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Politics is rife with motivated cognition. People do not dispassionately engage with the evidence when they form political beliefs; they interpret it selectively, generating justifications for their desired conclusions and reasons why contrary evidence should be ignored. Moreover, research shows that epistemic ability (e.g. intelligence and familiarity with evidence) is correlated with motivated cognition. Bjørn Hallsson has pointed out that this raises a puzzle for the epistemology of disagreement. On the one hand, we typically think that epistemic ability in an (...) 

Disagreement is a ubiquitous feature of human life, and philosophers have dutifully attended to it. One important question related to disagreement is epistemological: How does a rational person change her beliefs (if at all) in light of disagreement from others? The typical methodology for answering this question is to endorse a steadfast or conciliatory disagreement norm (and not both) on a priori grounds and selected intuitive cases. In this paper, I argue that this methodology is misguided. Instead, a thoroughgoingly Bayesian (...) 

Assume that it is your evidence that determines what opinions you should have. I argue that since you should take peer disagreement seriously, evidence must have two features. (1) It must sometimes warrant being modest: uncertain what your evidence warrants, and (thus) uncertain whether you’re rational. (2) But it must always warrant being guided: disposed to treat your evidence as a guide. Surprisingly, it is very difficult to vindicate both (1) and (2). But diagnosing why this is so leads to (...) 

Formal epistemologists criticise the Conciliatory View of peer disagreement for being noncommutative with conditionalisation, path dependent and does not preserve the independence between propositions. Failing to commute with conditionalisation, one may switch the order between conciliating and conditionalising and obtain different outcomes. Failing to be path independent, the outcome of conciliation varies with the order of the acquisition of new testimonies. Failing to preserve the independence between propositions, one may suffer from a sureloss and hence be deemed irrational. The three (...) 

When an agent learns of an expert's credence in a proposition about which they are an expert, the agent should defer to the expert and adopt that credence as their own. This is a popular thought about how agents ought to respond to (ideal) experts. In a Bayesian framework, it is often modelled by endowing the agent with a set of priors that achieves this result. But this model faces a number of challenges, especially when applied to nonideal agents (who (...) 

When members of a group doxastically disagree with each other, decisions in the group are often hard to make. The members are supposed to find an epistemic compromise. How do members of a group reach a rational epistemic compromise on a proposition when they have different (rational) credences in the proposition? I answer the question by suggesting the FineGrained Method of Aggregation, which is introduced in Brössel and Eder 2014 and is further developed here. I show how this method faces (...) 

This model explores consensus among agents in a population in terms of two properties. The first is a probability of belief change. This value indicates how likely agents are to change their mind in interactions. The other is the size of the agents audience: the proportion of the population the agent has access to at any given time. In all instances, the agents converge on a single belief, although the agents are arational. I argue that this generates a skeptical hypothesis: (...) 

Dawid, DeGroot and Mortera showed, a quarter century ago, that any agent who regards a fellow agent as a peerin particular, defers to the fellow agent's prior credences in the same way that she defers to her ownand updates by splitthedifference is prone to diachronic incoherence. On the other hand one may show that there are special scenarios in which Bayesian updating approximates difference splitting, so it remains an important question whether it remains a viable response to ``generic" peer update. (...) 

The debate on the epistemology of disagreement has so far focused almost exclusively on cases of disagreement between individual persons. Yet, many social epistemologists agree that at least certain kinds of groups are equally capable of having beliefs that are open to epistemic evaluation. If so, we should expect a comprehensive epistemology of disagreement to accommodate cases of disagreement between group agents, such as juries, governments, companies, and the like. However, this raises a number of fundamental questions concerning what it (...) 

SupraBayesianism is the Bayesian response to learning the opinions of others. Probability pooling constitutes an alternative response. One natural question is whether there are cases where probability pooling gives the supraBayesian result. This has been called the problem of Bayescompatibility for pooling functions. It is known that in a common prior setting, under standard assumptions, linear pooling cannot be nontrivially Bayescompatible. We show by contrast that geometric pooling can be nontrivially Bayescompatible. Indeed, we show that, under certain assumptions, geometric and (...) 

This paper poses a problem for Lewis’ Principal Principle in a subjective Bayesian framework: we show that, where chances inform degrees of belief, subjective Bayesianism fails to validate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. This problem points to a tension between the Principal Principle and the claim that conditional degrees of belief are conditional probabilities. However, one version of objective Bayesianism has a straightforward resolution to this problem, because it avoids this latter claim. The problem, then, offers some support (...) 

This paper poses a problem for Lewis’ Principal Principle in a subjective Bayesian framework: we show that, where chances inform degrees of belief, subjective Bayesianism fails to validate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. This problem points to a tension between the Principal Principle and the claim that conditional degrees of belief are conditional probabilities. However, one version of objective Bayesianism has a straightforward resolution to this problem, because it avoids this latter claim. The problem, then, offers some support (...) 

In this paper we present the results of a simulation study of credence developments in groups of communicating Bayesian agents, as they update their beliefs about a given proposition p. Based on the empirical literature, one would assume that these groups of rational agents would converge on a view over time, or at least that they would not polarize. This paper presents and discusses surprising evidence that this is not true. Our simulation study shows that these groups of Bayesian agents (...) 

This paper explores the fact that linear opinion pooling can be represented as a Bayesian update on the opinions of others. It uses this fact to propose a new interpretation of the pooling weights. Relative to certain modelling assumptions the weights can be equated with the socalled truthconduciveness known from the context of Condorcet's jury theorem. This suggests a novel way to elicit the weights. 

In this paper, I provide a novel explanationist framework for thinking about peer disagreement that solves many of the puzzles regarding disagreement that have troubled epistemologists over the last two decades. Explanationism is the view that a subject is justified in believing a proposition just in case that proposition is part of the best explanation of that subject’s total evidence. Applying explanationism to the problem of peer disagreement yields the following principle: in cases of peer disagreement, the thing that the (...) 

While many philosophers have agreed that evidence of disagreement is a kind of higherorder evidence, this has not yet resulted in formally precise higherorder approaches to the problem of disagreement. In this paper, we outline a simple formal framework for determining the epistemic significance of a body of higherorder evidence, and use this framework to motivate a novel interpretation of the popular “equal weight view” of peer disagreement—we call it the Variably Equal Weight View (VEW). We show that VEW differs (...) 

This paper is about how to aggregate outside opinion. If two experts are on one side of an issue, while three experts are on the other side, what should a nonexpert believe? Certainly, the nonexpert should take into account more than just the numbers. But which other factors are relevant, and why? According to the view developed here, one important factor is whether the experts should have been expected, in advance, to reach the same conclusion. When the agreement of two (...) 