rusanen & Samuli Pöyhönen - 2013 - Science & Education 22 (6):1389–1403.
    In this article we focus on the concept of concept in conceptual change. We argue that (1) theories of higher learning must often employ two different notions of concept that should not be conflated: psychological and scientific concepts. The usages for these two notions are partly distinct and thus straightforward identification between them is unwarranted. Hence, the strong analogy between scientific theory change and individual learning should be approached with caution. In addition, we argue that (2) research in psychology and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Extended Mind: Born to Be Wild? A Lesson From Action-Understanding. [REVIEW]Nivedita Gangopadhyay - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):377-397.
    The extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998; Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that the extended mind hypothesis is born to be wild. It has undeniable and irrepressible tendencies of flouting grounding assumptions of the traditional information-processing paradigm. I present case-studies from social cognition which not only support the extended mind proposal but also bring out its inherent wildness. In particular, I focus on cases of action-understanding and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Concepts in Change.Anna-Mari Rusanen & Samuli Pöyhönen - 2013 - Science & Education 22 (6):1389-1403.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Computational Modeling of Analogy: Destined Ever to Only Be Metaphor?Ann Speed - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (4):397-398.
    The target article by Leech et al. presents a compelling computational theory of analogy-making. However, there is a key difficulty that persists in theoretical treatments of analogy-making, computational and otherwise: namely, the lack of a detailed account of the neurophysiological mechanisms that give rise to analogy behavior. My commentary explores this issue.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Information Processing and Dynamics in Minimally Cognitive Agents.Randall D. Beer & Paul L. Williams - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (1):1-38.
    There has been considerable debate in the literature about the relative merits of information processing versus dynamical approaches to understanding cognitive processes. In this article, we explore the relationship between these two styles of explanation using a model agent evolved to solve a relational categorization task. Specifically, we separately analyze the operation of this agent using the mathematical tools of information theory and dynamical systems theory. Information-theoretic analysis reveals how task-relevant information flows through the system to be combined into a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Does Computation Reveal Machine Cognition?Prakash Mondal - 2014 - Biosemiotics 7 (1):97-110.
    This paper seeks to understand machine cognition. The nature of machine cognition has been shrouded in incomprehensibility. We have often encountered familiar arguments in cognitive science that human cognition is still faintly understood. This paper will argue that machine cognition is far less understood than even human cognition despite the fact that a lot about computer architecture and computational operations is known. Even if there have been putative claims about the transparency of the notion of machine computations, these claims do (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark