Could emotions be a uniquely human phenomenon? One prominent theory in emotion science, Lisa Feldman Barrett’s “Theory of Constructed Emotion” (TCE), suggests they might be. The source of the sceptical challenge is that TCE links emotions to abstract concepts tracking socio-normative expectations, and other animals are unlikely to have such concepts. Barrett’s own response to the sceptical challenge is to relativize emotion to the perspective of an interpreter, but this is unpromising. A more promising response may be to amend the (...) theory, dropping the commitment to the abstract nature of emotion concepts and allowing that, like olfactory concepts, they have disjunctive sensory groundings. Even if other animals were emotionless, this would not imply they lack morally significant interests. Unconceptualized valenced experiences are a sufficient basis for morally significant interests, and such experiences may occur even in the absence of discrete, constructed emotions. (shrink)

Animals are an important part of our social, economic and corporate world. Their wellbeing is significantly affected by the ways in which humans treat them. However, animals have long remained (and, indeed, continue to remain) effectively invisible in the business ethics and corporate responsibility discourse. This article argues in favor of the moral necessity of according animal welfare a higher priority in business. In line with most streams in both recent and traditional animal ethics, this article derives the avoidance of (...) unnecessary animal suffering as the moral minimum standard for responsible management in the livestock industry. Based on a broad range of different interpretations of what animal suffering may be necessary, the article discusses three distinct ways in which humans working in the animal industry could meet their moral responsibility to avoid unnecessary suffering, and, with this, increase animal welfare: by ameliorating circumstances for animals, by aiming at a two-pronged transformation, or by transforming into a “zero-suffering” business. Considering animal welfare as a legitimate ethical value in and of itself is a first step towards overcoming the anthropocentric bias in today's sustainability and corporate responsibility debate. (shrink)

O objetivo deste livro é propor uma reflexão sobre o ideário de centro, se perguntando se ele seria possível e como. Preferi chamar de “Uma Ideologia de Centro” em vez de “Ideário”, pois o termo “Ideologia” é instigante para um título. Entretanto tenho a noção de que essa palavra é bastante carregada de significados teóricos. No modelo marxista, grosso modo, a ideologia é um conjunto de crenças, construído pela parcela dominante da sociedade, para naturalizar a dominação. Não é nesse sentido (...) que utilizo o termo “ideologia”. Gostaria de um significado mais neutro para ele, tal como um conjunto de crenças, valores e/ou ações que respeita um conjunto de princípios. Nesse sentido, podemos pensar em uma ideologia para a direita política, para a esquerda política e para o centro político. Normalmente dividimos o espectro político de acordo com esses princípios; entretanto outras divisões são possíveis, ou ainda pode ser o caso que nenhuma divisão seja realmente objetiva. Como devemos, então, pensar essa divisão? Quais princípios subjazem as ações de diferentes atores políticos? Numa época de polarização política entre esquerda e direita, faz sentido refletirmos sobre posições mais moderadas? Qual conjunto de crenças, valores e ações poderia constituir moderação no cenário atual? Nosso livro tenta trazer uma reflexão sobre o ideário de centro, apresentando pensadores que refletem sobre a possibilidade de estabelecermos um centro, sobre a relação entre a ciência e o centro, sobre reformas centristas, entre outras coisas. Nossa intenção é que este livro promova uma reflexão inicial estimulante, e não a palavra final sobre as ideias apresentadas. Nesse sentido, este livro é ensaístico e tenta produzir algo original, ainda que incompleto. Nosso livro não têm uma unidade de visão; e acreditamos que isso é um mérito, pois não tenta estabelecer, em definitivo, se há e o que é o centro, mas nos leva a pensar sobre o conceito. A reflexão filosófica tem a característica de nos aprofundar nas questões investigadas. Podemos não chegar numa resposta final, mas nosso conhecimento sobre o problema e sobre as respostas para ele aprimoram nossa capacidade reflexiva. Pode-se acabar não concordando com nada do que aqui foi escrito. Maravilha! Se esse é o caso, o mais importante é saber por que não concordamos e construirmos nossa própria crítica argumentativa. Mas não paremos na crítica; construamos também uma teoria positiva, uma visão de mundo. É a partir do processo de criação, crítica, destruição e reconstrução, que tornamos mais fortes as nossas visões de mundo. Parafraseando a maior celebridade filosófica de todos os tempos, Sócrates: a vida só vale realmente a pena, se refletida. (shrink)

The paper argues that adopting a form of skepticism, Skeptical-Dogmatism, that recommends disbelieving each philosophical position in many multi-proposition disputes- disputes where there are three or more contrary philosophical views-leads to a higher ratio of true to false beliefs than the ratio of the “average philosopher”. Hence, Skeptical-Dogmatists have more accurate beliefs than the average philosopher. As a corollary, most philosophers would improve the accuracy of their beliefs if they adopted Skeptical-Dogmatism.

This study explores the role of an informal institution—engaged Buddhism—in leadership responses to issues of bribery at the firm level in the context of Vietnam. In-depth interviews were carried out in Vietnam with 26 organizational leaders who were Buddhist practitioners. The leaders expressed a Buddhist-enacted utilitarian approach based on three context-associated mechanisms: karmic consequences, community and social well-being, and total detachment. These mechanisms manifest in leadership approaches based on the Middle Way, Skillful Means, and Emptiness. They are involved in forming (...) leaders’ perceptions about bribery issues and their enacting of contextual approaches to balance organizational means and ends in tackling ethical issues associated with bribery. The study also sheds light on moral struggles involved in the process of shaping and enacting a Buddhist-enacted utilitarian approach. (shrink)

During the past few decades, the global food system has confronted new sustainability challenges related not only to public health and the environment but also to ethical concerns over the treatment of farmed animals. However, the traditional threedimensional framework of sustainable development is ill equipped to take ethical concerns related to non-human animals into account. For instance, the interests of farmed animals are often overridden by objectives associated with social, economic or environmental sustainability, despite their vast numbers and influence on (...) contemporary societies. Moreover, sustainability policies necessarily involve an element of ethical evaluation; yet this element is not explicitly incorporated in prevailing frameworks of sustainable development. Our purpose in this article is to address these shortcomings by developing a Sustainability Matrix that recognizes the need to consider food system sustainability from the perspective of all interest groups affected by the issue under consideration, from a plurality of ethical standpoints. Combing sustainability principles with the basic idea of an ethical evaluation tool, the proposed Sustainability Matrix evaluates the sustainability of food-related systems, decisions and policies from the perspectives of three major strands of ethical theory and from the perspectives of human beings, farmed animals and wildlife. In terms of policy implications, the Sustainability Matrix can be applied in deciding on the specific targets of food system sustainability that can then be utilized as a basis for designing policies and measures towards the achievement of these goals. (shrink)

Moore's moral programme is increasingly unpopular. Judith Jarvis Thomson's attack has been especially influential; she says the Moorean project fails because ‘there is no such thing as goodness’. I argue that her objection does not succeed: while Thomson is correct that the kind of generic goodness she targets is incoherent, it is not, I believe, the kind of goodness central to the Principia. Still, Moore's critics will resist. Some reply that we cannot understand Moorean goodness without generic goodness. Others claim (...) that even if Moore does not need Thomson's concept, he still requires the objectionable notion of absolute goodness. I undermine both these replies. I first show that we may dispense with generic goodness without losing Moorean intrinsic goodness. Then, I argue that though intrinsic goodness is indeed a kind of absolute goodness, the objections marshalled against the concept are unsound. (shrink)

Individuals with chronic spinal cord injury (CSCI) require complex and lengthy health services based on ethical philosophy. The virtue character that is most relevant to the egalitarian concept is fairness. The aim of the study is whether the character of fairness becomes the character of a doctor serving individuals with CSCI. It is a mixed method cross-sectional explanatory study, with questionnaires sent to doctors and individuals with CSCI, interviews with doctors, and healthcare system field observation. Sixty-two doctors and 33 patients (...) with CSCI participated in the study. The virtues most frequently chosen by doctors were love, gratitude, spirituality, zest, fairness, and kindness. The CSCI patients’ views regarding doctors’ characters were a postponement of personal interest, compassion, and loyalty to trust. All interviewed doctors indicated that they supported more than five of the 24 virtues. Doctors serve with ethical principles of virtue, even though the rewards received are inadequate. In fact, the use of health services by CSCI is still limited. Virtue ethics, especially the character of fairness, is necessary as a base of positive relationships between doctors and patients, to achieve equality of benefits for CSCI patients. Data obtained that the doctors’ character of fairness is still not the main choice. (shrink)

Faced with the disenchantment and disengagement expressed by their employees, business leaders are considering ways of incorporating more benevolence into managerial practices. Nevertheless, ‘benevolence’—care and concern for the well-being of others—has not yet been studied in an organizational profit-focused context. In this paper, we seek to investigate the emergence and practice of benevolence with an eye on profit and performance. We begin by investigating the main ethical approaches to benevolence—virtue ethical, utilitarian, and deontological. Then, based on an empirical study, we (...) identify two distinct types of benevolence. On the one hand, formal benevolence is defined and monitored by the organizational processes and actions of leaders; it is understood by all concerned to be bounded by organizational performance. On the other hand, informal benevolence exists at the margin of these processes, in interpersonal and discretionary relationships. We set out to analyze these two types of benevolence and the complementarity between them. We also discuss to what extent they can be managed, teasing out some implications for managers and some potential avenues for further research. (shrink)

In this article, I suggest that the recently emerged perspective of environmental pragmatism encompasses self-contradicting principles. For many years, it was deemed impossible for environmental ethics to formulate justified environmental policy. Environmental pragmatism, and its primary scholar Bryan G. Norton, has promoted a new outlook in that debate by proposing an ideal methodology based upon classic American pragmatism. In this methodology, a community can determine what is morally righteous by conducting open-ended inquiry and considering all relevant stakeholders in a rational (...) discourse. Environmental pragmatism must therefore accommodate reasonable value pluralism. Moreover, Norton claims that these criteria should be complemented with what I call the ‘sustainability criterion’. However, this principle of righteous decision- making appears inconsistent with the two aforementioned commitments. This article considers why this is the case. (shrink)

Human Resource Management is in a contentious relationship with moral philosophy. To understand this relationship, one can approach it from the standpoint of Human Resource Management (HRM) or philosophy. This article presents the latter. One of the most important 20th century discussions on the development of moral behaviour came from Laurence Kohlberg. His model of universal moral stages provides a framework inside which virtually all forms of morality take place. These stages are used to characterise the morality of HRM. In (...) order to avoid portraying them as moral philosophy the paper assesses HRM’s morality by using these seven stages as an ordering framework. To achieve this, a normative and a supportive empirical study have been conducted: the normative study found that HRM appears to be located at stages two and four; this is supported by empirical data because most respondents (76%, n=204) saw HRM’s morality as a reflection of these three stages. These stages represent: seeking personal benefits, corporate conformity, and supporting corporate policies. (shrink)

Moral theories, such as the variations on virtue ethics, deontological ethics, contractualism, and consequentialism, are expected – inter alia – to explain the basic orientation of morality, give us principles and directives, justify those, and thereby guide our actions. I examine some functions and characteristics of the extant moral theories from a moral metatheoretical point of view, in order to clarify the generally assumed rivalry between them. By thinking of moral theories in analogy to languages it is argued that different (...) moral theories are neither simply competing nor simply complementary; their respective orientations justify using them, in virtue of the problems they help to solve. But even if considerations about the functionality of a theory and the context in which it is created play an important role, they can neither be sufficient to determine these theories’ relations to one other nor for choosing between them. The challenge is to set criteria for the quality of a moral theory on a moral metatheoretical level and, in particular, to make room for future views on morality. (shrink)

Two distinct and perhaps mutually exclusive understandings of utilitarianism have emerged in the ethics literature. Utilitarianism is typically regarded as an approach to determine ethicality by focusing on whether or not actions produce the greater good, but has also been conceptualized as a set of traits to which individuals might be predisposed. This paper is designed to clarify the meaning and implications of such utilitarian traits as “results-oriented,” “innovative,” and “a winner.” Although the Janus-headed model of ethical theory from which (...) these traits emerged had been acknowledged by its developer as possibly misrepresenting typical views of utilitarianism, much research using these traits appears to have been conducted without clear recognition of this. If the conceptual foundation underpinning hypothesis development is disconnected from the measure used to test them, then little support for relevant predictions should emerge. A review of the literature which featured utilitarian traits generally confirmed this. This paper also explored the origins and emergence of these traits and suggested that existing evidence that these measure utilitarian ethical predispositions is not especially persuasive. Understanding what utilitarian traits do not assess is critical in order for knowledge about this potentially useful measure to advance. (shrink)

While ethical and empirical interest in so-called secondary variants and incidental findings in clinical genetics contexts is growing, critical reflection on the ethical foundations of the various recommendations proposed is thus far largely lacking. We examine and critique the ethical justifications of the three most prominent disclosure positions: briefly, the clinical geneticist decides, a joint decision, and the patient decides. Subsequently, instead of immediately developing a new disclosure option, we explore relevant foundational ethical values and norms, drawing on the normative (...) and empirical ethical literature. Four ethical signposts are thereby developed to help guide disclosure discussions. These are: respectful sharing of the clinician’s expertise; transparent communication; epistemic modesty; and respect for the embedded nature of the patient. We conclude by considering the most common current disclosure positions in the light of the four ethical signposts. (shrink)

As information technologies have become synonymous with progress in modern society, several ethical concerns have surfaced about their societal implications. In the past few decades, information technologies have had a value-laden impact on social evolution. However, there is limited agreement on the responsibility of businesses and innovators concerning the ethical aspects of information technologies. There is a need to understand the role of business incentives and attitudes in driving technological progress and to understand how they steer the ethics discourse on (...) technology. In the information technology industry, there is an observed trivialization of ethics supported by a business driven and technology-centric approach to ethics. This trivialization rests on hardened beliefs, ideologies, and arguments which hint at reduced accountability for business and tend to individualize social responsibility. The phenomenon of ethics trivialization needs to be duly addressed to resolve the tensions between business needs and ethical concerns. This paper has identified from literature and conceptually analyzed the beliefs and ideologies underlying ethics trivialization which undermine ethics in business contexts. The paper has attempted to address the business concerns indicated by this phenomenon as well as highlight the weaknesses of its assumptions, rhetoric, and justifications. The aim of this paper is to systematically present the justifications in favor of and against the practice of ethics trivialization in the information technology domain, thereby highlighting the need to develop frameworks for assessment of ethical responsibility, accountability, and democratization of the value trade-offs involved in the design of technologies. (shrink)

Shaftesbury's philosophy combined a powerfully teleological approach, according to which all things are part of a harmonious cosmic order, with sharp observations of human nature (see section 2 below). Shaftesbury is often credited with originating the moral sense theory, although his own views of virtue are a mixture of rationalism and sentimentalism (section 3). While he argued that virtue leads to happiness (section 4), Shaftesbury was a fierce opponent of psychological and ethical egoism (section 5) and of the egoistic social (...) contract theory of Hobbes (section 6). Shaftesbury advanced a view of aesthetic judgment that was non-egoistic and objectivist, in that he thought that correct aesthetic judgment was disinterested and reflected accurately the harmonious cosmic order (section 7). Shaftesbury's belief in an harmonious cosmic order also dominated his view of religion, which was based on the idea that the universe clearly exhibits signs of perfect divine design (section 8). According to Shaftesbury, the ultimate end of religion, as well as of virtue, beauty, and philosophical understanding (all of which are turn out to be one and the same thing), is to identify completely with the universal system of which one is a part. (shrink)

This is an open-access textbook designed for introduction to philosophy courses that contain a section on ethics, or for introductory courses in moral theory. In this edited work, chapter authors explore both historical and contemporary approaches to understanding and justifying moral and ethical norms. The chapters cover a wide range of topics, including moral relativism, the relationship between ethics and religion, virtue ethics in the Western and Eastern traditions, the question of self-interest and ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian deontological ethics, and recent (...) work in feminist ethics and evolutionary ethics. -/- Introduction to Philosophy: Ethics, edited by George Matthews (Plymouth State University), is one of a series of open-access textbooks for introduction to philosophy courses edited by Christina Hendricks (University of British Columbia), published with the support of The Rebus Community. (shrink)

You and I lead different lives. While we share a society and a world, our existence is separate from one another. You and I matter individually, by ourselves. My dissertation is about this simple thought. I argue that this simple insight, the separateness of persons, tells us something fundamental about morality. My dissertation seeks to answer how the separateness of persons matters. I develop a precise view of the demands of the separateness of persons. The separateness of persons imposes both (...) a requirement on the justification of first-order moral principles as well as a requirement on the content of first-order moral principles. In specifying these demands, I argue that respecting the separateness of persons requires taking into consideration each person’s point of view separately. This requires taking into account the moral relations in which individuals stand to one another. I make use of this relational understanding of the separateness of persons to advance various debates in moral and political philosophy. I argue for a framework to assess to which extent the veil of ignorance can be reconciled with the separateness of persons. I also argue for a new view on the ethics of risk which is a form of contractualism that discounts risks only by their objective risk. Furthermore, I argue for a new solution to the problem of aggregation that is skeptical of aggregation and can set plausible limits to aggregation. Lastly, I provide a new relational agent-based justification for deontological constraints. In addition to answering how the separateness of persons matters, I defend the separateness of persons against challenges. Most importantly, I argue that the importance of the separateness of persons is not undermined even if we believe that our personal identity, i.e. whether we persist as the same person, is unimportant. (shrink)

The study’s main thesis is that respect for some moral values is a condition for methodologically rational decisions, namely, decisions which do not satisfy the condition are either not methodologically rational at all, or not fully rational. The paper shows supporting arguments for the thesis in terms of the philosophical theories by Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, Tadeusz Kotarbiński, Max Weber, Jean-Paul Sartre and some other thinkers. Their presentation undergoes phenomenological analysis of the phenomenon of decision making.

El presente capítulo presenta un análisis teórico del tipo de amor que involucra la sexualidad, las altas expectativas que genera y la incertidumbre de que se cumplan. Para esclarecer el estudio se distingue entre sexualidad, impulso amoroso (“eros”) y amor propiamente dicho (“ágape”) y se echa mano de conceptos tomados de la filosofía personalista incluidos los de naturaleza, persona, racionalidad, relación y los varios tipos de amor. A final de cuentas se propone que sólo cuando se vuelve conyugal puede el (...) amor sexuado puede desarrollar su máximo potencial. (shrink)

This chapter first introduces naturalistic approaches to ethics more generally and distinguishes methodological ethical naturalism (the focus of this chapter), from metaphysical ethical naturalism. The second part then discusses evolutionary ethics as a specific variant of methodological ethical naturalism. After introducing the concepts of evolutionary theory that are relevant for evolutionary ethics, I will sketch the history of evolutionary ethics, which offers an interesting lesson about why it became a controversial topic, and then focus on four central questions about ethics (...) that can be approached from within the framework of evolutionary ethics: 1. What should we do? 2. Why are we moral? 3. Are there moral facts? 4. Can we have justified moral beliefs and moral knowledge? (shrink)

One of the core issues in contemporary political philosophy is concerned with `political obligation.' Stated in an overly simplified way, the question being asked when one investigates political obligation is, "What, if anything, do citizens owe to their government and how are these obligations generated if they do exist?" The majority of political philosophers investigating this issue agree that a political obligation is a moral requirement to act in certain ways concerning political matters. Despite this agreement about the general nature (...) of what is being searched for, a broad division has arisen between political obligation theorists - there are some who take political obligations to actually exist and there are some who take there to be no general political obligation. While there is debate within the camp defending political obligation about what it is that generates the obligations, the common core of all "defender theories" is the fundamental idea that one has a moral requirement to support and obey the political institutions of one's country. Despite utilitarianism's status as one of the major ethical theories, historically, it has largely been dismissed by theorists concerned with political obligation. Within the contemporary debate it is generally accepted that utilitarianism cannot adequately accommodate a robust theory of political obligation. The overarching objective of this dissertation is to challenge this general dismissal of a utilitarian account and to build upon the two accounts which have been developed in offering a robust utilitarian theory of political obligation which can be considered a competitor to the other contemporary theories. However, as this utilitarian account of political obligation develops, the possibility will also emerge for a non-antagonistic relationship between the utilitarian theory on offer and the contemporary political obligation debate. The moral reasons posited by the traditional theories of political obligation can be included in and accommodated by my utilitarian account. The utilitarian account of political obligation can accept that there are many types of reasons explaining why broad expectations concerning individual and group behavior are created, and each type of reason can be understood as supporting the utilitarian claim that there are moral reasons for following the laws and supporting legitimate political authorities. Taken all together, my arguments will take the form of a three tiered response to the prevailing opinion that any utilitarian attempt to account for political obligations is doomed. The first tier contends that the utilitarian can consistently claim that there are moral reasons to follow the law. This is not a particularly strong claim, but it is one which has been denied by the vast majority of political theorists. The second tier of my argument addresses this apparent issue by contending that even the traditional deontological accounts of political obligation are not offering more than this. Lastly, it is contended that, given the contingent features of humans, the strength of the utilitarian political obligations is comparable to other accounts' analyses of the obligations. (shrink)

What factors affect judicial decision-making? The legal system is of utmost importance because of its impact on our lives. Judges appear to have the most power among any social workers seeing as the precedents set in their decisions are tantamount to written law. Nevertheless, judges may be subject to certain biases, moral and cognitive alike, which influence their rulings. Looking into how morality and cognitive biases affect judges may also reveal how we as individuals handle combining morals with ethics- as (...) well as whether any discrepancies among ourselves are justifiable. An investigation into relevant moral and jurisprudential theories revealed much about the inner workings of a judge’s mindset- whether he or she recognizes it or not. Coupling this with corroborated research on a select few heuristics present specifically for judges sets the foundation for an array of possible solutions in order to ensure the most impartial judicial proceedings. Plausible remedies include conducting premortems, implicit association tests, and a revised ruling procedure. (shrink)